The Jericho Option: Al-Qa'ida and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure by Ackerman, G. et al.
 The Jericho Option: 
Al-Qa’ida and Attacks on 
Critical Infrastructure 
A report by the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies, a division of the 
Akribis Group 
 
UCRL-SR-224072 
UCRL-SR-224072 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, 
makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, 
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that 
its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, 
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or 
imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of 
California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the 
United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product 
endorsement purposes. 
 
Auspices 
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Jericho Option*: 
Al-Qa`ida and Attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
June 8, 2006 
 
 
 
* “When the trumpets sounded, the people shouted, and at the sound of the 
trumpet, when the people gave a loud shout, the wall collapsed; so every 
man charged straight in, and they took the city.” (Joshua 6:21) 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL HEAD OFFICE 
227 DEVCON DRIVE, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95112 U.S.A 
PHONE: (831) 233-2220  FAX: (408) 937-7679 
EMAIL: ACKERMAN@CETISRESEARCH.ORG 
Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies 
 
A Division of the Akribis Group 
 
 
 
The Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), an 
independent division of the Akribis Group, is a research center 
dedicated to identifying, better comprehending, and accurately 
assessing the present and future security threats stemming from a 
variety of violence-prone extremists and their enablers. In an effort to 
improve existing scholarship, inform policy, and provide guidance 
about these important, specialized, and often arcane topics, CETIS 
undertakes in-depth, cutting-edge research and prepares innovative 
analyses of terrorist groups, clandestine and covert operations, and 
political and religious extremism. 
  
The Center brings together a unique group of scholars and analysts in 
order to investigate both existing and emerging asymmetrical and 
unconventional threats. CETIS currently receives project funding 
from a variety of sources, including scientific and academic 
foundations, government subcontractors, non-governmental 
organizations, private sector companies, and individual benefactors.  
 
CETIS Core Project Team 
 
Gary Ackerman, Director 
Charles Blair, Deputy Director 
Jeffrey M. Bale, Research Director  
Gordon M. Hahn, Senior Researcher  
Elle DiLorenzo, Researcher 
Sundara Vadlamudi, Researcher 
Christopher Lunsford, Research Assistant 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The contents of this report are based solely on the views of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the
Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, the Akribis Group,
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, or the United States 
Department of Homeland Security.  ii
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................vi 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION....................................................................1
CHAPTER TWO: WHY TARGET CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?........8 
Defining Critical Infrastructure....................................................................... 8 
General Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure....... 11 
CHAPTER THREE: AL-QA`IDA’S EVOLUTION AND JIHADIST 
STRATEGY................................................................................................................. 20 
The Evolution of the al-Qa`ida Organization ............................................ 20 
Al-Qa`ida’s Strategic Thinking and the Question of Critical 
Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLORING HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS 
LINKS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ................................................... 75 
Religious Referents for Attacks on Critical Infrastructure........................ 75 
Islamic Historical Precedents for Attacks on Critical Infrastructure ...... 82 
CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT THEY SAY – AL-QA`IDA’S CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY AS REVEALED THROUGH ITS 
STATEMENTS........................................................................................................... 91 
The Attitudes of Al-Qa`ida’s Leaders .......................................................... 93 
Al-Qa`ida “Strategic Studies” Literature.................................................... 102 
CHAPTER SIX: CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE .............................................................................................. 116 
Al-Qa`ida Attack Planning........................................................................... 116 
Critical Infrastructure Targets ..................................................................... 118 
Al-Qa`ida’s Capabilities for Attacking Critical Infrastructure ................ 138 
CHAPTER SEVEN: AL-QA`IDA-LINKED TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.. 140 
Successful al-Qa`ida Critical Infrastructure Attacks in Europe, Asia, and 
the Middle East & North Africa ................................................................. 142 
Unsuccessful Critical Infrastructure Attacks Outside the U.S. .............. 155 
Analysis and Indications of Changing Trends .......................................... 166 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CASE STUDIES OF PRIOR AL-QA`IDA-LINKED 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS ON U.S. SOIL..................... 169 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing (Ramzi Yusuf and “Nusayr 
Cell”) ............................................................................................................... 169 
1993 Tunnel and Bridge Plot ...................................................................... 178 
Ahmad Rassam and the December 1999 “Millenium Plot”................... 193 
The September 11, 2001 “Planes Operation” .......................................... 208 
The Ayman Faris Case: Al-Qa`ida Preparations to Attack a New York 
City Bridge and Derail Trains...................................................................... 221 
False “al-Qa`ida” Claims of Responsibility for Accidental Critical 
Infrastructure Disasters................................................................................ 222 
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION.................................................................... 226 
APPENDIX A: AL-QA`IDA CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK 
CHRONOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 241 
APPENDIX B: CETIS CORE PROJECT TEAM........................................... 253 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 257 
 
 
 iv
  
TABLE OF FigureS 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Al-Qa`ida’s Four-Tiered Structure.................................................. 24
FIGURE 3.2. Al-Qa`ida Majlis Al-Shura & Committees .................................... 26 
FIGURE 7.1: Successful Al-Qa`ida Related CI Attacks: by Region................ 141 
FIGURE 7.2: Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: Middle East & North Africa by Country . 151 
FIGURE 7.3: Al-Qa`ida Successful CI Attacks: Middle East & North Africa 
by Country and Group.............................................................................................. 154 
FIGURE 7.4: Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: Middle East & North Africa by Country 
and Group (Excluding Iraq) .................................................................................... 155 
FIGURE 7.5: Successful Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: Europe, Asia and The Middle 
East & North Africa by Year................................................................................... 167 
FIGURE 7.6: Successful Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: Europe, Asia and The Middle 
East & North Africa by Year (Excluding Iraq).................................................... 167 
FIGURE 7.7: Successful Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: Asia by Group and Region 168 
 
 
TABLE 6.1: Capability Requirements for Attacking Specific Critical 
Infrastructure Sectors ................................................................................................ 121 
TABLE 9.1: Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment Analysis ......................... 232 
 
 
BOX 6.1: Al-Qa`ida Capabilities and 9/11........................................................... 135 
BOX 6.2: The July 7, 2005 London Bombings.................................................... 137 
BOX 7.1: The Madrid Train Attacks ..................................................................... 143 
BOX 7.2: The Macedonian Consulate in Pakistan.............................................. 148 
BOX 7.3: Saudi Arabia’s Abqa`iq Oil Facility Attack ......................................... 156 
BOX 7.4: Saudi Hijacking Plot: “This is our 9/11” ............................................ 159 
BOX 7.5: Operation Bojinka................................................................................... 163 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
  
Executive Summary 
 
 
 
here is no doubt that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates have displayed, 
and continue to display, an acute interest in attacking targets that 
are considered to be important components of the infrastructure of 
the United States. What has not thus far been carried out, however, is an 
in-depth examination of the basic nature, historical evolution, and 
present scope of the organization’s objectives that might help 
government personnel develop sound policy recommendations and 
analytical indicators to assist in detecting and interdicting plots of this 
nature. This study was completed with the financial support of the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, through a project sponsored 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology 
Directorate. It is specifically intended to increase counterterrorism 
analysts’ understanding of certain features of al-Qa`ida’s strategy and 
operations in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of attacks 
directed against our most critical infrastructures. 
T 
 
The procedure adopted herein has involved consulting a wide variety of 
source materials that bear on the topic, ranging from sacred religious 
texts and historical accounts to al-Qa`ida-linked materials and the 
firsthand testimony of captured members of the group. It has also 
intentionally combined multiple approaches, including exploring the 
more esoteric religio-historical referents that have served to influence al-
Qa`ida’s behavior, providing a strategic analysis of its objectives and 
targeting rationales, closely examining the statements and writings of al-
Qa`ida leaders and spokesmen (in part on the basis of material translated 
from primary sources), offering a descriptive analysis of its past global 
attack patterns, and producing concise but nonetheless in-depth case 
studies of its previous “infrastructural” attacks on U.S. soil.   
 
The analyses contained herein tend to support the preliminary 
assessment made by some of the authors in an earlier report, namely, that 
transnational jihadist organizations are amongst the extremist groups that 
are most likely to carry out successful attacks against targets that U.S. 
officials would categorize as elements of this country’s critical 
infrastructure. These networks clearly have the operational capabilities to 
conduct these types of attacks, even on a large scale, and they display a 
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number of ideological proclivities that may incline them to attack such 
targets. Although this seems self-evident, this study has also yielded 
more detailed insights into the behavior and orientation of al-Qa`ida and 
its affiliated networks. The remainder of this Executive Summary 
provides a precis of the information found in the successive chapters of 
the full report.  
 
 
Chapter One introduces and explains the four basic “framing 
questions” that were selected for the purpose of guiding research and 
analysis of al-Qa`ida’s attitudes towards critical infrastructure, namely: 
 
1. Does al-Qa`ida perceive “infrastructure” or “critical 
infrastructure” as a separate species of target distinct 
from other target types? 
2. To what extent do al-Qa`ida’s ideology, strategy and 
tactics cause the group to purposely target “critical 
infrastructure” or elements of what are considered 
critical infrastructure by the United States 
Government? 
3. Do recent trends in al-Qa`ida statements and behavior 
signify a major shift in the group’s strategy with 
respect to critical infrastructure? 
4. Can we learn anything about al-Qa`ida tactics and 
operations that would be useful in a counterterrorism 
context should al-Qa`ida or its affiliates target critical 
infrastructure? 
 
 
Chapter Two contains a brief introduction to the concept of critical 
infrastructure and discusses general terrorist motivations for targeting it. 
The concept of critical infrastructure and the systems this term was 
thought to encompass progressed through a number of iterations in the 
U.S., both before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
This process culminated in the draft National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) of 2005. The NIPP brought together previous definitions 
and codified the U.S. definition of critical infrastructure as: 
 
Systems, assets, or functions, whether physical or virtual, 
publicly or privately owned, that are used by or provide 
benefit to the public and are so vital to the U.S. that the 
exploitation, destruction, or incapacitation of such systems, 
assets, or functions would have a debilitating impact on 
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security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters. 
 
Before turning to al-Qa`ida’s specific orientation towards infrastructural 
targets, it is instructive to highlight three points relevant to terrorist 
motivations, in the most general sense, for attacking critical 
infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on the factors that influence the 
terrorist target selection process.  
 
First, basic threat assessments should be based on the consideration of 
three factors: the value of the target (or negative value, in the sense of the 
amount of harm expected if the target is attacked), the vulnerability of the 
target, and the likelihood of an attack on it. The likelihood of attack in turn 
depends upon both the motivations and capabilities of the attacker.  
 
Unlike the capabilities of a terrorist group, which can mostly be measured 
in terms of its available resources, broadly defined, the motivations of a 
terrorist group are much more difficult to clarify, let alone represent or 
measure. Not surprisingly, many threat analyses focus primarily if not 
exclusively on the vulnerability and value of the target and the capabilities 
of terrorist groups for attacking it, in the process ignoring or 
underestimating the relevance of the motivations of those terrorist groups. 
As a result, all terrorist groups possessing similar capabilities are assumed 
to be equally willing and able to attack all highly vulnerable targets of 
proportionate value. Such a focus on more or less “tangible” factors tends 
to produce worst-case scenarios, an emphasis that can in turn result in the 
gross misallocation of available resources.  
 
Second, it is important to examine the factors influencing the target 
selection process of terrorist groups. The key factors that influence their 
target selection process can be organized into three broad categories: 
Group Factors, External Factors, and Decision-Making Factors. Each of 
these categories contains several relevant sub-factors that are considered 
more fully in the Chapter and are listed below:  
 
Group Factors: Ideology; Organizational Structure; Organizational 
Dynamics; Organizational Lifecycle status (a terrorist group’s maturity); 
Demographics; Resources; and Operational Capabilities; 
 
External Factors: Historical Context, Events, and Precedents; Relations 
with External Actors (such as sympathizers and supporters, the mass 
media, the general public, other extremist and criminal groups, and the 
 viii
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state apparatus); the Security Environment; and Target Characteristics 
(in the current case the characteristics of critical infrastructure); and 
 
Decision-Making factors: General Planning Characteristics (such as 
decision-maker time horizons and risk thresholds); Perceptual Filter 
(how decision-makers perceive information obtained from outside the 
group); Operational Objectives (what a terrorist group hopes to achieve 
from its attacks); and Attack Modalities (the methods and techniques a 
terrorist group employs to attack targets).   
 
Each of the sub-factors listed above, in combination with others, exerts 
varying degrees of influence on a particular group’s target selection 
process. 
 
Third, the conclusions of a previously conducted study, which comprised 
both a quantitative analysis of prior attacks on critical infrastructure and 
qualitative case studies of particular terrorist groups that have in the past 
focused on targeting critical infrastructure, reveal important information 
on trends in terrorist motivations. 
 
This research indicates that terrorist groups generally attack 
infrastructure because: 1) they want to destroy certain important 
facilities; 2) they feel that they can obtain more publicity or external 
support than if they had attacked non-infrastructural targets; 3) they can 
cause even larger number of casualties – or avoid causing casualties 
altogether – by attacking such facilities; 4) the symbolic value of 
infrastructural targets is often greater than that of other targets; or 5) for 
a complex combination of general and very specific reasons. As one 
would expect, therefore, there is no single explanation that is applicable 
to all the prior cases of attacks on critical infrastructure. 
 
Past trends indicated that secular left- or right-wing groups with utopian 
ideologies and religious groups have conducted the majority of attacks 
against critical infrastructure worldwide. The relative absence of 
operationally efficient secular utopian terrorist groups in the U.S., 
coupled with the increasing incidence of attacks by religious groups, 
suggests that there are three categories of terrorist groups that may have 
the highest disposition to attack U.S. critical infrastructure targets in the 
future: 1) transnational jihadist groups, 2) domestic right-wing “militias,” 
and 3) the most violent fringes of the radical ecology movement. 
 
Of the three categories of groups that are most likely to seek to conduct 
attacks against critical infrastructure, jihadist terrorist groups possess 
 ix
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both the ideological proclivities and the necessary operational 
capabilities to perpetrate large-scale critical infrastructure attacks. In 
terms of absolute numbers, groups generally classified as “religious” 
have accounted for roughly 73% of all casualties and 35% of all fatalities 
for confirmed major critical infrastructure attacks. If both major and 
minor attacks are included, the data reveal that these groups have 
accounted for 62% of all casualties, with the vast majority of these 
casualties being caused by groups in the “Islamic” subcategory. These 
statistics lend preliminary support to a worrisome hypothesis – that 
religious terrorist groups are more likely than other groups to mix critical 
infrastructure attacks with mass casualty attacks. 
 
 
Chapter Three considers the organizational evolution of al-Qa`ida 
and explores the group's general “strategic” objectives and rationales in 
order that this knowledge can inform the remainder of the analysis. The 
chapter begins by examining al-Qa`ida’s four-tiered organizational 
structure: 1) the al-Qa`ida leadership group, 2) the al-Qa`ida rank and 
file, 3) other jihadist terrorist groups throughout the world that are 
affiliated in some way with al-Qa`ida, and 4) ostensibly independent 
cells whose members have been inspired by Usama bin Ladin’s 
ideology. This structure, however, has evolved markedly since the 9/11 
attacks. In October 2001, following the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, the U.S. attacked 
Afghanistan, removed the Taliban regime, and destroyed al-Qa`ida’s safe 
sanctuaries in that country. As a result, al-Qa`ida lost much of its original 
organizational infrastructure, and many of its cadres were either killed, 
captured, or dispersed during the campaign. In looking at the 
organization’s evolution since 9/11, three broad trends have become 
apparent. First, al-Qa`ida has adopted an increasingly decentralized 
organizational structure as a result of the loss of its sanctuaries in 
Afghanistan and other countries. Second, al-Qa`ida has suffered 
significant financial losses. Since 9/11, group assets worth more than 
$120 million have been frozen. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Bin 
Ladin and other al-Qa`ida leaders have recast the organization as an 
international Islamic insurgent movement and have helped to spawn an 
unknown number of jihadist cells that adhere to its worldview and 
objectives, but which may or may not have any organic organizational or 
logistical connection with the core group and do not have to be 
subsidized by the latter’s own resources.  
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It is evident, therefore, that the initial phases of the “war on terrorism” 
succeeded in destroying al-Qa`ida’s original infrastructure in 
Afghanistan and severely disrupting its worldwide operational and 
support networks. However, the group has managed to survive the 
international campaign directed against it by adopting a more flexible 
organizational structure. During the past four years, aided by the Internet 
and the periodic appearance of audio and video messages from Bin 
Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qa`ida spokemen, the 
organization has been transformed into more of an international 
movement than a terrorist group in the narrowest sense of that term. The 
net impact of the U.S.-led war on terrorism on al-Qa`ida’s ability to carry 
out large-scale attacks against the U.S. homeland remains unclear. 
 
In terms of the group’s strategic reasoning, assessing the degree to which 
al-Qa`ida is interested in targeting critical infrastructure, whether on 
American soil or overseas, is a difficult proposition. First of all, the 
pattern of al-Qa`ida attacks, to the extent that such a pattern exists and is 
discernable, has not only evolved over time but must be viewed from the 
enemy’s own point of view. Second, al-Qa`ida’s proclaimed rationales 
for carrying out its terrorist assaults, both those that it has launched in the 
past and those that it threatens to make in the future, can rarely if ever be 
taken at face value. These intrinsic problems have been further 
compounded because intelligence and military analysts in the U.S. and 
Europe who are charged with comprehending and interdicting jihadist 
terrorism have all too often employed entirely secular, materialistic types 
of reasoning and exclusively Western military frames of reference, above 
all – whether consciously or not – certain ideas derived from well-known 
nineteenth-century military theorists such as the Prussian officer Carl 
von Clausewitz (1780-1831), in an effort to explain what it is that al-
Qa`ida is currently up to.  
 
As is described in more detail in the full chapter, influential terrorism 
analysts cannot even agree on the most basic of questions: the extent to 
which al-Qa`ida’s objectives may be considered realistic and therefore 
realizable. Some view al-Qa`ida, through the prism of a conventional 
Western military perspective, as an essentially rational strategic actor, 
whereas others argue that the group and its leaders are essentially 
irrational. Still others seek to forge a middle ground by arguing that 
although al-Qa`ida may be said to operate more or less rationally as 
opposed to completely irrationally, it does so primarily within the 
restrictive confines of a basically non-rational theological framework. 
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The key point that needs to be emphasized is that, far from accepting 
modern Western conceptions of international law, which presuppose “the 
existence of a family of nations composed of a community of states 
enjoying full sovereign rights and equality of status” – the leaders of al-
Qa`ida instead adhere to what they consider – quite rightly – to be 
authentically Islamic conceptions. Indeed, despite their often intimate 
familiarity with the functioning of complex modern Western societies, as 
well as their willingness to adopt modern technology and their penchant 
for periodically employing modern-sounding “anti-imperialist” rhetoric 
of the sort normally associated the secular revolutionary left and right, 
the jihadists are essentially living in a seventh-century mental universe.  
 
Bin Ladin’s ultimate aims are to unite the Muslim umma, restore the 
power and glory of the Caliphate, and secure the triumph of the dar al-
islam over the dar al-kufr. He recognizes, however, that this objective 
cannot be achieved until a truly Islamic state is established in the heart of 
the Muslim world and until the power of the United States is undermined 
and destroyed, two objectives that are viewed as closely interrelated. 
What, then, is al-Qa`ida’s basic strategy for accomplishing its ultimate 
objectives? Since at least the mid-1990s, its principal aim has been to 
precipitate a titanic “conflict of civilizations” between the Islamic world 
and the West, and in the process create a global Islamic insurgent 
movement that even the unmatched power and vast resources of America 
would be unable to cope with or quell. In order to accomplish this 
preliminary aim, al-Qa`ida has carried out a series of provocative attacks 
marked by increasing lethality, culminating in the 9/11 attacks, that were 
intended to goad the United States into launching a massive attack on the 
Islamic world, which would only serve to confirm Bin Ladin’s long-
standing claims that the “Great Satan” and its allies were waging a war 
against Islam. An incautious, brutal response by the U.S. military would 
in turn hopefully have the effect of arousing the increasingly angry 
Muslim masses from their slumber and compelling them at long last to 
answer al-Qa`ida’s call to wage a “defensive jihad” against the invading 
“infidels,” who could then be more plausibly portrayed as trying to 
militarily subjugate the dar al-islam and directly exploit its resources. 
 
Irrespective of whether its leaders always display a coherent and realistic 
“strategic” vision, which is not in fact the case, al-Qa`ida has repeatedly 
shown itself to be devastatingly effective on the operational and 
“tactical” levels. Indeed, it is precisely this combination of 1) delusional, 
utopian, and non-negotiable goals, which ultimately derive from a 
theologically-based and fanatical “fantasy ideology,” and 2) a ruthless 
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operational efficiency capable of causing tremendous damage, that 
makes al-Qa`ida such a dangerous and formidable adversary.  
 
In the final analysis, there is one seemingly insurmountable difficulty 
that faces any state or society which is confronted by hostile, violence-
prone religious extremists: their stubborn maintenance of faith that their 
agendas and actions are “divinely-sanctioned,” even in the face of 
looming defeat and disaster. To the extent that they are absolutely 
convinced that God is on their side and that the enemy is inherently evil 
and ungodly, they are unusually hard to deter or permanently undermine 
the morale of. 
 
 
Chapter Four traces various religious and historical referents that 
might inform al-Qa`ida's attitudes towards critical infrastructure. In the 
case of the jihadists, it is critical to analyze Islam’s original sources 
since, unlike more mainstream and traditionalist Islamic doctrines, 
jihadist thinkers promote opening the “doors of ijtihad” by returning 
almost exclusively to the Qur’an and ahadith as arbiters of the precepts 
of Islam. Most jihadists believe that all they need to know at all times – 
including in the realms of military strategy and tactics – is divinely laid 
out in Qur’anic revelations and embodied in the sunna (customary 
practices) of Muhammad, as interpreted by radical ideologues. Hence, 
for them “any action associated with jihad – when to fight, how to fight, 
what sort of treaties to conclude with the enemy – must find some 
support from the texts.” This makes it a necessity to examine the extent 
to which the original precepts of Islam – as they appear in the Qur’an 
and ahadith and have been interpreted by the jihadists – provide al-
Qa`ida with incentives, justifications, or possibly even constraints on 
targeting critical infrastructure. 
 
One can never be absolutely certain which religious referents al-Qa`ida’s 
ideologues will use to guide or justify any particular action. Yet even 
without claiming any special insights into the particular religio-historical 
analogies flitting inside the heads of al-Qa`ida’s operational chiefs, it is 
possible to discuss several elements within sacred Islamic texts and 
religious thinking that might influence their targeting decisions vis-à-vis 
critical infrastructure.  
 
First, it should be noted that jihadists view Allah as “the true owner of all 
property, and man is allowed to use it only when he does so in an 
Islamically correct way.” There is therefore no inherent respect for 
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private or state property if the erstwhile owners are seen to be acting un-
Islamically. Islamic laws governing the conduct of war, many of which 
are interpreted in the mainstream as specifically precluding attacks on 
certain elements of an enemy’s infrastructure, are often circumscribed by 
the current incarnation of jihadists and are therefore unlikely to dissuade 
them from attacking critical infrastructure.  Furthermore, verses can be 
found in the Qur’an that specifically allude to human-built spaces in the 
context of death or violence. These include Sura 2:190, which prescribes 
that under certain circumstances (namely, when acting in self-defense), 
the forces of Islam are even allowed to enter the most holy of places to 
fight their enemies – “Kill them wherever you find them and turn them 
out from where they have turned you out, for fitna is worse than killing, 
but do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. 
But if they fight you, kill them. Such is the reward of the unbelievers.” 
Even more telling is the following verse from the Sura al-Nisa’ (The 
Women): “Wherever you are, death will find you out. Even if you are in 
towers built up strong and high” (4:78). While Qur’anic verses like these 
and others noted in the full chapter may be interpreted by the Islamic 
mainstream in a way which bears no connection at all to critical 
infrastructure, it is not difficult to see how the jihadists of al-Qa`ida 
could find in such verses either a prescription, or at the very least a 
justification, for attacking their enemies’ societal edifices, which in 
modern times could easily be equated with the very systems and assets 
we conceive of as critical infrastructure. 
 
Moreover, al-Qa`ida’s leaders subscribe to the doctrine of retaliation in 
kind, at the same time perceiving the West as primarily responsible for 
the Islamic world’s economic woes (through colonization and neo-
imperialism), and specifically for the destruction of particular 
infrastructural targets (such as occurred in Iraq in both the first and 
second Gulf Wars and during the intervening years of sanctions). Insofar 
as they believe that the United States is at fault for harming Muslim 
societal and economic infrastructure, this may provide an incentive for 
them to attack their perceived American equivalents. 
 
Just as a particular selection of religious referents serve to inform al-
Qa`ida’s religious, political, and social philosophies and prescriptions, so 
too do historical precedents in Islamic warfare and jihad from the era of 
the Prophet, the immediate post-Muhammad centuries, and even more 
modern experiences. This is not to say, necessarily, that al-Qa`ida will 
behave as other Arabs and Muslims have in the past. It is to say, 
however, that historical referents are important in Arab and Muslim 
culture and that various al-Qa`ida planners of today might well derive 
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inspiration (whether positive or negative) from past Islamic methods of 
warfare and rebellion.  
 
As Mary Habeck points out, even jihadists’ theoretical explanations for 
Islam’s failure to restore the Caliphate are based largely on a return to 
ancient theological-ideological roots and a view of “history as a series of 
repetitious events” in which the struggle against the Pharoah, the Mongol 
conquest, and especially the Crusades are “templates” upon which the 
present war against the West is laid out and interpreted. 
 
Usama bin Ladin’s repeated incantations regarding the West as 
‘Crusaders’ is the most frequently made and obvious such reference, but 
there are many others. His deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, 
suggested in his July 2005 letter to Iraq’s leading al-Qa`ida terrorist, Abu 
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, that the present-day battle to establish “a caliphate in 
the manner of the Prophet” is prophesied: “I want to be the first to 
congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting 
battle in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for 
major battles in Islam’s history…and what will happen, according to 
what appeared in the Hadiths of the Messenger of God about the epic 
battles between Islam and atheism.”  
 
Even at the tactical level, historical referents occur in al-Qa`ida’s 
discourse. A pertinent example of how this occurs in practice is when al-
Qa`ida drew a parallel between the successful use of trebuchets as heavy 
weapons by Muslim forces to conquer the high-walled city of Ta`if in 
630 CE and the use of airplanes to attack American buildings in the 9/11 
attacks. Even al-Qa`ida technical documents such as training manuals are 
replete with references to general propositions, such as the need to 
maintain the sort of secrecy, discipline, discretion, and the like that had 
been urged by Prophet Muhammad and both his more immediate and 
contemporary successors, as a means of supporting the rationale behind 
basic intelligence gathering, recruiting, military, and terrorist principles, 
if not methodologies. Attacking critical infrastructure could be a similar 
means by which al-Qa`ida can undermine the West’s economic stability, 
its military capacity, and even its very way of life.   
  
There is no doubt that Muhammad targeted the economic base and 
infrastructure of his new faith’s enemies with both his words and deeds. 
The Prophet Mohammad’s first forays into battle were attacks on the 
caravans that functioned as the “infrastructure,” indeed the lifeline, of 
ancient desert city-states’ food and other supplies. Muhammad also 
destroyed his enemies’ fruit-trees that were an essential source of food 
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sustenance and of protection from the deadly desert sun, though there 
remains a debate among Islamic scholars to this day as to what 
circumstances permit such an act.  
 
Islamic historical precedents long after Muhammad can be found for al-
Qa`ida’s endeavors to undermine the functioning of, or even destroy, key 
systems and infrastructures. Based on the Prophet’s founding example, 
Muslim forces in both the early caliphal conquests of pagan lands and in 
intra-Islamic wars attacked enemy supply caravans. There are also 
numerous instances in which ancient Islamic armies poisoned or otherwise 
destroyed the water resources of their enemies. Attacks on infrastructure 
continued into modern times. The legendary T.E. Lawrence “of Arabia” 
relayed numerous instances of both the Ottoman Turks and his Arab 
legions plundering caravans and blowing up trains, railroads, bridges, 
and telegraph installations.  
 
The Algerian revolution against French rule in the 1950s can be regarded 
as the first jihad to have taken place amidst modern material culture and 
infrastructure. The Algerian rebels’ remarkably well-coordinated 
campaign saw hundreds of bombings, arsons, and other forms of attack 
on almost every form of infrastructure from telephone and telegraph 
lines, to power transmitters and food supplies. During the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988), both belligerents sought to destroy the other side’s oil 
production and export infrastructures. In the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-
1989), the mujahidin destroyed bridges, tunnels, and power transmission 
lines in addition to schools and health centers, which were viewed as 
places of Soviet indoctrination. Since al-Qa`ida emerged in part from the 
Afghan war and mujahidin milieu, these historical precedents may have 
a stronger salience among today’s al-Qa`ida and its affiliates. 
 
The link between religious and historical precedents, on the one hand, 
and target selection, on the other, is a significant and persistent one in the 
case of al-Qa`ida. Therefore, the numerous religious and historical 
elements that might be interpreted as justifying, prompting, or providing 
tactical guidance for attacks on critical infrastructure targets must be 
consistently borne in mind during efforts to protect America’s critical 
infrastructure.  Ignoring such justifications by the jihadists themselves 
could be a fatal mistake, since they claim to have selected every strategy 
and tactic from the examples set by the Muhammad and other “rightly-
guided” Muslim leaders. 
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Chapter Five examines various statements by al-Qa`ida and its 
affiliates relating to critical infrastructure, and on this basis provides a 
general analysis of how targeting critical infrastructure fits into al-
Qa`ida's broader strategic outlook.  
 
There is voluminous evidence indicating that al-Qa`ida desires and fully 
intends to damage the American economy, which it sees both as highly 
vulnerable and as the foundation of U.S. military and political power. In 
part this is because, ideologically speaking, the group perceives the U.S. 
as a crass, greedy, materialistic society whose morally corrupt members 
care only about their own economic well-being. For that very reason, al-
Qa`ida is convinced that inflicting heavy damage on the American 
economy is the best way to exert an impact on the attitudes and behavior 
of both the elites and the masses within the U.S. The importance of 
attacking “Crusader” economic targets has been repeatedly emphasized 
by Bin Ladin himself, and at various times al-Zawahiri and other al-
Qa`ida leaders have also stressed the value of attacking Western 
economies. These exhortations by Bin Ladin and his lieutenants contain 
several recurrent themes, including 1) that the U.S., despite all of its 
apparent power, is a “paper tiger” that can be defeated militarily, just as 
the Soviet superpower was defeated by the mujahidin in Afghanistan; 2) 
that damaging the economy is one of the best ways to defeat the U.S., 
since this will serve to undermine its military power; and 3) that 
attacking the oil infrastructure and driving up the price of oil is one of 
the best ways to weaken the American economy. 
 
Despite the obvious awareness among al-Qa`ida leaders and strategists of 
the importance of attacking economic targets in the U.S. and the West, what 
is surprising is that there are apparently only a relatively small number of 
articles and treatises that are devoted exclusively to discussing infrastructure 
in this regard (with the exception of the oil infrastructure). Indeed, there 
seems to be little or no discussion of critical infrastructure in al-Qa`ida 
materials and other jihadist literature, at least in the specific technical sense 
in which people in the West – especially officials charged with protecting it 
– employ that term.  
 
This seems to confirm that al-Qa`ida has no clear understanding of 
critical infrastructure in the Western sense, much less a coherent strategy 
for attacking critical infrastructure qua critical infrastructure. Still less 
does the group, at least in its public exhortations, seem to grasp the 
potential advantages of making compound attacks on critical 
infrastructure, i.e., using certain components of the infrastructure to 
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disrupt or destroy other key infrastructural elements. What al-Qa`ida 
does possess, however, is a strong desire to harm the economy of the 
United States and the West, and an increasingly sophisticated awareness 
that effectively targeting the oil infrastructure in the Gulf States will 
create serious economic burdens and dislocations in all of the world’s 
industrialized societies, none of which are part of the relatively 
underdeveloped dar al-islam. 
 
In sum, based on an analysis of the group’s statements and manuals, 
there is an acute danger that al-Qa`ida will instigate, sponsor, and/or 
directly organize more and more attacks on vital oil facilities and 
pipelines, and that it will continue to attack sensitive infrastructural 
targets such as buildings, bridges, roadways, tunnels, and airports, places 
where large numbers of people tend to congregate. However, as in the 
past, such attacks are likely to be carried out for a multiplicity of reasons 
– to strike symbolically significant political, military, or cultural targets, 
kill large numbers of “infidels,” physically destroy property, traumatize 
and frighten enemy civilians, rally and embolden Islamist supporters, 
and cause tangible economic damage – rather than simply to disrupt or 
destroy infrastructure in the narrowest sense of that term. 
 
 
Chapter Six offers a preliminary analysis of al-Qa`ida's capabilities 
with respect to attacks on critical infrastructure. Al-Qa`ida has already 
demonstrated its flexible and adaptive nature as a terrorist organization 
and its ability to conduct a wide range of attacks, including those on 
critical infrastructure targets, such as the Kenyan and Tanzanian 
embassies and the World Trade Center towers. In order to review al-
Qa`ida’s capabilities in more detail, this section first examines the 
development and execution of al-Qa`ida’s attack planning. This is 
followed by a discussion of critical infrastructure targets and the range of 
baseline capability attributes necessary to make successful attacks on 
those targets. 
  
The six capability categories below are examined in the context of the 
requirements necessary for attacking various infrastructure sectors, 
followed by a discussion of the current capability levels possessed by al-
Qa`ida:  
 
1. Physical and Logistical Resources  
2. Weapons 
3. Financial Resources 
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4. Ability to innovate/Technology Levels/Skill sets  
5. Familiarity with the target environment 
6. Communication 
 
The evaluation of these capability requirements suggests that the 
capability levels required to attack most critical infrastructure targets 
under current levels of protection are sufficiently low to allow most 
fairly operationally sophisticated terrorist groups to conduct such attacks. 
While an exact measure of al-Qa`ida’s capabilities in these areas is not 
currently quantifiable, a general calculation of its abilities supports the 
view that al-Qa`ida is capable of attacking a broad cross-section of 
critical infrastructure targets. It should also be remembered that large-
scale attacks along the lines of the 9/11 attacks are not always necessary 
to further al-Qa`ida’s short- or long-term goals. More recent attacks, 
such as the Bali bombings and the London subway bombings, may have 
lacked the scope and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks, but they were 
nonetheless successfully completed operations that returned al-Qa`ida to 
the forefront of political debate and the public eye. After all, even 
relatively small-scale attacks, while perhaps not optimal in the eyes 
ofcertain al-Qa`ida leaders, can further al-Qa`ida’s goals of inciting fear 
in the West and slowly weakening the economic strength of Western 
nations. 
 
 
Chapter Seven presents both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis 
of past al-Qa`ida attacks outside the United States, in order to provide 
context for and additional details about the ways in which al-Qa`ida 
might carry out attacks against American-based infrastructure. To 
accomplish this, the Chapter provides a quantitative assessment of 
successful al-Qa`ida critical infrastructure attacks in Europe, Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa, combined with a more in-depth 
examination of certain notable attacks. Assessing the frequency of al-
Qa`ida-related attacks on critical infrastructure outside the United States 
is complicated by the insurgency in Iraq, since it is often difficult to 
discern which groups are responsible for carrying out particular attacks, 
and which attacks technically fall into the insurgent category rather than 
the narrower terrorist category. If Iraq is excluded from the total, it is 
possible to draw three inferences from the data. First, Europe is now 
clearly being targeted by al-Qa`ida-linked groups. Second, of the four 
sub-regions of Asia – Central, South, Southeast, and East – South Asia is 
the locus of more al-Qa`ida-related critical infrastructure attacks than 
any other sub-region. Given the neuralgic regional context, it is likely 
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that this trend will continue. Finally, if Iraq is discounted, Saudi Arabia 
and Algeria lead all other states in al-Qa`ida-related critical 
infrastructure attacks in the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
The chapter also investigates al-Qa`ida attacks targeting critical 
infrastructure components that were ultimately deemed unsuccessful, 
either because the attacks failed, were foiled, or otherwise were 
abandoned.  
 
Finally, the chapter offers a comparative overview of al-Qa`ida’s attack 
trends against critical infrastructure, both outside of and within the 
United States. Although al-Qa`ida’s attacks against U.S. critical 
infrastructure have been devastating in their effects, successful attacks 
against critical infrastructure targets in America constitute just under 3 
percent of all infrastructural attacks perpetrated by the group and its 
affiliates. In comparison to the five North American al-Qa`ida critical 
infrastructure attacks, which are detailed in the full study, al-Qa`ida has 
carried out successful attacks against critical infrastructural sectors in 
Europe (3 attacks), Asia (10 attacks), and the Middle East and North 
Africa (147 attacks).  
 
 
Chapter Eight examines prior al-Qa`ida attacks and plots against 
critical infrastructure on U.S. soil, in the form of in-depth qualitative 
case studies. These include: 1) the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) 
bombing, 2) the 1993 Tunnel and Bridge Plot, 3) the December 1999 
“Millennium Plot” involving Ahmad Rassam, 4) the September 11, 2001 
Attacks, and 5) the Ayman Faris Case that involved making preparations 
to attack the Brooklyn Bridge and derail trains, as well as several 
instances in which responsibility was claimed by Islamist groups for 
accidental critical infrastructure disruptions. In each case, the target 
selection processes are examined, along with the operational details of 
the plot and its most notable characteristics. The relevance of each plot 
to al-Qa`ida’s targeting of critical infrastructure is highlighted below. 
 
1. World Trade Center Attack (1993)  
The 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing was the first major 
attack by jihadists in the U.S. Although the consequences of the attack 
paled in comparison to those that would occur at the very same location 
eight years later, the bombing is instructive in a number of respects. It 
seems, in this case at least, that “key resources” (nationally recognized 
structures) were singled out from the very beginning of the attack 
 xx
The Jericho Option: Al-Qa`ida & Attacks On Critical Infrastructure 
process. Moreover, it appears as if the economic role played by the WTC 
and its environs was also a factor in its selection as the target. However, 
other elements of the target selection process had little or nothing to do 
with the infrastructural nature of the WTC – a large part of the reason 
Ramzi Yusuf chose it was because of the number of potential casualties 
that could be produced in a successful attack. In sum, there were multiple 
influences on the choice of the WTC as the target, only some of which 
related to its role as an element of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  
 
At the level of operations and tactics, the 1993 WTC case is somewhat 
recondite. On the one hand, a small band of ad-hoc terrorists with one 
skilled operative came close to destroying one of America’s icons and 
killing thousands of people. The production and nature of the bomb itself 
evidenced sophisticated tradecraft, and the terrorists did their homework 
on their target. On the other hand, the amateurishness of some of the cell 
members was obvious, and the group struggled with the financing aspect 
of the operation, which perhaps would have succeeded in causing far 
more damage had Yusuf been given access to more funds. 
 
2. Tunnel and Bridge Plot (1993)  
There is little evidence in the materials from the 1993 Tunnel and Bridge 
Plot to support or refute the view that targeting critical infrastructure stems 
from al-Qa`ida’s perception that such infrastructure constitutes a species 
of target different from other target types. The focus seems to have been 
on executing a spectacular attack and, more importantly, on carrying out 
one that would yield the maximum number of casualties. However, a 
1980s al-Qa`ida training manual found by the police in Manchester, 
England, which recommends attacking bridges and tunnels that lead in and 
out of large cities, suggests that the disruption of transportation arteries 
may be among the goals of such operations. There is a reference to taking 
out the “federal system” in the terrorists’ discussions about attacking FBI 
headquarters on Federal Plaza in New York City, suggesting that there 
was a “larger” purpose involved in attacking the law enforcement 
infrastructure. This would mean, in this sense at least, that at times al-
Qa`ida purposely targets critical infrastructure or elements of what the 
U.S. government would regard as such. 
 
There are signs that al-Qa`ida and affiliated jihadists see the international 
value to the jihad of attacking critical infrastructure targets such as 
tunnels and bridges. Thus, the `Abd al-Rahman cell’s Hasan suggested 
sending copies of blueprints of the tunnels to mujahid countries like the 
Sudan so that future operations could be launched.  
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The bridge, tunnels, and attendant plots say something about more 
general issues of jihadist motivations and modes of operation. Although 
jihadists endeavor to maintain the greatest secrecy during the planning 
and preparation of their operations, they are often quite open about their 
overall intentions when they make public threats regarding future 
attacks. For instance, they acknowledge that one of their motivations for 
acting is responding to the “evils” of U.S. foreign policy. Even in 
private, cell members and `Abd al-Rahman seemed to be driven by a 
hatred of what they saw as U.S. interference in the Muslim world, 
including Bosnia, as well as of its support for Israel.  
 
It needs to be emphasized, however, that stated intentions, even those of 
a movement’s leaders to their followers in private, and especially the 
statements of al-Qa`ida’s foot soldiers, cannot be taken to represent al-
Qa`ida’s ultimate goals. The political rhetoric of al-Qa`ida and its 
affiliates, while focused on U.S. foreign policy, often seems to serve as a 
convenient cover for their underlying objective – Islam’s expansion at 
the expense of, and ultimate victory over, the dar al-kufr. 
 
3. Millennium Plot (1999)  
The reasons why Ahmad Rassam’s December 1999 “Millennium Plot” is 
relevant to any evaluation of al-Qa`ida’s possible interests in targeting 
critical infrastructure are twofold. First, elements within the Algerian 
expatriate circles with which Rassam was associated were undoubtedly 
linked to al-Qa`ida. Second, as Rassam himself also acknowledged, he 
had received advanced training in manufacturing explosives at certain 
Afghan camps, training which was specifically designed to help him 
attack targets that fall into the infrastructural category. Indeed, Rassam’s 
statement that he was trained “how to blow up the infrastructure of a 
country” suggests that at least some portions of that training were 
specifically geared toward attacking infrastructure qua infrastructure. 
 
However, that particular statement should probably not be interpreted too 
literally. As has been argued elsewhere, assaults on certain types of 
infrastructural targets enabled al-Qa`ida to achieve a multiplicity of 
operational objectives, including killing large numbers of people, 
exerting a profound psychological impact on hostile and friendly target 
audiences, striking famous symbolic targets, and physically damaging 
important buildings and facilities. Yet ironically, disrupting 
infrastructure in the narrow sense of that term seems not to have loomed 
particularly high in their considerations. That was seemingly true in this 
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case as well. Among the indications of this were that Rassam and his 
“brothers” debated attacking a number of targets that did not fall into the 
category of critical infrastructure, e.g., Jewish neighborhoods in 
Montreal. Moreover, even when they considered attacking targets that 
could technically be construed as critical infrastructure, such as the 
Bureau of Exchange in Montreal, LAX, and government buildings such 
as an office of the FBI and the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, their 
main objectives were not in fact to disrupt the functioning of those 
facilities. For example, in the case of the Bureau of Exchange, the 
scheme was hatched as a possible means of stealing money that could 
thence be used to finance other jihadist operations, and both the planned 
bomb attack on LAX and the hypothetical plans to attack government 
buildings, including with cyanide, were viewed as good ways to kill 
large numbers of “infidel” enemies. 
 
4. September 11 Attacks (2001)  
On the basis of the overview in the full chapter of the targeting decisions 
behind the September 11, 2001 “Planes Operation” and projected follow-
up attacks, which was drawn largely from the testimony of its 
mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), one can conclude that at 
least five direct objectives were being pursued by al-Qa`ida. The first 
was entirely practical: to attack targets that could be successfully 
attacked. Throughout KSM’s testimony there are indications that 
practical considerations influenced al-Qa`ida’s targeting decisions in this 
case, and that plans were altered to increase the likelihood of the success 
of the attacks. Second, the planners of the attack clearly wanted to 
produce a huge psychological impact on target audiences, both the 
American people and Muslim observers who al-Qa`ida hoped to inspire. 
Indeed, KSM specifically indicated that he wished to “maximize the 
psychological impact of the attack.” Elsewhere, he stated that the attacks 
were designed to create “havoc” and to “be a big slap for the American 
people on American soil,” as well as something calculated to “wake the 
American people up” to the supposedly anti-Muslim policies of their 
own government, which is why not only governmental or military targets 
were chosen. Third, the sponsors and planners of these attacks clearly 
wanted to cause “as many deaths as possible.” Fourth, KSM admitted 
that tall buildings and other high-profile targets were selected for their 
“symbolic” value and impact. It is this that serves to explain Bin Ladin’s 
expressed desire to attack well-known political, military, and economic 
targets in the U.S. Fifth, there is no doubt that al-Qa`ida wished to 
damage economically valuable American targets. KSM himself 
specifically acknowledged that New York City was “always the first 
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target on my mind” because it was the “economic capital of the U.S.” 
Moreover, among the potential follow-up attacks being considered were 
“subway strikes, poisoning of reservoirs, demolition of bridges, etc.,” all 
of which constitute part of the critical infrastructure of this country. This 
surely is indicative of the fact that one of the many objectives Bin Ladin 
was pursuing in carrying out the 9/11 attacks was to cause economic 
damage by striking infrastructural targets. 
 
Even so, precisely because so many different motives were explicitly 
mentioned by the planners of the “planes operation,” it would be ill-
advised to assume that the sole or even that the primary objective of the 
9/11 attacks was to harm infrastructure qua infrastructure. Here, as in so 
many other instances, one can identify multiple motives behind the attack. 
In short, even when considering the most spectacular of all modern 
terrorist attacks, one which did in fact strike significant components of the 
critical infrastructure of the U.S., one is forced to acknowledge that this 
does not seem to have been the main purpose for carrying out these 
devastating assaults. Furthermore, although this was not specifically 
mentioned by KSM, in part because it is such a base, vulgar, and only 
partially conscious motive, there is no doubt that the 9/11 attacks were 
carried out in part to specifically express the jihadists’ outright hatred for 
Western “unbelievers” and to satisfy their overwhelming desire to avenge 
the “oppression” and “humiliation” of Muslims, real or imagined, at the 
hands of the “Great Satan” and its client regimes in the Middle East.  
 
5. Ayman Faris Plots (2002-2003) 
 It is clear from the Ayman Faris plot to attack the Brooklyn Bridge and 
derail trains that al-Qa`ida regards bridges as an important potential target. 
Aside from the call to destroy bridges providing routes into and out of 
large cities in at least one al-Qa`ida training manual, it is difficult to 
determine precisely whether the importance of bridges as a target for al-
Qa`ida is because of the likelihood that lots of “infidels” might be killed, 
or because of the financial cost that would be incurred in rebuilding a 
similar structure, or because of the losses to the economy resulting from 
the disruption of transportation routes. It is nonetheless clear, depending 
upon the location and nature of the targeted bridge, that the desired 
damage could be financial, symbolic, or even security-related should it 
come on the eve of another form of attack on the city or cities which the 
bridge services. There is no reason to presume that the recent calls by al-
Zawahiri to focus on oil targets, which perhaps suggest a revitalized 
interest in critical infrastructure writ large, would exclude renewed efforts 
to strike targets such as bridges and other transportation infrastructure.   
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Chapter Nine returns to the framing questions posed at the start of the 
study and presents broader conclusions and recommendations for threat 
analysis.  
 
1. Does al-Qa`ida perceive “infrastructure” or “critical 
infrastructure” as a species of target different from other 
target types? 
 
The question of whether al-Qa`ida as a whole perceives infrastructure as 
a distinct species of target is a rather complex matter. Al-Qa`ida sources 
do occasionally mention infrastructure, and to some extent evince an 
understanding of the “criticality” of certain infrastructures, but this does 
not necessarily mean that they perceive infrastructure in the same way 
that the U.S. government defines and analyzes it.  
 
Within the broader Islamic historical and religious tradition there are 
many allusions to targets that can be broadly conceived of as 
infrastructure. Several of these referents provide a justification, explicitly 
or implicitly, for launching strikes against present-day infrastructural 
targets, and perhaps even for adopting specific types of plans of attack. 
In that sense, attacks on critical infrastructural clearly fall within the 
Islamic historical tradition, as embodied in the military actions taken or 
authorized by Muhammad himself, such as attacks on the caravan trade 
and the burning of date-palms.  
 
What emerges from a close analysis, however, is something less than a 
full-blown prescription within the Islamic tradition for attacking critical 
infrastructures. What this tradition does provide is ample raw material 
from which al-Qa`ida, which has in fact radicalized Islamic traditions of 
warfare, can justify (at least to its own followers) attacking critical 
infrastructure targets should such targets be chosen. Moreover, it should 
be reiterated that its radicalization and selective reading of Islamic tenets 
mean that the group is unlikely to embrace or be bound by any religious 
prohibitions on attacking such targets.  
 
In addition to providing legitimization for their attack choices, the 
Islamic historical record, real and imagined, can and does serve as a 
source of inspiration for contemporary jihadists. For this reason Islam’s 
historical “infrastructural” attacks could provide a kind of model for the 
zealous attack planner. As noted above, to the creative operative the 
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poisoning of water wells and the destruction of fruit trees might, for 
example, suggest attacks on water reservoirs and river dams, as well as 
on agricultural and food supplies with chemical or biological agents. 
However, these types of attacks are not the only kinds that were carried 
out by Muhammad and his commanders, and as such it is possible to 
justify attacking all sorts of targets on the basis of the Prophet’s 
exhortations and actions. Therefore those historical episodes, which 
relate to critical infrastructure targets, only represent a single arrow 
amongst a quiver of targeting guideposts that can be drawn from early 
Islamic sources, above all the Qur’an itself and the collections of 
ahadith. 
 
In terms of their own utterances, on the one hand, certain statements by 
jihadists seem to suggest that they view critical infrastructures as core 
elements of Western society. For example, would-be “millennium plot” 
bomber Rassam testified that he had been trained “how to blow up the 
infrastructure of a country” in al-Qa`ida’s Afghan training camps, and 
Shaykh `Umar `Abd al-Rahman specifically referred to taking out the 
“federal system” in discussions with the cell members who were plotting 
to bomb FBI headquarters in New York City, thereby suggesting that 
there was a “larger” purpose in attacking this particular law enforcement 
facility. On the other hand, al-Qa`ida does not display a clear conception 
of infrastructure in the Western sense, much less a coherent strategy for 
attacking infrastructure qua infrastructure. What seems to be missing 
from al-Qa`ida’s strategic repertoire is a focus on the overall functional 
aspects of infrastructure. Despite recognizing the importance of the 
psychological disruption brought about by the group’s attacks, one finds 
very little evidence in al-Qa`ida sources that its leaders and strategists 
are thinking specifically in terms of disrupting the functions of 
infrastructural systems in the narrow sense of that phrase. Instead, al-
Qa`ida’s sense of infrastructure, such as it is, seems to be based primarily 
on either recognizing the practical or symbolic value of targeting discrete 
structures, especially landmarks such as buildings and bridges, or on the 
general economic importance of the prospective target. 
 
In the final analysis, there is very little evidence suggesting that al-
Qa`ida targets critical infrastructure as a category worthy of attack 
simply because it is critical infrastructure. Put another way, there is little 
to suggest that a target’s status as critical infrastructure is alone sufficient 
to recommend it as a target. Indeed, al-Qa`ida normally targets 
infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives, above all to kill large 
numbers of people and strike the symbols of “infidel” prestige and 
economic power. 
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2. To what extent do al-Qa`ida ideology, strategy and 
tactics purposely target “critical infrastructure” or elements 
of what are considered critical infrastructure by the United 
States Government? 
 
One of the key findings from the analysis of al-Qa`ida’s statements, 
materials, and actions is that al-Qa`ida normally has a variety of 
objectives in mind when it carries out attacks, and that targets are, in the 
main, specifically chosen in order to maximize the attainment of as many 
of those objectives as possible. The multiplicity of operational objectives 
that al-Qa`ida seeks to achieve include killing large numbers of people, 
exerting a profound psychological impact on hostile and friendly target 
audiences, striking famous symbolic targets, causing widespread 
economic harm to the enemy, and physically damaging important 
buildings and facilities.  
 
In the investigation of previous al-Qa`ida plots and attacks, the authors 
found that almost no targets were selected purely for their function as 
infrastructure. This does not mean, however, that al-Qa`ida’s targeting 
process will not often result in the selection of targets that fall within 
what the U.S. regards as its critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure, 
as currently defined, encompasses a broad range of assets and systems, 
and it is therefore likely that several of these assets and systems will 
fulfill one or more of al-Qa`ida’s operational and strategic objectives. 
The set of targets favored by al-Qa`ida might then substantially intersect 
the set of assets and systems we think of as falling under the rubric of 
critical infrastructure. 
 
There are also certain targets that fall within the U.S. conception of 
critical infrastructure that al-Qa`ida seems particularly drawn towards, as 
is evidenced either by ideological predilections or the fact that these 
targets have been specifically mentioned in al-Qa`ida statements and 
documents. For example, financial targets would fulfill the desire to 
wage economic jihad and to symbolically punish the usurious practices 
of Western society, and such targets have been specifically singled out in 
previous jihadist statements and writings. 
 
Since al-Qa`ida does not seem to conceive of critical infrastructure as a 
distinctive target set, in order to reconcile al-Qa`ida’s strategic aims in 
target selection with the U.S. understanding of critical infrastructure, we 
need to disaggregate “critical infrastructure” into its component sectors 
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and examine which of these sectors fulfill which targeting goals of al-
Qa`ida and to what extent. 
 
In the following table, which is fully explained in the body of the study, 
al-Qa`ida’s targeting goals, as determined in Chapter 3, are compared 
with individual, “officially designated” U.S. critical infrastructure 
sectors.  
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Table 9.1: Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment Analysis 
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All effects are based on a large-scale, successful attack 
 
i Casualties: 
  *     = Can be expected to cause low—moderate levels of fatalities (<100) 
  **   = Can be expected to cause moderate—high levels of fatalities (100-1,000) 
  *** = Can be expected to cause high—catastrophic levels of fatalities (>1,000) 
 
ii Economic Harm (on a national level): 
  *     = Unlikely that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
  **   = Some possibility that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
  *** = Likely that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
 
iii Symbolic / Psychological Resonance: 
  *     = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have low symbolic/psychological resonance  
  **   = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have moderate symbolic/psychological resonance 
  *** = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have high symbolic/psychological resonance 
 
iv Inherent Attractiveness: 
  *     = Infrastructure sector does not possess any inherent targeting attractiveness 
  **   = Some indications that this infrastructure sector possesses some inherent targeting attractiveness 
  *** = Definite indications that this infrastructure sector possesses specific inherent targeting attractiveness 
 
v Variances found in the “casualties” column reflect the range of different types of facilities included in the     
   energy infrastructure, e.g. oil pipeline vs. nuclear facility) 
 
vi Variances found in the “casualties” and “inherent attractiveness” columns reflect the range of relative    
   differences between specific targets in this category, e.g. Mt. Rushmore vs. the Empire State Building. 
 
 
 
 
As highlighted in the table, the infrastructure sectors that in general have 
the greatest capacity to fulfill al-Qa`ida’s aims are: Banking & Finance; 
Energy (especially oil pipelines); Food; Continuity of Government 
(although this is unlikely to be a common target since it is especially 
difficult to attack); Public Health; Transportation; and Key Resources. 
However, one must be cautious about “adding up” or averaging across 
the different objectives and the table, as provided, is merely a means for 
exploring the intersection between the U.S.’s current official 
understanding of critical infrastructure and those targets which al-Qa`ida 
is likely to attack. Furthermore, specific targets in each sector may be so 
attractive along one objective dimension that it outweighs other 
considerations. Nonetheless, the table offers a more nuanced perspective 
on al-Qa`ida’s targeting as it relates to critical infrastructure, and if 
combined with vulnerability and consequence analysis, might prove to 
be a useful tool when analyzing al-Qa`ida attack patterns. 
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3. Do recent trends in al-Qa`ida statements and behavior 
signify a major shift in al-Qa`ida’s strategy with respect to 
critical infrastructure? 
 
Recent statements by al-Qa`ida spokesmen that exhort the group’s 
followers to attack elements of the energy infrastructure, as well as 
recent attacks and plots by “homegrown” jihadists targeting the high-
density public transportation targets, could conceivably be regarded as 
signaling a shift in al-Qa`ida’s targeting strategy. A discussion of the 
nature and extent of this perceived shift is thus warranted. 
 
First, the missives of Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, especially those relating 
to targeting elements of the energy infrastructure, should be taken 
seriously. After all, past experience has shown that al-Qa`ida’s leaders are 
often explicit, albeit in generalized terms, about their future plans. 
However, one should not take such comments out of context. While 
perhaps upgrading the attractiveness of oil and gas pipelines and facilities 
in the Middle East as al-Qa`ida targets (which may contribute to an overall 
rise in the attractiveness of infrastructural targets), this does not mean that 
the group’s existing targeting priorities, including causing widespread 
economic damage and mass casualties, will be abandoned. These 
statements are therefore more likely to represent a tactical shift within a 
specific domain of targets (energy infrastructure) in a specified area (the 
Middle East), rather than a wholesale shift in targeting strategy. In other 
words, homeland security planners should certainly not shift their attention 
away from other target types, including other elements of critical 
infrastructure that have been identified as highly attractive targets above. 
 
Second, one cannot ignore the potential impact of the increasing 
prevalence of self-radicalized jihadist entrepreneurs, who often include 
so-called “homegrown” jihadists, on the targeting of critical 
infrastructure. It is necessary to distinguish between attacks carried out 
by these self-radicalized cells and those carried out by “official” al-
Qa`ida operatives, since the targets attacked by the latter have generally 
been carefully selected through a vetting process carried out by senior al-
Qa`ida operatives and leaders, while the target selection of individual 
cells is more independent and idiosyncratic and therefore difficult to 
predict. In many cases, the influence of al-Qa`ida leaders might be 
restricted to general guidelines posted on Internet sites. This is not to say 
that al-Qa`ida proper does not support the actions of these local jihadists 
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– indeed, al-Qa`ida leaders probably view such actions as a valuable 
supplement to their efforts to “bleed America into bankruptcy” and 
humble the “infidels.” 
 
However, the (d)evolution of the jihad in many cases to self-radicalized 
cells may have two important implications for target selection. The first 
is the likelihood that target selection, divorced from the direct control of 
al-Qa`ida’s leaders and ideologues, will become less sophisticated, in the 
sense of fine-tuning the selection of targets over a period of time in order 
to simultaneously attain multiple objectives, maximize the probability of 
success, and still remain concordant with perceived religious mandates. 
This might mean that targets are selected based more on practical factors, 
such as local knowledge or the desired attainment of only one or two 
primary objectives. It would also increase the saliency of statements and 
instructions purveyed by al-Qa`ida leaders on the Internet (particularly as 
these relate to infrastructural targets), since these might be all the 
guidance from their gurus that the relatively isolated, self-radicalized 
jihadist cells have access to. The continued monitoring of jihadist 
websites, specifically to detect any changes in targeting guidelines, 
might thus become more crucial than ever. 
 
The second possible effect of a shift to actions initiated by self-
radicalized jihadists relates to their capability to attack critical 
infrastructure targets. This is not to say that this face of al-Qa`ida, as 
represented by such cells, will be incapable of attacking critical 
infrastructure, but we may see less sophisticated asymmetrical attacks 
that require less planning and coordination than the large-scale 
operations undertaken by the al-Qa`ida core (i.e., attacks that are more 
along the lines of the 2005 London underground bombings than the 9/11 
attacks). These “simpler” attacks by independent cells can still be 
extremely deadly and effective in terms of contributing to the economic 
weakening of Western nations and the evocation of feelings of terror in 
the Western public, but are more likely to require simpler materials and 
shorter lead times and to focus on relatively “soft” targets. 
 
Besides the impact of these shifts in targeting statements and the nature 
of jihadist operatives, it is instructive to consider the general evolution of 
al-Qa`ida’s capabilities with regard to attacks against critical 
infrastructure. As can be seen from the discussion of the individual 
capabilities necessary for critical infrastructure sector attacks and the 
illustrative review of case studies of actual attacks (in Chapters 6, 7, and 
8), both the capabilities maintained by al-Qa`ida and the capabilities 
required for a successful attack are constantly evolving. The most 
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obvious example is the increased emphasis placed on the protection of 
various targets since the 9/11 attacks, including elements of critical 
infrastructure.  
 
As such, there is a great deal of speculation about whether al-Qa`ida’s 
target selection will evolve to reflect these changes. Some experts assert 
that al-Qa`ida targeting will shift to unprotected or poorly defended 
targets. According to this logic, since military, diplomatic, and some 
transportation sector targets are receiving greater protection, terrorist 
attacks will shift to economic targets, such as banks and tourist locations, 
as well as religious targets and population centers. Likewise, since the 
United States has vastly increased domestic protection levels, attacks 
may also shift to American targets abroad and to the allies of the U.S. 
 
Others maintain that al-Qa`ida will seek to acquire additional technology 
or employ new techniques in order to locate and exploit loopholes in 
infrastructure targets, even those that are currently provided with higher 
levels of protection. One of the chief questions in this regard is whether 
we will see a new focus on cyberterrorism. While there seems to be a 
general consensus that al-Qa`ida’s large-scale employment of 
cyberterrorism could have potentially devastating consequences, there is 
less agreement on whether al-Qa`ida is actually moving in this direction.  
 
Adding motivational concepts to the analysis of the cyber-debate, those 
who doubt that al-Qa`ida will focus on cyberattacks emphasize the 
notion that resorting to cyberterrorism would result in the loss of the 
physical “big bang” that a physical terrorist attack provides. The 
alternative position is that if one of al-Qa`ida’s primary goals is truly the 
economic weakening of the United States, then cyberattacks would be 
likely to have a great appeal, especially if other types of attacks were to 
focus on causing casualties and symbolic targets. The ominous mid-way 
point between the two effects would be attacks on the combinations of 
virtual and physical critical infrastructure systems cited earlier in this 
report, such as the Internet or SCADA control systems. 
 
In broad terms, it is unlikely that al-Qa`ida’s strategy vis-à-vis critical 
infrastructure targets will undergo any radical changes in the near future. 
Specific targets (such as oil pipelines in the Middle East) may rise to the 
fore from time to time, the shift to self-radicalized local cells might affect 
attack modalities, and new techniques such as cyberattacks may become 
more common, but it is likely that al-Qa`ida’s basic attack objectives will 
remain relatively constant, barring any major changes to its leadership or 
ideological outlook. Therefore, it will continue to pursue its broad strategy 
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of causing economic damage to the United States and “bleeding” the 
enemy, as well as its desire to inflict casualties and widespread 
psychological damage. Many assets within what the U.S. defines as 
critical infrastructures will thus continue to fall between al-Qa`ida’s cross-
hairs, as was noted in the response to the second framing question above. 
Possible changes will most likely be at the tactical or operational levels, 
e.g., looking for loopholes in sectors with high security (imagine the 
psychological blow that would be dealt to the U.S. by another major attack 
on the aviation sector), as well as seeking “softer” targets with relatively 
lower protection levels or focusing on American targets overseas and the 
assets of America’s allies. Such actions would, after all, continue to force 
the United States to expend increasing revenue and resources to secure 
these expanding target categories.  
 
4. Can we learn anything about al-Qa`ida tactics and 
operations that would be useful in a counterterrorism 
context should al-Qa`ida or its affiliates target critical 
infrastructure? 
 
This study has focused on gaining a better understanding of al-Qa`ida’s 
attitude towards critical infrastructure, but in so doing it has revealed 
several potentially salient features of its tactics and operations in the 
context of its attacks against critical infrastructure, and often more 
generally too. The most important of these are summarized below: 
 
1. Al-Qa`ida’s past behavior has demonstrated that, in the main, it 
possesses adequate capability levels to attack almost all types of 
infrastructural targets. This does not necessarily mean that each 
group of operatives will be capable of attacking any potential 
target, but rather that, viewed as a whole, analysts should not 
exclude any target types from being attacked based on al-
Qa`ida’s capabilities. Moreover, due to the rapid growth in online 
manuals and operational guides, it is unlikely that future would-
be al-Qa`ida attackers would require the kind of personal training 
that cadres previously received in camps in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. At the same time, the lack of centralized and direct 
tactical instruction may limit the scale or effectiveness of attacks 
carried out by disparate cells, at least for a time.  
 
2. Al-Qa`ida is not afraid of imitating past successful attacks. The 
Saudi Airlines case detailed in Chapter 7 was starkly reminiscent 
of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Therefore, one must not 
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assume that increasing protection levels will necessarily result in 
target substitution; as mentioned above, al-Qa`ida may be all too 
eager to exploit gaps in protection even in relatively well-
defended sectors. The public transportation sector, especially 
commercial aviation, will thus continue to be a prime al-Qa`ida 
target, since this sector has the capacity to fulfill so many of al-
Qa`ida’s attack objectives. 
 
3. In the era of globalized jihadist terrorism, attack groups can be 
made up of either local or foreign operatives, or a combination of 
the two. In other words, the persons involved in planning and 
carrying out attacks against critical infrastructure are not confined 
to a specific geographic location. 
 
4. Based on past attacks and plots against critical infrastructure 
targets, the geography of attacks on critical infrastructure seems 
to be following that of al-Qa`ida attacks in general, namely 
continued attempts against U.S., Middle Eastern (especially 
Saudi Arabian and Iraqi), and South Asian targets, and a rise in 
attacks on targets in Europe, especially the United Kingdom. 
 
5. Perpetrators, even the more “amateurish” self-radicalized cells, 
expend significant effort and resources on surveilling potential 
critical infrastructure targets and engaging in “dry runs.” This 
may provide important opportunities for detection and 
interdiction by counterterrorist forces. 
 
6. Despite the plethora of vulnerable targets available to would-be 
al-Qa`ida attackers and the difficulties associated with infiltrating 
disparate cells, many of the cases examined in this study reveal 
that al-Qa`ida operatives face substantial difficulties of their own 
in conducting effective attacks. Specifically, operations are often 
plagued by a lack of sufficient funds to carry out the desired scale 
of attack, as well as by the presence of incompetent cell members 
who can delay or compromise an operation before its execution. 
It is vital that authorities exploit these difficulties and errors in 
order to forestall attacks against critical infrastructures. 
 
As has been stated previously, however, even as al-Qa`ida’s strategy 
remains relatively constant, its tactics and capabilities are constantly 
evolving. Therefore, we are likely to see examples of innovation, 
adaptability, and development in the group’s tactics and procedures, 
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especially as levels of protection around critical infrastructure targets 
increase.  
 
In sum, this study has utilized various approaches in an attempt to trace 
al-Qa`ida’s propensity to attack what has been characterized in the 
United States as critical infrastructure. Despite the finding that al-Qa`ida 
does not distinguish critical infrastructure as an independent category of 
targets and that disrupting the function of these infrastructures does not 
appear to be a primary targeting motivation, critical infrastructure targets 
will often fall into the set of targets that al-Qa`ida will find attractive in 
terms of fulfilling its broader strategic objectives. We have come to the 
conclusion that in counterterrorist efforts to forecast likely targets, it 
would be best to designate targets that, if attacked, would produce 
multiple effects simultaneously, including massive human casualties, 
severe economic disruption and damage, and maximum media attention 
and psychological terror. This was certainly the template for al-Qa`ida’s 
attacks on the WTC twice, and it seems also to have driven the 2000 
Millennium Plot, the 1993 Tunnels and Bridges Plot, and the Madrid 
train and London underground bombings, among others. 
 
We believe that this study has brought considerable information to bear 
on this important topic and thereby contributed to the development of a 
more nuanced understanding of al-Qa`ida’s intentions and operational 
objectives in relation to critical infrastructure. We are hopeful that this 
will in turn help to facilitate the development of better threat assessment 
procedures by relevant U.S. government agencies, as well as provide 
useful information for those making financial allocation determinations 
on protection measures for critical infrastructure sectors. Yet we are 
under no illusions that this study represents the final word in this regard. 
Continued monitoring of al-Qa`ida and its related networks’ behavior 
and publications is essential, but if nothing else this study provides a 
baseline from which to track future al-Qa`ida targeting goals and 
preferences as these relate to critical infrastructure. 
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Chapter One: 
 
  Introduction*
 
 
 
n August 1996, Usama bin Ladin issued a “Declaration of War” 
against the United States in which he cautioned Muslims not to 
exhaust their own economic and financial resources, damage the 
infrastructure in the Arabian Peninsula, or destroy the oil industry. As he 
put it, 
I 
 
I caution my brothers, the mujahidin, the sons of the umma 
[Islamic community], to protect the oil resources and not 
damage them. It is a great Islamic asset and represents critical 
economic power essential to the forthcoming pan-Islamic state, 
with God’s permission.1
 
Yet just over eight years later, on December 16, 2004, al-Qa`ida’s leader 
urged those very mujahidin to “make every effort in your power to stop 
the greatest theft in the history of the natural resources of both present 
and future generations” by focusing attacks on oil production facilities in 
Iraq and the Gulf area.2 This was echoed the following year in a 
statement made by Bin Ladin’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri: “I call on the 
holy warriors [mujahidin] to concentrate their campaigns on the oil wells 
stolen from the Muslims, because most of the revenues from this oil go 
to the enemies of Islam…The enemies of Islam are exploiting such vital 
resources with incomparable greed, and we have to stop that theft with 
all we can to save this fortune for the nation [umma] of Islam.”3
 
                                                 
*  This chapter was prepared by Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary A. Ackerman. 
1 Cited in Randall B. Hamud, ed., Osama Bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own 
Words (San Diego, CA: Nadeem, 2005), p. 42. 
2 Cited in Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin 
Laden (London; New York: Verso, 2005), p. 272. 
3 “Zawahiri urges attacks on Iraq’s Oil,” Associated Press, December 7, 2005. This 
headline is somewhat misleading, for Zawahiri also advocated attacks on Gulf oil 
facilities. This statement was made in a previously unaired segment from a 43-minute 
videotape, which was then subsequently broadcast by al-Jazira on December 7, 2005. 
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At first glance, the quotes cited above appear to suggest that between the 
mid-1990s and the first half-decade of the twenty-first century there has 
been a dramatic shift in the attitudes of al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders 
concerning the value of attacking the world’s oil infrastructure. In the 
first instance, Bin Ladin emphasizes the need to preserve and protect the 
oil industries located in the Gulf States, which he clearly views as the 
patrimony of the Arab people. Indeed, he specifically warns his 
followers against attacking oil facilities in Saudi Arabia despite his oft-
proclaimed desire to overthrow the ruling al-Sa`ud family in that 
country, whom he regards as “apostates” because of their de facto 
deviation from Islamic precepts, egregious corruption, and alleged 
subordination to the interests of the “infidel” United States. In the second 
case, he argues that these facilities should be attacked in order to prevent 
the West from looting that patrimony.  
 
However, this seemingly sharp contrast over the propriety and value of 
attacking the oil infrastructure only serves to disguise an important 
underlying reality, namely, that one of al-Qa`ida’s long-standing 
objectives has been to damage the economy of the United States. This is 
an objective that Bin Ladin himself has often articulated. For example, in 
his December 26, 2001 statement celebrating the catastrophic attacks on 
September 11, 2001, he argues that “America, the Hubal of the age, is 
based on great economic power, but it is soft.”4 From this it follows that 
the “destructive, usurious global economy that America uses, together 
with its military force, to impose unbelief and humiliation on poor 
peoples, can easily collapse.”5 All that is needed is to deliver more blows 
against the U.S. economy, as the “nineteen students” did on 9/11. Hence 
Bin Ladin urges his followers to “strive to find the weak points of the 
American economy and strike the enemy there.”6 Since “it is possible to 
strike the economic base that is the foundation of the military base…it is 
very important to focus on attacking the American economy by any 
means necessary.”7 Among other things, this emphasis on damaging the 
U.S. economy means that supporters of al-Qa`ida may well consider 
making attacks on sensitive targets that fall broadly under the rubric of 
critical infrastructure, as this term has been defined by the U.S. and other 
Western governments. The purpose of this study is to try and assess the 
level of the threat posed by al-Qa`ida to critical infrastructure in 
                                                 
4 Cited in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 149. Hubal was a pagan pre-Islamic 
deity in Arabia whose idol, which was displayed prominently inside the Ka`ba in 
Mecca, was physically destroyed by Muhammad and his followers.  
5 Ibid., p. 150. 
6 Ibid., p. 155. 
7 Ibid., p. 151. 
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America’s homeland, both at the present time and in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
In an earlier report, several of the authors of this study concluded that the 
terrorist groups that were most likely to be motivated to attack critical 
infrastructure on U.S. soil were transnational jihadist groups such as al-
Qa`ida.8 Therein we also cited several examples of jihadist statements 
and described select plots or attacks against critical infrastructure that 
seemed to support this preliminary conclusion. We also emphasized, 
however, that most of al-Qa`ida’s assaults on targets that fall into the 
critical infrastructure category seemed to have been made for a 
multiplicity of reasons, and that the desire to attack infrastructure qua 
infrastructure was in many cases a relatively minor factor in the group’s 
calculations.9 The aim of this present study is to follow up on those 
initial findings by carrying out further research on jihadist intentions and 
activities in order to evaluate just how acute the threat from al-Qa`ida to 
critical infrastructure really is. 
 
Since al-Qa`ida and affiliated Islamist terrorist organizations are 
focusing their attention on infrastructural targets, both within their own 
countries and beyond, any detailed investigation of al-Qa`ida’s 
decisionmaking structures and operational capabilities in this regard 
should prove useful ab initio for counterterrorism officials seeking to 
prevent large-scale attacks on important components of America’s 
critical infrastructure. Yet even though the U.S. currently spends at least 
$16 billion10 on protecting its critical infrastructure from this eventuality, 
there are a number of pertinent questions that remain unanswered with 
                                                 
8 In this report the plural noun “jihadists” (and its adjectival form “jihadist”) will be 
used to refer to Islamists who believe that waging armed struggle against unbelievers 
(jihad bi-al-sayf, i.e., “jihad of the sword”) is the only path to victory over the forces of 
“unbelief.” This is because other Islamist groups, whose ultimate objectives may be no 
less radical, have instead opted to employ a gradual “Islamization from below” strategy 
involving a combination of proselytization, ideological indoctrination, and the 
provision of social services in order to win “hearts and minds” and fulfill their agendas. 
The meaning of the term jihad will be discussed further below. 
9 [Gary, I can’t seem to locate the portion of our earlier report where we drew these 
conclusions] 
10 Owing to the fact that critical infrastructure protection tasks are divided amongst 
several government agencies, obtaining accurate budget figures for the total amount 
spent on critical infrastructure protection is difficult. The above amount was derived 
from supplementary material to the President’s 2007 budget request, which states that 
the 2007 budget “[i]ncreases funding by nearly $500 million (3 percent) for protecting 
critical infrastructure and key assets.” Office of Management and Budget, “Homeland 
Security,” The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pdf/Homeland-07.pdf. 
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respect to this specific subset of al-Qa`ida’s wider target selection. For 
example, when one extrapolates from its prior and ongoing terrorist 
operations, it seems clear that al-Qa`ida, despite recent diminutions in its 
global operations, still has the operational capability to carry out 
complex and sophisticated attacks against existing U.S. infrastructural 
targets if Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri really decided that 
they wanted to do so. Hence the key question is why they have not yet 
done this more frequently and systematically. 
 
Further questions present themselves. If al-Qa`ida really is increasingly 
intent on attacking critical infrastructure, as seems to be the case, why is 
this so? Is there a growing awareness among its cadre of current 
American infrastructural vulnerabilities, or is it simply a question of 
pursuing an ongoing operational objective more aggressively for 
particular pragmatic or theological reasons? These are the types of 
questions that are crying out for answers, and addressing them in a 
reasonably comprehensive manner constitutes the principle goal of this 
study. This is also why it is absolutely crucial to shed more light on the 
motivations and intentions of the organization’s leadership group in this 
context. The answers to such questions will better equip us to identify, 
anticipate, and forestall al-Qa`ida’s plans in the context of critical 
infrastructure, and thus may ultimately help facilitate the prevention of 
such attacks. 
 
The current study explores al-Qa`ida’s motivations and capabilities for 
attacking critical infrastructure along a number of axes. The first set of 
issues concerns ideas about infrastructural targets held by al-Qa`ida’s 
decisionmakers. One of the most common criticisms leveled against past 
counterterrorism efforts has been that U.S. analysts are prone to 
“mirroring” when assessing their opponents’ intentions and strategies, 
i.e. that they project their own mental images, frameworks of knowledge, 
cultural values, and strategic worldviews onto foreign extremists and 
terrorists, who may in fact have a completely different way of looking at 
the world. This becomes especially significant when one realizes that 
“critical infrastructure,” as a distinct security concept, is largely a 
construction of the United States government, with historical roots that 
can be traced back to the 1960s. The possibility must therefore be 
entertained that Usama bin Ladin and other operational and strategic 
leaders of al-Qa`ida may not even regard critical infrastructure as a 
distinct species of target, as is done in the U.S., but instead treat 
infrastructural targets no differently than any other target type, such as 
football stadiums, crowded marketplaces, or naval vessels. If this is 
indeed the case, critical infrastructural targets would have to “compete” 
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with all of the other target types on an equal playing field in al-Qa`ida’s 
target selection evaluations. Here, broader questions of the strategic and 
tactical utility of each particular potential target would predominate. On 
the other hand, if – whether as a result of indigenous conceptual 
developments or learning from developments in the West – critical 
infrastructure is nowadays viewed as a distinct and distinctly attractive 
(or unattractive) target type by al-Qa`ida strategists, then under certain 
conditions al-Qa`ida leaders may be biased towards (or away from) 
attacking infrastructural targets in their selection of targets within or 
outside of the U.S. homeland. If the latter characterization is indeed a 
better reflection of reality, an ancillary question then involves the extent 
to which al-Qa`ida’s conception of critical infrastructure accords with 
the prevailing official understanding and categorization of critical 
infrastructure within the United States. An examination of al-Qa`ida’s 
own conception of critical infrastructure, assuming that the group has 
such a conception, is thus a prerequisite for a better understanding of 
their target selection processes. 
 
The next broad issue to investigate is the extent to which al-Qa`ida’s 
ideology, strategy, and tactics intentionally focus on those elements of 
American society that the U.S. government itself characterizes as critical 
infrastructure, irrespective of whether al-Qa`ida’s commanders define or 
conceive of it as such. Even if al-Qa`ida does not consider critical 
infrastructure to be a separate target category, its leaders may still be 
drawn towards attacking particular targets or types of targets that fall 
within the rubric of what we define as critical infrastructure. Revealing 
any predilections on the part of al-Qa`ida towards attacking critical 
infrastructure, or specific types of critical infrastructure, is thus one of 
the central objectives of this study. 
 
International terrorism can be viewed as a formally complex 
phenomenon11 and, as such, the dynamics of various aspects of 
terrorism, including target selection, will always be a vital consideration. 
An important question addressed by this study, once al-Qa`ida’s current 
orientation vis-à-vis critical infrastructure has been outlined, is therefore 
whether, in light of its organizational evolution since the advent of the 
“Global War on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, any 
major shifts in the group’s targeting as it pertains to critical infrastructure 
                                                 
11 See Nancy K. Hayden, “The Complexity of Terrorism,” in Mapping Terrorism 
Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
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are on the horizon. This must be considered in the context of recent 
trends discernable in al-Qa`ida’s statements and behavior with respect to 
critical infrastructure, including the statements of key leaders such as Bin 
Ladin and al-Zawahiri. 
 
In addition to the broad questions identified above, by examining the 
historical record this study seeks to provide relevant information about a 
host of more detailed, “tactical” aspects of al-Qa`ida’s attacks on critical 
infrastructure, including its actual operational methods, the types of 
critical infrastructure it is likely to target, and its probable attack 
modalities (such as whether suicide attacks are more likely than 
sabotage). In the process, it may be possible to discern broader patterns 
concerning the timing, location, or nature of future al-Qa`ida attacks 
against critical infrastructure. 
 
The above discussion can be encapsulated within four basic “framing 
questions” which this study seeks to address. These questions have 
served to guide the research and analysis of al-Qa`ida’s relationship to 
critical infrastructure, and will be revisited in the conclusion. 
 
Basic Framing Questions: 
 
5. Does al-Qa`ida perceive “infrastructure” or “critical 
infrastructure” as a species of target different from 
other target types? 
6. To what extent do al-Qa`ida ideology, strategy and 
tactics purposely target “critical infrastructure” or 
elements of what are considered critical infrastructure 
by the United States Government? 
7. Do recent trends in al-Qa`ida statements and behavior 
signify a major shift in al-Qa`ida’s strategy with 
respect to critical infrastructure? 
8. Can we learn anything about al-Qa`ida tactics and 
operations that would be useful in a counterterrorism 
context should al-Qa`ida or its affiliates target critical 
infrastructure? 
 
It is not difficult to recognize that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates have 
displayed and continue to display an acute interest in attacking elements 
of the U.S. infrastructure. What is required, however, is an in-depth 
exploration of the nature, origins, and direction of the group’s objectives 
in order to derive policy recommendations and analytical indicators to 
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assist in detecting and interdicting plots of this nature. In sum, this study 
is specifically intended to increase counterterrorism analysts’ 
understanding of certain features of al-Qa`ida’s strategy and operations 
in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of attacks directed 
against our most critical infrastructures. In doing so, this report also aims 
to provide useful information for those making financial allocation 
determinations on protection measures for critical infrastructure sectors. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
 
This study was completed with the financial support of the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, through a project sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate. 
The report is organized in the following manner. Chapter Two contains a 
brief introduction to the concept of critical infrastructure and discusses 
general terrorist motivations for targeting it. Chapter Three considers the 
organizational evolution of al-Qa`ida and explores the group’s strategic 
rationale. The fourth chapter traces various religious and historical 
referents that might inform al-Qa`ida’s attitudes towards critical 
infrastructure. Chapter Five examines various statements by al-Qa`ida 
and its affiliates relating to critical infrastructure, and based thereon 
provides a general analysis of how targeting critical infrastructure fits 
into al-Qa`ida’s broad strategic outlook. A preliminary analysis of al-
Qa`ida’s capabilities with respect to attacks on critical infrastructure is 
then offered in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven presents both a quantitative 
and a qualitative analysis of past al-Qa`ida attacks outside the United 
States, whereas Chapter Eight covers past al-Qa`ida attacks and plots 
against critical infrastructure on U.S. soil in the form of in-depth 
qualitative case studies. The final chapter will return to the framing 
questions above and present broader conclusions and recommendations 
for threat analysis. The report also contains an appendix consisting of a 
detailed chronology of al-Qa`ida-related attacks against critical 
infrastructure. 
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Chapter TWO:  
 
Why Target Critical 
Infrastructure? 
 
 
 
DEFINING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE*
 
efore turning to the attitudes displayed towards critical 
infrastructure by terrorist groups, above all by al-Qa`ida and other 
transnational jihadist groups, it is first necessary to briefly limn 
the concept of “critical infrastructure” as it has developed in the United 
States.12 The notion that certain types of infrastructure (often taking the 
form of interconnected systems) play vital roles in underpinning our 
economy, security, and way of life can be traced back as far as the 1960s, 
when shortcomings in existing telecommunication systems complicated 
the communications between John F. Kennedy and Nikolai Khrushchev 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The 1980s saw much discussion of 
“infrastructure,” although the debate was dominated not so much by 
security concerns as by anxiety that various elements of the U.S. 
infrastructure were deteriorating and would be unable to sustain future 
growth.13 It was not until 1996 that the term “critical infrastructure” in its 
B 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gary A. Ackerman. 
12 The concept of “critical infrastructure” in its current usage is largely the construct of 
American officials. Even though the concept (or something close to it) is embraced by 
several nations, the lion’s share of the discourse on critical infrastructure is still to 
carried on in the United States. For a detailed discussion of the development of the 
concept of critical infrastructure, see Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey M. Bale, and Kevin 
Moran, “Assessing the Threat to Critical Infrastructure” in James J.S. Forest, ed., 
Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, Volume III: Critical Infrastructure 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); and Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
Homeland Security: Protecting a Networked Nation. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Interscience, 2006). 
13 As a 2003 Congressional Research Service report notes, “Nearly 20 years ago, 
infrastructure was debated because of concern that the nation’s public works 
infrastructure was believed to be suffering from severe problems of deterioration, 
technological obsolescence, and insufficient capacity to serve future growth.” See John 
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current usage entered into official discourse when, in the wake of the 
Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 
13010 – Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
 
Thereafter, the concept of critical infrastructure and the systems this term 
was thought to encompass progressed through a number of iterations, 
both before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.14 This 
process culminated in the draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) of 2005.15 The NIPP brought together previous definitions and 
ended up defining critical infrastructure as: 
 
Systems, assets, or functions, whether physical or virtual, 
publicly or privately owned, that are used by or provide 
benefit to the public and are so vital to the U.S. that the 
exploitation, destruction, or incapacitation of such systems, 
assets, or functions would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.16
                                                                                                                       
Moteff et. al., Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure Critical? 
Congressional Research Service (2003) p. 14. 
14 These are reflected in a number of official U.S. reports and strategies, including the 
1997 “Marsh Report,” (“Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures: 
The Report on the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 
(October 1997) 
http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/publications/deskbook/full_text/Other_Relevant_R
eferences/PCCIP_Report.pdf; “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63-Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Presidential Decision Directive 63,” The White House (1998). 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm;  “Establishing the Office of Homeland 
Security and the Homeland Security Council,” Executive Order 13228 (October 8, 
2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders/;”Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
the Information Age,” Executive Order 13231. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/orders/; Critical Infrastructures Protection Act (USA 
PATRIOT Act, Section 1016, H.R. 3162-130 (P.L. 107-56));  “Protecting Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets,” The National Strategy for Homeland Security. The 
White House (2002). http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect3-3.pdf; 
“National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets,” The National Strategy for Homeland Security, The White House (2003). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html. 2003; and  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection, The White House (December 17, 2003). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html. 
15 Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Base Plan, Department of Homeland 
Security (November 2, 2005). (review copy provided to authors, November 2005). As 
of the time of writing, the final version of the NIPP had not been released, and therefore 
it is possible, though unlikely, that the definitions included here might subsequently be 
amended. 
16 Ibid., p. 97. 
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The societal sectors most commonly listed17 as forming part of 
America’s critical infrastructure were: 
 
• Agriculture 
• Food 
• Water 
• Public health 
• Emergency services 
• Government  
• Defense industrial base 
• Information and Telecommunications 
• Energy, transportation 
• Banking and finance 
• Chemical industry and Hazardous Materials 
• Postal and Shipping 
• Key Resources18 
 
The above definition and list of infrastructures will form the basis for the 
term critical infrastructure as it is used in this report.19
 
 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that most official documents list these sectors as “examples,” thus 
allowing room for amending the list as society changes. In fact, since 1996, several new 
sectors have been added to the original listing of “critical” sectors. The list presented 
here relies primarily on HSPD 7. 
18 Starting with the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the concept of “key 
assets” (subsequently relabeled “key resources” or KR) was appended to the critical 
infrastructure list, and recent reports have referred jointly to “CI/KR”. Key assets are 
defined as “individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but 
could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation’s morale or confidence.” 
“Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. p.30.  
19 Alternative definitions have been suggested by scholars. For instance, Ackerman, 
Bale, and Moran supply a definition which highlights the notion that what is considered 
to be a “critical” infrastructure to one community or part of society at one point in time 
may differ from what is considered critical by other communities. Their definition of 
critical infrastructure is as follows: “Critical infrastructures are those physical or digital 
systems that a community depends upon to maintain its security, governance, public 
health and safety, economy, and public confidence. The constituent parts of such 
systems will vary according to the community context in which they are viewed.” 
Ackerman, Bale, and Moran, Assessing the Threat to Critical Infrastructure, pp. XX. 
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GENERAL TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS FOR 
ATTACKING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE*
 
Before turning to al-Qa`ida’s relationship to critical infrastructure, it is 
instructive to examine terrorist motivations, in the most general sense, 
for attacking critical infrastructure, with particular emphasis on the 
factors that influence the terrorist target selection process. This section is 
divided into three parts that a) explain the importance of examining 
terrorist motivations in assessing the threat to critical infrastructure; b) 
provide an overview of the factors influencing the target selection 
process of terrorist groups; and c) present the conclusions of previously-
conducted study, which comprised both a quantitative analysis of prior 
attacks on critical infrastructure and qualitative case studies of particular 
terrorist groups that have in the past focused on targeting critical 
infrastructure. 
 
 
a) Terrorist Motivations in Threat Assessment 
 
Basic threat assessments should be based on the consideration of three 
factors: the value of the target (or negative value, in the sense of the 
amount of harm expected if the target is attacked), the vulnerability of 
the target, and the likelihood of attack. The likelihood of attack in turn 
depends upon both the motivations20 and capabilities of the attacker. 
This can be represented as follows: 
 
LIKELIHOOD OF THREAT = MOTIVATION x CAPABILTY 
 
Unlike the capabilities of a terrorist group, which can mostly be 
measured in terms of its available resources, broadly defined, the 
motivations of a terrorist group are much more difficult to clarify, let 
alone represent or measure. Not surprisingly, many threat analyses focus 
primarily if not exclusively on the vulnerability and value of the target 
and the capabilities of terrorist groups for attacking it, in the process 
ignoring or underestimating the relevance of the motivations of those 
terrorist groups. As a result, all terrorist groups possessing similar 
capabilities are assumed to be equally willing and able to attack all 
highly vulnerable targets of proportionate value. Such a focus on more or 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Sundara Vadlamudi. 
20 Distinguish intent from motivation. 
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less “tangible” factors tends to produce worst-case scenarios,21 an 
emphasis that in turn can result in the gross misallocation of available 
resources. By eliminating numerous extremist groups from the list of 
potential terrorist threats, threat assessments that fully incorporate the 
motivations of terrorist groups will therefore greatly assist policymakers 
in the judicious allocation of scarce resources.  
 
 
b) Factors Influencing Target Selection 
 
This section provides a broad overview of the factors that influence the 
target selection process of a terrorist group.22 The key factors that 
influence the terrorist target selection process can be grouped under three 
broad categories: Group Factors, External Factors, and Decision-Making 
Factors. Each of these broader categories contains several relevant sub-
factors that need to be considered. It must be emphasized that the list of 
sub-factors provided below should not be viewed as a comprehensive list 
of all of the factors influencing the terrorist target selection process. 
Rather, it is a representative list of those factors that the authors of this 
report have determined to be most important in the majority of cases. 
 
Group Factors: Ideology; Organizational Structure; Organizational 
Dynamics; Organizational Lifecycle status (a terrorist group’s maturity); 
Demographics; Resources; and Operational Capabilities; 
 
External Factors: Historical Context, Events, and Precedents; Relations 
with External Actors (such as sympathizers and supporters, the mass 
media, the general public, other extremist and criminal groups, and the 
                                                 
21 For examples of the exclusion of motivations, see “Combating Terrorism: Threat 
And Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments,” 
GAO/NSIAD-98-74, U.S. General Accounting Office (April 1998); Harry F. Martz and 
Mark E. Johnson, “Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis 7, no.1 (1987); 
Nancy A Renfroe and Joseph L. Smith, “Threat/Vulnerability Assessments and Risk 
Analysis. Whole Building Design Guide,” http://www/wbdg/org/design/res-
print.php?rp=27; and Office for Domestic Preparedness (OPD), “Vulnerability 
Assessment Methodologies Report,” Phase I Final Report, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (July 2003). 
22 This section summarizes the key findings of a previous study performed for 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2004. For a more detailed description of 
the factors listed in this section, see Ackerman, Bale, et al., “Assessing Terrorist 
Motivations to Attack Critical Infrastructure,” Report prepared by the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism Research Program (WMDTRP), Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies (August 2004).  
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state apparatus); the Security Environment; and Target Characteristics 
(in the current case the characteristics of critical infrastructure); and 
 
Decision-Making factors: General Planning Characteristics (such as 
decision-maker time horizons and risk thresholds); Perceptual Filter 
(how decision-makers perceive information obtained from outside the 
group); Operational Objectives (what a terrorist group hopes to achieve 
from its attacks); and Attack Modalities (the methods and techniques a 
terrorist group employs to attack targets).   
 
Each of the sub-factors listed above, in combination with others, exert 
varying degrees of influence on a particular group’s target selection 
process. Some of the most important influences in this regard are:23
 
 Ideology, which provides the broad guidelines for identifying the 
enemy and the necessary legitimization for attacking the targets that 
are believed to represent the enemy. 
 
 Organizational Structure, represented by factors such as group size 
and bureaucratic sophistication, which are indicative of an 
organization’s level of resources, capabilities, and functional 
specialization. A group with a robust and a flexible organizational 
structure is capable of executing sophisticated and highly damaging 
attacks against large targets. 
 
 Organizational Dynamics help in determining the target priorities. In 
particular, group leaders – especially if they are charismatic, 
authoritarian, or totalitarian in nature – may dominate their 
organization’s decision-making processes and play decisive roles in 
target selection. 
 
 The Organizational Lifecycle Status of a terrorist group can 
sometimes be used to gain insight into its general behavior. 
Successive generations that arise within terrorist groups, possibly due 
to internal divisions, often display a greater capacity for violence, 
which might well have an impact on their operational objectives and 
consequent target selection. Sometimes, a terrorist group might 
evolve into a criminal organization, which would then likely preclude 
certain types of destructive acts. 
 
                                                 
23 This list is merely an attempt to highlight some of the most important factors. Any 
comprehensive threat assessment, however, should consider all the factors listed above. 
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 Resources, broadly defined, have a more or less direct correlation 
with the ability of a terrorist group to carry out an attack. Even if a 
group decides to carry out large and sophisticated attacks, its actual 
ability to launch such attacks is largely determined by the level of 
financial, physical, and logistical resources at its disposal.   
 
 Operational Capabilities also affect a group’s choice of targets, 
since few groups are likely to select targets that they knowingly lack 
the ability to attack successfully. In terms of developing new 
capabilities, terrorists have tended to rely on tried-and-true weapons 
and tactics for the simple reason that they have worked well in the 
past and continue to work well. Terrorists constantly try to develop 
their capabilities in response to the countermeasures implemented 
against the group. In that sense, there is an ongoing cycle of 
innovation, as those who seek to protect targets and those who seek 
to attack them try to outmaneuver one another. 
 
 Historical Context, especially as framed by precedents and resonant 
prior events, influences terrorist behavior in crucially important 
ways. No terrorist group emerges with an entirely blank slate, since 
its members have invariably internalized, adopted, or adapted and 
modified many pre-existing ideas. Similarly, no terrorist group is 
entirely unaware of the methods and tactics employed by prior or 
existing terrorist organizations, especially those that have operated 
within its own political, intellectual, ethnic, religious, or cultural 
milieu.  
 
 External Relations influence the target selection process, since the 
terrorist group must take into account the reactions of its supporters 
and sympathizers, its potential constituents, other extremist groups in 
its area, sponsoring states (if they exist), and above all the target 
“enemy” audience. 
 
 Target Characteristics are among the most important factors in a 
terrorist group’s decision to attack – or not attack – specific targets. 
The most important characteristics of an infrastructure target that 
tend to affect terrorist targeting are 1) its level of protection; 2) 
whether or not it has a high profile (which is in part a function of 
how much attention the media has paid to it); and 3) its actual 
function.  
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 General Planning Characteristics, such as time horizons and risk 
thresholds, influence the target selection process, above all on the 
tactical level.  
 
 Operational Objectives – the desired objectives of an attack, such as 
desired casualty levels, level of publicity sought, whether the target 
should be symbolic or instrumental, the type and extent of the 
reaction terrorists want to elicit from various audiences, expected 
secondary effects, and hoped-for scale of effects play a complex role 
in targeting decisions. Typically, a group’s operational objectives are 
shaped in large part by its ideology. In addition to the immediate 
objectives, other motives such as boosting group morale, 
demonstrating the uniqueness of the group in relation to other 
terrorist groups, or exhibiting leadership qualities will influence the 
target selection process. 
 
 
c) Terrorists and Critical Infrastructure: Evidence from 
Case Studies and Quantitative Analyses 
 
In the study cited previously,24 researchers collected evidence to study 
the influence of the factors listed above on the target selection process, 
using both quantitative analysis performed on a database of incidents 
involving attacks on critical infrastructure and detailed empirical case 
studies of past attacks on critical infrastructure.25  
 
The quantitative analyses of the data revealed the following major trends 
in attacks on critical infrastructure: 
 
 The number of attacks against critical infrastructure has increased 
significantly since the 1960s. 
 Attacks on government-related facilities and energy infrastructure 
constitute the largest proportion of attacks on critical infrastructure. 
 Bombing remains the preferred method of attacking critical 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
24 Ackerman, Bale, and Moran, Assessing the Threat to Critical Infrastructure. 
25 The case studies included the following groups and attacks: the Jaish-e-Muhammad 
(JEM: Army of Muhammad) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET: Army of the Righteous) – 
attack on the Indian Parliament; the Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC: 
National Liberation Front of Corsica) – hundreds of attacks targeting economic 
infrastructure; Chukaku-ha – attacks on the Japanese National Railways; and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – attacks on the Philippine power infrastructure. 
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 Secular utopian, particularly left-wing groups, and religious groups, 
particularly Islamist groups, have attacked critical infrastructure 
more frequently than other types of groups. 
 Attacks on critical infrastructure by religious groups are increasing 
in number. 
 
The examination of the case studies highlighted the role of several 
factors identified in the first part of this section in influencing the choice 
of critical infrastructures as targets. Some of the important conclusions 
of the assessment are: 
  
 Ideology is one of the most significant factors in influencing a 
terrorist group’s target selection process. For example, the National 
Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC)’s ideology helped the group to 
determine the categories of targets that could legitimately be 
attacked. Generally speaking, the FLNC sought to minimize 
casualties and thus focused its efforts on attacking infrastructure-
type targets. As a direct consequence, although it has conducted 
hundreds of attacks, the group appears to have intentionally killed 
fewer than fifty people between 1975 and 1995. 
 
 Knowledge of critical infrastructure played a particularly important 
role in target selection and attack implementation. In the case of the 
attack on the Japanese National Railways, Chukaku-ha’s detailed 
knowledge of the rail system allowed the group to significantly 
damage its target. 
 
 Characteristic of critical infrastructure, in particular the symbolic 
nature and functional importance of such targets, are of tremendous 
importance in target selection, as was indicated by the Jaish-e-
Muhammad/Lashkar-e-Tayyiba attack on the Indian Parliament in 
2001. This case, however, also highlights the important long-term 
methodological challenge of categorizing terrorist attacks as “critical 
infrastructure attacks.” Terrorists generally have multiple motives 
for attacking targets. In the case of critical infrastructure attacks, 
interfering with the operations of a vital infrastructure may be of 
secondary importance compared to other motives such as 
traumatizing a population psychologically or killing large numbers 
of people.     
 
 Relations with External Actors, especially the enemy target 
audience, invariably played a crucially important role in the process 
of target selection. Terrorists also usually consider the impact of an 
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attack on their supporters, sympathizers, and proclaimed 
constituencies. For example, Chukaku-ha’s avowed support for 
Japanese farmers and union members, and the group’s decision to 
champion certain issues relating to these constituencies, probably 
influenced its target selection more significantly than any other 
single factor. 
 
 Factionalization of a group is likely to have an impact on the target 
selection of newly formed splinter groups as well as on the original 
group. In particular, the existence of autonomous, localized cell 
structures and competitive inter-cell dynamics, such as those found 
in the FLNC, might force groups to carry out extremely violent 
attacks or attacks that produce severe consequences. Similarly, 
intense competition between rival groups sharing similar but distinct 
ideologies, as in the case of Chukaku-ha, might encourage groups to 
engage in particularly “spectacular” attacks designed to generate 
high levels of publicity and prestige.    
 
 Historical Events are likely to be key factors in target selection. The 
MILF’s tactic of attacking power grids, for example, was not novel. 
At least three other groups in the Philippines that the MILF was 
clearly aware of – the Communist New People’s Army (NPA), the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) – had previously conducted similar attacks. It is likely that the 
MILF’s efforts were at least in part informed by such precedents. 
 
 The Ability to Innovate within a group influences its decision to 
consider new targets and to identify novel and effective methods of 
attack that may have a greater likelihood of success. Chukaku-ha’s 
initial attack on the Japanese National Railway system, for example, 
was unprecedented in scope and implementation, which may have 
been one of the reasons for its success. 
 
 Operational Objectives played a very important role in target 
selection. The FLNC perhaps provides the most obvious example of 
the way in which operational objectives largely restricted the group’s 
set of preferred targets to those involving physical assets such as 
critical infrastructure. The FLNC focused most of its attacks on 
targets that were seen as perpetuating the second-class status of 
native Corsicans, since its primary objective was to preserve the 
unique culture of Corsica and establish effective political and 
economic control over their homeland.  
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 Organizational Structure appeared to affect a terrorist group’s 
capability to attack various critical infrastructure targets, but it is 
unclear whether it increases a group’s specific propensity to attack 
critical infrastructure. Chukaku-ha’s large size and cell-based 
structure, for example, provided it with the manpower, operational 
capabilities, and operational security necessary to conduct highly 
effective guerrilla actions that were especially successful against 
widely dispersed critical infrastructure targets such as the Japanese 
railway system. 
 
Previous research thus indicates that terrorist groups will decide to attack 
infrastructural targets for a multiplicity of reasons, as is demonstrated by 
the 9/11 attacks, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the assault 
on the Indian Parliament. Hence it is probably safe to conclude that 
terrorists generally attack infrastructure because 1) they want to destroy 
certain important facilities; 2) they feel that they can obtain more 
publicity or external support than if they had attacked non-infrastructural 
targets; 3) they can cause even larger number of casualties – or avoid 
causing casualties altogether – by attacking such facilities; 4) the 
symbolic value of infrastructural targets is greater than that of other 
targets; or 5) for a complex combination of general and very specific 
reasons. As one would expect, there is no single explanation that is 
applicable to all the prior cases of attacks on critical infrastructure. 
 
Past trends indicated that secular utopian and religious groups have 
conducted the majority of attacks against critical infrastructure 
worldwide. The relative absence of operationally efficient secular 
utopian terrorist groups in the U.S., coupled with the increasing 
incidence of attacks by religious groups, suggests that there are three 
categories of terrorist groups that may have the highest disposition to 
attack U.S. critical infrastructure targets in the future: 1) transnational 
jihadist groups, 2) domestic right-wing “militias,” and 3) the most 
violent fringes of the radical ecology movement. 
 
Of the three groups that are most likely to seek to conduct attacks against 
critical infrastructure, jihadist terrorist groups possess both the 
ideological proclivities and the necessary operational capabilities to 
perpetrate large-scale critical infrastructure attacks. Even the most 
cursory analysis of the previously cataloged attacks on critical 
infrastructure reveals that Islamist terrorist groups have significantly 
increased both the volume and lethality of their critical infrastructure 
attacks during the past two decades. In terms of absolute numbers, 
groups generally classified as “religious” have accounted for roughly 
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73% of all casualties and 35% of all fatalities for confirmed major 
critical infrastructure attacks. If both major and minor attacks are 
included, the data reveal that these groups have accounted for 62% of all 
casualties, with the vast majority of these casualties being caused by 
groups in the “Islamic” subcategory. These statistics support a 
frightening hypothesis – that religious terrorist groups are more likely 
than other groups to mix critical infrastructure attacks with mass casualty 
attacks. 
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Chapter THREE:  
 
Al-Qa`ida’s Evolution and 
Jihadist Strategy  
 
 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AL-QA`IDA 
ORGANIZATION*
 
 
n order to make an accurate assessment of the targeting proclivities 
of a particular terrorist group, it is first necessary to understand the 
general characteristics of that group. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, factors such as group ideology, organizational structure, 
organizational dynamics, capabilities, and access to resources exert an 
influence on both the nature and the extent of the threat posed by 
particular groups. This chapter provides a brief organizational outline of 
the development of the al-Qa`ida network and an extended discussion of 
whether al-Qa`ida has a clear strategic vision. This crucially important 
background information will provide the context for the assessment of 
the group’s threat to U.S. critical infrastructure in the following chapter.  
 
 
Al-Qa`ida: Origins and Early Period 
 
Al-Qa`ida (the “Base” or “Foundation”) is a transnational Islamist 
terrorist organization that was created by Usama bin Ladin and his 
closest advisors near the end of the decade-long Afghan resistance war 
that took place between 1979 and 1989. Despite the availability of a 
wealth of information concerning al-Qa`ida’s evolution during the 
1990s, certain details about the organization’s origins and early history 
still remain unclear. It is generally accepted that `Abdallah `Azzam, an 
early spiritual mentor of Bin Ladin’s, and the wealthy scion of a 
construction empire in Saudi Arabia operated the Maktab al-Khidamat li-
I 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Sundara Vadlamudi. 
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al-Mujahidin (MAK: Mujahidin Services Bureau) to help organize and 
administer the recruitment and deployment of Arab volunteers who 
wished to participate in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. 
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, `Azzam 
and Bin Ladin decided to make use of the MAK’s infrastructure, which 
included a registry of Arab fighters, to create a transnational network of 
mujahidin known as al-Qa`ida.26 Even though this version is not entirely 
inaccurate, it both overlooks and ignores certain key events and 
influences. A careful examination of the information recently revealed 
by captured al-Qa`ida operatives and former mujahidin who participated 
in the fight against the Soviet army provides new information regarding 
the origins of al-Qa`ida. 
 
`Abdallah `Azzam was the ideational fountainhead for developing an 
Islamic army for fighting against the oppression of Muslims in every part 
of the world. In 1988, he outlined this concept in the al-Jihad magazine 
published by MAK: 
 
Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, 
while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks 
and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly 
nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives 
everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this 
ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer, endless and 
difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of 
life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and 
manifest itself. This vanguard constitutes al-Qa`idah al-
Sulbah [the solid foundation] for the expected society.27
 
Despite advocating the creation of an Islamic “rapid reaction force,” 
`Azzam did not immediately intend to wage jihad against pro-Western 
Muslim regimes in the Middle East. Indeed, he was primarily interested 
in forming an Islamic government in Afghanistan and using Afghanistan 
as a launching pad for the liberation of Palestine.28
 
                                                 
26 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) p. 56; 
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley, 
2002) pp. 5-6. 
27 `Abdallah `Azzam, “Al-Qa`ida al-Sulba,” Al-Jihad 41 (April 1988) p. 46. Cited in 
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 4-5. Emphasis added. 
28 Fawwaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge 
University, 2005), p. 135. 
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Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s on,29 Bin Ladin had established separate 
training camps for Arab volunteers and become increasingly influenced 
by operatives from the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization).30 
Towards the end of the Afghan war, differences emerged between 
`Azzam and Bin Ladin over the role of Arabs in the Afghan war and the 
future utility of the Arab mujahidin who had gained combat experience 
during the war.31 `Azzam viewed the Arab volunteers’ primary role as 
the provision of assistance to the Afghans in their efforts to reclaim their 
land from the occupying Soviet aggressors; whereas Bin Ladin began to 
view the Afghan war as a means by which the Arab volunteers could 
gain valuable combat experience that could then be used elsewhere. As a 
result of such differences, `Azzam’s role in creating a transnational 
jihadist network to target the U.S., the network that eventually became 
known as al-Qa`ida, was clearly limited.32 In fact, the minutes from one 
of the earliest meetings of al-Qa`ida does not even include `Azzam’s 
name in the list of attendees.33 In sum, Bin Ladin and his associates built 
upon and considerably expanded `Azzam’s original concept for the 
creation of an Islamic army, and during the 1990s this embryonic 
paramilitary force evolved into a transnational terrorist organization.34
                                                 
29 According to Hutayfa `Azzam, the son of `Abdallah `Azzam, Bin Ladin opened his 
first military camp in Jalalabad in 1987. See Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I 
Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 62. 
30 Several sources indicate that Bin Ladin formed separate military training camps for 
the Arab volunteers, and he himself stated that “Abu Ubaidah al Banjshiri established 
the training camps for our mujahideen against Russia’s terrorism during the 1980s. We 
used to call the training camp al Qaeda. And the name stayed.” See Bin Ladin’s 
interview with Taysir Alouni in October 2001. cited in Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I 
Know, p. 74. Compare the comments of Abu Jandal, Bin Ladin’s bodyguard, who 
described the latter’s opening of a military training camp called al-Faruq. See Khalid al-
Hamadi, “An Insider’s View of Al-Qa’ida as Narrated by Abu-Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), 
Bin-Ladin’s Bodyguard (4),” Al-Quds al-`Arabi, March 22, 2005. p. 19; Another 
veteran Arab Afghan, `Abd al-Rabbuh al-Surayhi, who participated in the Afghan war 
along with Bin Ladin, also described the camps run by the latter, but provided different 
names for them. See Hasin al-Banyan, “The Oldest Arab Afghan Talks to Al-Sharq al-
Awsat About his Career That Finally Landed him in Prison in Saudi Arabia,” Al-Sharq 
al-Awsat, November 25, 2001, p. 6; For more information on the influence of the 
Egyptians on Bin Ladin, compare Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp. 81-3; and 
Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 134-6. 
31 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp. 47-8. 
32 In fact `Azzam eschewed terrorism and explicitly warned that without proper 
guidance the jihadists could be transformed into “bandits that might threaten people’s 
security and would not let them live in peace.” See Gerges, Far Enemy, p. 136. 
33 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p. 80. This meeting occurred on August 18-
20, 1988. 
34 During the early years of al-Qa`ida, it could be argued that Bin Ladin did not intend 
to attack the United States. His overwhelming desire to attack U.S. targets developed 
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In its early years, al-Qa`ida operated military camps that provided 
rigorous physical and mental training. The characteristics of potential 
recruits were scrutinized in great detail, and the would-be applicants had 
to meet stringent selection criteria in order to be included in the 
organization.35 After the selection process, those selected were forced to 
undergo a strict training regimen. Indeed, a former Arab veteran of the 
Afghan war even claimed that the selection process matched that of the 
U.S. Special forces in its emphasis on the ability to endure tough 
physical conditions.36 The training camps were run by the Egyptians, and 
their salaries were paid by Bin Ladin.37 These camps continued to 
operate even after al-Qa`ida’s leader left Afghanistan in 1989. 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida’s Pre-9/11 Organizational Structure 
 
Efforts to describe al-Qa`ida’s organizational structure during both the 
pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods have been hampered by the lack of 
detailed information available in the public domain. Al-Qa`ida followed 
a combination of top-down and bottom-up decision-making processes, 
which serves to complicate the process of identifying the nodes of 
authority in the structure. Tribal and ethnic affiliations sometimes 
created parallel or alternate lines of authority that added additional 
“unofficial” layers of structural complexity.38 In recent years, however, 
partial details of the group’s organizational structure have been revealed 
during the interrogation of captured al-Qa`ida operatives, trial 
proceedings of several al-Qa`ida members, memoirs and interviews of 
several people belonging to al-Qa`ida or other groups that were affiliated 
                                                                                                                       
after Saudi Arabia agreed to the stationing of U.S. troops on its soil following Saddam 
Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait. Gerges also stresses that militant Islamist groups only 
began to focus on the “far enemy,” i.e., the United States, during the mid-1990s. See 
Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 1-15. It should be emphasized that throughout the 1990s, al-
Qa`ida operatives and affiliated group members participated in several conflicts around 
the world, which they viewed as involving the oppression of Muslims. Thus, al-Qa`ida 
mujahidin continued to operate as a paramilitary force even as they conducted terrorist 
attacks against the U.S. 
35 al-Banyan, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, p. 6. 
36 See Ayman Faraj, Memoirs of an Afghan Arab [in Arabic] (Cairo, 2002), pp. 24-41. 
Cited in Gerges, Far Enemy, p. 308. 
37 al-Banyan, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, p. 6; According to Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, a senior al-
Qa`ida leader, the Egyptians, who were probably members of the Tanzim al-Jihad 
(author’s note) and were not necessarily part of al-Qa`ida, greatly assisted Bin Ladin in 
building al-Qa`ida. See Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp. 114-16. 
38 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 76-7. 
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with al-Qa`ida, and the research conducted by investigative journalists. 
Based on the available information, al-Qa`ida’s organizational structure 
can essentially be depicted as a four-tiered structure:39  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Al-Qa`ida’s Four-Tiered Structure 
 
 
                                                 
39 This scheme has been outlined in various contexts by Jeffrey M. Bale. Several others 
have also attempted to describe the organizational structure of al-Qa`ida. For example, 
according to Gunaratna, “[Al Qaeda] comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, 
satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties and other 
largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other 
responsibilities. Leaders of all of the above are co-opted as and when necessary to serve 
as an integral part of Al Qaeda’s high command, which is run via a vertical leadership 
structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network 
of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations.” See Gunaratna, Inside Al 
Qaeda, p. 73. In contrast, Jason Burke presents a model in which al-Qa`ida consists of 
three elements: the “al-Qa`ida hardcore” which consists of Bin Ladin’s aides who have 
remained with him since the Afghan war and about 100 skilled operatives who joined 
the group during the 1990s; a diffuse set of Islamist groups worldwide who are 
affiliated with al-Qa`ida at varying levels of collaboration; and lastly an al-Qa`ida 
ideology or worldview that is shared by many who have no organizational links to Bin 
Ladin. See Burke, Al Qaeda, pp. 13-16. 
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Al-Qa`ida Core Leadership Group 
 
The al-Qa`ida core group consists of experienced members who were 
either associated with Bin Ladin since the founding of al-Qa`ida or 
highly skilled personnel whose utility and integrity were regarded as 
useful to the organization.40 Bin Ladin is regarded as the `amir 
(commander) and is considered to be the final authority on all critical 
issues. The majlis al-shura (Consultative Council) consisted of a 
relatively small advisory group that discussed and deliberated on all 
important issues, but Bin Ladin had the power to overrule the others 
even if a majority in the majlis al-shura held a different opinion. Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad, the chief 9/11 planner, indicated that 
 
Shurah council in al Qaeda is not a Board of Directors or a war 
operations room as you know it. It is an advisory board for Bin 
Ladin or Abu Hafs al-Masri, unlike what you have in the West. 
For you, ruling is by the majority of votes. However, if the 
Shurah council at a1-Qaeda, the highest authority in the 
organization, had a majority of 98 percent on a resolution and 
it is opposed by Bin Ladin, he has the right to cancel the 
resolution because it is only consultative to him and not 
binding.41
  
The majlis al-shura supervised the activities of several committees, and 
it is highly likely that the head of each committee was a member of the 
majlis al-shura, although the membership of the Council was not strictly 
limited in membership to the heads of the committees. Some reports 
have suggested that the hierarchical structure of al-Qa`ida’s core 
developed after Bin Ladin returned to Afghanistan from the Sudan in 
1996.42 However that may be, al-Qa`ida possessed a strict hierarchical 
structure with a clear delineation of labor by the early 1990s.43
                                                 
40 Among the early members of the majlis al-shura were Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri, Abu 
Hafs al-Masri, Abu al-Walid al-Masri, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
41 [Central Intelligence Agency], “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed,” United States v. Zacarias Moussoui. Defendant’s Exhibit. Cr. No. 01-
455-A.  
42 Burke, Al Qaeda, p. 14. 
43 According to Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, an early al-Qa`ida member who tried to 
kill the exiled Afghan ruler King Zahir Shah, al-Qa`ida recruits were divided into 
several camps. Santos himself tried to gain membership into the technological group, 
but was assigned to an analysis group after he failed the test for entering the technology 
group. Even at that early date, around 1990, Santos claimed that he was assigned the 
task of reading newspapers and presenting analyses of current events. See Bergen, The 
Osama bin Laden I Know, p. 118. 
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Figure 3.2. Al-Qa`ida Majlis al-Shura and Committees 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida Rank and File 
 
The al-Qa`ida rank and file included between several hundred and a few 
thousand lower-ranking volunteers who were trained in al-Qa`ida’s 
military camps. An accurate figure is not available, and the difficulty in 
determining the exact number is further compounded by the fact that 
only a small portion of the volunteers who received training in al-
Qa`ida’s camps became actual group members.44 Strictly speaking, only 
the group’s core leadership and its official rank-and-file members can be 
said to belong, organizationally speaking, to al-Qa`ida proper. Moreover, 
volunteers who wished to become al-Qa`ida members were urged to 
pledge an oath of personal allegiance (ba`ya) to Bin Ladin. Even though 
this was not a necessary condition for becoming a member, during his 
interrogations Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) revealed that senior 
members were strongly advised to pledge allegiance to Bin Ladin.45 The 
pledge of allegiance to bin Ladin was performed in secrecy, and for this 
reason even Bin Ladin’s closest aides were not always aware of the 
identity of al-Qa`ida members among the multitudes of people who were 
present at the training camps.46 The members were organized in a 
                                                 
44 The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that the number of 
trainees who passed through al-Qa`ida’s training camps was roughly 18,000. The CIA 
estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 trainees passed through the group’s training 
camps up until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. The CIA believes 
that the actual number of al-Qa`ida members ranges from a low of several hundred to a 
high of 5,000. For the IISS estimate, see Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of al-
Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27:6 
(November-December 2004), p. 552. 
45 “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” pp. 52-55. 
46 al-Hamadi, Al-Quds al-`Arabi. p. 19. 
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hierarchical fashion and expected to perform a variety of tasks according 
to their abilities and predilections. 
   
 
Al-Qa`ida-Affiliated Groups 
 
From the outset al-Qa`ida maintained loose affiliations with several 
jihadist groups and their members, despite the fact that they shared only 
a few common objectives. After Bin Ladin moved to the Sudan in 1991, 
he formed an “Islamic Army Shura,” composed of the al-Qa`ida shura 
and those of other groups, which was designed to serve as a coordinating 
body for a consortium of terrorist groups. Some of the groups that were 
affiliated with al-Qa`ida were chiefly interested in targeting “apostate” 
regimes in their own countries or in waging local conflicts, although al-
Qa`ida itself was by then focused primarily on the “far enemy” – the 
United States. The Islamic Army Shura included groups from Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea.47 In addition, Bin Ladin maintained 
loose collaborations with groups from Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Myanmar.48 For example, 
he provided equipment and training to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. Furthermore, al-Qa`ida 
and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI: Islamic Community) reached an agreement in 
which the latter organization promised to conduct surveillance of targets 
and help acquire bomb-making materials and other supplies, in exchange 
for which al-Qa`ida promised to finance operations in Southeast Asia, 
provide bomb-making expertise, and deliver operatives. In another 
instance, Bin Ladin provided the Groupe Islamique Combattant 
Marocain (GICM: Moroccan Islamic Combat Group) with $3,000, and 
also promised to train its members.49 The Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour 
la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Fighting) has also publicly announced its support for al-Qa`ida’s policy 
of attacking the U.S.,50 even though there is no evidence to suggest that 
leaders or members of the group have pledged personal allegiance to al-
Qa`ida. Other groups with links to al-Qa`ida include the Groupe 
                                                 
47 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 58-59.  
48 Ibid. 
49 See Ibid., p. 58, p. 151; and Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p. 279; In some 
circumstances, al-Qa`ida received assistance from its affiliated groups. For example, 
Tanzim al-Jihad members trained al-Qa`ida members to carry out specialized military 
and underground activities. See Gerges, Far Enemy, p. 119. 
50 “Algerian group backs al-Qaeda,” BBC, October 23, 2003. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3207363.stm.   
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Islamique Armé (GIA: Armed Islamic Group), the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU),51 the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and `Usbat al-
Ansar in Lebanon.52
 
In February 1998 Bin Ladin announced the formation of the World 
Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders – later known as the 
World Islamic Front (WIF) – with four other Islamist groups, namely, a 
faction of the Tanzim al-Jihad, al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
Group), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), and the Jihad Movement in 
Bangladesh. The statement, signed by Bin Ladin and representatives of 
each of the four groups, stressed that every Muslim is obligated to kill 
Americans and their allies wherever possible.53 Since its formation, the 
composition of this coalition has undergone some changes. In July 1998 
Rifa`i Ahmad Taha, who signed the statement on behalf of al-Jama`a al-
Islamiyya, publicly retracted his signature and denounced the World 
Islamic Front’s intentions to attack the U.S.54 In the most recent 
incarnation, Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, the widely known Jordanian 
terrorist operating in Iraq, pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin in October 
2004 and his inclusion into WIF was accepted by al-Qa`ida’s historic 
leader.55 In November 2005, the Moroccan authorities arrested 17 
members of a cell that was attempting to form an al-Qa`ida-affiliated 
group in the Arab-Maghrib region. The members planned to model the 
group after al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al-Qa`ida in 
the Land of the Two Rivers, i.e., Mesopotamia), which they intended to 
                                                 
51 After the death of Juma Namangani, the IMU’s charismatic leader, its maintenance of 
links to al-Qa`ida seem to be less clear. The group has since changed its name to the 
Islamic Party of Turkestan, partly in an attempt to expand its scope of operations. See 
“Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
Accessible at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/imu.htm. 
52 Kenneth Katzman, “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” CRS Report for 
Congress: RL33038, August 17, 2005. pp. 10-11. 
53 The statement was signed by Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri on behalf of Tanzim al-
Jihad, Abu Yasir Rifa`i Ahmad Taha on behalf of al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya (Islamic 
Group), Shaykh Mir Hamza on behalf of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), and Fazlur 
Rahman representing the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. 
54 See Gerges, Far Enemy, p. 155; and David Hirst, “Islam’s Holy Warriors Break 
Ranks; A change of heart before the embassy bombings has exposed divisions among 
fundamentalists,” The Guardian, August 15, 1998, p. 16. 
55 Dexter Filkins, “Wanted Rebel Vows Loyalty to bin Laden, Web Sites Say,” The 
New York Times, October 18, 2004. After pledging allegiance to Bin Ladin, al-Zarqawi 
changed the name of his terror group from the Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Unity of 
God and Jihad Association) to al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. 
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call the Tanzim al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-`Arabi (the Al-Qa`ida 
Organization in the Arab Maghrib Countries).56
 
 
Independent Cells Inspired by al-Qa`ida 
 
The final tier in al-Qa`ida’s organizational structure consists of 
individuals or groups of individuals who are inspired by al-Qa`ida’s 
jihadist ideology and thence decide to carry out attacks in support of that 
ideology. Bin Ladin himself has claimed that his role is to increase the 
awareness of the umma about the plight of fellow Muslims, and stresses 
the importance of waging jihad to liberate the umma.57 The proliferation 
of these independent “self-radicalized” cells arguably poses as much of a 
threat, if not more of one, to the U.S. and other countries than al-Qa`ida 
proper,58 since these cells, united only by their anti-Western worldviews 
and inspired to take action by al-Qa`ida, present the greatest detection 
challenge for intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. The situation is 
exacerbated when these cells are formed by domestic volunteers who can 
blend into the local social and cultural setting. Such “al-Qa`idist” cells 
have already carried out several attacks in Europe.59  
 
 
Al-Qa`ida since 9/11 
 
In October 2001, following the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, the U.S. attacked 
Afghanistan, removed the Taliban regime, and destroyed al-Qa`ida’s safe 
                                                 
56 As part of the scheme, the cell members planned to formalize the relationship 
between the GSPC and al-Qa`ida by pledging an oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin. See 
“Moroccan Sources Detail Terrorist Cell’s Plan for Saudi Arabia, Arab Maghreb,” Al-
Sharq al-Awsat, December 6, 2005; and “Al-Hayah Cites Detainees on Moroccan Al-
Qa’da Group That Enlists Volunteers for Iraq,” Al-Hayah, November 29, 2005, p. 1.   
57 Michael Scheuer, “Coalition Warfare: How Al-Qaeda Uses the World Islamic Front 
Against Crusaders and Jews, Part I,” Terrorism Focus [Jamestown Foundation] 2:7 
(March 31, 2005). 
58 “PDDNI Address the AFCEA San Antonio Chapter,” April 25, 2006. 
http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060425_speech.htm.  
59 The London train bombings in July 2005 were carried out by a local cell inspired by 
al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Compare David Crawford and Keith Johnson, “New Terror 
Threat in EU: Extremists with Passports,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2004; 
Mark Trevelyan, “Local cell, web role link London and Madrid probes,” Reuters, April 
11, 2006; and Mark Townsend, “Leak reveals official story of London bombings,” 
Observer, April 9, 2006. 
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sanctuaries in that country. As a result, al-Qa`ida lost much of its original 
infrastructure, and many of its cadres were either killed or captured 
during the campaign.60 A recent report has stated that “about 3,000 
suspected Al Qaeda members have been detained or arrested by about 90 
countries, of which 650 are under U.S. control.”61 However, several 
senior al-Qa`ida leaders, including Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and Sayf al-
Adl, and mid-level operatives managed to evade capture. In the months 
following the American attack on Afghanistan, al-Qa`ida’s ability to 
carry out attacks was greatly diminished. However, beginning in 2002, 
the organization and its affiliates have managed to carry out several 
successful operations.62 Indeed, postings on al-Qa`ida forums have 
suggested that the group has emerged even stronger, since it has 
managed to carry out two major attacks every year since 9/11, as against 
carrying out a single major attack every two years prior to 9/11.63
 
The net impact of the U.S.-led war on terror on al-Qa`ida’s ability to 
carry out large-scale attacks against U.S. remains unclear. In looking at 
the organization’s evolution since 9/11, four broad trends become 
apparent. First, al-Qa`ida has adopted an increasingly decentralized 
organizational structure as a result of the loss of its safe operating 
sanctuaries in Afghanistan and other countries. Khalid Shaykh 
Muhammad, the operational planner of the 9/11 attacks, claimed that the 
                                                 
60 The precise number of key al-Qa`ida members who have been captured or killed 
remains unknown. Some vague numbers are available in the public domain. President 
Bush, during his re-election campaign, stated that “more than three-quarters of al-
Qaeda’s key members and associates have been detained or killed.” On earlier 
occasions, in a televised speech on September 7, 2003 and the State of the Union 
message on January 20, 2004, he claimed that more than two-thirds of “known al qaeda 
members” have been captured or killed. Some experts have stated that the change in the 
terminology from “known al qaeda members” to “al Qaeda’s key members and 
associates” increases the size of the group as well as the vagueness of the claim. See 
“President’s Remarks at the 2004 Republican National Convention,” September 2, 
2004., available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-
2.html; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Catching Al Qaeda,” Newsweek, 
September 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5945061/site/newsweek/.  
61 Katzman, “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment.” This report indicates that 37 
top al-Qa`ida members have been identified by the U.S. government. A separate news 
report in 2004 claimed that 14 members on the then list of approximately 30 “high 
value targets” were dead or detained. See Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, 
“Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” The Washington Post, October 22, 2004, p. 
A1.  
62 Since October 2001, al-Qa`ida and its affiliates have launched major attacks in 
Tunisia, Pakistan, Indonesia (Bali), Yemen, and Kuwait. See Hoffman, “The Changing 
Face of Al Qaeda,” p. 551. 
63 Ibid., p. 552. 
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group was forced to provide more autonomy to field commanders due to 
destruction of its communication networks during the war in 
Afghanistan.64 Al-Qa`ida also suffered a steady attrition of its top 
leadership.65 Nevertheless, the organization has managed to replace its 
senior and mid-level operational leaders from its vast reserves of trained 
cadres.66
 
Second, and closely linked to the first phenomenon, in recent years there 
has been a proliferation of al-Qa`ida cells and affiliated groups in several 
countries. To be sure, in some instances security agencies belatedly 
uncovered the presence of al-Qa`ida cells that had been established long 
before 9/11. Nevertheless, it appears that the group has increased its 
presence and established new operational and support networks in 
several regions, particularly East Africa, Western Europe, and Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Third, al-Qa`ida has suffered significant financial losses. Since 9/11, 
group assets worth more than $120 million have been frozen.67 Even so, 
the destruction of training camps in Afghanistan is believed to have 
greatly reduced al-Qa`ida’s annual operating costs.68 Hence the 
organization has managed to survive financial sanctions as a result of the 
reduction in its financial needs. Moreover, information regarding al-
Qa`ida’s sources of funding has been relatively scarce, and this situation 
                                                 
64 Christian Lamb, “Focus: The Confessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Times, 
March 28, 2004. According to the interrogation reports, KSM claimed that “[after 9/11] 
we were immediately on the run …there was no longer a war room or shura and 
operatives had more autonomy.” See ibid. 
65 Since 9/11, al-Qa`ida has lost Abu Hafs al-Masri (the head of its military committee 
killed in a U.S. air strike), Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (the 9/11 planner captured in 
Pakistan), Abu Zubayda (a senior operational manager captured in Pakistan), and 
Ramzi bin al-Shayb (a key coordinator for 9/11 captured in Pakistan). Several other 
senior al-Qa`ida operatives have been captured or killed, but its figureheads, Bin Ladin 
himself and al-Zawahiri, remain at large. Moreover, several capable regional 
commanders (such as al-Zarqawi) have emerged to replenish the ranks of the group’s 
operational commanders. 
66 Compare David Johnston and David E. Sanger, “New Generation of Leaders Is 
Emerging For Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, August 10, 2004; and Dan Eggen and 
John Lancaster, “Al Qaeda Shows New Signs of Life,” The Washington Post, August 
14, 2004. 
67 Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda,” p. 553.  
68 According to the CIA, prior to 9/11 al-Qa`ida needed about $30 million annually to 
fund its activities. Of this amount, about $10-$20 million was paid to the Taliban for 
providing sanctuary. A major portion of the remaining sum was spent on managing the 
training camps. Only a small portion of the money was spent on financing terrorist 
attacks. See 9/11 Commission Report, p. 171. 
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is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Bin Ladin has 
acknowledged in an interview that al-Qa`ida possesses three alternative 
financial systems that are independent of each other.69
 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Bin Ladin and other al-Qa`ida 
leaders have recast the organization as an international Islamic insurgent 
movement and have helped to spawn an unknown number of jihadist 
cells that adhere to its worldview and objectives, but which do not have 
to be subsidized by the organization’s own resources. Another key 
element in al-Qa`ida’s ongoing transformation is its ever-increasing 
exploitation of the internet, which will be briefly summarized below. 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida’s Cyber Operations 
 
Prior to 9/11 al-Qa`ida operated only one website, al-Nida 
(www.alneda.com). Currently, more than 50 websites are linked to al-
Qa`ida.70 The organization is certainly not the only terrorist organization 
to use the internet, since these days almost every significant terrorist 
group has an internet presence.71 Gabriel Weimann, who has extensively 
studied terrorist use of the internet, identifies eight different ways in 
which terrorists utilize the internet, for psychological warfare, publicity 
and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilization, 
networking, sharing information, and planning and coordination.72 This 
is seconded by Bruce Hoffman, who notes that al-Qa`ida uses the 
internet to perform the following three critical functions:73
 
1. Propaganda for recruitment and fund-raising and to shape public 
opinion in the Muslim world 
2. Terrorist training and instruction, and 
3. Operational planning for attacks through both e-mail 
communication and the access it provides to an array of useful 
open source information. 
 
                                                 
69 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp. 315-16. 
70 Bruce Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists,” Testimony before 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, May 
4, 2006, p. 6 
71 Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report 116, March 2004, p. 3. 
72 Ibid., pp. 5-10. 
73 Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists,” p. 6. 
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These websites are multi-functional. Some of the sites act as message 
boards that serve as discussion areas in which members can request 
assistance on operational issues, discuss and debate the theological 
validity of certain operations, and express their opinions and concerns 
about current events. Other sites function as operational hubs and contain 
“strategic” and military jihadist literature. Still others serve as hosts for 
presenting the information of the group’s ideologues and theoreticians.74 
There are also some that perform all of these functions. 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida Today 
 
Since the launch of the U.S.-led war on terrorism al-Qa`ida, through its 
autonomous field commanders, loosely connected affiliate groups, and 
independent “self-starter” cells, has carried out several major attacks and 
dozens of lesser attacks. Certain of al-Qa`ida’s strategists have suggested 
that the 9/11 attacks were part and parcel of a multi-stage effort to re-
establish the Islamic caliphate.75 Despite such post-facto rationalizations, 
it is evident that the war on terrorism succeeded in destroying al-
Qa`ida’s original infrastructure in Afghanistan and severely disrupting its 
worldwide operational and support networks. However, the group has 
managed to survive the international campaign directed against it by 
adopting a more flexible organizational structure. During the past four 
years, aided by the internet and the periodic appearance of audio and 
video messages from Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qa`ida 
spokemen, the organization has been transformed into more of an 
international movement than a terrorist group in the narrowest sense of 
that term. According to a U.S. State Department report, “[d]uring 
2005…it appeared that al-Qa`ida senior leadership often inspired 
terrorist activity bit could not direct it as fully as in the past.” The report 
goes on to suggest that “[in the future there] could be a larger number of 
smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than 
                                                 
74 Lawrence Wright, “The Terror Web,” The New Yorker, August 2, 2004. 
75 Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, alias Sayf al-Adl, formulated a seven-stage plan to re-
establish the Islamic caliphate. Al-Adl states that “Al-Qa`ida leaders drew up a plan to 
deal a strike to the head of the serpent and cause it to lose consciousness and act 
chaotically against those who attacked it.” The plan, which was outlined in a book on 
Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi by Jordanian journalist Fu`ad Husayn, will be discussed in the 
section immediately below. 
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transnational in scope.”76 It remains to be seen whether this 
prognostication is warranted. 
 
 
AL-QA`IDA’S STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE 
QUESTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE*
 
Assessing the degree to which al-Qa`ida is interested in targeting critical 
infrastructure, whether on American soil or overseas, is a difficult 
proposition. The reason that it is so difficult is because properly 
assessing al-Qa`ida’s general strategic objectives, much less the precise 
means it intends to employ in the future to achieve those objectives, is 
itself a formidable task.77 This might appear to be a counterintuitive if 
not a nonsensical claim. After all, al-Qa`ida and the various Islamist 
terrorist organizations with which it is affiliated have been attacking the 
United States and its Arab and European allies for over a decade, and 
these attacks should in and of themselves reveal distinctive patterns of 
action and provide careful observers with a reasonably clear idea of what 
their operational objectives are. Moreover, Usama bin Ladin, his 
lieutenants, and his supporters have often publicly announced their 
supposed political and strategic objectives in an effort to influence the 
                                                 
76 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2005), chapter 2, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64332.htm. 
* This section was prepared by Jeffrey M. Bale. 
77 Indeed, even using the term “strategy” is somewhat problematic when discussing 
relatively small, sectarian extremist groups which rarely if ever field conventional 
military forces or employ conventional military methods. The word, which derives 
from the ancient Greek term strategia (meaning “generalship”), has both a general 
meaning and one that is specifically related to the conduct of military operations. In the 
general sense, it can be defined as “a plan of action or policy designed to achieve a 
major or overall aim,” whereas in a narrowly military context it signifies “the art of 
planning and directing overall military operations and movements” in a war or 
campaign. See The Oxford American English Dictionary (New York: G. P. Putnam, 
2002), p. 1361. In the latter context, it is usually distinguished from the term “tactics,” 
which refers to “the art of disposing armed forces in order of battle and of organizing 
operations, especially during contact with the enemy,” i.e., the actual disposition and 
maneuvering of forces on the battlefield. See Ibid., p. 1407. There are, of course, 
further distinctions that can be drawn between “grand strategy” (which refers to the 
most general decisions made concerning the deployment of armed forces to achieve 
national policies), “strategy,” “grand tactics” (which concerns the maneuvering of 
forces in a particular region prior to engaging in battle), and “tactics,” but these not 
concern us here. For our purposes, the terms “strategy” and “strategic” will be used 
loosely to refer both to al-Qa`ida’s broader political objectives and the quasi-military 
operational methods they have opted to employ to achieve those objectives. 
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perception and behavior of their enemies and followers. Yet these 
sources alone cannot, if not properly interpreted, provide us with a clear 
picture of al-Qa`ida’s strategic thinking. First of all, the pattern of al-
Qa`ida attacks, to the extent that such a pattern exists and is discernable, 
has not only evolved over time but must be viewed from the enemy’s 
own point of view. Second, al-Qa`ida’s proclaimed rationales for 
carrying out its terrorist assaults, both those that it has launched in the 
past and those that it threatens to make in the future, can rarely if ever be 
taken at face value. 
 
These intrinsic problems have been further compounded because 
intelligence and military analysts in the U.S. and Europe who are 
charged with comprehending and interdicting jihadist terrorism have all 
too often employed entirely secular, materialistic types of reasoning and 
exclusively Western military frames of reference, above all – whether 
consciously or not – certain ideas derived from well-known nineteenth-
century military theorists such as the Prussian officer Carl von 
Clausewitz (1780-1831),78 in an effort to explain what it is that al-Qa`ida 
is currently up to.79 Unfortunately, this is a classic case of analytical 
“mirror-imaging,” since to the extent that transnational jihadists operate 
on the basis of some sort of military logic and rationality, which remains 
debatable, it is often a logic and rationality rooted in a profoundly 
religious worldview that is intrinsically non-rational and arguably both 
utopian and delusional in terms of its intermediate and ultimate aims. 
Indeed, one might carry this argument further and suggest that al-Qa`ida 
                                                 
78 For more on Clausewitz’s ideas about war and its relation to politics, see especially 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1989). For scholarly analyses of his ideas and their 
influence on modern strategic thought, see Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on 
Clausewitz and the History of Military Power (Princeton: Princeton University, 1993), 
especially Part Two; and idem and Gordon A. Craig, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy 
from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University, 1986), especially 
chapter 7. Klausewitz’s most famous maxim is that “War is the continuation of politics 
by other means.” This alone should imply that his ideas have little or no relation to 
those held by Usama bin Ladin. 
79 Even al-Qa`ida military analysts have pointed out the shortcomings of Clausewitzian 
approaches. Note, e.g., the comments of Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, which in this case 
concern the impact of al-Qa`ida’s organizational structure on U.S. military analyses and 
actions: “America today is facing a huge problem with Clausewitz’s theories. The latter 
are premised on the existence of a centralized hostile power with a unified command. 
Assuredly, the mujahidin, with the al-Qa`ida organization in their vanguard, believe in 
decentralized organizations. Thus the enemy cannot ascertain the [mujahidin’s] center 
of gravity, let alone aim a mortal blow at it.” See Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, “A Lesson 
War,” Al-Ansar, December 19, 2002. 
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is prone to engage in a peculiar form of “magical thinking,”80 in this case 
one that is derived from essentially theological precepts associated with 
Islam. Hence the group’s strategic reasoning, such as it is, is generally 
based on radically different principles than those which are characteristic 
of sovereign nation-states or conventional Western military forces. 
 
 
Organizational Factors 
 
Before actually turning to the question of al-Qa`ida’s strategic concepts 
and objectives, it is necessary to highlight how the group’s complex 
organizational structure may affect the implementation of those 
objectives. As has been noted above, al-Qa`ida proper is a relatively 
small organization, numerically speaking, which is divided into two 
basic levels. First, there are a few dozen members of the Majlis al-Shura 
(Consultative Council), which is internally subdivided into several 
committees, one of which is concerned explicitly with military affairs.81 
This council effectively constitutes the strategic directorate or officer 
corps of the group. Second, al-Qa`ida consists of somewhere between 
several hundred and several thousand rank-and-file members who take 
their marching orders directly from leading figures in the Majlis al-
Shura.82 That is essentially all there is to al-Qa`ida as an actual 
organization. If Bin Ladin or his principal lieutenants wish to organize an 
attack themselves, they will either employ existing members of al-
Qa`ida’s rank-and-file or recruit suitable volunteers who have already 
                                                 
80 “Magical thinking” is a term that seems to have been used first by nineteenth-century 
cultural anthropologists who sought to explain how members of traditional societies 
viewed the world, in particular the manner in which they explained natural phenomena 
in a pre-scientific context. Perhaps the most notable characteristic of magical thinking 
has to do with misperceiving or misunderstanding causation processes by, e.g., 
confusing correlation with causation. One of the classic examples of magical thinking 
was provided by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Magic, and Oracles among the 
Azande (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), concerning the Azande’s explanation for why a 
roof collapsed onto a particular individual, which was attributed to witchcraft rather 
than natural causes. 
81 This is somewhat misleading, however, insofar as it suggests that the other 
committees of the Majlis al-Shura are concerned primarily with “non-military” affairs. 
In fact, what the military committee is concerned with are operational matters, whereas 
the financial committee and training committees are both concerned with logistical 
matters and the so-called fatwa committee is concerned with evaluating the religious 
appropriateness of the tangible actions to be undertaken by the group. 
82 The precise number of rank-and-file members has fluctuated considerably over time, 
and probably reached its lowest ebb after the U.S. military and its Afghan allies toppled 
the Taliban regime and drove the surviving al-Qa`ida fighters across the Afghan 
frontier into the Pushtun tribal zones of Pakistan. 
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received – or are currently receiving – training from those rank-and-file 
members in the group’s camps. Strictly speaking, if one was limiting 
one’s analysis to al-Qa`ida as an organization, it would only be necessary 
to consider the actions carried out by its rank-and-file members or those 
seemingly promising individuals who its leaders had recruited 
specifically to carry out particular operations, wherever in the world they 
may be operating. 
Unfortunately, there is much more to the Islamist terrorist threat than that 
which is represented by the leaders and rank-and-file members of the al-
Qa`ida organization. The issue under consideration here is complicated 
enormously by two developments that have been discussed above in the 
section on al-Qa`ida’s historical evolution and transformation. First, al-
Qa`ida has established affiliations with a host of other Islamist terrorist 
organizations or factions thereof, both within and outside of the Middle 
East. These affiliated groups and factions have more or less officially 
embraced al-Qa`ida’s transnational jihadist agenda, including its 
emphasis on attacking the “far enemy,” i.e., the United States. At the 
same time, they have not entirely abandoned their former local, national, 
or regional concerns and objectives, much less their armed struggles 
against the “near enemy” in their respective areas. There is no doubt, for 
example, that proclaimed supporters of a global jihad such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah in Indonesia, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le 
Combat (GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting) in Algeria, 
the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and the Groupe Islamique 
Combattant Marocain (GICM: Moroccan Islamic Combat Group) are 
still interested, perhaps even more so, in eventually overthrowing the 
“infidel” regimes in their own areas or countries. This should not come 
as a surprise, since despite his advocacy of a worldwide jihad Bin Ladin 
himself has retained a particular interest in destabilizing the Saudi 
regime in his own homeland, the “Land of the Two Holy Places,” and 
Zawahiri still remains embroiled in Egyptian Islamist infighting despite 
having left Egypt and opted to merge his own “internationalist” faction 
of the Tanzim al-Jihad into the al-Qa`ida organization to form Qa`idat al-
Jihad (the Base [or Foundation] of the Jihad).83
                                                 
83 Bin Ladin’s obsession with the apostasy of the Saudi regime and its ongoing 
persecution of radicals is frequently reflected in his public statements. Likewise, to this 
day al-Zawahiri is engaged in polemics with former jihadist comrades in Egypt over 
tactics and decision to renounce violent struggle. See, e.g., his bitter polemics between 
Muntasir al-Zayyat, which can in part be followed by comparing Montasser al-Zayyat, 
The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man (London: Pluto, 
2004), especially chapters 4-8, and al-Zawahiri, Fursan tahta rayat al-nabi`[Knights 
under the Prophet’s Banner], serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in December 2001, parts 
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Moreover, as many analysts have argued, in recent years al-Qa`ida has 
transmogrified from an actual, relatively delimited organization into a 
diffuse ideological current that nowadays serves to inspire hundreds of 
thousands if not millions of people across the Muslim world.84 Although 
only a small segment of this radicalized population may end up having 
recourse to terrorism, the result is an ever-growing increase in the threat 
posed by “self-starter” groups inspired by Bin Ladin’s ideology – which 
some have referred to as “Bin Ladinism” – but that typically have few if 
any tangible organizational, operational, or logistical connections to al-
Qa`ida itself. For example, although the final verdict is not yet in, it 
seems as though the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombings and the July 7, 
2005 London bombings were carried out mainly by small cells composed 
of disaffected Muslim citizens or permanent residents who, inspired to 
respond to the exhortations of al-Qa`ida and other jihadist spokesmen, 
endeavored to carry out devastating acts of violence against “infidel” 
Westerners at home.85 Although Bin Ladin has always claimed, 
sometimes disingenuously in an effort to conceal the actual operational 
involvement of al-Qa`ida, that his primary role was to function as an 
instigator rather than an actual organizer of jihadist actions, as time has 
gone on this has more and more turned out to be the case.86 What this 
                                                                                                                       
8-9. Compare also Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005), especially chapters 3 and 4. 
84 See, e.g., Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Taurus, 
2003), pp. 7-22; Erik Schechter, “Generic Jihad,” Jerusalem Post, December 5, 2003. 
85 For the Madrid bombings as the product of a purely local cell, see Daniel Benjamin 
and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy 
for Getting it Right (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), pp. 3-16. For the view that the 
Madrid cell was intimately linked to broader jihadist networks, including those linked 
to al-Qa`ida, see Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of 
International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), pp. 295-340. The most detailed 
accounts of the Madrid bombings are provided by Casimiro García-Abadillo, 11-M: La 
vengenza (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2004); José Maria Irujo, El agujero: España 
invadida por la yihad (Madrid: Santillana, 2005); Miguel Platón, 11-M: Como la Yihad 
puso de rodillas en España (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2005). For the ideological 
background of jihadist animosity toward Spain, see Gustavo de Arístegui, La Yihad en 
España: La obsesión por reconquistar Al-Andalus (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 
2005). For the 7/7 bombings, see the recent report by the British authorities, United 
Kingdom, House of Commons, Intelligence and Security Committee, Report of the 
Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005, 11 May 2006 (London: 
Stationery Office, 2006). 
86 For examples of Bin Ladin’s public and indeed proud claims to function as an 
instigator of jihadist terrorism, see Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The 
Statements of Osama Bin Laden (London and New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 69 (where 
he says it is his duty is to motivate the umma to wage jihad against the U.S., Israel, and 
their allies), 107-8 (where he admits that he incited “martyrs” to carry out the 9/11 
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means, effectively speaking, is that would-be “amateur” jihadists with no 
observable prior associations with al-Qa`ida or any other established 
Islamist terrorist groups may suddenly take it upon themselves to 
translate exhortations made by ideologues such as Bin Ladin and al-
Zawahiri into action – whether or not they understand or correctly 
interpret the strategic aims of those figures properly. In short, actions 
taken by individuals who claim to be inspired by Bin Ladin but who may 
not even be correctly divining his real aims can only complicate the 
analysis of the objectives of al-Qa`ida proper. That is why, for the 
purposes of this study, the focus has been on al-Qa`ida itself and its more 
or less “official” organizational branches. 
 
 
Ideological Factors: Are Al-Qa`ida’s Objectives Truly 
“Strategic”? 
 
There can be no doubt that specific military or paramilitary actions and 
operations carried out within the context of what is generally referred to 
as unconventional, asymmetric, or “fourth generation” warfare, like 
those carried out in the course of conventional wars, are generally 
intended to accomplish some objective. Such actions are rarely if ever 
utterly random, purely pathological, entirely whimsical, or so 
idiosyncratic in their etiology as to be incomprehensible to others, nor 
are they generally undertaken with no purpose at all in mind, initiated 
simply “for their own sake,” or carried out just because of a perceived 
need to do something, anything. Unless a particular political or military 
leader has suddenly descended into outright madness, i.e., mental illness 
in the clinical sense of that term, it must be assumed that his actions are 
directed towards some purpose. This is all the more true of terrorism per 
se, which by definition involves the carrying out of acts of violence that 
are specifically intended to influence the perceptions and behavior of 
wider target audiences. Terrorism is thus indisputably a technique or 
tactic that various parties adopt for purposive reasons.87
 
                                                                                                                       
attacks in “self-defense,” as well as inciting other attacks on Americans and Jews, 
which is a religious duty, and says that if this makes him a terrorist, so be it). 
87 Compare Daniel S. Gressang IV, “Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD 
Potential,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 91: “Terrorist 
actions are purposive acts, designed to produce, directly or indirectly, expected 
outcomes…Each act serves a purpose, whether the audience understands that purpose 
or not.” 
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To put it another way, although terrorists and other non-state actors 
rarely if ever engage in the sort of formal “cost-benefit” analyses that 
many social scientists futilely seek to model, and their “rationality” may 
not be comprehensible to outsiders, they normally carry out their acts of 
violence in order to achieve more or less calculated operational 
objectives.88 To the extent that this is true, whether terrorists choose to 
attack infrastructural targets will largely depend – assuming that a) they 
have the technical capabilities to do so, and b) targeting such facilities is 
not utterly antithetical to their ideological agendas and/or psychological 
make-up – on whether “the operational advantages that their use might 
be perceived to confer” is seen as outweighing “the operational 
disadvantages that their use might incur.”89 From this perspective, a 
group’s decision to attack critical infrastructure, like its other decisions 
concerning targeting, weaponry, and tactics, will often be based on some 
degree of rational strategic calculation or choice. 
 
This does not mean, however, that terrorists are entirely “rational” 
actors. Indeed, it would be incorrect to assume, as many observers have, 
that extremist groups behave and operate primarily if not exclusively in 
accordance with “rational choice” models, that the important actions they 
undertake are decided upon only after a careful calculation of “costs and 
benefits,” and consequently that those whose responsibility it is to 
counter their nefarious schemes will be able to ascertain their most likely 
potential targets simply by determining the tangible value of the targets 
themselves and the objective difficulties any attacker would encounter if 
they chose to attack those targets.90 Since in the real world it appears 
self-evident that individuals and organizations rarely if ever make 
decisions based entirely on rational processes and objective calculations, 
the adoption of such an abstract, hyper-rational theoretical approach is 
                                                 
88 See especially Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a 
Product of Strategic Choice,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind, ed. by Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 1998), pp. 7-24; McCormick, “Terrorist Decision 
Making,” p. 481. 
89 Compare, e.g., Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats 
from Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 91. See also Ibid., 
p. 80. Note, however, that these arguments were made in connection with terrorist use 
of CBRN weapons, not in the context of terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure. 
90 This is the approach that is typically adopted, for example, by the insurance industry. 
In that context it makes some degree of sense, since the industry is primarily concerned 
with assessing the objective value of potential targets, as well as determining the 
probabilities that certain targets or types of targets will be hit, in order to establish 
economically viable rates. When counterterrorism analysts rely entirely on the same 
more or less “objective” criteria, however, they are bound to make errors. 
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not only quite unrealistic, but is more likely than not to yield results that 
are seriously misleading. 
 
Artificially rational decision-making models are even more flawed when 
applied uncritically or mechanically to predict the behavior of extremist 
groups, which almost by definition are far more prone to carry out 
actions for arguably less rational – or at least less discernibly rational – 
“expressive” reasons than, say, staid business firms, entrenched 
policymaking bureaucracies, or conventional military units (although 
these latter entities do not invariably behave rationally either). Indeed, 
extremist groups tend to carry out acts of violence both 1) for reasons 
that one can characterize as broadly rational, in particular to produce 
certain tangible impacts (e.g., cause casualties or physical damage) 
and/or to provoke certain desired psychological responses in wider 
audiences (i.e., terrorism proper), and 2) to satisfy more arcane 
ideological, subjective, impulsive, or partially conscious and hence 
ostensibly less rational needs.91 These latter “internal” motives, which 
are herein being characterized as “expressive,” include such things as 
doctrinal obsessions (e.g., compulsions to attack designated enemies or 
smite “evildoers,” longings to precipitate a prophesied Armageddon, 
injunctions promoting individual or collective martyrdom, technological 
fetishism), group pathologies (e.g., excessive insularity, charismatic 
and/or authoritarian leadership, extreme forms of peer pressure, 
suppression of internal dissent, “groupthink”), collective emotional 
impulses (e.g., a burning desire to get revenge, a passion for gaining 
glory or grabbing the spotlight, a perceived need to demonstrate prowess 
or outdo rival groups, a desire to evoke past triumphs or tragedies), or – 
in the case of “lone wolves” – an incalculably diverse range of potential 
                                                 
91 From the days of Karl Heinzen in the mid-nineteenth century, certain radicals and 
observers have drawn a distinction between terrorism as a utilitarian and thus a 
relatively rational act and terrorism as an expressive act, above all an act of personal 
redemption. See Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Reviews 
in Political Science 6 (2003), pp. 477-8. Although these two categories are not 
necessarily discrete, much less mutually exclusive, some scholars rightly emphasize the 
individual and collective (i.e., group-oriented) psychological functions terrorism serves 
rather than only its narrowly instrumental functions. See, for example, Jerrold M. Post, 
“Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Produce of Psychological Forces,” in 
Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of 
Mind (Washington, DC : Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), pp. 25-40; and Walter Reich, 
“Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological 
Inquiry,” in Ibid., pp. 261-79. 
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personal idiosyncrasies.92 It is in fact the varying importance, fluidity, 
and precise configuration of such “expressive” factors that serve to 
distinguish particular extremist groups from one another, including those 
operating within the same ideological milieu, and these very distinctions 
can be crucially important in terms of influencing a group’s selection of 
targets and/or its chosen methods for attacking those targets. 
 
That is why the never-ending flood of terrorist threat assessments that 
are based primarily on rational choice models or on standard 
“Clausewitzian” strategic or geopolitical frames of reference, which 
almost invariably downplay or even ignore altogether the important 
“expressive” motivational factors that derive from a particular group’s 
ideologies, internal organizational dynamics, and general emotional 
orientation (which is in turn strongly influenced by regnant cultural 
values within their respective societies), are so often misguided or 
erroneous. As long as this type of analytical “mirror imaging” of the 
enemy persists, both inside and outside of the intelligence community, 
serious flaws in the ongoing assessment of future terrorist threats, 
whether to critical infrastructure or other targets, are likely to occur. 
 
Again, this is not to say that extremist groups are entirely irrational or 
that they do not usually make various types of strategic calculations, 
especially on the operational level where they are often brutally 
effective, but simply that their reasoning processes and decision-making 
concerning target selection, weapons selection, and attack modalities are 
also influenced by a host of other, less predictable, and less recognizably 
rational if not predominantly semi-rational or non-rational factors, 
including their frequently obtuse ideological proclivities and their often 
unrealistic ultimate goals. This is especially true in the cases of secular 
or religious extremists who seek to achieve utopian and arguably 
delusional aims, i.e., those which promote what Lee Harris has referred 
to as “fantasy ideologies,” whether these envision the forging of 
preternaturally harmonious, cooperative, strife-free communities on the 
international level (communists) or the national level (fascists), the 
creation of racially “pure” havens (white and black supremacists), the 
extirpation of human “despoilers” of the environment (fringe eco-
radicals), the precipitation or hastening of catastrophic “end times” 
prophecies (apocalyptic millenarians), or the restoration of the Caliphate, 
the unification of the Muslim umma, and ultimately the Islamization of 
                                                 
92 For one such “expressive” motive, personal glorification, see Albert Borowitz, 
Terrorism for Self-Glorification: The Herostratos Syndrome (Kent, OH: Kent State 
University, 2005). 
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the entire world (the most radical elements within the global jihadist 
milieu).93
 
Nor does the fact that terrorism is by definition purposive mean that the 
short-term, intermediate, or long-term goals which the perpetrators of 
particular acts of violence are trying to accomplish are necessarily 
realistic, nor that the specific actions they carry out will necessarily 
produce the actual effects that they were designed to achieve. Indeed, in 
the real world it is very often the case that 1) the ultimate objectives 
pursued by terrorist groups and states are unrealizable, utopian, and 
indeed delusional, and/or that 2) their specific acts of violence regularly 
produce effects on wider audiences – both potential supporters and 
designated enemies – which are contrary if not antithetical to those they 
were aiming for. To the extent that particular parties, whether states or 
extremist groups, promote phantasmagoric, unachievable goals and 
regularly miscalculate the impact of and reactions to their acts of 
violence, they can be characterized as essentially non-rational or, at best, 
as only being rational within the framework or in accordance with the 
tenets of a “fantasy ideology.” It seems obvious that if a violence-prone 
group begins by embracing absurd notions or fundamentally flawed 
premises, then even if it acts perfectly logically on the basis of those 
premises, the results will inevitably be disastrous. Such a group cannot 
ultimately achieve its desired objectives, no matter how much mayhem it 
causes, but until it implodes or is effectively neutralized or destroyed it 
may well be capable of doing a tremendous amount of material and 
psychological damage to those it has designated as enemies. 
 
With this background, the extent to which al-Qa`ida’s objectives may be 
considered realistic and therefore realizable can perhaps begin to be 
addressed. As it happens, influential terrorism analysts cannot even agree 
on this most basic of questions. Some view al-Qa`ida, through the prism 
of a traditional Western military perspective, as an essentially rational 
strategic actor, whereas others argue that the group and its leaders are 
essentially irrational. Still others seek to forge a middle ground by 
arguing that although al-Qa`ida may be said to operate more or less 
rationally as opposed to completely irrationally, it does so primarily 
within the restrictive confines of a basically non-rational theological 
framework. 
                                                 
93 For the “fantasy ideologies” characteristic of extremists, see Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda’s 
Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz,” Policy Review 114 (August-September 
2002), pp. 19-36; and idem, Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History 
(New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 1-20. His ideas will be discussed further below. 
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The “rationalist” interpretation has been championed by analysts such as 
George Friedman, founder of the private Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) 
firm, which generally promulgates a “realist” geopolitical and strategic 
perspective, and Michael Scheuer, the former head of the Bin Ladin Unit 
within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although Friedman 
acknowledges that al-Qa`ida ultimately aims to reestablish the Caliphate 
and restore it to its former position of greatness, an objective that is 
almost certainly unrealizable, he nevertheless gives the overall 
impression that Bin Ladin’s organization is an extraordinarily calculating 
if not a thoroughly rational strategic actor.94 Indeed, he explicitly 
contrasts the often dramatic but less effective approaches adopted by 
terrorist groups that were active during the 1970s and 1980s, groups 
which he considers to have been overly hierarchical and dangerously 
dependent upon the support of various foreign intelligence services, with 
the strategic seriousness of al-Qa`ida. As he puts it, instead of devoting 
their energies primarily to “making symbolic gestures,” as earlier 
terrorists purportedly did, al-Qa`ida “saw itself as trying to put into 
motion certain political processes that would result in achieving its 
political goals.”95 This is a rather peculiar statement insofar as it implies, 
falsely, that earlier generations of terrorists were not trying to set certain 
processes in motion in order to achieve specific political goals, however 
utopian those goals might have been. In reality, even the most 
“symbolic” and arguably “expressive” of the terrorist actions in previous 
decades, such as the demonstrative “propaganda of the deed” 
assassinations perpetrated by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
anarchists, were intended to achieve certain hoped-for political results. 
Friedman is certainly correct to argue that al-Qa`ida is much more 
dangerous than most of the terrorist organizations in the past, but if one 
were to accept his general portrayal of al-Qa`ida at face value, one could 
easily be led to conclude that Bin Ladin has not only carefully planned 
out every phase of some ostensible strategic “master plan” in advance, 
but that his terrorist group has so far been singularly successful in 
carrying out the phases of that master plan and, consequently, in 
achieving its supposed strategic objectives. These claims are, to say the 
least, contestable. 
 
Scheuer too rightly recognizes and indeed goes out of his way to 
emphasize that Bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida are motivated primarily by 
                                                 
94 George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle 
between the United States and its Enemies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 28, 33-8. 
95 Ibid., p. 58. 
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religious imperatives.96 Yet although he departs from this perfectly 
sound premise, he inexplicably draws a number of seriously flawed and 
misleading conclusions. For one thing, he argues that Bin Ladin does not 
preach or practice an “aberrant form” of Islam, and indeed that the al-
Qa`ida leader is “in the Islamic mainstream.”97 This statement is frankly 
astounding inasmuch as it erroneously conflates Islam with Islamism, an 
inherently radical political ideology with openly imperialistic aims. 
While it is certainly true that several of the traditional Islamic 
conceptions and generic anti-Western attitudes espoused by Bin Ladin 
are widely accepted by Muslims, this does not mean that the latter share 
his puritanical interpretation of the Islamic faith or his extremely radical 
ideology, much less that they generally support his utopian transnational 
jihadist agenda or his brutal terrorist methods. For another, despite 
highlighting Bin Ladin’s fundamentally religious motivations, which 
should have led him to expect the al-Qa`ida leader to periodically display 
faith-based and arguably non-rational patterns of behavior, Scheuer, like 
Friedman, nonetheless proceeds to ascribe far too much rationality and 
pragmatism to Bin Ladin and his fellow jihadists, especially in his 
second book. Therein he vehemently denies, despite the existence of 
masses of evidence to the contrary, that they have an intrinsic and 
theologically-based hatred towards the secular United States, an 
apocalyptic worldview, or fundamentally unrealistic ultimate 
objectives.98 Quite the contrary, in fact: “Bin Laden and most Islamists, 
therefore, can be said to be motivated by their love of Allah and their 
hatred of a few, specific U.S. policies and actions they believe are 
damaging – and threatening to destroy – the things they love. Theirs is a 
war against a specific target and for specific, limited purposes.”99 From 
this, it follows that if the United States and its key allies were willing to 
                                                 
96 Anonymous [Micheal Scheuer], Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, 
Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), pp. xvii-
xviii, 3-5, and especially 16-17: “What must be understood is that what bin Laden has 
said and done has everything to do with religion…When U.S. and other Western 
leaders describe bin Laden as a terrorist problem, not a religious one, they mislead their 
publics.”; and idem, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: Potomac, 2004), pp. xviii and passim, but especially xi: “The war 
bin Laden is waging has everything to do with the tenets of the Islamic faith.” Note that 
the author of this section shares Scheuer’s view that “ideas are the main drivers of 
human history” and that, as per historian Perry Miller, they are “coherent and powerful 
imperatives to human behavior.” See Ibid., p. xvii. This is even more true for the 
leaders and members of extremist groups, whose raison d’être, identities, and purposes 
all derive primarily from their adherence to particular political and religious ideologies. 
97 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
98 Ibid., pp. xviii, 8, 16-18. 
99 Ibid., p. 17. 
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alter their foolish, counterproductive, oppressive, and exploitive policies 
towards the Muslim world, Bin Ladin would then cease attacking the 
West.100 However, as will be argued below, what Scheuer does not seem 
to grasp is that the global jihadists’ “love of Allah” is infused with 
extremely irrational notions that make their objectives anything but 
limited or fully rational. This immediately becomes apparent as soon as 
one carefully examines Bin Ladin’s own pronouncements, provided that 
the reader is familiar enough with Islam and Islamic history to 
understand his historical references and code words.101
In marked contrast to this “rationalist” perspective, which might be more 
aptly characterized as “hyper-rationalist,” both Lee Harris and Ralph 
Peters adopt the “non-rationalist” perspective in that they emphasize 
what they regard as the inherently irrational objectives and 
characteristics of global jihadists such as Bin Ladin. Harris begins by 
explicitly challenging the appropriateness of using Clausewitzian 
analytical frameworks to explain the 9/11 attacks, and by extension to 
understanding al-Qa`ida’s entire agenda. Instead, he argues that al-
Qa`ida operates in accordance with a “fantasy ideology,” a phenomenon 
he considers operative whenever “political and ideological symbols and 
tropes [are] used not for political purposes, but entirely for the benefit of 
furthering a specific personal or collective fantasy.”102 Many individuals 
behave at least in part in accordance with their own personal fantasy 
ideology, but in most such cases – serial killers and other delusional 
maniacs excluded – they tend to be obnoxious but relatively harmless. 
However, such fantasy ideologies can become very dangerous indeed 
when they are embraced collectively by members of a certain group. 
This can occur when there is a “preexisting collective need” for such a 
fantasy that stems “from a conflict between a set of collective aspirations 
and desires, on one hand, and the stern dictates of brutal reality, on the 
other – a conflict in which the lack of realism is gradually transformed 
into a penchant for fantasy.”103 Moreover, according to Harris the groups 
that are especially prone to adopt fantasy ideologies are those which 
“history has passed by or rejected – groups that feel that they are under 
attack from forces which, while more powerful perhaps than they are, are 
nonetheless inferior in terms of true virtue.” This is why the “theme of 
                                                 
100 This is the clear implication of his analysis in Ibid., pp. 11-15, 17. 
101 See, however, the cautionary note by Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after 
the Iraq War,” Middle East Journal 60:1 (Winter 2006), p. 15: “the study of ideology is 
not an exact science and…our current concepts do not adequately capture the 
complexity of the phenomenon of Islamist militancy.” 
102 Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz,” Policy Review 
114 (August-September 2002), p. 23. 
103 Ibid., p. 25, for this and the two quotes immediately below. 
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reviving ancient glory is an important key to understanding fantasy 
ideologies…” Just as “uncivilized” Ethiopia served as the prop for 
Mussolini’s fantasy of restoring the Roman Empire, so too does the 
United States, cast in the image of an inherently corrupt and imperialistic 
Crusader power out to destroy Islam, serve as the prop for Bin Ladin’s 
jihadist fantasy of purifying and unifying the umma, restoring the 
Caliphate, and regaining Muslim supremacy vis-à-vis the world of 
“unbelief.”104 From this standpoint, the attacks on 9/11 were not really 
designed to achieve a concrete strategic objective, but instead constituted 
a spectacular and symbolic act of theatre designed to confirm al-Qa`ida’s 
fantasy that a few Muslim martyrs could defeat the “Great Satan” and, in 
the process, inspire and rouse the Muslim masses in support of that 
fantasy. Since al-Qa`ida supposedly “has no strategic purpose in 
anything [it] does” and is allegedly incapable of making a “realistic 
assessment,” Lee argues that there is nothing that the U.S. can do, 
policy-wise, to “change the attitudes of our enemies – short, perhaps, of 
a massive nationwide conversion to fundamentalist Islam.”105 However, 
while the transnational jihadists do in fact adhere to a “fantasy ideology,” 
this does not mean that they do not eschew strategic calculations. 
Moreover, Lee commits the very same error that Scheuer makes in that 
he fails to draw a clear distinction between jihadist ideological vanguard 
organizations such as al-Qa`ida and the Muslim masses. Although no 
changes in U.S. foreign policies are likely to induce those vanguard 
groups to cease attacking us, the adoption of more sensible policies could 
very well help to reduce their growing base of popular support. 
 
As for Peters, he makes an even harsher judgment about al-Qa`ida’s 
supposed rationality. He begins by drawing a relatively hard and fast 
distinction between what he terms “practical terrorists” and “apocalyptic 
terrorists.” He argues that the actions of the practical terrorist are 
“calculated to change political circumstances, while for the apocalyptic 
terrorist, destruction is an end in itself, despite his extravagant statements 
about strategic objectives.”106 Practical terrorists “may behave savagely, 
but they have tangible goals and a logical approach to achieving them,” 
                                                 
104 For al-Qa`ida’s desire to unite the umma and restore the historic power of the 
“righteous” Caliphate, and wage jihad against “Crusaders” and other unbelievers, 
compare the remarks of Bin Ladin in his October 21, 2001 interview for al-Jazira, cited 
in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 121; and those of al-Zawahiri in Fursan, 
part 11. 
105 Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” pp. 33, 32. 
106 Ralph Peters, “When Devils Walk the Earth: The Mentality and Roots of Terrorism, 
and How to Respond,” in idem, Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World 
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002), p. 22.  
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and although ideology can “dominate their thinking…it does not break 
loose entirely from mundane reality.”107 In contrast, apocalyptic 
terrorists like Bin Ladin are “mentally divorced from our world and its 
values…view the greater world as their enemy…[and] are merciless 
[because] they view themselves as tools of a divine and uncompromising 
retribution.”108 Indeed, he goes so far as to claim, with considerable 
plausibility, that retribution against “unbelievers, heretics, and even their 
own brethren whose belief is less pure, is the real strategic goal of 
apocalyptic terrorists, even when they do not fully realize it themselves 
or cannot articulate it.” Hence “we cannot know apocalyptic terrorists by 
their pronouncements as well as by their deeds, since much of what they 
say is meant to make their intentions seem more innocent or justified 
than they are.”109 For this reason Peters concludes, as Lee did concerning 
his fantasist, that “[n]o change in the world order will ever content the 
apocalyptic terrorist, since his actual discontents are internal to himself 
and no alteration in the external environment could sate his appetite for 
retribution against those he needs to believe are evil and guilty of 
causing his personal sufferings and disappointments.”110 It follows that 
such people cannot be controlled, like practical terrorists, but instead 
need to be killed. There are, however, two fundamental problems with 
Peters’ analysis. First, his two categories of terrorists should be seen as 
representing Weberian “ideal types” rather than living human beings, 
who – apart from clinical lunatics – are never either entirely rational or 
entirely irrational in their behavior. Since in any given case it is difficult 
if not impossible for observers to artificially separate their “rational” 
from their “expressive” motives and actions, one simply cannot accept 
Peters’ overly sharp distinction between practical and apocalyptic 
terrorists. Second, even extremists who are in fact impelled by their 
adherence to Manichean ideological or theological doctrines (and 
perhaps also by personal demons) to smite “evildoers” are at times 
capable of rational calculation and understanding basic cause-and-effect 
relationships. Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of 
violence-prone extremist groups whose members simultaneously 
espoused delusional worldviews and exhibited a ruthless efficiency on 
the operational level. 
 
                                                 
107 Ibid., p. 23. 
108 Ibid., pp. 27, 28, 29. 
109 Ibid., p. 29. 
110 Ibid., p. 30. Peters further argues, persuasively, that since the “health of any 
religious community can be gauged by the degree to which it rejects these bloody 
apostles of terror…the Islamic world’s acceptance of apocalyptic terrorists as heroes is 
perhaps the most profound indicator of its spiritual crisis and decay.” 
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Given such acute disagreements among analysts concerning the strategic 
rationality of al-Qa`ida, it should come as no surprise to learn that they 
cannot even agree on the most important fundamental questions. Take, 
for example, the seemingly straightforward matter of whether al-Qa`ida 
carried out the 9/11 attacks with the specific intention, among others, of 
provoking a massive and hopefully ham-fisted and therefore 
counterproductive American military invasion of Islamic territories. 
According to the “rationalists,” this was precisely Bin Ladin’s intention, 
and certain al-Qa`ida theorists even retrospectively claimed that this was 
indeed part of his original plan.111 Yet many other high-ranking al-
Qa`ida insiders have revealed that Bin Ladin had ignored the concerns 
expressed by his confidants and seriously miscalculated by believing that 
the Americans would not carry out aggressive actions against the group’s 
Afghan base and its Taliban hosts. Indeed, there was a good deal of 
retrospective bitterness and post-facto criticism of Bin Ladin for naively 
believing his own propaganda about American cowardice and 
weakness.112 Furthermore, it is also clear that Bin Ladin was himself 
surprised by the collapse of the Twin Towers, which he did not 
anticipate despite his relative optimism about the probable success of the 
“planes operation.”113 This serves to illustrate just how difficult it is to 
divine the real intentions of the jihadist adversary, especially in lieu of 
inside information. 
 
                                                 
111 For the rationalist view, see Friedman, America’s Secret War, pp. 34-6. Al-Qa`ida’s 
own retrospective claims have been reported by journalist Fu`ad Husayn in his recent 
biography of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, Al-Zarqawi, al-jil al-thani li-al-Qa`ida [Al-
Zarqawi: Al-Qa`ida’s Second Generation] (Beirut: Al-Khayal, 2005), as serialized in 
Al-Quds al-`Arabi in May 2005, part 14; and by Bassam al-Baddarin, “Al-Qa`ida Drew 
Up Working Strategy Lasting until 2020: Plans for Broad ‘Jihadist Front’ Covering 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon,” Al-Quds al-`Arabi, March 11, 2005, citing an 
internet text written by Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, “Al Qa`ida’s Strategy to the 
Year 2020.” Compare Abdel Bari Atwan. editor-in-chief of that same newspaper, in his 
fascinating recent book, The Secret History of al-Qa`ida (London: Saqi, 2006), pp. 221-
2. 
112 Compare Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 191-9; Bari Atwan, Secret History of al-Qa`ida, p. 
180; and the recent book by Abu al-Walid al-Masri, a top Afghan Arab operative, 
Tarikh al-Afghan al-`Arab [The History of the Afghan Arabs], which was serialized in 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat in December 2004, part 2. The author is highly critical of Bin 
Ladin’s judgment. Similar critiques were leveled against Bin Ladin and other global 
jihadists by Islamists who have repudiated violence and by jihadists who prefer to focus 
their efforts of overthrowing the apostate regimes in their own countries. See Gerges, 
Far Enemy, pp. 200-14, 218-28, 234-40. 
113 As his videotaped comments at a private November 9, 2001 dinner in Jalalabad, 
together with his lieutenants Sulayman Abu Ghayth and al-Zawahiri, clearly indicate. 
See Ben Fenton, “Damned by his Gloating Smile,” The Telegraph, December 14, 2001. 
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In any case, in between these overly dichotomous postulations of either 
full strategic rationality or essential non-rationality lies a middle 
position. One version of such a stance, “pragmatic messianism,” has 
been proffered by Christopher Blanchard, who comes to the following 
eminently sensible conclusion: 
 
Bin Ladin has outlined specific political demands that support 
the image of Al Qaeda as a pliable, pragmatic political actor. 
Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s operational record seems to indicate 
that its leaders’ commitment to specific national causes and 
strategic objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit 
support for their broader ideological agenda of confrontation 
with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world.114
 
However, the version promoted here incorporates two distinct levels of 
activity – a “strategic” level that concerns the realism or lack thereof of 
Bin Ladin’s ultimate goals, and an “operational” level that concerns al-
Qa`ida’s actual mechanics of planning and executing attacks. This is a 
considerably more nuanced approach that seems to more accurately 
reflect the mindset and behavior of al-Qa`ida and other transnational 
jihadist groups. From this point of view, al-Qa`ida can be said to behave 
rationally on the “strategic” level, at least in part, but that to the extent 
that this is the case it does so largely within certain historically- and 
culturally-conditioned theological and thus arguably non-rational 
parameters. In contrast, on the “operational” level, al-Qa`ida displays 
considerable sophistication, which allows it to plan and carry out 
devastatingly effective and often spectacular terrorist attacks which 
allow the group to achieve its narrowly “tactical” aims, if not to further 
its unachievable strategic goals. Let us begin by considering the 
“strategic” objectives of al-Qa`ida. 
 
The key point that needs to be emphasized is that, far from accepting 
modern Western conceptions of international law, which presuppose “the 
existence of a family of nations composed of a community of states 
enjoying full sovereign rights and equality of status” – the leaders of al-
                                                 
114 See Christopher Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” CRS 
[Congressional Research Service] Report, November 16, 2004, p. 5 (italics added). 
Compare also his further conclusions: “Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders 
believe that regular attempts to characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and 
religiously sanctioned will increase tolerance of and support for their broader 
ideological program. The identification of limited political objectives and the 
implication that their fulfillment will resolve broader grievances may help to mask the 
group’s underlying ideological agenda.” See Ibid., p. 6 (italics again added). 
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Qa`ida instead adhere to what they consider – quite rightly – to be 
authentically Islamic conceptions.115 These conceptions, which were first 
laid down in the era of the “virtuous forefathers” of the faith (al-salaf al-
salih) – Muhammad and his “rightly-guided” caliphal successors – in 
order to govern the relations between the growing Islamic community 
and non-Muslims, do not involve the recognition of other sovereign 
states, since “the ultimate goal of Islam was the subordination of the 
whole world to one [universal] system of law and religion.”116 This 
“classical” notion has in fact been augmented rather than abandoned by 
today’s jihadists, who regard modern nation-states as artificial creations 
that the “enemies of Islam” intentionally designed to prevent the 
restoration of a unified Muslim umma. 
 
The first and most important of these traditional Islamic conceptions was 
clearly articulated in the Qur’an itself: one of the primary responsibilities 
incumbent upon all Muslims is to spread the divine word of Allah, which 
was thought to have been revealed directly by the archangel Gabriel to 
the Prophet Muhammad, throughout the entire world, since it was 
ostensibly meant for all of humanity, not restricted to Arabs alone.117 
Therefore, whenever the Muslims encountered “unbelievers,” they were 
admonished to offer them three options: convert to Islam, pay a poll tax 
(jizya) and accept a subordinate status in a Muslim-dominated society, or 
prepare to fight.118 Second, the methods Muslims traditionally used to 
                                                 
115 For the general Muslim rejection of Western and other non-Islamic international 
laws, norms, and institutions, see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1955), pp. 44-6. Furthermore, in theory Muslims 
also reject standard Western conceptions of international relations, including notions 
such as the balance of power and Realpolitik. That this is also the jihadist and al-Qa`ida 
view is apparent. See Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the 
War on Terror (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), pp. 74-5. This is confirmed by the 
comments of Bin Ladin, who stated that “no sane Muslim should take his grievances to 
the United Nations” or any other international bodies, which are “infidel, man-made 
organizations.” See his December 1998 interview for al-Jazira, cited in Lawrence, ed., 
Messages to the World, pp. 67-8. Compare also the remarks of al-Zawahiri, who argues 
that the battle between unbelief and Islam is universal, and specifically identifies the 
U.N., multinational corporations, international communications and exchange systems, 
international news agencies and satellite channels, and international relief agencies, 
“which are being used as a cover for espionage, proselytizing, coup planning, and the 
transfer of weapons,” as being in the enemy camp. See Fursan, part 11. Ironically, it is 
Islamic relief agencies that are engaged in the sordid activities that he ascribes to their 
Western counterparts. 
116 Ibid., p. 45. 
117 See, e.g., Qur’an 9.33. 
118 Compare Qur’an 9.5, 9.124, 47.4. The second option was originally confined to 
believers in the Abrahamic faiths or “people of the book” (ahl al-kitab), i.e., Christians 
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spread and universalize Islam involved a combination of proselytization 
(da`wa) and “jihad of the sword in the path of Allah” (jihad bi al-sayf fi 
sabil Allah), i.e., armed struggle for the faith.119 During periods of 
relative weakness, Muslims tended to rely primarily on da`wa, but when 
they were militarily strong, they often waged jihad bi al-sayf in a frankly 
imperialistic effort to expand the boundaries of the Islamic world by 
conquest (fatah) at the expense of non-Muslims. Third, on the basis of 
the examples reportedly set by the Prophet himself or his close 
companions and successors,120 medieval jurists soon formulated a 
geopolitical conception that was based upon a clear-cut division of the 
world into two antithetical parts: the dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam), 
“territories in which the law of Islam prevails,” and the dar al-harb 
(Abode of War), “territories under perpetual threat of missionary 
                                                                                                                       
and Jews, but was subsequently extended to Zoroastrians and, at various times and 
places, even polytheists (such as Hindus). 
119 In recent years there has been a lot of nonsense written on the subject of jihad, both 
by Muslims who have intentionally sought to conceal its nature and by naive academic 
apologists for both Islam and Islamism. The term jihad is derived from the verbal root 
jahada, which means to “strive,” “struggle,” or “exert oneself,” especially in the path of 
Allah. While it is true that the Qur’an makes a distinction between the “greater jihad,” 
i.e., struggling against the evil within oneself, and the “lesser jihad,” i.e., waging armed 
struggle against unbelievers, and that medieval jurists recognized several distinct 
categories of jihad (e.g, jihad of the heart, of the tongue, of the hands, and of the 
sword), the fact remains that in early Muslim chronicles – apart from texts dealing 
exclusively with personal piety and Sufism –  the term normally refers to armed 
struggle against unbelievers. See E[mile] Tyan, “Djihad,” in Bernard Lewis et al, 
Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition [hereafter EI2] (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983 [1965]), 
volume 2, p. 538: “In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the 
djihad consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need 
be, of its defence…The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality 
of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to 
embrace the whole universe, if necessary by force.” Note that the Encyclopedia of 
Islam is the standard scholarly reference work on Islam, one that is aimed at scholars 
more than at students. For excellent analyses of the evolution of the meaning of jihad, 
see David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California, 2005); Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University, 1999); and Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical 
and Modern Islam (Princeton: Marcus Weiner, 1996). In any event, despite the 
existence of multiple meanings, it is undeniable that radical Islamists invariably use the 
term jihad to refer to armed struggle against unbelievers, and also that they have 
repeatedly sought to transform jihad (bi-al-sayf) from being a sixth “unofficial” pillar 
(arkan) of the Islamic faith into one of its official de jure pillars. 
120 The cases that are most often cited as examples of this practice are Muhammad’s 
invitation to the Persians and Jews to adopt Islam under pain of invasion. See, e.g., 
Muhammad ibn Isma`il al-Bukhari, Kitab al Jihad, 147, 148, 149, and 151. However, 
the prototype case is the invitation by a Muslim commander to the people of Yamama. 
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war.”121 The latter included all of the territories that were not ruled by 
the khalif (Caliph) or an imam in accordance with Islamic law (the 
shari`a). In theory, if the rulers who governed portions of the dar al-harb 
refused to allow Muslims to freely practice their religion within their 
realms, the leaders of the umma were obliged to wage war against those 
rulers, defeat them, and incorporate their lands into the dar al-islam. This 
was, if taken at face value, a doctrine that postulated a state of more or 
less permanent war against unbelievers, albeit one that could be 
periodically interrupted, until such time as they agreed to convert to 
Islam. 
 
In practice, of course, the decision to initiate military action against 
segments of the dar al-harb was affected by a host of practical 
considerations, above all the existing correlation of forces between 
particular Muslim and non-Muslim rulers. Therefore, if non-Muslim 
rulers were simply too powerful to fight and defeat, or if they freely 
allowed Muslims to practice their religion, it was not considered 
necessary to fight them, at least not immediately. In fact, two new 
categories were developed by jurists to accommodate political and 
military realities and thereby allow Muslims to avoid having to wage war 
continually or at once: the concept of the dar al-sulh (Abode of Truce), 
“territories not conquered by Muslim troops but by buying peace by the 
giving of tribute, the payment of which guarantees a truce or armistice 
(hudna, sulh),” and that of the dar al-`ahd (Abode of the Covenant), 
territories existing under the temporary proprietorship of non-Muslims 
that fall neither within the boundaries of the Dar al-Islam nor of the dar 
al-harb.122 Although rejected as legitimate by many influential jurists, 
these temporary and intermediate categories allowed Muslim rulers to 
maintain peaceful relations with non-Muslim rulers as long as the latter 
were not actively engaged in the repression of their co-religionists. 
However, despite these concessions to reality, in the pre-modern era 
Muslims were convinced that such arrangements were strictly temporary 
and that at some point these transitional territories would be 
incorporated, along with the remaining portions of the dar al-harb, into 
the dar al-islam. Indeed, for them “the duty of djihad exists as long as 
the universal domination of Islam has not been attained,” from which it 
follows that “[p]eace with non-Muslim nations is…a provisional state of 
                                                 
121 See, respectively, A[rmand] Abel, “Dar al-Islam,” EI2, volume 2, p. 127; and idem, 
“Dar al-Harb,” EI2, volume 2, p. 126. 
122 See, respectively, D. B. McDonald and A[rmand] Abel, “Dar al-Sulh,” EI2, volume 
2, p. 131; and Halil Inalcik, “Dar al-`Ahd,” EI2, volume 2, p. 116. 
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affairs only…[and] there can be no question of genuine peace treaties” 
with such states.123
 
Such uncompromising, expansionist, and imperialistic notions were 
problematic enough during the extraordinary period of Arab conquest 
and rapid Islamization that lasted from the seventh to the tenth centuries, 
but maintaining them today, when the Muslim world is politically, 
economically, and militarily weak, can only be characterized as 
delusional and potentially suicidal. That is why most Muslim states, and 
indeed the vast majority of Muslims, have not only reluctantly 
abandoned their former universalist and expansionist pretensions but also 
accommodated themselves to the ever-growing power imbalances 
between the dar al-kufr (Abode of Unbelief) and the dar al-islam, as 
well as to international norms and institutions that are nowadays 
accepted throughout most of the rest of the world. Some Muslims may 
still secretly hope that, with the help of Allah, the status quo ante of 
Muslim glory and supremacy can one day be restored, but in the 
meantime they are generally willing to face reality. 
 
Not so with Bin Ladin and the transnational jihadists, for whom such 
eminently practical considerations do not count for much. Indeed, 
despite their often intimate familiarity with the functioning of complex 
modern Western societies, as well as their willingness to adopt modern 
technology and their penchant for periodically employing modern-
sounding “anti-imperialist” rhetoric of the sort normally associated the 
secular revolutionary left and right, the jihadists are essentially living in 
a seventh-century mental universe. As Walid Phares has rightly noted: 
 
The jihadist logic is historicist and theological at the same time. 
In the mind of its authors, leaders, and militants, the initial 
rissala (mission) bestowed on the Prophet, and carried on by 
the caliphs for more than thirteen centuries, is also theirs…The 
jihadists believe that what was initiated in Muslim history ages 
ago is still moving forward today, just as it was in the 
beginning. They also believe that Allah is still commanding 
them to perform these wajibat, or duties, without interruption. 
And they are firmly convinced that the enemies of their 
ancestors as perceived in those times are still the enemies of 
                                                 
123 Tyan, “Djihad,” p. 539. This traditional view is clearly accepted by Bin Ladin, who 
in an October 21, 2001 interview for al-Jazira argued that the clash of civilizations 
between the dar al-islam and the dar al-kufr (Abode of Unbelief) is a reality proven in 
the Qur’an and ahadith of Muhammad, in contrast to the “fairytale” of “world peace” 
promoted by the West. Cited in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, pp. 124-5. 
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today, in a war that has not ended for the last millennium and a 
half…Put simply, in the mind of the jihadists…they are in line 
to fulfill a mission launched centuries ago.124
 
He adds that “[w]hen Osama bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan eight 
centuries later, he was executing the orders of [militant thirteenth-
century century scholar] Ibn Taymiya: fighting the infidels, 
reestablishing the pure Islamic state, and laying the groundwork for the 
return of the Caliphate.”125 Furthermore, having deluded themselves into 
thinking that their victory over the “atheistic” Soviet superpower in 
Afghanistan was due solely to their own divinely-sanctioned efforts and 
to the intervention of Allah, as opposed to the operational assistance 
provided by the Pakistani secret service and the external financial and 
logistical support they received from the Gulf States and the U.S., the 
“Afghan Arabs” became convinced that with Allah’s help they could 
also defeat the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States, 
which they viewed as unremittingly hostile to Islam but inherently 
corrupt, weak, and decadent. Although Phares acknowledges that it may 
be hard for Western analysts to accept the fact that “the modern jihadists 
of al Qaeda and its sister organizations embody thirteenth century jihad 
in the framework of twenty-first century global politics,” he nonetheless 
justly concludes that “this reality explains most of the irrational behavior 
of modern-day jihadists, including suicide bombers, and the litany of 
extreme, violent acts and statements for which they have been 
responsible – which to reasonable people seem to belong to another 
age.”126
 
Indeed, it is precisely their failure to recognize this fundamental reality 
that explains why the “rationalist” interpreters of al-Qa`ida have 
mistakenly projected their own modern Western military and strategic 
analytical frameworks onto the enemy and thereby seriously 
misconstrued jihadist objectives. Such a perspective is perhaps most 
clearly expressed by Scheuer, when he insists that Bin Ladin’s struggle 
has “specific, limited purposes” and is narrowly calculated to deter the 
U.S. from pursuing certain policies. Similarly, he scoffs at the view that 
al-Qa`ida has utopian imperialistic goals by arguing that “[a]t this point 
in history we need worry little about the threat of an offensive and 
expansionist jihad meant to conquer new lands for Islam and convert 
new peoples to the faith” since “[s]uch a jihad is the collective – not 
                                                 
124 Phares, Future Jihad, pp. 50, 49. 
125 Ibid., p. 56. 
126 Ibid. 
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individual – responsibility of Muslims, and must be called by a 
Caliph…”127 He also claims that the Islamists are “not so offended by 
our democratic…system of politics, guarantees of personal rights and 
civil liberties, and separation of church and state that [they are] willing to 
wage war against overwhelming odds in order to stop Americans from 
voting, speaking freely, and praying, or not, as they wish.”128 These 
statements are both analytically problematic and in large part factually 
incorrect. 
 
First, Scheuer accepts Bin Ladin’s assertions that al-Qa`ida is waging a 
“defensive jihad” against the enemies of Islam at face value, which 
makes no sense at all.129 The fact that Bin Ladin and other jihadists are 
convinced that Muslims are everywhere under attack, when in fact 
Muslims themselves are so often the party doing the attacking, and that 
they view American actions as intrinsically anti-Islamic, ignoring the 
fact that during the 1990s the U.S. militarily defended Muslims in 
Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo, criticized brutal Russian policies and 
actions in Chechnya, and sought to provide humanitarian relief and a 
measure of security in Somalia, is a sign that they have collective, 
ideologically-derived paranoid delusions and are prone to adopt 
nonsensical conspiracy theories, not that they have accurately and 
realistically interpreted world events.130 In this context it should be 
                                                 
127 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, pp. 6-7. 
128 Ibid., p. 8. In reality, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the jihadists are 
intrinsically and intransigently opposed to virtually every defining characteristic of 
modern Western civilization, including secularism (above all), pluralism, democracy, 
individual freedom (especially freedom of choice), materialism, and hedonism (which 
they regard as “immorality” and “decadence”). For an excellent overview, see Habeck, 
Knowing the Enemy, chapter 4. Anything that the perceive as undermining Allah’s rule 
(hakimiyya) is anathema to them. 
129 He also fails to point out that Bin Ladin and his cohorts have consistently sought to 
alter the circumstances and terms under which jihad can legitimately be waged, 
specifically by arguing that “defensive jihad” is an individual duty (fard `ayn) that 
requires no authorization from above. See Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 3-4. Note also that 
for the jihadists, as for most medieval jurists, forcibly recovering territories that were 
once under Muslim control but were subsequently lost to Islam is considered “defensive 
jihad.” Hence if the jihadists sought to expel the Spaniards from Spain, the Serbs and 
Croats from the Balkans, the Russians from Turkic Central Asia, the Chinese from 
Uighur territory, Christians from the southern Philippines, and the Indians from 
Kashmir and other Muslim-majority parts on northern India, from their point of view 
this would be considered “defensive” rather than “offensive” jihad. 
130 For the penchant of the Islamists, and indeed Muslims in general, to believe in a host 
of absurd conspiracy theories, in the pejorative sense of that term, see Daniel Pipes, The 
Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996). 
However, the remarks above are not meant to imply that U.S. policies toward the 
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remembered that political and religious extremists of all varieties almost 
invariably portray themselves as victims of persecution, oppression, and 
aggression in order to rationalize and justify their own initiation of 
violence and aggression against real and imagined enemies. For 
example, Hitler and Stalin – the two biggest mass murderers of the 
twentieth century – both portrayed themselves and their nations, also not 
without some justification, as targets and victims of Western 
imperialism. Even the worst, most bellicose tyrants and fanatics often 
manage to delude themselves that they are the real victims, and Bin 
Ladin is no exception. 
 
Second, Scheuer is on decidedly shaky ground when he argues that Bin 
Ladin is “a practical warrior, not an apocalyptic terrorist in search of 
Armageddon.”131 As both David Cook and Timothy Furnish have 
documented, there is no doubt at all that apocalyptic, messianic, and 
millenarian themes are common within today’s Sunni jihadist circles, 
including those close to al-Qa`ida, just as they have always been intrinsic 
to the Shi`i tradition and have been systematically stoked since the late 
1970s by certain Khomeini-linked and -inspired Islamist milieus.132 For 
an example of such themes on al-Qa`ida-linked websites, note the March 
9, 2003 article by Usama `Azzam, who made the following statement on 
the eve of the American invasion of Iraq: 
 
Is there anyone who still doubts that we are approaching the 
end of the world? Does anyone think the hour is far? We are on 
the eve of the total dismantling that will be followed by our 
clear victory…After this war, which has no precedence in 
human history and in the fight between the community of 
                                                                                                                       
Muslim world have not often been foolish and counterproductive, or that Muslims do 
not have many legitimate complaints and grievances about those policies. 
131 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, p. xviii. 
132 See David Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University, 2005), especially chapters 6-9, which reveal, somewhat 
surprisingly, that such literature is filled with apocalyptic notions stemming from the 
Christian, Jewish, and secular Western as well as the Islamic traditions; and Timothy R. 
Furnish, Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2005), especially chapters 4 and 6. The term mahdi (literally “rightly 
guided one”) applies above all to the prophesied redeemer of Islam who is destined to 
emerge and transform the world into a perfect Islamic society before the Day of 
Resurrection (Yawm al-Qiyama), at which point he will fight alongside the returned 
Jesus against the Dajjal (Antichrist or false messiah). The word does not appear first in 
the Qur’an itself, but rather in early collections of ahadith that are considered reliable. 
See W[ilferd] Madelung, “Al-Mahdi,” EI2, volume 5, pp. 1230-8. 
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believers and the Devil and his followers, does anyone doubt 
that these are the days of the Mahdi?133
 
`Azzam then adds the following revealing remark: “I have no doubt that 
the leaders of the mujahidin of al-Qa`ida and the Taliban are the owners 
of the black banners who will assist the Mahdi.”134 In support of these 
apocalyptic notions, `Azzam cited the now famous work by Abu Qatada 
al-Filastini, the imprisoned “spiritual leader” of al-Qa`ida in Europe, 
Ma`alim al-Ta`ifa al-Mansura (Signs of the Victorious Side). Nor was 
`Azzam alone in predicting imminent “end of the world” scenarios that 
would pave the way for the prophesied return of the Mahdi, notions 
which at that moment apparently caught the imagination of many young 
anti-Western Saudis. See, for example, the postings on the Muntada al-
Jinn wa al-`Afarit internet forum, a section of which deals primarily with 
dreams and visions. In the words of the Saudi supervisor of this 
particular section: 
 
These [apocalyptic] visions and their like, many of which were 
sent to me, propagate the destruction of this evil country [the 
United States] and the punishments, disasters, and dismantling 
that will occur there. This is the way Allah deals with 
oppressors…The punishment of this super oppressor is very 
close. We ask Allah to heal the hearts of the believers of its 
influence, and grant the Muslims all of its finance and 
equipment as booty.135
 
Indeed, such notions had become so widespread, along with the idea that 
Bin Ladin himself was the Mahdi, that al-Qa`ida’s leaders felt compelled 
to openly criticize them, in part because they were afraid that overly 
optimistic expectations of Islam’s looming final triumph might induce 
jihadist supporters not to take action and in part because Bin Ladin has 
never claimed to be the Mahdi and almost certainly does not believe that 
he is. Thus, in February 2003, on the website of the Markaz al-Dirasat 
wa al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya (Center for Islamic Studies and Research), a 
                                                 
133 Usama `Azzam, “Are the Taliban and al-Qa`ida those who will Raise the Black 
Banners?,” al-Da`wa website, March 9, 2003. Cited by Reuven Paz, “Global Jihad and 
the Sense of Crisis: Al-Qa`idah’s Other Front,” undated [but 2003] report, Intelligence 
and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, p. 1, available at: 
www.intelligence.org.il/g_j/rp_d_11_03.html.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Muntada al-Jinn wa al-`Afarit website, available at 
www.jazanvoice.net/vb/forumdisplay.php?s=09676bd441afa83467c79a96220906c1&f
orumid=32. The name of the website means The Jinn [Spirits] and the Demons. Cited in 
Ibid., p. 2. 
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Saudi-based entity closely linked to al-Qa`ida, an anonymous author 
leveled an attack on such apocalyptic ideas, firstly by claiming that the 
ahadith concerning “the black banners that will appear in the East” are 
very weak, and secondly by advising would-be supporters to “support 
the jihad against Allah’s enemies rather than harm the jihad and the 
mujahidin with nonsensical ideas.”136 Alas, this is an inordinately 
complex matter that can only be touched upon here, but suffice to say 
that Scheuer is as wrong to deny that there are any apocalyptic 
tendencies observable in the al-Qa`ida milieu as Peters is to argue that 
Bin Ladin and his cohorts are entirely apocalyptic. 
 
Third, there is plenty of evidence indicating that the global jihadists are 
pursuing an expansionist imperialistic agenda, though the cleverer ones 
like Bin Ladin seek to divert attention from or otherwise disguise their 
aggressive and expansionist underlying designs by continually harping 
on their more reasonable and legitimate grievances in an effort both to 
rally support from the Muslim masses and foment divisions within 
“infidel” ranks in order to prevent the formation of a common anti-
jihadist front.137 However, even in his own public propaganda 
statements, Bin Ladin regularly juxtaposes seemingly rational and 
morally justifiable objectives with bizarre theological imperatives that 
can only be said to “make sense” within an Islamic cultural and historical 
context that has long since been superseded. Indeed, even the most 
restrained and proximate demands of al-Qa`ida and other global jihadist 
groups – the complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from 
“Muslim lands,” the abandonment of all Western support for “apostate” 
Muslim regimes and Israel, the elimination of all “corrupting” Western 
cultural influences from the dar al-islam, and the end of Western 
“exploitation” of Muslim resources, above all the paying of artificially 
low prices for oil – are in large part non-negotiable and therefore 
virtually impossible to achieve, whatever their moral merits or demerits 
might be. 
 
Worse still, when one considers jihadist long-term objectives, one has 
truly entered the realm of total unreality. These long-term goals can be 
divided into three categories: minimal, intermediate, and maximal. The 
minimal objective of the jihadists is to “liberate” all Muslim-majority 
                                                 
136 “Allah has not assigned our umma to know the person of the Mahdi prior to his 
Appearance,” Markaz al-Dirasat wa al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya website, February 2003, 
previously available at: www.conrado.net/_vit_inf/print.php?id=989&ty=pr&img=no. 
Cited in Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
137 The more rational grievances expressed by Bin Ladin have been usefully categorized 
and summarized by Scheuer in Imperial Hubris, pp. 11-14. 
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territories that are currently “occupied” by hostile “infidel” military 
forces, including Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, southern Thailand, 
the southern Philippines, and “Eastern Turkestan,” which effectively 
brings them into direct contact with Israel, the United States, Russia, 
India, the Thai and Philippine governments, and China.138 The 
intermediate long-term objective of the global jihadists is to recover all 
of the territory that was once under Muslim control but then 
subsequently lost to “infidel” powers, including Spain, Sicily and parts 
of southern Italy, a substantial portion of the Balkans, huge swaths of 
territory in Turkic Central Asia, all of northern India, and large segments 
of northwestern China, which adds Spain, Italy, Croatia, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece to their list of enemies.139 Their maximal long-term 
goal, of course, is the very same one promoted by both the “rightly-
guided” Caliphs and several later Umayyad, `Abbasid, and Ottoman 
rulers – to spread the word of Allah to the “unbelievers” (kuffar), by 
force if necessary, and ultimately to Islamize every corner of the globe at 
the expense of both the ahl al-kitab and the “polytheists,” which in 
practice would nowadays amount to completely overturning and 
transforming the existing world order. As Phares sums it up, al-Qa`ida 
aims to humiliate and ultimately destroy America, the military and 
economic bastion of the dar al-harb, in order to lay the groundwork for 
Islam’s final triumph over the West and other non-Muslims.140 It was 
this very decision to shift the target of jihadist terrorism away from the 
                                                 
138 This was essentially the objective of `Abdallah `Azzam, who sought to form a 
jihadist “rapid deployment force” that could come to the aid of Muslims being 
subjected to “infidel” military control. See Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 135-8. Compare 
also the key texts of `Azzam himself, such as Ilhaq bi-ilqafila [Join the Caravan] 
(London: Azzam, 2001); and idem, Al-difa’ `an ard al-muslimin, aham furud al-`ayn 
[The Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important of the Individual Duties] (Jedda: 
Dar al-Mujtama’, 1987). Both can also be found online, with partial English 
translations, on the Islamist Watch website: www.islamistwatch.org. 
139 For one illustrative example, note the Islamist obsession to recover control over al-
Andalus, i.e., Spain. See Arístegui, Yihad en España, especially pp. 119-55. Compare 
Bin Ladin’s remarks in his December 1994 letter to Saudi religious scholar `Abd al-
`Aziz ibn Baz, head of the pro-regime “palace `ulama,” which he closes by asking 
Allah to help the umma re-establish tawhid (belief in the unity of God) in “stolen” 
Islamic lands such as Palestine and Spain. Cited in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the 
World, p. 14. 
140 Phares, Future Jihad, pp. 134-5, 161-9. Compare al-Zawahiri, Fursan, part 11; and 
Bari Atwan, Secret History of al-Qa`ida, p. 222, who, on the basis of Muhammad 
Makkawi’s strategic treatise, notes that al-Qa`ida intends to bring down the U.S., just as 
it previously brought down the Soviet Union, after which an “ultimate, definitive 
military clash between a mighty Islamic army and the ‘nonbelievers,’ often mentioned 
by bin Laden, will result in the victory and global dominance of the Caliphate. This is, 
at any rate, al-Qa`ida’s dream.” Italics added.  
 60
The Jericho Option: Al-Qa`ida & Attacks On Critical Infrastructure 
“near enemy” (al-`adu al-qarib), i.e., “apostate” Muslim regimes, and 
instead strike directly at the “far enemy” (al-`adu al-ba`id), the United 
States, that constituted Bin Ladin’s chief strategic innovation, one which 
has already had incalculable geopolitical implications.141 Lest anyone 
doubt that this is the global jihadists’ ultimate objective, one might wish 
to consider the inflammatory, unequivocal remarks of the 
aforementioned Abu Qatada: 
 
We must destroy Rome. The destruction must be carried out by 
sword. Those who will destroy Rome are already preparing the 
swords. Rome will not be conquered with the word but with the 
force of arms…Muslims’ target is the West. We will split 
Rome open.142
 
Equally explicit are two August 2002 articles penned by Sayf al-Din al-
Ansari, which appeared in the al-Qa`ida-linked journal Majallat al-Ansar 
(The Magazine of the Supporters) and openly advocated the 
extermination of infidels by means of jihad. In one such article, he wrote 
the following: 
 
Just as the law of extermination was applied to the infidel 
forces among the nations in previous days and no one could 
escape it, so it will be applied to the infidel forces in our day 
and no one will escape it. Namely, similar to the fate of the 
Thamud and `Ad peoples, so the American state, the Jewish 
state, and all other infidel countries will surely be destroyed.143
                                                 
141 For analyses of this crucial reorientation of jihadist objectives, based primarily upon 
internal jihadist sources, compare Gerges, Far Enemy, especially pp. 143-50; and al-
Zayyat, Road to Al Qaeda, pp. 68-70. 
142 Cited by Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe, p. 135. In this passage the term “Rome” refers 
not simply to the capital of Italy and the locale of the Papal States, but to Christendom 
as a whole, i.e., the West. Similar sentiments concerning the coming “conquest” (fatah) 
of the West appear frequently on jihadist websites. 
143 Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, “Wa yimhaq al-kafirin [And Exterminate the Infidels],” 
Majallat al-Ansar 16, August 10, 2002, pp. 4-8, cited by Jonathan D. Halevi, “Al-
Qaeda’s Intellectual Legacy: New Radical Islamic Thinking Justifying the Genocide of 
Infidels,” Jerusalem [Center for Public Affairs] Viewpoints 508, December 1, 2003, 
electronic pp. 10-11. The `Ad and the Thamud were pagan Arab tribes that were totally 
destroyed by God because they both rejected the efforts of ancient Arabian prophets, 
respectively  Hud (Hebrew `Eber) and Salih (Hebrew Shelah), to call them to abandon 
polytheism and embrace the one true God. Allusions to these stories can be found in the 
Qur’an 7:65-7, 11:58-9, and 26: 124-5, 142-3. Note also that the term al-ansar (the 
supporters) has a very precise and historically important meaning for Muslims, in that it 
was the name given to Muhammad’s earliest supporters in the town of Medina, in 
contradistinction to the earliest Meccan Muslims who emigrated with the Prophet from 
Mecca to Medina in 622, who were known as al-muhajirun (the émigrés). 
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In the second article, he claims that Allah has the power to exterminate 
the infidels directly, without using intermediaries, but that instead He has 
laid down that “the infidels’ extermination is part of Islamic law, which 
is operative until the Day of Judgment” and that its “principal element 
will be fulfilled only at the hands of the believers, meaning through 
jihad, which is also to be operative until the Day of Judgment.144 This is 
meant as a direct criticism of those Islamist scholars and organizations 
which argue that gradual, less violent approaches involving missionary 
work, education, and the provision of social services are nowadays the 
preferred methods for expanding the faith and ensuring the ultimate 
victory of Islam. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that even these ostensibly non-
violent Islamist groups, such as the Jam`iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
(Society of the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood) and Hizb al-
Tahrir al-Islami (HT: Islamic Liberation Party), likewise intend to spread 
the faith and eventually raise the banner of Islam over the “infidel” world 
by means of a combination of da`wa, infiltration and penetration 
operations, demographic “reconquest,” and/or outright armed struggle 
(jihad).145 See, for example, the illustrative remarks of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s supposedly “moderate” spiritual guide, Yusuf al-
Qaradhawi: 
 
Islam will return once more to Europe as a conqueror and as a 
victorious power after it was expelled twice from the 
continent…I assume that next time the conquest will not be 
achieved by the sword but by preaching [da`wa] and spreading 
the ideology [of Islam]…The conquest of Rome and the 
expansion of Islam will reach all the areas where the sun shines 
and the moon appears [i.e., the entire world]…That will be the 
result of a planted seed and the beginning of the righteous 
Caliphate’s return…[The Islamic Caliphate] deserves to lead 
the umma to the plains of victory.146
                                                 
144 Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, “Yi`adhibuhum Allah bi-`aydikum,” Majallat al-Ansar 16, 
August 24, 2002, pp. 4-9, cited in Halevy, “Al-Qaeda’s Intellectual Legacy,” p. 11. 
145 For a secret Muslim Brotherhood plan to gain influence and eventual supremacy in 
the West via stealth and subversion, see Sylvain Besson, La conquête de l’Occident: Le 
projet secret des islamistes (Paris: Seuil, 2005), especially chapters 1-2, 5-7. The actual 
document, entitled “The Project,” appears in French translation on pp. 193-205. For the 
universalist and frankly imperialistic objectives of HT, it is sufficient to visit their 
website, which among other items contains PDF files of numerous brochures put out by 
the group. See http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org.  
146 Cited by Halevi, “Al-Qaeda’s Intellectual Legacy,” electronic p. 4. 
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Compare further the even more militaristic June 2003 remarks of Anjem 
Choudray, one of the leaders of the radical London-based group al-
Muhajirun (The Émigrés), an offshoot of Hizb al-Tahrir: 
 
One day the black flag of Islam will be flying over Downing 
Street. Lands will not be liberated by individuals, but by an 
army. Eventually there’ll have to be a Muslim army. It’s just a 
matter of time before it happens.147
 
How anyone can characterize such extreme views as “limited” in their 
focus and aims is beyond comprehension. 
 
Indeed, Scheuer fails even to acknowledge, much less give sufficient 
weight to, al-Qa`ida’s less-than-rational “expressive” motives for 
carrying out attacks, above all 1) its religiously-grounded obsession with 
cleansing the world of “apostates” and “infidels,” and 2) its burning 
desire to exact revenge against “Crusaders” and perfidious Jews for a 
host of proclaimed “crimes,” real or imagined, that these “servants of 
Satan” are supposed to have committed against innocent Muslims. Such 
atavistic or retributional impulses are well-expressed by numerous al-
Qa`ida-linked spokesmen. For example, in his book Ayman al-Zawahiri 
perfectly captures both sentiments. He advocates that the mujahidin 
inflict massive casualties on the enemy whenever possible, since this is 
supposedly the only language that the West understands, and also clearly 
reveals his thirst for revenge when he opines that the jihadist movement 
 
promises destruction and ruin for the new Crusades against the 
lands of Islam. It is ready for revenge against the heads of the 
world’s gathering of infidels, the United States, Russia, and 
Israel. It is anxious to seek retribution for the blood of the 
martyrs, the grief of the mothers, the deprivation of the 
                                                 
147 Cited by Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe, p. 171. Another al-Muhajirun member, Abu 
Yusuf, made the following alarming statement in April 2004: “I would to see the 
Mujahidin coming into London and killing thousands, whether with nuclear weapons or 
germ warfare. And if they need a safehouse, they can stay in mine.” See ibid. This is 
the very same group that organized demonstrations in Britain in early 2006, ostensibly 
to protest the Danish cartoons satirizing Muhammad, at which marchers carried signs 
with messages such as “Islam Will Dominate the World,” “Exterminate Those Who 
Slander Islam,” “Be Prepared for the Real Holocaust,” “Freedom Go to Hell,” “Europe 
is the Cancer, Islam is the Answer,” and “Europe You Will Pay, Your 9/11 is on Its 
Way!” Author’s personal observation. 
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orphans, the suffering of the detainees, and the sores of the 
tortured people throughout the land of Islam.148
 
Nor are al-Zawahiri’s sentiments unique in jihadist circles. Sayf al-Din 
al-Ansari, in a book entitled Ghazwa 11 Sibtimber (The September 11 
Raid), claimed that the deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans in the attacks 
on New York and Washington, DC, was justified both in accordance 
with the principle of retaliation and because Islamic doctrine approves 
the destruction of enemy fortresses, even in circumstances where it may 
be impossible to distinguish between soldiers and civilians.149 Still more 
radical are the views expressed in a series of public letters by al-Qa`ida 
spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghayth, a Kuwaiti shaykh, who argues that 
the number of American casualties resulting from the 9/11 attacks was 
not nearly high enough to balance the historical ledger. As he sees it, the 
mujahidin have a right to kill at least four million Americans (including 
one million children), displace eight million, and maim hundreds of 
thousands more, since this is approximately how many Muslim deaths, 
displacements, and injuries he calculates have been directly or indirectly 
attributable to anti-Islamic U.S. policies and actions.150 Saudi scholar 
Nasir ibn Hamid al-Fahd, in a May 2003 fatwa, approved the use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the U.S., since a 
combination of military necessity and the law of retaliation supposedly 
gave Muslims the right to kill as many as ten million Americans.151 
Again, one would think that such blatant justifications and open calls for 
revenge might temper Scheuer’s overemphasis on al-Qa`ida’s rationality, 
but this is not the case. In that sense the attitudes of the “rationalists” are 
reminiscent of those observers in the 1930s who insisted, despite 
massive evidence to the contrary, that Hitler had pragmatic goals which 
could actually be satisfied rather than an irrational hatred of real and 
                                                 
148 Al-Zawahiri, Fursan, part 11. 
149 Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, “Ghazwa 11 Sibtimbir. Kitab al-ansar li-muwajahat al-harb 
al-salibiyya,” September 2002, pp. 10-11. In pre-Islamic Arabia, the noun of unity 
ghazwa (pl. ghazawat) referred to an “expedition, usually of limited scope, conducted 
with the aim of gaining plunder.” However, after the triumph of Islam, it was used 
specifically to refer to Muhammad’s expeditions against “infidels.” See T. M. 
Johnstone, “Ghazw,” EI2, volume 2, p. 1055. 
150 Sulayman Abu Ghayth, “In the Shade of the Lances: Why We Fight America,” 
which first appeared on jihadist websites on June 2002. Portions of this text have since 
been translated into English and published in Ben N. Venzke, ed., The Al-Qaeda 
Documents, Vol. 3 (Alexandria, VA: Tempest/IntelCenter, 2003), pp. 107-10. 
151 The actual text was formerly available at http://www.al-
fhd.com/rsayl/doc/rsayl.damar.doc. It has been usefully cited and analyzed by Reuven 
Paz, “Yes to WMD: The first Islamist Fatwah on the Use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” PRISM Special Dispatches 1: 1 (May 2003), pp. 4-7. 
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imagined enemies, a passionate desire to exact revenge against them, and 
an outright will to exterminate them. It was precisely their failure to take 
Nazi ideological fanaticism seriously that led to misplaced efforts to 
appease the German chancellor. 
 
Unfortunately, the “non-rationalist” interpreters have themselves only 
gotten things partially right. After all, it is a fairly short step between 
arguing that the jihadists’ basic worldview is not only archaic and 
anachronistic but delusional, which is essentially true, and concluding – 
wrongly – that this means that they are incapable of displaying any 
strategic rationality. This unwarranted leap is perhaps best epitomized by 
French Arabist Olivier Roy, who like Lee claims that al-Qa`ida “has no 
strategic vision” at all, and that “most of its targets have no military or 
strategic value.”152 To say the least, this is an overstatement, even if one 
is willing to admit that Bin Ladin’s organization has carried out 
particular actions in part for ideologically-induced “expressive” reasons, 
such as a compulsion to smite “infidels” or obtain retribution, rather than 
for purely rational “strategic” reasons. 
 
Bin Ladin’s ultimate aims, as noted above, are to unite the Muslim 
umma, restore the power and glory of the Caliphate, and secure the 
triumph of the dar al-islam over the dar al-kufr. He recognizes, however, 
that this objective cannot be achieved until a truly Islamic state is 
established in the heart of the Muslim world and until the power of the 
United States is undermined and destroyed, two objectives that are 
viewed as closely interrelated.153 What, then, is al-Qa`ida’s basic strategy 
for accomplishing its ultimate objectives? Since at least the mid-1990s, 
its principal aim has been to precipitate a titanic “conflict of 
civilizations” between the Islamic world and the West, and in the process 
create a global Islamic insurgent movement that even the unmatched 
power and vast resources of America would be unable to cope with or 
quell.154 In order to accomplish this preliminary aim, al-Qa`ida carried 
                                                 
152 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: 
Columbia University, 2004), p. 294. Compare also pp. 55-6. 
153 See the extended discussion of al-Zawahiri, Fursan, part 11. 
154 For example, Bin Ladin has explicitly stated that his goal was to “move, incite and 
mobilize the umma” until such time as it reached a “revolutionary ignition point.” See, 
respectively, “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq,” Al-Jazira, February 11, 2003; and 
“Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against US,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, November 27, 1996. 
Both of these quotes are conveniently cited in Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and 
Evolving Ideology,” p. 6. Compare the remarks of Bari Atwan, Secret History of al-
Qa`ida, p. 225: “Al-Qa`ida wishes to foment a ‘clash of civilizations,’ with Christian 
fundamentalism opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, resulting in an eventual all-out 
war between the ‘believers’ and the kafir.” 
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out a series of provocative attacks marked by increasing lethality, 
culminating on 9/11, that were intended to goad the United States into 
launching a massive attack on the Islamic world, which would only serve 
to confirm Bin Ladin’s long-standing claims that the “Great Satan” and 
its allies were waging a war against Islam.155 An incautious, brutal 
response by the U.S. military would in turn hopefully have the effect of 
arousing the increasingly angry Muslim masses from their slumber and 
compelling them at long last to answer al-Qa`ida’s call to wage a 
“defensive jihad” against the invading “infidels,” who could now be 
more plausibly seen as trying to militarily subjugate the dar al-islam and 
directly exploit its resources. 
The beauty of this scheme, apart from its breathtaking simplicity, was 
that it provided the transnational jihadists with a virtual “win-win” 
situation. If the United States lashed out indiscriminately, on the one 
hand, or did not react forcefully at all, on the other, it would 
inadvertently hand a huge propaganda victory to al-Qa`ida. Only a 
measured, precisely targeted, and quietly lethal response might have 
foiled Bin Ladin’s plan, since such a relatively restrained but highly 
efficacious middle course would have served to demonstrate American 
power and resolve without causing unnecessary civilian casualties, in the 
process further radicalizing the Muslim “street” and providing al-Qa`ida 
with new recruits. For several years the United States actually failed this 
test, in that it did not respond decisively or effectively to jihadist attacks, 
thereby repeatedly allowing al-Qa`ida to display its operational prowess 
and also serving as an inspiration both to jihadists and other anti-Western 
Muslims by mistakenly giving them the impression that America really 
was a weak, decadent “paper tiger” which had no stomach for fighting or 
taking casualties, just as Bin Ladin had been saying ever since the 1993 
Somali debacle. After 9/11, however, by cracking down on anti-Muslim 
vigilante violence inside the U.S. and precisely targeting al-Qa`ida and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, America for a time deprived Bin 
Ladin of such an easy anticipated victory.156 It was only later, when the 
U.S. military failed to seal off the retreat of the mujahidin at Tora Bora, 
thereby not dealing al-Qa`ida a knockout blow,157 and when the Bush 
Administration embarked on its ill-conceived invasion and occupation of 
Iraq, that Bin Ladin was handed a golden opportunity to rally his 
                                                 
155 See al-Zawahiri, Fursan, part 11. On this point, many analysts who otherwise 
disagree seem to concur.  
156 Phares, Future Jihad, pp. 166-8. 
157 For the factors involved in the U.S. failure to trap Bin Ladin’s fighters at Tora Bora, 
a military blunder of tremendous import, see Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great 
Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 
2004). 
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scattered, disillusioned fighters, recruit new generations of mujahidin, 
and more effectively tap and exploit Muslim popular anger.158
 
It has been argued above that al-Qa`ida has extremely utopian aims, 
rooted in “classical” Islamic juridical and political conceptions about the 
relations between the Islamic world and the non-Islamic world, that 
could only be achieved in the present era if some unanticipated 
combination of natural and human cataclysms brought about the collapse 
of the existing world order. However, this does not mean that Bin Ladin 
and his principal lieutenants are incapable of formulating particular 
strategic concepts in an effort to achieve those fundamentally unrealistic 
goals. In his recent assessment of global jihadist objectives, Thomas 
Hegghammer argues that there are “five principal categories of actors 
that shape contemporary global jihadist ideology” and, more narrowly, 
endeavor to define global jihadist strategy. The first is “represented by 
the leadership of the ‘old al-Qa`ida,’” i.e., Bin Ladin and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who communicate primarily through sound and visual 
recordings diffused on Arab television stations. According to 
Hegghammer, 
 
The statements by Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are often quite 
general in content, and their main purpose seems to be to 
convince and motivate believers to take up arms against the 
enemy. Their approximately 40 statements since the Autumn of 
2001 have focused on the political reasons to fight the 
Crusaders. They rarely provide specific strategic or tactical 
advice, and hence their declarations are always subject to 
interpretation by other writers.159
 
This does not mean that they do not discuss specific strategic matters at 
all,160 but that the primary responsibility for defining and clarifying 
                                                 
158 On the disastrous impact of the invasion of Iraq on support for global jihadism, see, 
e.g., Benjamin and Simon, Next Attack, pp. xiv, 31-50; and Gerges, Far Enemy, pp. 
251-76. There is no doubt that jihadist leaders see the U.S. invasion of Iraq as a golden 
opportunity to “bleed” the Crusaders and eventually erect an Islamic state in the historic 
heart of the dar al-islam. See Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” pp. 
17-24. 
159 Ibid., p. 15. 
160 See, e.g., al-Zawahiri’s comments on the potential geostrategic impact should the 
Caucasus fall into the hands of local and global jihadists: “The liberation of the 
Caucasus would constitute a hotbed of jihad (or fundamentalism as the United States 
describes it) and that region would become the shelter of thousands of Muslim 
mujahidin from various parts of the Islamic world, particularly Arab parts. This poses a 
direct threat to the United States represented by the growing support for the jihadist 
movement everywhere in the Islamic world. If the Chechens and other Caucasian 
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global jihadist strategy falls to the other four categories, namely, pro-
jihadist religious scholars (the `ulama al-jihad), actual military and 
strategic thinkers linked to al-Qa`ida, members of other active militant 
organizations (including branches of al-Qa`ida), and what Hegghammer 
refers to as “grassroots radicals, i.e., the thousands of anonymous 
participants on radical Islamist discussion forums on the Internet.”161
 
In this context, there is no need to devote any attention to the exhortative 
and juridical materials produced by the jihadist `ulama, most of whom 
have in any case since been arrested by the Saudi or European 
authorities, nor to focus on the voluminous materials produced by 
Islamist terrorist groups with their own agendas or by jihadist 
sympathizers who post all sorts of messages on jihadist forums and 
blogsites. Rather, what is perhaps most significant is that since 9/11, and 
especially since the Autumn of 2002, the number of texts produced by 
the third group above, which can be broadly characterized as “strategic 
studies” texts, has increased considerably. In particular, the online 
magazine Majallat al-Ansar and the website of the Markaz al-Dirasat wa 
al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya have provided forums for materials of this type. 
Unlike other jihadist materials, these strategic analyses tend to be more 
“secular in style, academic in their approach, and objective in their 
assessments.”162 One indication of this is that the authors of some of 
these works have evidently examined and analyzed Western military 
writings, as the example of Sayf al-Ansar’s article on “Fourth Generation 
Warfare” indicates.163 Hence it cannot be denied that certain al-Qa`ida 
military leaders, such as Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and the recently captured 
Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, do possess a relatively clear strategic vision, one 
that is informed by years of operational experience. 
                                                                                                                       
mujahidin reach the shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, the only thing that will separate 
them from Afghanistan will be the neutral state of Turkmenistan. This will form a 
mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected in the east to 
Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahidin movements in Kashmir. The belt will be 
linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic to the Muslims of Central 
Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the Muslim Caucasus and allow it 
to communicate with the Islamic world in general, but particularly with the mujahidin 
movement.” See Fursan, part 7. 
161 Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” pp. 16-17. For the fatawa of the 
radical `ulama, see the new book by Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of 
Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2006). 
162 Ibid., p. 28. 
163 Sayf al-Ansar, “Hurub al-jil al-rabi,” Majallat al-Ansar 2, January 28, 2002). 
Compare also Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi, “Amrika wa Mabadi’ al-Harb: Bayna al-
Nazariyya ila al-Tatbiq [“America and the Principles of War: From Theory to 
Practice],” Majallat al-Ansar 24, January 2, 2003.  
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However, the extent to which al-Qa`ida engages in coherent strategic 
thinking should not be exaggerated. Three examples should suffice to 
demonstrate that limitations in al-Qa`ida’s strategic thinking.164 First, 
there is a 113-page strategic treatise written by Abu Bakr Naji, Idarat al-
Tawahhush (The Management of Savagery), which was produced by the 
aforementioned Markaz and posted in March 2005 on the al-Ikhlas 
online forum by someone using the moniker “Irhabi3,” i.e., “Terrorist 3.” 
The jihadist strategic plan outlined by Naji is extremely schematic, so 
much so that one wonders how seriously to take it. He begins by 
hypothesizing a three-phase strategy. In the first phase, the disruption 
and exhaustion phase, the jihadists will bleed “infidel” forces and rally 
Muslim youth by means of exemplary targeting (such as the 2002 Bali 
bombing); in the second, the “management of savagery” phase, they will 
establish zones under their own control, where they can establish 
authentically Islamic institutions and impose the shari`a; and in the third, 
the empowerment phase, they will extend the above phases and link up 
various jihadist zones of control.165 Among the targeting objectives Naji 
lists are tourist resorts, “Crusader” banks, and oil installations (in order 
to force the enemy to expend resources to raise security for refineries, 
pipelines, and shipping), and he especially advocates striking hard, since 
a superior enemy can only be defeated by means of economic and 
military attrition. 
 
Second, in another text posted on the internet, “Al-Qa`ida’s Strategy to 
the Year 2020,” Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi – a pseudonym used by 
                                                 
164 Three unresolved questions concerning the texts cited below are 1) whether they 
amount to different versions of the same basic strategy, which may well be the case; 2) 
whether they constitute hyper-rationalist post-facto analyses of what has already 
occurred that are designed to retrospectively display al-Qa`ida’s supposed “prescience,” 
together with future optimistic prognostications; and 3) the extent to which they can be 
said to reflect al-Qa`ida’s “official” strategy. The fact that they all surfaced around the 
time time period suggests that there was an effort by the group to make its strategic 
intentions known. 
165 Compare the brief analyses by Stephen Ulph, “New Online Book Lays Out al-
Qaeda’s Military Strategy,” Terrorism Focus [Jamestown Foundation] 2:6 (March 17, 
2005), pp. 4-6; Bruce Tefft, “Al-Qa`ida Book on Managing Savagery,” Isralert, March 
8, 2005; and Jarrett M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al-Qa`ida’s 
Playbook,” CTC [West Point Counterterrorism Center] Report, February 2006, pp. 6-
10. This scheme echoes traditional guerrilla warfare strategies, which likewise involve 
weakening the enemy and rallying the masses, gradually establishing “liberated zones,” 
and then expanding those zones at the enemy’s expense until such time as the latter is 
fatally weakened.. In short, this is little more than an Islamic version of the classic “oil 
spot” strategy. 
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Sayf al-Adl – outlined a similar five-phase strategy.166 In the first phase, 
the goal was to induce the “ponderous American elephant” to invade 
Muslim lands. In the second phase, this invasion would in turn anger and 
galvanize the resistance of the umma, in the process providing more 
jihadist recruits. In the third, the conflict with the Crusaders would be 
expanded throughout the region, thereby trapping and bleeding U.S. 
forces within a “jihad triangle of horror” running through Afghanistan, 
currently neutral Iran and southern Iraq, then into southern Turkey, 
southern Lebanon, and Syria. In the fourth phase, the movement would 
be expanded globally, with the result that independent jihadist cells 
would spring up autonomously, including in the West. In the fifth and 
phase, the U.S. will become so overextended militarily that its economy 
will collapse, paving the way for the final victory of the mujahidin over 
the dar al-kufr. 
 
Third, in a 2005 book by journalist Fu`ad Husayn, which is entitled Al-
Zarqawi, al-jil al-thani li-al-Qa`ida (Al-Zarqawi: Al-Qa`ida’s Second 
Generation), the author purports to describe a strategy for victory that 
has been carefully outlined by al-Qa`ida’s own leaders.167 This particular 
scheme has seven rather than three phases, and is thus even more 
elaborate – and arguably more of an exercise in wishful thinking – than 
Naji’s. The first is the “awakening” stage from 2000 to 2003, during 
which the umma will be awakened from its state of hibernation by the 
jihadist precipitation of an American invasion of the Muslim world. The 
second is the “eye-opening” stage from 2003 to 2006, during which the 
U.S. will open the eyes of the believers by occupying Muslim lands and 
thence be engaged directly by the mujahidin on Muslim soil. The third is 
the “standing upright” stage from 2007-2010, during which the jihadist 
vanguard and the umma will develop the capacity to take effective 
offensive action, especially in the al-Sham region (Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordan). The fourth is the “recuperation of power” stage from 2010 to 
2013, during which apostate Muslim regimes will be overthrown by 
means of direct combat, thereby accelerating the deterioration of U.S. 
power and influence in the region. The fifth is the “declaration” and 
establishment of an Islamic state stage from 2013 to 2016, during which 
the Caliphate will be restored even as American and European power 
                                                 
166 See the analysis in Bari Atwan, Secret History of al-Qa`ida, pp. 221-2. Compare al-
Baddarin, “Al-Qa`ida Drew Up Working Strategy,” Al-Quds al-`Arabi, March 11, 
2005. 
167 See Husayn, Al-Zarqawi, parts 14-15. This analysis may well represent a synthesis 
of the two texts cited directly above, as opposed to being based on other, unspecified 
jihadist sources. Unfortunately, the CETIS team was unable to obtain a copy of the 
actual book, given its relative scarcity in Western libraries. 
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declines in relation to that of China, India, and the Islamic world. The 
sixth is the “all-out confrontation” stage from 2017 to 2020, during 
which there will be total war between the dar al-islam and the dar al-
kufr and the creation of a new balance of power. The seventh and last is 
the “final victory” stage after 2020, during which the unbelievers will 
suffer complete defeat at the hands of the Islamic umma. Interestingly, 
from the second stage on, the mujahidin plan to “burn” Arab oil in order 
to deprive the West of vital revenues and to wage a campaign of 
electronic jihad, i.e., cyber-sabotage, against the U.S. economy. More 
bizarrely, in the fourth stage they plan to gradually reinstitute the gold 
standard in order to devalue Western currency, an idea first proposed by 
Hizb al-Tahrir. What particularly strikes the outside observer is not only 
the overly schematic and absurdly optimistic “strategy” outlined here, 
but also the apparent reliance on a vaguely numerological system to 
determine the length of the successive stages. In short, beyond the most 
rudimentary and seemingly unrealistic projections and prognostications, 
one finds precious little coherent strategic thinking in these two works.168
 
Nevertheless, al-Qa`ida has repeatedly shown itself to be devastatingly 
effective on the operational and “tactical” levels, irrespective of whether 
its leaders always display a coherent and realistic “strategic” vision. As 
is now well-known, the principal modus operandi employed by al-
Qa`ida, especially in the major attacks officially authorized by Bin Ladin 
and his Majlis al-Shura, is characterized by thorough, time-consuming, 
and at times meticulous planning, the careful surveillance of prospective 
targets, and the gradual insertion of operatives into the target zone, 
followed by the sudden execution of near simultaneous attacks by well-
prepared “martyrs” (shuhada), i.e., suicide terrorists. These salutary 
traits were clearly displayed in, among other actions, the destructive 
1998 attacks on the two U.S. embassies in Africa, the attack on the 
U.S.S. Cole, and the “planes operation” on 9/11, and they have since 
been adopted by other jihadist organizations that are affiliated with or 
directly inspired by al-Qa`ida, e.g., by Jemaah Islamiyah in its horrific 
2002 and 2005 attacks on areas frequented by tourists in Bali. On the 
operational level, al-Qa`ida generally displays a serious, realistic, and 
fundamentally rational approach. This is illustrated by a series of articles 
authored by Sayf al-Adl, who was appointed head of al-Qa`ida’s military 
committee after the death of Muhammad Atif, that appeared during 2004 
in Mu`askar al-Battar, an important but now defunct al-Qa`ida military 
                                                 
168 Ironically, because of the Bush Administration’s terrible mistakes in Iraq, the initial 
phases of these projected schemes seem to be developing according to jihadist 
projections. 
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and operations journal.169 In one such article, al-Adl urged the mujahidin 
to develop a “creative” and “flexible” attack plan marked by the 
following characteristics: 
 
1. A plan should be reasonable. In other words, alternatives 
should be examined properly and weighed carefully so that the 
best of them can be chosen. 
2. There should be a major – specific – target and other 
secondary targets for the operation. 
3. The plan should be realistic. 
4. It should be coherent, tight, and accurate. There should be no 
gaps in it. Rather, each part of the plan should complement the 
other part. It should appear to the enemy as a connected 
sequence of events. 
5. It should be simple. In other words, every member [of the 
operational cell] should easily understand it and be able to 
implement it without difficulty.170
 
Such an approach is unfortunately typical of the sound, realistic 
(para)military thinking that permeates al-Qa`ida’s operational and 
tactical planning. Therefore, no matter how bizarre and absurd the 
maximal objectives of the global jihadists may in fact be, it would be a 
terrible mistake to underestimate their undeniably effective operational 
methods and capabilities. 
 
Indeed, it is precisely this combination of 1) delusional, utopian, and 
non-negotiable goals, which ultimately derive from a theologically-based 
and fanatical “fantasy ideology,” and 2) a ruthless operational efficiency 
capable of causing tremendous damage, that makes al-Qa`ida such a 
dangerous and formidable adversary. If the group actually had rational, 
limited, negotiable aims, as Scheuer insists, it would be vastly 
preferable.171 In that case, compromises could be made by both sides, 
and it might well be possible to come to some sort of acceptable 
                                                 
169 Some of his analyses have been conveniently quoted verbatim in Micheal Scheuer, 
“Assessing London and Sharm al-Sheikh: The Role of Internet Intelligence and Urban 
Warfare Planning,” Terrorism Focus 2:15 (August 15, 2005), pp. 6-8. A total of 22 
issues of Mu`askar al-Battar were produced. 
170 Sayf al-Adl, “Planning Special Operations,” Mu`askar al-Battar, September 13, 
2004. 
171 Compare Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” p. 33. Even Bari Atwan, whose 
portrayal of Bin Ladin and his group is relatively sympathetic, is forced to admit that 
“the prospect of opening negotiations with al-Qa`ida seems remote indeed…[although] 
this notion should not be completely ruled out…The problem, of course, is that al-
Qa`ida’s demands are global…” See Secret History of al-Qa`ida, p. 234. 
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agreement or settlement that would serve to limit the ongoing campaign 
of jihadist violence that is nowadays being incited and partially 
organized and executed by Bin Ladin. No serious observer can honestly 
believe, however, that even if the United States and its allies suddenly 
acceded to all of Bin Ladin’s proximate and relatively limited but still 
expansive demands, that the mujahidin affiliated with al-Qa`ida and the 
other Islamist terrorist groups would then be willing to lay down their 
arms, say “thank you,” and initiate peaceful and mutually beneficial 
relations with the dar al-kufr.172 Such a naive illusion, which completely 
ignores their underlying religious intolerance and fanaticism, can 
scarcely be reconciled with the ongoing flood of utterly uncompromising 
statements that Bin Ladin and other jihadist spokesmen have made over 
the years, above all in Arabic-language materials that most Westerners 
cannot read. Yet even in his December 1998 interview for al-Jazira, Bin 
Ladin made the following revealing statement: “Every Muslim, from the 
moment they realize the distinction in their hearts, hates Americans, 
hates Jews, and hates Christians. That is part of our belief and our 
religion.” Or elsewhere in that same interview, when he refers to non-
Muslims as mankind’s “devils and demons” and boasts that “we are 
continuing on this path [of jihad] until we meet God Almighty.”173 Nor 
is his meaning any less clear in another interview for al-Jazira, this one 
dating from October 21, 2001, when he says that the “disbelieving 
fornicators” may choose whether or not to fight Muslims, but the latter 
have no choice but to fight everyone in the “ranks of the Jews.”174 
Needless to say, when the only alternatives that presently remain open to 
Western “infidels” are capitulating and converting to a strict, puritanical 
version of Islam, on the one hand, or fighting to defend the values, 
interests, and territories of Western civilization, on the other, there is 
absolutely no choice but to fight, and to fight ruthlessly and effectively. 
This, in turn, requires that we understand the true nature of our enemy, 
properly interpret his intentions and objectives, and take appropriate 
counteractions. Up until now, governments in the West have generally 
failed on all three counts. 
 
In the final analysis, there is one seemingly insurmountable difficulty 
that faces any state or society which is confronted by hostile, violence-
                                                 
172 Bin Ladin occasionally gives the impression that he is reasonable and would stop 
attacking “unbelievers” if only they would cease and desist. In his October 21, 2001 
interview for al-Jazira, e.g., he said “if our violators stop violating us, there is a way 
out.” Cited in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 126. This also partially explains 
his occasional offers of “truces” to the West in his speeches. 
173 Cited in Ibid., pp. 81, 92. 
174 Cited in Ibid., p. 128. 
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prone religious extremists: their stubborn maintenance of faith that their 
agendas and actions are “divinely-sanctioned,” even in the face of 
looming defeat and disaster. This is because when things are going their 
way, they attribute all of their good fortune to the support and will of 
God, but when things cease going their way, they rarely draw the equally 
logical but opposing conclusion – that God, in His infinite wisdom, has 
decided to withdraw that favor because they have sinned or are otherwise 
no longer worthy of it. On the contrary, they almost invariably conclude 
that God is increasing their suffering and misfortune precisely in order to 
test their faith, and then respond by renewing and redoubling their efforts 
to achieve their goals. In short, to the extent that they are absolutely 
convinced that God is on their side and that the enemy is inherently evil 
and ungodly, they are unusually hard to deter or permanently undermine 
the morale of. 
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Chapter FOUR:  
 
Exploring Historical and 
Religious Links to Critical 
Infrastructure 
 
 
 
RELIGIOUS REFERENTS FOR ATTACKS ON 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE*
 
ne of the first places to look for influences on al-Qa`ida’s 
decisionmaking more generally, and target selection with regards 
to critical infrastructure in particular, is Islamic religious sources, 
primarily the basic texts – the Qur’an and the collections of reports on 
Muhammad’s purported words and deeds, i.e., the hadith (pl., ahadith) – 
as interpreted by jihadists. The relevance of historical religious texts for 
the operations and tactics of al-Qa`ida today might at first seem rather 
tenuous; after all, even terrorist groups professing the most archaic and 
abstruse ideologies rarely forego the strategic efficacy of modern tactics 
and technology. Yet in the case of the jihadists, it is critical to analyze 
Islam’s original sources since, unlike more mainstream and more 
traditionalist Islamic doctrines, jihadist thinkers promote opening the 
“doors of ijtihad”175 by returning almost exclusively to the Qur’an and 
ahadith as arbiters of the precepts of Islam.176 Most jihadists believe that 
O 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gary A. Ackerman. 
175 Ijtihad can loosely be described as Islamic juridical reasoning. Around the 10th 
century, Islamic jurists declared that the “gates of ijtihad were closed,” meaning that all 
important legal questions in Islam had been decided, and all future Muslims could do 
was to emulate learned religious leaders (the ulema). Jihadists, in contrast, (represented 
by ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Maulana Maududi) reject this 
view (and over a millennium of Islamic thought) and believe that it is possible to rely 
on their own interpretations of the Qur’an and ahadith to find the truth by asserting that 
ijtihad is not necessary where the meaning of the original text is clear. See Mary R. 
Habeck. Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. New Haven: 
Yale University, 2006), pp. 10-13. 
176 They also follow certain scholars, especially the salaf (“forefathers” or “ancestors”) 
who collected the ahadith, but do so very selectively. See ibid., p. 43. 
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all they need to know at all times – including in the realms of military 
strategy and tactics177 – is divinely ordained in Qur’anic revelations and 
embodied in the sunna (customary practices) of Muhammad. Hence for 
them, “any action associated with jihad – when to fight, how to fight, 
what sort of treaties to conclude with the enemy – must find some 
support from the texts.”178 This makes it a necessity to examine the 
extent to which the original precepts of Islam – as they appear in the 
Qur’an and ahadith and have been interpreted by the jihadists – provide 
al-Qa`ida with incentives, justifications, or possibly even constraints on 
targeting critical infrastructure. 
 
Salafist movements in Egypt, Wahhabi movements from the Arabian 
Peninsula, and even Sufi movements have influenced al-Qa`ida’s 
messianic and apocalyptic theology and ideology.179 Specifically, al-
Qa`ida’s theology and ideology are rooted in these movements’ belief 
that Islam needs renewal through a return to the principles and practices 
of early Islam. At the most basic level, al-Qa`ida’s leaders believe that 
Islam is locked in an eternal struggle with the evil forces of jahiliyya 
(“ignorance” or “barbarism”), which is presently represented by the West 
and most egregiously by the United States.180 By characterizing the 
current status of Muslims as oppressed and under attack by, variously, 
the Judeo-Christian world, modernization, and the Muslim world’s own 
“unbeliever” and “apostate” rulers, the jihadists in groups like al-Qa`ida 
promote the carrying out of a violent, religiously-sanctioned jihad 
                                                 
177 Indeed, the conduct of war (and particularly of jihad) has been a prevalent theme in 
Islamic writings. To cite but a few prominent examples, see the treatises of `Abd al-
Rahman Awza’i (d. 774) and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 804), as described in 
Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton, NJ: 
Markus Weiner, 1996), p. 3; and the 14th-century classic, Tafrij al-qurub fi tadbir al-
hurub [Dispelling Fears in the Management of Wars] by `Umar ibn Ibrahim al-Awasi 
al-Ansari, which deals with such issues as cavalry tactics, infantry deployments, 
espionage, and selection of encampments (see Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa 
Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 
2004), p.2. 
178 Ibid., 52. 
179 Faisal Devji, Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2005).
180 These ideas have been expounded upon at length in the previous chapter and are 
reiterated only insofar as they bear on the following discussion. 
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against their perceived oppressors.181 By appealing to Islamist thinkers 
like Mawlana Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutub, al-Qa`ida’s 
ideologues justify their way around several religious obstacles presented 
by traditional interpretations of Islamic law (the shari`a). For instance, 
al-Qa`ida characterizes the current jihad against the West as “defensive” 
rather than “offensive,” which arguably allows the group’s members a 
greater latitude in terms of recruitment and tactics. Indeed, jihadists –
including the supporters of al-Qa`ida – often cite the following verse 
from the Sura al-Baqara (The Cow): “and fight in the way of God those 
who will fight you, but transgress not, for God does not like the 
transgressors” (2:191) as a basis for their actions, but neglect to address 
the latter half of the verse, from which early Islamic scholars inferred the 
Islamic concept of “just war.”182 They also draw a marked distinction 
between the dar-al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and the dar-al-harb (Abode 
of War, a reference to the non-Islamic world), treating the latter and all it 
contains with contempt.183 As we shall see, within al-Qa`ida’s milieu, 
not only theology and ideology but also goals, strategy, and tactics are 
derived in part from carefully selected words and actions of the Prophet, 
his companions, and his immediate successors. 
 
One can never be absolutely certain which religious referents al-Qa`ida’s 
ideologues will use to guide or justify any particular action. The allusion 
to the conquest of Ta`if cited in the following section illustrates just how 
creative the extremists can be when referencing their sacred texts. Yet 
even without claiming any special insights into the particular religio-
historical analogies flitting inside the heads of al-Qa`ida’s operational 
chiefs, it is possible to discuss several elements within sacred Islamic 
texts and religious thinking that might influence their targeting decisions 
vis-à-vis critical infrastructure.  
 
First, it should be noted that jihadists view Allah as “the true owner of all 
property, and man is allowed to use it only when he does so in an 
                                                 
181 An in-depth discussion of Islamist ideology is beyond the scope of this study; 
therefore, only those aspects most relevant to the current discussion are presented. For a 
general introduction to these topics, compare Habeck, Knowing Thy Enemy; Peters, 
Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam; Roy, Globalized Islam; Gerges, Far Enemy; and 
Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World 
Disorder (Berkeley: University of California, 2002). 
182 Aboul-Enein and Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare , p. 8. 
183 The ultimate goal, of course, is to bring the entire world within the fold of the dar-
al-Islam, after which a new and peaceful global umma (Islamic community) can be 
established in which everyone will accede to the will of Allah. 
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Islamically correct way.”184 There is therefore no inherent respect for 
private or state property if the erstwhile owners are seen to be acting un-
Islamically. Furthermore, verses can be found in the Qur’an that 
specifically allude to human-built spaces in the context of death or 
violence. These include Sura 2:190, which prescribes that under certain 
circumstances (namely, when acting in self-defense), the forces of Islam 
are even allowed to enter the most holy of places to fight their enemies – 
“Kill them wherever you find them and turn them out from where they 
have turned you out, for fitna is worse than killing, but do not fight them 
at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. But if they fight you, 
kill them. Such is the reward of the unbelievers.”185 Even more telling is 
the following verse from the Sura al-Nisa’ (The Women): “Wherever 
you are, death will find you out. Even if you are in towers built up strong 
and high” (4:78). While Qur’anic verses like these may be interpreted by 
the Islamic mainstream in a way which bears no connection at all to 
critical infrastructure, it is not difficult to see how the jihadists of al-
Qa`ida could find in such verses either a prescription, or at the very least 
a justification, for attacking their enemies’ societal edifices, which in 
modern times could easily be equated with the very systems and assets 
we conceive of as critical infrastructure. 
 
As we have seen above, however, Islamic tradition does place some 
limits on behavior in war. One source of these restrictions is found in the 
exhortations of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and Muhammad’s immediate 
successor, to a Muslim army setting off to war:  
 
I advise you ten things: Do not kill women or children or an 
aged, infirm person. Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do 
not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or 
camels except for food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter 
them. Do not steal from the booty, and do not be cowardly.186
 
However, this statement of Abu Bakr is arguably at variance with the 
actual practice of the Prophet Muhammad, who in hadith 4324187 is said 
                                                 
184 Habeck, Knowing Thy Enemy, p. 76. 
185 Translation found in Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam 
(New York: Oxford University, 1999), p. 58. 
186 Malik’s Muwatta, Book 21: Jihad, Section 3: Prohibition against Killing Women 
and Children in Military Expeditions, Number 21.3.10. Translated by `A’isha `Abd al-
Rahman al-Tarjumana and Ya`qub Johnson, available at 
<http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muwatta/021.mmt.html>.  
187 Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Jihad wa al-Siyar [The Book of Jihad and Expedition], book 
19. 
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(by the authority of `Abdallah ibn `Umar) to have ordered the date-palms 
of the Banu Nadir to be burnt and cut. At the time, fruit-bearing trees 
were sources of both food and shade in the desert, and could thus be 
construed as the contemporaneous version of critical infrastructure. 
Rudolph Peters notes that these actions were justified in this instance 
only because the date-palms in question were being used as protection 
during battle and were not a source of sustenance for the enemy.188 Other 
scholars bring up the arguments that either Muhammad’s order applied 
only to the specific circumstances of the Banu Nadir, or that Abu Bakr 
would never have countermanded Muhammad, and therefore that 
Muhammad’s policy had been abrogated at a later date.189 More 
generally, there is a divergence of opinion amongst the different schools 
of Islam about exactly what kinds of damage can be inflicted on an 
enemy’s property (including buildings, cattle, and crops).190 Al-Qa`ida 
and other jihadists, who in any event have a proclivity for both 
interpreting the scriptures so as to allow them as much latitude of action 
as possible and deferring to the “original” practices of Muhammad, can 
exploit this difference of opinion to negate the aforementioned 
restrictions on military conduct, especially as these pertain to critical 
infrastructure. In fact, they may even derive from passages like hadith 
4324 the idea that they are being divinely guided towards considering 
critical infrastructure targets. 
 
Moreover, al-Qa`ida’s leaders subscribe to the doctrine of retaliation in 
kind,191 believing that they are justified in “meet[ing] an action with an 
action: killing with killing, taking prisoners with taking prisoners, and 
causing wreckage and destruction with causing wreckage and 
destruction”192 [emphasis added]. At the same time, they perceive the 
                                                 
188 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 172-3. 
189 Ibid., pp 36-7. 
190 Peters (ibid., pp. 36-37) describes the situation as follows: “Malik allowed the 
felling of trees, the picking of fruits and the demolishing of buildings, but not the 
slaughter of cattle and the burning of date-palms. Awza’i disapproved of the felling of 
fruit-trees and the demolishing of buildings, regardless of whether the buildings in 
question were churches or not. According to Shafi`i, dwellings and trees may be burnt 
as long as the enemy have (sic) the disposal of fortresses. When that is not the case, he 
considers it reprehensible to demolish buildings and to fell trees.” 
191 `Usama bin Muhammad ibn Ladin, “A Message to the American People,” trans. 
Jihad Unspun, (October 7, 2002). 
http://www.jihadunspun.com/BinLadensNetwork/statements/amta.html.   
192 Safir ibn `Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali, “A Statement to the Umma Concerning the 
Recent Events.” 
http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=720&pageID=40&pageI
D=41&. 
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West as primarily responsible for the Islamic world’s economic woes 
(through colonization and neo-imperialism), and specifically for the 
destruction of particular infrastructural targets (such as occurred in Iraq 
in both the first and second Gulf Wars and during the intervening years 
of sanctions). It is therefore likely that they will continue to invoke the 
doctrine of retaliation in kind and – as evinced by al-Qa`ida spokesman 
Sulayman Abu Ghayth193 and discussed previously - seek to exact 
retribution for the damage they believe the West has caused the Islamic 
world.194 Insofar as they believe that the United States is at fault for 
harming Muslim societal and economic infrastructure, this may provide 
an incentive for them to attack their perceived American equivalents. 
 
There are also Islamic religious ideas that appertain to specific critical 
infrastructure sectors. For example, some Islamic writers dealing with 
military practice are of the opinion that it is not permissible to attack 
ambulances, stretchers, medical orderlies, and the like.195 This might 
suggest an aversion for launching an attack specifically on the public 
health or emergency services sectors, although it is doubtful whether 
jihadists share the views of these writers, as can be seen from the recent 
attacks on such facilities in Iraq.196
 
Something that the Qur’an speaks especially loudly against is the 
practice of usury197 and, indeed, this is one of the crimes that al-Qa`ida 
and Bin Ladin have charged the Sa`udi royal family and the United 
States with,198 often tying these statements to conspiracies involving 
international Jewry.199 Al-Qa`ida and its supporters have projected the 
opprobrium reserved for usurers to Western financial institutions in 
                                                 
193 “We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill four million 
Americans – two million of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and 
cripple hundreds of thousands… ,” Sulayman Abu Ghayth, In the Shadow of the 
Lances, cited by IntelCenter.com, June 2002,  
http://www.intelcenter.com/alqaedathreat/excerpts.html. 
194 Indeed, this is the justification many jihadists give for apparently ignoring Islamic 
strictures on killing women and children, i.e., they state that this does not apply if one is 
retaliating for harm done to Muslim women and children. 
195 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 146. 
196 JTJ bombed a hospital on 6/24/2004, and on 6/26,2005 al-Qa`ida in Iraq conducted a 
suicide bombing of a hospital at a police station. See: Critical Infrastructure Terrorist 
Attack Database; Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism - Terrorism 
Knowledge Base. 
197 See, for example, Qur’an 2:275, 2:276, and 3:13. 
198 `Usama bin Muhammad ibn Ladin, “Declaration of War Against the Americans 
Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” The Idler 3:165, September 13, 2001. 
199 “Statement by al-Qa`ida,” The Observer, November 24, 2002. 
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general. In fact, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Safir ibn `Abd al-Rahman 
al-Hawali, a Saudi cleric who is a supporter of Bin Ladin, referred to the 
World Trade Center as “that center of usury.”200 Another telling example 
of the aversion to such institutions can be found in a website testament to 
an al-Qa’ida martyr: 
 
The year before his martyrdom, Suraqah decided to make Hajj 
[the pilgrimage to Mecca] and up to this point, this was the trip 
that had the most impact on him. … There he saw the 
ignorance of the Muslims… He saw their innovations and 
Shirk [associating others with God] when performing the Hajj. 
He saw outside the Sacred Mosque of Makkah, the interest-
based banks in the very same land which 1400 years ago was 
purified from Shirk by the first group of Muslims led by the 
Prophet […] His blood boiled about how this sacrifice, 
purchased for the Ummah by the sweat and blood of threw 
Companions [of Muhammad] had been affronted by the 
establishment of interest-based institutions everywhere. This 
consolidated his commitment to this path.201
 
Since interest-charging Western banks, stock markets, and other 
financial institutions are regarded by most jihadists as inherently evil 
enterprises, elements of the Banking and Finance sector represent 
especially attractive targets for al-Qa`ida. 
 
The above religious references illustrate some of the ways in which the 
religious aspects of the sacred Islamic texts might inspire modern 
jihadists to attack critical infrastructure. Yet the Islamic world, from its 
very beginnings, has placed almost as much emphasis on history as on 
religion.202 It is therefore advisable to consider potential lessons relating 
to infrastructural targets that could conceivably be drawn from the 1400 
years of Islamic military history. 
  
 
                                                 
200 al-Hawali, “Statement to the Ummah.” 
201 “Azzam.com correspondent Suraqah al-Andalusi, killed by cluster bomb in Battle 
for Tora Bora 14 December 2001 at 28 years,” p.10. 
http://www.zawaj.com/azzam/suraqah_al)andalusi.html#brother.   
202 Indeed, religion and history are deeply intertwined in Islam, beginning with the fact 
that much of the Qur’an and ahadith relate to historical events in the life of 
Muhammad. 
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ISLAMIC HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR ATTACKS 
ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE*
 
Just as a particular selection of religious referents serve to inform al-
Qa`ida’s religious, political, and social philosophies and prescriptions, so 
too do historical precedents in Islamic warfare and jihad from the era of 
the Prophet, the immediate post-Muhammad centuries, and even more 
modern experiences. These seminal historical events provide some of the 
tactical and strategic rationale behind al-Qa`ida’s efforts to attack critical 
infrastructure.  
 
This is not to say, necessarily, that al-Qa`ida will behave as other Arabs 
and Muslims have in the past. It is to say, however, that historical 
referents are important in Arab and Muslim culture and that various al-
Qa`ida planners of today might derive inspiration (whether positive or 
negative) from past Islamic methods of warfare and rebellion. As Mary 
Habeck points out, even jihadists’ theoretical explanations for Islam’s 
failure to restore the Caliphate are based largely on a return to ancient 
theological-ideological roots and a view of “history as a series of 
repetitious events” in which the struggle against the Pharoah, the Mongol 
conquest, and especially the Crusades are “templates” upon which the 
present war against the West is laid out and interpreted.203
 
Usama bin Ladin’s repeated incantations regarding the West as 
‘Crusaders’ is the most frequently made and obvious such reference, but 
there are many others.204 His deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, for example, 
suggested in his July 2005 letter to Iraq’s leading al-Qa`ida terrorist, Abu 
Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, that the present-day battle to establish “a caliphate in 
the manner of the Prophet” is prophesied: “I want to be the first to 
congratulate you for what God has blessed you with in terms of fighting 
battle in the heart of the Islamic world, which was formerly the field for 
major battles in Islam’s history…and what will happen, according to 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gordon M. Hahn. 
203 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, pp. 165-6. See, for example, “‘Text’ of Al-Zarqawi 
Message Threatening More Attacks,” Federation of American Scientists Website, April 
6, 2006. www.fas.org/irp/world/para/zarqawi040604.html.  
204 For example, see Bin Ladin’s famous February 1998 fatwa, “Jihad Against Jews and 
Crusaders,” co-signed by al-Zawahiri, Abu Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (of al-Jama`a al-
Islamiyya), Shaykh Mir Hamza (secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan), and 
Fazlur Rahman (`amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh), which declared war on 
the U.S. and Israel. See “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders – World Islamic Front 
Statement,” Federation of American Scientists Website, February 23, 1998. 
www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 
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what appeared in the Hadiths of the Messenger of God about the epic 
battles between Islam and atheism.”205 In an earlier message to the 
“Islamic nation,” al-Zawahiri sought to rally the umma against the 
“hordes of the neo-Tatars” (i.e., Western forces in Iraq), thereby making 
a specific reference to the ancient Muslim “assassins” and Ibn Taymiyya: 
“We tell them, as Shaykh-al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah said in his message to 
the King of Cyprus: Muslims have commandos that can kill kings in 
their beds and on their horses.”206
  
Even at the tactical level, historical referents occur in al-Qa`ida’s 
discourse. A pertinent example of how this occurs in practice is when al-
Qa`ida drew a parallel between the successful use of trebuchets as heavy 
weapons by Muslim forces to conquer the high-walled city of Ta`if in 
630 CE, and the use of airplanes to attack American buildings in the 9/11 
attacks.207 Even al-Qa`ida technical documents such as training manuals 
are replete with references to general propositions, such as the need to 
maintain the sort of secrecy, discipline, discretion, and the like that had 
been urged by Prophet Muhammad and both his more immediate and 
contemporary successors, as a means of supporting the rationale behind 
basic intelligence gathering, recruiting, military, and terrorist principles, 
if not methodologies.208
 
Attacking critical infrastructure could be a similar means by which al-
Qa`ida can undermine the West’s economic stability, its military 
capacity, and even its very way of life. However, in trying to specify 
particular episodes or methods of Islamic warfare and jihad that may 
serve as historical precedents for the types of targets or attacks al-Qa`ida 
might apply to contemporary critical infrastructure, a certain 
interpretative extrapolation must be employed in order to flesh out how 
past practice relates to present practice given the rather different material 
cultures and infrastructural landscapes extant during the periods under 
consideration. Nevertheless, the tactics and targets of what was regarded 
as “sabotage” in antiquity, not to mention recent history’s more familiar 
material culture and landscape, may have some relevance for al-Qa`ida 
                                                 
205 Translation of July 9, 2005 letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus`ab al-
Zarqawi, Federation of American Scientists, 
www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf. 
206 “‘Text’ of Al-Zarqawi Message Threatening More Attacks.” 
207 Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s 
Justification for September 11.” Middle East Policy 10:2 (Summer 2003), pp. 89-90. 
208 Translation of Entire Al Qai’da Training Manual, pp. 13, 17-18, 20-1 94-100, and 
113-14. www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf. 
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strategists and decision-makers and suggest or serve as a models for 
future attacks on critical infrastructure. 
 
 
Precedents from the Life of Muhammad 
  
The above discussion regarding religious precepts conveyed by 
Muhammad can thus be supplemented by the historical precedents set by 
Islam’s Prophet. In this respect, Muhammad can serve as a source of 
both religious and historical referents for al-Qa`ida behavior, with the 
line between the two not always being clear. Indeed, it is the Prophet’s 
deeds, as much as his words, that are likely to function as precedents and 
form the basis of al-Qa`ida’s military and terrorist arts and the tactical 
and strategic rationale for its attacks on critical infrastructure. For 
Islamists of all stripes, precedents set by Muhammad are deemed the 
most authoritative for dictating the limits of correct conduct in all 
spheres of life. 
  
There is no doubt that Muhammad targeted the economic base and 
infrastructure of his new faith’s enemies with both his words and deeds. 
The Prophet’s propaganda attacks on the polytheist essence of the Ka`ba 
were part of a much larger strategy of undermining the Quraysh’s 
economic hegemony over Mecca, which he sought to wrest control from 
Arab pagans. As Reza Aslan notes: 
 
“…Muhammad understood…the only way to bring about 
radical social and economic reform in Mecca was to overturn 
the religio-economic system on which the city was built; the 
only way to do that was to attack the very source of the 
Quraysh’s wealth and prestige—the Ka`ba.”209
 
The Prophet Mohammad’s first forays into battle were attacks on the 
caravans that functioned as the “infrastructure,” indeed the lifeline, of 
ancient desert city-states’ food and other supplies. Moreover, the attack 
“was not just a looting foray, but a strike at the vital commercial interests 
of the Meccans,” particularly those of the aristocratic and influential 
Umayyad branch of the Quraysh, who stood against Muhammad because 
of the threat posed to them by his new religion.210 As noted above in the 
                                                 
209 Reza Aslan, No God But God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam (New 
York: Random House, 2005), pp. 44-5.
210 George F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton, Islam at War: A History (Westport: 
Praeger, 2003), pp. 2, 5.
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discussion of religion, Muhammad also destroyed his enemies’ fruit-
trees that were an essential source of food sustenance and of protection 
from the deadly desert sun, though there remains a debate among Islamic 
scholars to this day as to what circumstances permit such an act.211
  
 
Early Islamic World after Muhammad, 700-1900 AD 
 
Islamic historical precedents long after Muhammad can be found for al-
Qa`ida’s endeavors to undermine the functioning of, or even destroy, key 
systems and infrastructures. Given the desert landscape, caravan 
“infrastructure” remained essential for survival in most Arab and Muslim 
regions long after Muhammad’s death. Based on the Prophet’s founding 
example, Muslim forces in both the early caliphal conquests of pagan 
lands and in intra-Islamic wars attacked enemy supply caravans.212 The 
Muslim Seljuk Turks continued this practice and, in seizing full control 
of Khurasan from the Ghaznavids during the Seljuk-Ghaznavid War 
(1030-1040), deliberately attacked the enemy’s food infrastructure by 
destroying outlying oases, thereby cutting off food supplies to the 
Ghaznavid cities and army. Nur al-Din of Aleppo also used the Prophet’s 
tactic of attacking food caravans in expanding the Zengid state’s 
dominion from present-day Iraqi Mosul over all of the Muslim areas of 
Syria and Jazira, and particularly in his capture of Damascus in 1154.213
 
There are numerous instances in which ancient Islamic armies poisoned 
or otherwise destroyed the water resources of their enemies. For 
example, in the May 1038 battle at Sarakhs, the Seljuk victory was 
delivered in part by their destruction of the Ghaznavids’ water wells and 
the ensuing collapse of morale among pro-Ghaznavid Mas`ud’s ghulams 
(Turkish “slave” soldiers).214 Salah al-Din al-`Ayyubi, Islam’s most 
admired military leader, defended Islam from the Third Crusade by 
                                                 
211 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 14. On the debate see idem, pp. 36-
37and 172-73.
212 It should be noted that this was a weapon of anti-Islamic forces as well. During his 
rebellion, Babak deployed attacks on caravans in his contest with the army of the 
Caliph’s commander Khaydar ibn Qawus al-Afshin around the Azerbaijan fort of 
Arshaq in the early ninth century. Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: The 
Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 132, 
186. 
213 Martin Sicker, The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the 
Siege of Vienna (New York: Praeger, 2000), p. 81. 
214 Ibid., pp. 52-3. 
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conducting a comprehensive “scorched earth” policy that included 
“poisoning all wells.”215  
   
There are several historical precedents for Islamic assaults on what can 
be regarded as the cultural, informational, and educational infrastructure 
of ancient times. The destruction by Muslim forces of the great ancient 
Egyptian library of Alexandria during Islam’s first expansionist wave 
into northern Africa is well-known. Less well-known is the destruction 
of the great Buddhist library at Bihar in 1193 by the great Muslim 
general Muhammad Khilji, who was sent by Qutb al-Din Aibak to the 
northern Indian state of Bihar to further spread Islam’s domain.216
 
 
Modern Islamic World, 1900-1990 
 
Attacks on infrastructure continued into modern times. The legendary 
T.E. Lawrence “of Arabia” relayed numerous instances of both the 
Ottoman Turks and his Arab legions plundering caravans and blowing up 
trains, railroads, bridges, and telegraph installations. Lawrence summed 
up the strategic thinking this way: “In Turkey things were scarce and 
precious, men less esteemed than equipment. Our cue was to destroy, not 
the Turk’s army, but his minerals. The death of a Turkish bridge or rail, 
machine or gun or charge of high explosive was more profitable to us 
than the death of a Turk.”217 To sum up briefly his tactics in demolishing 
railways and trains: he usually took a small- to medium-size detail to 
carry out reconnaissance on a railway or bridge, set the charges, waited 
until the locomotive engine passed over the demolition site (or, 
sometimes, an automatic mine), and blew the charge. Once the initial 
blast had gone off, his teams would open fire on the survivors and 
remove the booty (guns, ammunition, food, and sometimes prisoners) 
from the train. They then beat a hasty retreat to avoid counter-attack. 
This was classic guerilla warfare, and it proved very effective.218
 
During the first Jewish-Palestinian war (1947-1949), there were 
Palestinian (and Israeli) attacks on infrastructural sites such as oil 
refineries, transportation, and mass media organizations, though it 
                                                 
215 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 
3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 319. 
216 Nafziger and Walton, Islam at War: A History, p. 226.
217 Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp. 194. 
218 Ibid., pp. 104, 211, 287, 291, 342, 380, 424, 456-57. 
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remains unclear in many cases whether these attacks were inspired by a 
desire to destroy infrastructure or lives.219
 
The Algerian revolution against French rule in the 1950s can be regarded 
as the first jihad to have taken place amidst modern material culture and 
infrastructure. It saw further “refinements” in the conduct of Islamic total 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and in many ways set the standard for 
contemporary jihadist terrorism and attacks on targets that fall into the 
category of critical infrastructure. Documents found in a cave abandoned 
by one Algerian rebel leader read like an al-Qa`ida manual: “Any zone 
remaining inactive is considered to be high treason…Any utility 
belonging to the enemy must be destroyed...The permanence of action on 
the roads, with the participation of the civilians; destroy the telephone 
poles and attack those who repair them, and roads. No prisoners except 
big chiefs.”220 The Algerian rebels’ remarkably well-coordinated first 
onslaught in the war for independence on the evening of October 30, 
1954 included, among some 70 separate attacks, an attempt to set a 
railway station afire and bomb attacks on an oil depot, gas works, and a 
radio station. This set the tone for the entire war, which saw hundreds of 
bombings, arsons, and other forms of attack on telephone and telegraph 
lines, zinc and coal mines, power transmitters, police stations, schools, 
and trolleybus stations, not to mention bus stops and numerous other 
public venues. Economic targets and food supplies were targeted, 
including vineyards and orchards. Reserves of cork and esparto grass 
were burned, and livestock was poisoned. Police reported plans to attack 
railway lines.221 Produce sellers at markets were called upon in rebel 
circulars to poison vegetables sold to French soldiers.222
 
                                                 
219 Motti Goliani, “The ‘Haifa Turning Point’: The British Administration and the Civil 
War in Palestine, December 1947-1948,” Middle Eastern Studies, 37:2 (April 2001), 
pp. 93-130. Goliani notes that during the height of the civil war between Palestinian and 
Jewish forces, from December 1947 to May 1948, in addition to events in Jerusalem, 
there “were mutually murderous attacks at the Haifa oil refineries,” though it is unclear 
from the brief reference whether the target was the refineries or civilians [Goliani, “The 
‘Haifa Turning Point’,” p. 101. citing D. Koren, The Massacre at the Oil Refineries and 
Security at Mixed Places of Work – 1948, Galilee Center, 1988 (Hebrew)]. Goliani also 
claims (without providing details) that “the two sides … deliberately targeted each 
other’s holy places” and “transportation came under attack by both Jews and Arabs.” 
He notes: “On the night of 1-2 February an explosion ripped through the building that 
housed the Palestine Post.” Goliani, “The ‘Haifa Turning Point’,” p. 101.
220 Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion (New York: 
Praeger, 1959), p. 220. 
221 Ibid., pp. 105-9, 154, 174-76, 181, 198, 204, 244, 297, 323-28. 
222 Ibid., p. 181. 
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During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), both belligerents sought to 
destroy the other side’s oil production and export infrastructures. Even 
before the war, according to Rajaee, a Saddam-backed terrorist 
organization, the Arabistan Liberation Front, conducted sabotage and 
terrorist operations in Iran, including attacks on oil pipelines as well as 
bridges, mosques, and public transportation.223 During the war, Iran 
attacked Iraq’s northern oil pipeline and oil export terminals at Mina al 
Bakr and Al Faw. 224 For its part, Iraq carried out thousands of bombing 
sorties on oil terminals and pumping stations, including hundreds on the 
key Kharq Island terminal alone, as a result of which its capacity was 
immediately halved and later nearly eliminated. Iraq also bombed power 
generation facilities, communications centers, and hydro-electric 
schemes.225 The “tanker war” in the Gulf that emerged from the larger 
war was akin to a war on “sea caravans.” It included assaults by both 
sides not only on enemy ships, but on neutral shipping as well. Initially 
Iraq alone engaged in the tanker war, but by April 1984 Iran had joined 
the fray. From May 1981 to 1988, several hundred ships were 
attacked.226 By the time the war neared its end in 1988, ten Western 
navies and eight regional navies had been drawn into patrolling the Gulf 
to protect oil tankers, and the Iranian government was claiming several 
hundred billion dollars in damages and losses for its oil production and 
export infrastructure alone.227
 
In the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), the mujahidin destroyed bridges, 
tunnels, and power transmission lines in addition to schools and health 
centers, which were viewed as places of Soviet indoctrination.228 There 
were also reports of Afghan rebels poisoning wells, as their Arabian 
Muslim ancestors had over a millennium earlier, and using unidentified 
                                                 
223 Farhang Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression (Talahassee, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 20, 62.   
224 “The Iran-Iraq War,” The History of Iran, The Iran Chamber Society, 
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225 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder: Westview, 
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gases to attack Kabul schools and other institutions.229 Since al-Qa`ida 
emerged in part from the Afghan war and mujahidin milieu, these 
historical precedents may have a stronger salience among today’s al-
Qa`ida and its affiliates. 
 
Certainly there is much in al-Qa`ida’s repertoire of guerilla and terrorist 
strategy and tactics that resembles previous methods of Islamic warfare. 
However, it remains unclear whether these historical precedents serve as 
models or directly inform al-Qa`ida’s activity to any extent. The most 
plausible conclusion at this point is one that views al-Qa`ida as following 
in, but radicalizing, an Islamic tradition of total war; a tradition that can 
and has been drawn from Islamic texts as interpreted by radical Islamic 
scholars, teachers, and political strategists. Al-Qa`ida and other Islamists 
have and still are creating a new ideology to circumvent the body of 
Qur’anic verses and prophetic sayings that do not support their goals and 
methods. In this effort, as has been seen above, they draw selectively on 
the Islamic tradition and interpretations that suit their own purposes. 
Certainly, Muslim successes in the Algerian and Afghan wars for 
independence can only redound to the credit of their version of jihad, 
often taking the form of a total terrorist war waged by any means against 
any and all targets, including critical infrastructure. 
 
It should be noted, however, that technological advances are forcing 
rapid changes in the material culture that shapes critical infrastructure, 
making the drawing of direct lessons by al-Qa`ida or other Islamists 
more difficult. Notwithstanding this hurdle, Islamists could very well 
draw some specific tactical lessons, and in line with the demand for more 
imaginative threat assessments, analysts need to make some tentative 
extrapolations from the historical record available to al-Qa`ida and its 
affiliates the world over. Certainly Muhammad’s and his successors’ 
attacks on caravans can justify and inspire attacks on various forms of 
contemporary infrastructure, including food distribution, energy 
transmission, transportation, and communications. To the creative 
operative, the poisoning of water wells and the destruction of fruit trees 
can suggest attacks on water reservoirs and river dams, as well as the 
agriculture and food supplies, with chemical or biological agents. Islam’s 
destruction of great libraries in Egypt and India may be precursors of 
contemporary Islamist efforts at cyber-sabotage on Silicon Valley that 
would cripple one of the main engines of the information and 
technological infrastructure upon which so much of Western business 
                                                 
229 Nafziger and Walton, Islam at War: A History, p. 195 and Bradsher, Afghanistan 
and the Soviet Union, p. 230.
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and indeed civilization now depends. One must also remember that, 
irrespective of technological changes, al-Qa`ida will continue to derive 
justifications and “spiritual guidance” from their particular interpretation 
of Islam and its sacred texts. 
 
The link between religious and historical precedents, on the one hand, 
and target selection, on the other, is a significant and persistent one in the 
case of al-Qa`ida. Therefore, the numerous religious and historical 
elements that might be interpreted as justifying, prompting, or providing 
tactical guidance for attacks on critical infrastructure targets must be 
consistently borne in mind during efforts to protect America’s critical 
infrastructure.  Ignoring such justifications by the jihadists 
themselves could be a fatal mistake, since they claim to have selected 
every strategy and tactic from the examples set by the Muhammad and 
other “rightly-guided” Muslim leaders.230
 
 
                                                 
230 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, p. 18. 
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Chapter Five:  
 
What They Say – Al-Qa`ida’s 
Critical Infrastructure 
Strategy as Revealed 
through Its Statements*
 
 
 
ince the historical record suggests that al-Qa`ida generally carries 
out major attacks for a multiplicity of reasons, it would be unwise 
to assume – in the absence of evidence to the contrary – that the 
group had only one goal in mind in launching a particular attack. Indeed, 
evidence continues to appear in jihadist sources that lends support to this 
very interpretation. For example, in a summary report based on the “de-
briefings” of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the operational 
mastermind of the 9/11 “planes operation,” it is revealed that KSM stated 
that Bin Ladin had insisted on striking three types of targets, one 
political, one economic, and one military, which is why the hijacked 
planes were assigned the missions of attacking, respectively, the U.S. 
Capitol building, the two World Trade Center towers, and the Pentagon. 
At the same time, KSM made it clear that his own goal was to launch 
spectacular attacks on vulnerable “symbolic targets” that would “wake 
the American people up,” i.e., produce a huge psychological impact, but 
also added that New York City, the “economic capital of the U.S.,” was 
“always the first target on his mind.”231
 
In addition to seeking to achieve multiple objectives by means of a single 
attack, global jihadists also promote the adoption of a broad and diverse 
S 
                                                 
* This chapter was prepared by Jeffrey M. Bale, with Sundara Vadlamudi. 
231 See [Central Intelligence Agency], “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed,” pp. 11-14. This is a formerly classified document that was later submitted 
to the court handling the Zakhariyya Mussawi case in lieu of allowing KSM to testify. 
Al-Qa`ida’s diverse motives for carrying out the 9/11 attacks are discussed further 
below, in the case study section. 
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overall operational approach that includes, among other objectives, 
killing “infidels,” destroying their facilities, and attacking their symbols. 
This can be seen in a May 2002 article written by Abu Ayman al-Hilali, 
which appeared on the al-Uswa website and was said to be representative 
of the views of hardline al-Qa`ida leaders: 
 
Our solution is organized jihad that sets at the head of its 
priorities the attack against American and Zionist interests. It 
should not just boycott their goods, but explode their 
headquarters, centers, and industries, and everything that 
symbolizes them, such as McDonald’s, etc. We should add to 
that the killing of Americans and Zionists, and their loyal 
agents, in order that they will not feel safe anywhere…232
 
Still another example is provided by Abu Mu`sab al-Suri in the 
following passage, wherein he advises al-Qa`ida recruits to carry out 
attacks that  
 
1. cause as much pain as possible 
2. awaken Muslims as much as possible 
 
At the same time, he also compiled a broad list of target types that he 
believed should be attacked, including 
 
1. Missionary centers and cultural missions because they 
manufacture enemies [of Islam] and secularism. 
2. Companies, mines, engineers and agents of foreign 
companies, representatives of the Aramco company [in 
Saudi Arabia] that steal Muslim oil. 
3. All forms of diplomatic facilities and consulates. 
4. All forms of military facilities, including the homes of 
families on bases. 
5. All forms of foreign security, all Western teachers and 
doctors are actually in disguise as spies. 
6. All forms of tourism.233 
                                                 
232 Abu Ayman al-Hilali, article posted on the al-Usra website, May 2002, cited in 
Reuven Paz, “Qa`idat al-Jihad: A New Name on the Road to Palestine,” Report, May 7, 
2002, electronic p. 5. 
233 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s 
Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 245. The excerpt above is drawn from 
videotapes seized at al-Qa`ida camps in Afghanistan. 
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These excerpts suggest, once again, that even attacks that end up being 
made on so-called infrastructural targets are not necessarily intended to 
destroy infrastructure per se. 
 
THE ATTITUDES OF AL-QA`IDA’S LEADERS 
 
What, then, is al-Qa`ida’s attitude toward attacking infrastructural 
targets? Here it is crucially important to make an analytical distinction 
between having an interest in attacking “economic” targets in order to 
inflict grave damage on the enemy, and having an interest in attacking 
critical infrastructure with the specific intention of destroying or 
disrupting the functioning of key enemy facilities or systems in the 
narrowest, most technical sense of that term. There is voluminous 
evidence indicating that al-Qa`ida desires and fully intends to damage 
the American economy, which it sees both as highly vulnerable and as 
the foundation of U.S. military and political power.234 In part this is 
because, ideologically speaking, the group perceives the U.S. as a crass, 
greedy, materialistic society whose morally corrupt members care only 
about their own economic well-being.235 For that very reason, al-Qa`ida 
is convinced that inflicting heavy damage on the American economy is 
the best way to exert an impact on the attitudes and behavior of both the 
elites and the masses within the U.S. Its view seems to be that if the 
mujahidin can make the American people suffer enough materially, the 
latter will eventually force their government adopt new, less intrusive, 
and less belligerent policies towards Islam and the Muslim world. 
However, as the American reaction to the 9/11 attacks itself 
demonstrated, al-Qa`ida’s belief that the American people would display 
moral cowardice in order to secure their narrow economic interests rather 
than a sense of patriotism, national solidarity, and a collective desire to 
punish those responsible demonstrates that Bin Ladin and his advisors 
had again fundamentally misread the character and mood of their 
principal declared enemy. 
 
However that may be, the importance of attacking “Crusader” economic 
targets has been repeatedly emphasized by Bin Ladin himself, and at 
                                                 
234 See Bin Ladin’s December 2001 statement, “Nineteen Students,” which was 
broadcast on al-Jazira: “it is possible to strike the economic base that is the foundation 
of the military base, so when the economy is depleted they will be too busy with each 
other to be able to enslave poor peoples.” Cited in Lawrence, ed., Messages to the 
World, p. 151. 
235 For example, in the course of Bin Ladin’s December 1998 interview on al-Jazira, he 
accused America of worshipping money. Cited in Ibid., p. 83. 
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various times Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qa`ida leaders have also 
stressed the value of attacking Western economies.236 These exhortations 
by Bin Ladin and his lieutenants contain several recurrent themes, 
including 1) that the U.S., despite all of its apparent power, is a “paper 
tiger” that can be defeated militarily, just as the Soviet superpower was 
defeated by the mujahidin in Afghanistan; 2) that damaging the economy 
is one of the best ways to defeat the U.S., since this will serve to 
undermine its military power; and 3) that attacking the oil infrastructure 
and driving up the price of oil is the one of the best ways to weaken the 
American economy. 
 
Several of these themes were highlighted by Bin Ladin in the following 
statement issued in February 2003: 
 
They [19 hijackers] carried out the raid [9/11] by means of 
enemy planes in a courageous and splendid operation the like 
of which mankind had never before witnessed. They smashed 
the American idols and damaged its very heart, the Pentagon. 
They struck the very heart of the American economy, rubbed 
America’s nose in the dirt and dragged its pride through the 
mud. The towers of New York collapsed, and their collapse 
precipitated an even greater debacle: the collapse of the myth 
of America the great power and the collapse of the myth of 
democracy; people began to understand that American values 
could sink no lower. The myth of the land of freedom was 
destroyed, the myth of American national security was 
smashed, and the myth of the CIA collapsed, all praise and 
thanks to Allah.237
 
It is now time to provide illustrative examples of the attitudes of al-
Qa`ida’s leaders concerning all three of the themes identified above. 
 
 
                                                 
236 Indeed, according to Bari Atwan, al-Zawahiri is much impressed by Yale historian 
Paul M. Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change 
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage, 1989), wherein it is 
argued that great empires have fallen due to a combination of growing costs for the 
maintenance of internal security, an expanding global military presence and the 
financial burdens this entails, and intensifying foreign competition in trade and 
commerce. Bin Ladin’s duputy reportedly believes that the U.S. is just such an empire 
in decline, and that Kennedy’s first two conditions have already been met. See Secret 
History of al-Qa`ida, pp. 227-8. 
237 Randall B. Hamud, ed., Osama Bin Laden: America’s Enemy in his Own Words 
(San Diego, CA: Nadeem, 2005), p. 121. 
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America is a “Soft,” Fragile Superpower that can be 
Defeated Militarily 
 
In Bin Ladin’s statements, the United States has often been characterized 
as a “paper tiger” that cannot survive more than a few major terrorist 
blows.238 Indeed, America’s supposed inability to withstand repeated 
terrorist attacks was discussed at length by al-Qa`ida’s Majlis al-Shura in 
the years leading up to the September 11, 2001 assaults. During those 
debates, Bin Ladin is reported to have asserted that the U.S. was a weak 
power, and that he cited as evidence the hasty departure of American 
troops from Lebanon, Somalia, and Yemen in the wake of terrorist 
attacks.239 He apparently believed at the time – and may still believe – 
that the U.S. could only tolerate “two or three strong” strikes.240 As a 
consequence, he seems to have fashioned al-Qa`ida’s spectacular attacks 
as a means of achieving that objective.241
 
Indeed, Bin Ladin is convinced that, with Allah’s help, that al-Qa`ida can 
defeat the U.S. militarily. In his will, which was supposedly written in 
December 2001, he indicates that he viewed past attacks against America 
as part of an operational continuum that would eventually lead to the 
destruction of the U.S.: 
 
The New York and Washington action represented the third of 
the increasing blows dealt to the United States. The first was 
the bombing of the Marines in Lebanon and the second was the 
bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi from where the US 
invasion of Somalia was launched during which 31,000 of our 
brothers were killed under UN flag. Despite the setback that 
Allah, praise and glory be to Him, has tried us with, this battle 
                                                 
238 Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An 
Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p. 11. 
239 In December 2004, Al-Sharq al-Awsat published serialized versions of a book 
entitled The Story of the Arab-Afghans From the Time of Arrival I Afghanistan Until 
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al-Awsat, December 9, 2004, p. 15. 
240 Ibid. 
241 This is not to imply that Bin Ladin actually believed that the U.S. would be 
destroyed simply due to the immediate effects of these attacks, but rather that a 
combination of the effects of those attacks and the U.S. responses to them would 
eventually lead to its destruction. 
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will lead to the disappearance of the United States and the 
infidel West, even after dozens of years.242
 
In order to justify such a seemingly astounding claim, he frequently 
refers to the victory of the mujahidin against the Soviet Union, the other 
former superpower: 
 
Muslims defeated the Soviet empire when it was the 
superpower, so defeating America is an achievable task.243
 
Indeed, he seems to believe that the U.S. will be easier to defeat than the 
old Soviet Union: 
 
I took up arms against the Soviets in Afghanistan for ten years, 
and we believe that our battle with the United States is easy 
compared with the battles in which we engaged in 
Afghanistan.244
 
At first sight, such a superficial conclusion seems to be an example of 
wishful thinking, if not of outright “magical thinking.” 
 
Yet there is an underlying logic to it, for Bin Ladin believes that the 
U.S., despite its apparent economic power and military might, has an 
inherently “soft” or fragile nature that makes it highly vulnerable: 
 
[the 9/11 attacks] came by the grace of God Almighty, showing 
very clearly that this haughty, domineering power, America, 
the Hubal of the age, is based on great economic power, but it 
is soft. How quickly it fell from the sky, by the grace of God 
Almighty. 
… 
 It was nineteen post-secondary students – I beg God Almighty 
to accept them – who shook America’s throne, struck its 
economy right in the heart, and dealt the biggest military power 
a mighty blow, by the grace of God Almighty.245
 
We can conclude that America is a superpower, with enormous 
military strength, and vast economic power, but that all is built 
                                                 
242 Al-Majallah Obtains Bin Ladin’s Will,” Al-Majallah, October 27, 2002. pp. 22-6. It 
should be pointed out that the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines’ barracks in 
Beirut, Lebanon, was carried out by an Iranian-backed Hizballah front group, not by al-
Qa`ida. 
243 Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, pp. 108-9. 
244  Al-Quds al-Arabi, November 27, 1996. 
245 Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World, p. 149. 
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on foundations of straw. So it is possible to target these 
foundations and focus on their weakest points which even if 
you strike only one-tenth of them, then the whole edifice will 
totter and sway, and relinquish its unjust leadership of the 
world.246
 
One of the best ways to accomplish this objective, according to Shaykh 
Usama, is to bring down the American economy. 
 
 
The Importance of Damaging and Undermining the U.S. 
Economy 
 
Bin Ladin has repeatedly emphasized the economic aspects of the 
conflict with the “Great Satan,” and indeed has often urged volunteers 
from the Muslim umma to carry out operations in such a way as to 
increase their economic costs to the U.S. Moreover, he has openly 
gloated about the American economic losses that supposedly resulted 
from previous al-Qa`ida attacks. In his calculation of the costs of the 
9/11 operation, for example, he provided the following exaggerated 
figures: 
 
The share of the losses on the Wall Street Market reached 16 
percent. They said that this number is a record, which has never 
happened since the market opened more than 230 years ago. A 
collapse of this scale has never happened before. The gross 
amount that is traded in that market reaches $4 trillion. So if we 
multiply 16 percent with $4 trillion to find out the loss that 
affected the stocks it reaches $640 billion of losses from stocks, 
with God’s grace, an amount that is equivalent to the budget of 
Sudan for 640 years. They have lost this through an attack that 
happened with the permission of God, lasting one hour only. 
The daily income of the American nation is $20 billion. The 
first week [after the attack] they didn’t work at all as a result of 
the psychological shock of the attack, and even today some still 
don’t work because of it. So if you multiply $20 billion by 1 
week, it comes to $140 billion, we’ve reached how much? 
Approximately $800 billion. The cost of building and 
construction losses? Let us say more than $30 billion. So far, 
they have fired or liquidated more than 170,000 employees 
from airline companies, including airfreight companies and 
commercial airlines…the amount reaches no less than $1 
                                                 
246 Ibid., p. 195. 
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trillion by the lowest estimate due to these successful and 
blessed attacks.247
 
Similarly, in urging the people of Iraq to continue their fight against 
American troops, Bin Ladin portrayed the U.S. as a weak country 
burdened by its economic losses: 
 
Muslims [in Iraq]…those infidels will not scare you with their 
weapons, for God has weakened their schemes and stopped 
their progress. Don’t let their numbers frighten you, for their 
hearts are empty and they are falling into military and 
economic disarray, especially after the blessed day in New 
York, by the grace of God.  After the attack and its 
repercussions, their losses reached over a trillion dollars…and 
they have recorded a budget deficit for the 3rd year running, 
breaking the record this year with more than 450 thousand 
million dollars in deficit, thanks and blessings to God.248
 
In addition to the economic damage caused by direct attacks, Bin Ladin 
also includes terrorism-related defense expenditures in his estimates of 
the costs incurred by the U.S. As a result, he has specifically advocated 
that the mujahidin make empty threats so as to “frighten” the U.S. into 
spending even more money in an effort to guarantee its security: 
 
It [is] easy for us to bait this administration. All that we have to 
do is send Mujahideen to the farthest point east to raise a piece 
of cloth on which is written “Al Qaeda” in order to cause the 
American generals to race there, causing America to suffer 
economic and political losses without its achieving anything 
other than some financial benefits for their private 
companies.249
 
Bin Ladin seems convinced that al-Qa`ida’s policy of bleeding America 
to the point of bankruptcy is succeeding because, as a result of the 9/11 
attacks, the U.S. had supposedly lost a million dollars for every dollar 
spent by al-Qa`ida.250
 
                                                 
247 Ibid., pp. 111-12. 
248 Ibid., p. 210. 
249 Hamud, Osama bin Laden, p. 163. 
250 Bin Ladin justified this conclusion by pointing to a study by the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (RIIS), which concluded that al-Qa`ida spent $500,000 for the 
9/11 attacks. He then used this figure and his previously calculated losses of $1 trillion 
to reach the ratio cited above. See Ibid., p. 164. 
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For this reason, Bin Ladin continues to urge his followers and supporters 
to attack the American economy, which he anticipates will eventually 
collapse. In a December 2001 letter to Mullah Umar, for example, he 
made the following suggestions: 
 
A campaign against Afghanistan will impose great long-term 
economic burdens, leading to further economic collapse, which 
will force America, God willing, to resort to the former Soviet 
Union’s only option: withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
disintegration, and contraction…Our plan in the face of the 
campaign should focus on…[s]erving a blow to the American 
economy, which will lead to: 
a) Further weakening of the American economy 
b) Shaking the confidence in the American economy. This will 
lead investors to refrain from investing in America or 
participating in American companies, thus accelerating the fall 
of the American economy.251
 
He also emphasizes that attacks on the American economy will adversely 
affect the performance of the U.S. military, thereby compensating – at 
least in part – for the huge disparity between the capabilities of the U.S. 
military and the forces available to al-Qa`ida: 
 
One possibility of prevailing in spite of the gap between us and 
the American military establishment…is to attack the economic 
base at the foundation of the military establishment. When their 
financial reserves are spent, they will bicker among themselves 
and refrain from enslaving the weaker nation…it is critical to 
concentrate on striking the American economy by every 
possible means.252
 
Thus Bin Ladin has never ceased stressing the need to continue the jihad 
against the “far enemy,” both “militarily and economically.” Although 
he believes that America is already in decline and that its economy is 
even now in the process of hemorrhaging, he insists that further attacks 
are necessary to bring it to the point of total collapse. As he expressed it, 
young Muslim warriors must target the pillars of U.S. economy.253
 
In addition to seeking to harm the U.S. economy directly by carrying out 
actual terrorist attacks, Bin Ladin has also advocated waging economic 
                                                 
251 Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 
2004). 
252 Hamud, Osama bin Laden, p. 88. 
253 Ibid., p. 92. 
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warfare by boycotting American goods. In 1996, in his “declaration of 
war” against the United States, Bin Ladin argued that a combination of 
terrorist attacks and the boycotting of American products would expedite 
the departure of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. To justify promoting 
such a boycott, he made the following arguments:254
 
The money you spend on American goods will be converted 
into bullets to be used against our brothers in Palestine and 
tomorrow against our sons in Saudi Arabia. By buying these 
goods we strengthen their economy, while increasing our own 
poverty…denying these occupiers the enormous revenues 
derived from trading with our country is most important in 
helping out jihad against them.255
 
Eight years later, in October 2004, Bin Ladin boasted that al-Qa`ida 
would “bleed America to the point of bankruptcy,” just as the Afghan 
mujahidin and Arab Afghans had bled Russia to the point of bankruptcy 
during their ten-year war, thereby forcing that former superpower to 
withdraw from Afghanistan.256 There is no doubt, then, that al-Qa`ida’s 
leader appreciates the overall military value of damaging the U.S. 
economy. And oil seems to play an increasingly important role in 
achieving that goal. 
 
 
The Value of Attacking the Oil Infrastructure to Damage 
the United States Financially 
 
On the issue of oil, Bin Ladin has repeatedly stressed that the 
United States is stealing Saudi Arabia’s wealth by paying less for its oil 
than it is worth on the open market. He blames Saudi Arabia’s ruling 
regime for varying the production levels of oil to suit America’s needs. 
In 1997, while making a case against the United States for stealing oil, 
Bin Ladin adduced the following “evidence”: 
 
Since 1973, prices of all other items have increased but oil 
prices did not rise much. Since 1973, the price of petrol has 
increased only 8 dollars per barrel while the prices of other 
items have gone up three times. The oil prices should also have 
gone up three times but this did not happen. Price of American 
wheat has increased three-fold but the price of Arab oil has not 
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risen three-fold. The increase was not more than a few dollars 
over a period of 24 years because the United States is dictating 
to the Arabs at gunpoint. We are suffering a loss of 115 dollars 
per barrel every day. Only Saudi Arabia produces 10 million 
barrels per day and thus the loss is one billion dollars per day. 
Total loss is more than 2 billion dollars. In the past 13 years, 
the United States has caused Saudi Arabia a loss of more 1,100 
billion dollars. We must get this money back from the United 
States. The total population of Muslims all over the world is 
more than 1 billion. If every Muslim family is given 11,000 
dollars then the 1,100 billion dollars will be repaid. Muslims 
are starving to death and the United States is stealing their oil. 
It buys oil from us at low prices and then makes us buy its 
tanks and fighter airplanes by projecting Israel as a threat. In 
this manner the United States takes all its money back.257
 
According to Bin Ladin, it is justifiable to target the American economy 
since the U.S. “steals” the wealth of Muslims by purchasing oil at such 
low prices.258
 
Despite these sentiments, Shaykh Usama did not initially advocate 
attacking Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, and in fact specifically urged the 
mujahidin to protect such facilities, which he regarded as a “great 
Islamic asset [that] represents critical economic power essential to the 
forthcoming pan-Islamic state.”259 As was mentioned at the outset of this 
report, however, Bin Ladin has recently reversed this stand and begun 
urging his followers to attack the oil facilities in Iraq and the Gulf 
region: 
 
Bleeding (exhausting) the United States which is currently in 
Iraq economically, militarily and morally is a golden 
opportunity that you should not miss or you will regret it. One 
of the foremost motivations of our enemies is the desire to 
subjugate our lands and to steal our oil, for that, you should 
spare no effort in stopping the greatest theft in history from 
current and future generations through the work of 
collaborators. They take it for cheap knowing that the price of 
every other commodity has multiplied many times except for 
oil which is the base of industry. Its price has been reduced 
numerous times, while it was sold for $40 two decades ago; it 
was sold for $9 in the last decade. Its price today should be at 
                                                 
257 “Interview with Osama bin Laden by Hamid Mir,” Pakistan, March 18, 1997. 
258 Hamud, Osama bin Laden, p. 97.  
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least $100 per barrel. Be vigilant to put a distance between 
them and oil, and concentrate your operations on it especially 
in Iraq and the Gulf. This would be their end.”260
 
Some analysts have attempted to explain this shift by interpreting his 
words to mean that Bin Ladin has decided to target the oil infrastructure 
needed for refining and transporting oil but to avoid attacking the oil 
wells themselves.261 Echoing Bin Ladin, in an interview conducted in 
September 2005 and posted on the internet in December 2005, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri also urged the mujahidin to 
 
Focus their attacks on the stolen oil of the Muslims. Most of its 
revenue goes to the enemies of Islam, and most of what they 
leave is plundered by the thieves who rule our countries. This 
is the greatest theft in the history of humanity. The enemies of 
Islam are consuming this vital resource with unparalleled 
greed. We must stop this theft any way we can, in order to save 
this resource for the sake of the Muslim nation.262
 
In short, having long advocated launching terrorist attacks on and 
organizing boycotts of the American economy, Bin Ladin and his chief 
advisors have now shifted their focus to targeting components of the oil 
lifeline in an effort to undermine the viability of the economies of the 
U.S. and its European and “apostate” Arab allies. 
 
 
AL-QA`IDA “STRATEGIC STUDIES” LITERATURE 
 
Apart from the statements by al-Qa`ida’s leaders, there are a number of 
other al-Qa`ida texts, which can best be classified as strategic or 
operational studies, that devote considerable space to discussing the 
wisdom of jihadist targeting of the U.S. economy. Five examples should 
serve to illustrate this point. First, in an undated issue of one of al-
                                                 
260 “The Complete Text of Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, especially to the Muslims of 
Saudi Arabia and General Muslims Elsewhere,” al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad website, 
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Qa`ida’s official magazines, Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of the Jihad), the 
pseudonymous author Akhu Man Ta`a Allah provides a retrospective 
assessment of the economic impact and operational value of the 9/11 
attacks: 
 
Since September 11 America has been spending billions of 
dollars to protect its infrastructure and interests around the 
world…The attacker determines the timing of the strike. He 
will carry out a concentrated strike one time at a weak point 
and then sit in ambush again. So the enemy will look for a gap 
and close it, [but] this is not necessarily where he was hit but 
[applies also to] all other similar targets. So striking the 
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania means protecting 
every American embassy in the world. Striking the [U.S.S] 
Cole at sea means protecting all American assets in the seas. 
Diversifying targets means protecting all American things in 
every land that may contain terrorists! 
 
If the enemy used his economy to rule the world and hire 
collaborators, then we need to strike this economy with harsh 
attacks to bring it down on the heads of its owners. If the 
enemy has built his economy on the basis of open markets and 
free trade by getting the monies of investors, then we have to 
prove to these investors that the enemy’s land is not safe for 
them, that his economy is not capable of guarding their monies, 
so they would abandon him to suffer alone the fall of his 
economy.  
 
This is about jihad against the Crusader enemy, so what about 
the September 11 operation? Hijacking planes is a well known 
tactic, which was used by various fighters and freedom 
fighters, so what’s new about this operation? People used to 
hijack planes and consider them a target, but those who are 
willing to put in the extra effort turned these planes into a 
method only, a projectile shot into the heart of the enemy…The 
enemy used to protect his external interests and spend 
exorbitant sums for this protection, so he was surprised when 
he was struck inside his borders. The enemy used to protect a 
thousand interests outside his county, now he has to protect a 
million interests inside his country that need continuing 
protection! The attack on the Trade Center forced America 
since that day to spend billions to protect the huge economic 
infrastructure that runs the American economy. Using planes in 
this attack has forced America to spend billions to protect the 
planes and airports in all possible ways. This protection is not 
limited to the hundreds of American airports, but also [applies] 
 103
Al-Qa`ida’s Critical Infrastructure Strategy Through Statements 
to every airport in the world. Anyone related to the aviation 
field is spending excessive amounts to guard air travel; the 
matter has reached [the point of] protecting the [very] 
skies…This is how America was transformed after one strike, 
protecting all that can be struck, as they guard all that can be 
used to strike with! This related to armed protection. As for 
surveillance, now America monitors everything, it even needed 
to change its laws and to give up on what it used to pride itself 
on: civil rights and personal freedoms. It has violated all 
previous taboos searching for terrorists.263
 
It is clear from his remarks that the author believes that it would be very 
beneficial for the mujahidin to make follow-up attacks that likewise have 
the effect of forcing the “Great Satan” to expend huge sums of money to 
protect itself and its allies. He is therefore clearly cognizant of the 
economic impact of the 9/11 attacks, and if such views are widespread 
within jihadist circles it is likely that they will carry out other 
economically damaging assault. 
 
Second, in October 2003 a booklet by Abu Mus`ab al-Najdi was posted 
on the Al-Firdaws (Paradise) jihadist website that explicitly advocated 
“economic warfare” against the United States. This text is so relevant 
that it deserves to be quoted at length: 
 
The Islamic umma has entered, through al-Qa`ida’s war with 
America, a new period that is different from all the other 
periods experienced by Muslims against their enemies. This 
period is based on economic warfare due to the peculiar nature 
of the adversary in this ferocious battle. Usually, wars are 
based on military strength, and victory belongs to those who 
are militarily superior on the battlefield.  
 
But our war with America is fundamentally different, for the 
first priority is defeating her economically. For this reason, 
anything that negatively affects their economy is considered for 
us a step in the right direction on the path to victory. Military 
defeats do not greatly affect how we measure total victory, but 
these defeats indirectly affect the economy, which can be 
demonstrated by breaching [i.e., undermining] the confidence 
of capitalists and investors in this nation’s ability to safeguard 
                                                 
263 Akhu Man Ta`a Allah, “What Else is There to Say About September 11,” Sawt al-
Jihad 26, undated, chapter 2, pp. 35-42. Translated by Sammy Salama. A total of 29 
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their various trade and dealings. As for the infrastructure or 
machinery that is affected on the battlefield, it does not signify 
anything for two reasons: 
 
1. It is relatively affordable for the world’s 
largest economy 
2. America did not enter this war alone; rather, 
it is supported by many nations such as Japan 
and Germany [and even] the traitors [i.e., the 
Arab Gulf states] 
 
In light of this matter, the difficulty and ease of the task 
becomes apparent. In addition, it becomes apparent why 
additional al-Qa`ida strikes inside the United States have been 
delayed. When thinking about military strikes, it is not difficult 
to carry out an attack that would kill a good number of 
American civilians, but in my opinion this is a waste of 
resources without much benefit. However, directing these 
resources against economic targets is more effective and can 
get us many steps closer toward victory. An attack that kills a 
large number of Americans cannot achieve a tenth of this 
effectiveness. This reveals the importance of the blessed 
September 11 attacks, which is not that they killed a large 
number of infidels but, what is more important, the economic 
impact that this strike achieved.  
 
I would not be exaggerating if I said that striking the Pentagon 
was purely symbolic and had no noticeable effect on the course 
of the battle. It is symbolic, for it shows the Americans that 
their foremost military facility can be destroyed by handful of 
individuals, which is a blow to their morale and a point of pride 
for the Islamic peoples who have been drowning in defeat for 
many years.  
 
The ease of our battle is that [only] a few strikes are sufficient 
to exhaust the American budget, leading to its downturn and 
eventual fall. For that, all who are concerned with our battle 
with America should comprehend this strategy well. By doing 
so, with God’s permission, we can reduce the length of the 
battle by directing all our power and resources against 
economic targets, which unfortunately many see as 
insignificant, while directing a small part of the these resources 
against other targets that serve a symbolic purpose in the battle.  
 
When looking at the battlefronts that al-Qa`ida is involved in, 
we can divide them into two: 
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First, battlefronts aimed at indirectly exhausting the enemy 
economically. Many will be surprised by this uncommon 
categorization. These battlefronts serve as the beginning, not 
for the direct exhaustion of the enemy, but for informing the 
public, which serves [to harm] the economic target indirectly. 
For example, the battle in Saudi Arabia and all operations 
carried out previously are more directed at clarifying and 
revealing to the people the extent of the collaboration of the 
ruling regime, and the treason of the religious clerics that serve 
under this regime, who are silent about the regime’s crimes 
toward the mujahidin. This causes the Saudi people to 
experience the climate of the battle, and to donate their sons as 
fuel to this battle, which is what is truly occurring in Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq. By doing so, we have invested this battle for 
our benefit; for what the enemy does not realize is that we were 
able to awaken a considerable number of Saudi youth who will 
carry forward the battle as indicated by Shaykh Usama (May 
God Save Him): “by entering the battle against the sons al-
Haramayn [i.e., mujahidin from the Arabian peninsula], 
America will forget the hell of Vietnam.”  
 
We can say that the blessed Madrid operations were not aimed 
at exhausting the enemy, but rather to motivate the Spanish 
people to break ranks with the American thieves, which serves 
the economic interest indirectly by isolating America on the 
battlefield. As for the attack on England, it was aimed at 
punishing the United Kingdom for its aid to the American 
thieves, to embarrass its security services, and to rub its noses 
in the dirt in front of the European nations. [This is] because 
they turned down the ceasefire offered by Shaykh Usama. 
 
Second, battlefronts aimed at directly exhausting the enemy 
economically. We can categorize the battle in Iraq as one of the 
fronts that are economically exhausting the enemy, because the 
mujahidin, with God’s glory, prevented America from 
controlling a large segment of the Iraqi oil which they hoped 
would compensate for their economic losses on September 11. 
While currently they control the oil in Saudi Arabic, which 
amounts to two thirds of the pie, they hoped to control the 
whole pie after they controlled Iraq. 
 
Any operation targeting a field of infrastructure in a new 
country that does not have a history of countering these 
operations is considered to be bleeding (exhausting) the greater 
enemy, America, and the targeted nation itself. It is so because 
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these nations will be required to protect all similar potential 
targets, which results in economic exhaustion (bleeding). 
Moreover, the effect will be on America [because] when the 
target nation is incapable of doing so, they will turn over the 
mission to the Americans, who will need to personally defend 
their interests. This is what is occurring in a number of 
countries, like some of the African nations. For example, if a 
hotel that caters to Western tourists in Indonesia is targeted, the 
enemy will be required to protect all hotels that cater to 
Western tourists in all countries which may become a target of 
similar attacks. You can say the same thing about living 
residences, economic establishments, embassies, and other 
[targets].  
 
I conclude by taking a look at the future operations of al-
Qa`ida, which I can predict based on their communiqués and 
past operations. I predict that they will concentrate on the oil 
infrastructure in one of the following three nations: Kuwait – 
Venezuela – Saudi Arabia. In addition, there is a possibility 
that al-Qa`ida will, one way or another, target the Wall Street 
stock exchange, which represents the nerve center of the 
American domestic economy. Finally, continuing to prevent 
the American thieves from benefiting from Iraqi oil by 
concentrating a large effort [there]… 
 
Warning: 
 
When I indicated that the battle with the U.S. and others is 
economic, I do not mean that it is for the sake of the economy 
itself; rather, [it is important] because they use the economy to 
control Muslims and destroy them. This is first and last a 
religious war in all its forms.264
  
There are three important lessons that can be drawn from this relatively 
short text. First, it demonstrates that certain figures associated with al-
Qa`ida have explicitly recognized the strategic and military importance 
of targeting and inflicting damage on the American economy. This is 
clearly problematic, given that the American economy is now 
overstretched – and, according to some economists, in serious long-term 
trouble – since it indicates that the enemy has not only recognized but 
intends to exploit an inherent vulnerability in modern Western societies. 
Second, al-Najdi’s complaint that many jihadists see his emphasis on 
targeting the economy as “insignificant” suggests that for many 
                                                 
264 Abu Mus`ab al-Najdi, “Al-Qa`ida’s Battle is Economic, Not Military,” Al-Firdaws 
website, October 3, 2005. Translation by Sammy Salama. 
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mujahidin, either traditional wartime objectives of a strictly military or 
primarily political nature, or “expressive,” atavistic desires to kill large 
numbers of “infidel” Americans and/or exact revenge, take precedence 
over mundane tasks like exploiting the enemy’s economic 
vulnerabilities, which is viewed as less important or less psychologically 
satisfying. To the extent that this is true, it may militate against the future 
targeting of economic infrastructural targets inside the U.S. Third, and 
especially revealing, are the comments made by al-Najdi at the very end 
of his booklet. Despite his apparent rationality, like all committed global 
jihadists al-Najdi is imbued with a religious worldview and therefore 
feels compelled to insist that the jihad against the U.S. is and will always 
remain essentially a religiously-mandated struggle between Muslims and 
world of “unbelief.” This only serves to confirm the argument above that 
the rationality of the jihadists, such as it is, is severely constrained by 
theological imperatives which may have only a tenuous relation to 
international political realities. 
 
Beyond these relatively extended treatments of the value of economic 
targeting, there are many other al-Qa`ida-linked texts that discuss 
economic targets in conjunction with military, political, and symbolic 
ones. Although these materials are not focused exclusively on economic 
targets, they are nonetheless indicative of the growing awareness within 
jihadist circles of the importance of attacking such targets. A 
representative example is provided by the article written by the deceased 
former head of Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Haramayn (Al-Qa`ida in the Land 
of the Two Holy Places, i.e., the Arabian peninsula), Abu Hajir `Abd al-
`Aziz al-Muqrin, which appeared in the al-Qa`ida military journal 
Mu`askar al-Battar (Al-Battar Camp):265
 
Second, economic targets. The objective of attacking these 
targets: breaching the security and climate of stability that is 
necessary for economic growth, such as the bombing of oil 
pipelines in Iraq which has made it less appealing for foreign 
corporations. 
 
Additional objectives include:  
 
                                                 
265 Al-Battar was the name of one of Muhammad’s many swords. This particular sword, 
which was known as the “sword of the prophets” because it was engraved with a 
picture of King David and inscribed in Arabic with the names of many Jewish and 
Christian prophets, was one of three seized as booty after Muhammad suppressed the 
rebellious Jewish Banu Qaynaqa tribe in Medina. Some believe that al-Battar will 
eventually be wielded by Jesus when he returns to Earth to fight the Antichrist. 
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Removal of foreign capitalists from domestic markets; also 
negative economic consequences on their native lands, as 
occurred very quickly following the blessed strikes in Madrid, 
which affected the entire European economy. Among these are 
double strikes that affect the economy of the Crusader or 
Jewish or apostates regimes.  
 
Among the Examples of Such Strikes: 
 
 Striking Jewish-Crusader investments in Muslim lands. 
 Striking international corporations. 
 Striking international economists and business experts.  
 Striking imports from Crusader nations through military 
means (as occurred in the bombing and burning of 
certain American restaurants), or through political means 
like boycotts. 
 Striking raw materials stolen from Muslim lands, such as 
the strike on the French oil carrier or the strikes on Iraqi 
oil pipelines. These kinds of economic strikes are 
determined by the high leadership, who wait for the 
appropriate time and place. 
 Assassinating Jews who work in business and 
disciplining those who cooperate with them 
economically, following a proper warning. Only those 
who are proven to be collaborating apostates should be 
assassinated. 
 
Third, human targets. We should target and kill Jews and 
Christians. We say to all who fight God and his Prophet, we 
bring you slaughter. In our current reality we should not be 
deterred by borders or geography, all Muslim dwellings and 
lands are ours. We should turn the lands of the infidels into a 
Hell, just as they have turned our lands into a Hell. For that, all 
operational cells should not pay attention to geographic borders 
as described by the enemies, but aim to transform infidel lands 
into battlefronts, as they have turned Muslim lands into fields 
of experimentation for their weapons and inventions. 
 
The priority in these operations should be given to Jews and 
Christians with official connection to Muslim lands. It is 
advisable to start with targeting unprotected, easy targets. 
Priority is given to the dependants of infidel nations that are 
directly involved in supporting local apostates. For example, in 
Saudi Arabia first target Americans, then the English. In Iraq, 
the Americans. In Afghanistan, the Americans. In Algeria, the 
French. In Indonesia, the Australians, etc. 
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Categorizing Human Targets by Importance: 
 
1. Jews: they are divided into various degrees of importance. 
First American and Israeli Jews, then British Jews, then French 
Jews, etc. 
 
2. Christians: they are categorized by order of importance, as 
follows: 
 
 Americans. 
 Britons. 
 Spaniards. 
 Australians. 
 Canadians. 
 Italians. 
 
These groups are further divided into: 
 
 Businessmen. For business has global importance in 
this age. 
 Diplomats, politicians, intellectuals, analysts, and 
political emissaries.  
 Scientists and experts. 
 Military commanders and soldiers. 
 Tourists, visiting entertainers, and all who have 
received a warning from the mujahidin to abstain from 
or evacuate Muslim lands. 
 
3. Apostates: They are categorized by order of importance as 
follows: 
 
 The most important targets are those who are close to 
Jewish and Christian governments, such as Husni 
Mubarak, the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula, and their 
advisors.  
 Secularists and modernists who criticize believers and 
ridicule religion.  
 Intelligence professionals and spies, they are the armor 
and protection fence of the Jews and Christians. They 
are also the striking arms of the apostates.266 
 
                                                 
266 Abu Hajir `Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin, “Military Sciences: Targets in the Cities,” 
Mu`askar al-Battar Magazine 7, pp. 23-27. Translation by Sammy Salama. 
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This passage indicates that al-Muqrin, an experienced operational 
commander, clearly understood the importance of striking economic 
targets, including facilities such as banks and oil pipelines, means of 
transportation such as tankers, foreign and native personnel who worked 
in various vital sectors of the economy, and foreign tourists who 
provided income for apostate regimes. At the same time, he advocated 
attacking obvious military and political targets (such as soldiers, officers, 
intelligence officers and agents, diplomats, scientists, etc.) on pragmatic 
grounds, but also Jews, “infidels,” “apostates,” “secularists,” 
“modernists,” and “intellectuals,” in large part for religious reasons.267 
Thus, even in texts that focus more narrowly on operational matters, one 
typically finds injunctions to target enemies on essentialist religious 
grounds. 
 
The same mixture of pragmatic and curious religious considerations can 
be seen in a short text prepared by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, one of the most 
important al-Qa`ida operatives and strategic thinkers prior to his 2005 
arrest in Pakistan: 
 
All Western Christian and Jewish presence on Muslim lands is 
a legitimate target….Some will argue that the military presence 
is the most dangerous; actually, it is the least dangerous. 
Cultural and missionary presence on our land is far more 
dangerous. The second most dangerous are the economic 
thieves, the third are the diplomats.  
 
Even the most benign tourist, the old man who does not deal 
with politics and is only here to visit is a danger to our land. 
For he is coming to our land to entertain himself after his 
ancestors subjugated, ruled, and stole from our land.  
 
Have you ever seen a tourist who comes back after he is told 
that he will be slaughtered? Tourists continue to come back in 
spite of the warnings because they have ulterior economic and 
political goals in our lands.  
 
This is the rational argument. As for the religious argument, 
infidels are in a perpetual war with the Muslim umma. There 
are two exceptions to this. First, the dhimmi [Christians and 
Jews who reside in Muslim lands in exchange for accepting 
second-class status] have long term immunity from this, and 
                                                 
267 These religious motivations are even more apparent in the section dealing with 
“sectarian targets,” which was the first category mentioned, and in the last section 
entitled “The Benefits of Special Operations in the Cities.” See ibid. 
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travelers have short term immunity. However, this immunity is 
only valid if the land is ruled by a legitimate Muslim ruler who 
rules in accordance with the shari`a. Only he can grant such an 
immunity, and only if the infidels pay a jizya [poll tax].  
 
Let’s look at the current situation. Where is the [true] Muslim 
ruler? The current leaders who gave these infidels immunity 
should be killed. Are these people paying jizya [in exchange] 
for their presence on Muslim lands? We are the ones who are 
paying the jizya for their presence.268
 
Once again, there is a reference to “economic thieves” in amongst the 
other alleged threats to the mujahidin. 
 
A third example is an article by Nur al-Din al-Kurdi, which appeared in 
the Dharwat al-Sanam (Peak of the [Camel’s] Hump) journal, which 
discusses several “arenas of jihad,” specifically the military arena, the 
security and intelligence arena, the propaganda arena, the ideological 
arena, and the economic arena. Here are al-Kurdi’s comments regarding 
the latter: 
 
It [the economic arena] is the most dangerous and effective 
arena of jihad, because we live in a materialistic world…A 
boycott is still an effective weapon that we possess, which we 
can use without negative effects on us. For that, we have to 
benefit from this weapon, knowing that it would have no effect 
unless everybody participates in it. Muslims need to boycott 
the products of the infidel and hostile nations, knowing that 
with God’s grace we have numerous substitutes in our 
bountiful lands. We remind the Muslims how the unbelieving 
American people boycotted French cheeses in solidarity with 
their government against the policy of France, which opposed 
the U.S. involvement in Iraq.  
 
If someone says boycotting the products of infidel nations does 
not affect their economies, we tell him and others that the al-
Quds newspaper published in its economic pages that the 
American tobacco corporation Philip Morris annually sells 
about $6 billion [worth of cigarettes] in Arab markets. In the 
                                                 
268 “The Propaganda Front Presents the Second Episode: Lectures by Shaykh Abu 
Mus`ab al-Suri,” al-Faruq website, May 10, 2005. Translation by Sammy Salama. 
Unfortunately, the CETIS research team received a copy of Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s 
1,600-page strategic treatise, Da`wat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya al-`Alamiyya (The 
Call for International Islamic Resistance), too late to be able to incorporate the 
information contained therein into this report. 
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Muslim world as a whole, their sales reach $26 billion. These 
are of course the profits of only one corporation, selling one 
commodity. If the sales of tobacco can bring in such profits, let 
us imagine the volume of profits achieved by the infidels in the 
sale of necessities such as foods and communications…the 
truth will be bitter and sad.  
 
Let us not forget that the thing which will unravel the grip of 
the Americans and their servants and will result in the 
deterioration of their ability to conduct their operations in 
Muslim lands is the brothers aiming their fire at their economic 
interests in the region. That includes attacking the oil wells and 
pipelines, and targeting the supply and logistical lines of the 
Crusader army.269
 
In short, in jihadist publications the waging of economic jihad in various 
forms is recommended together with other types of jihad. This should 
hardly come as a surprise, since both pre-Islamic and early Islamic 
campaigns had important economic dimensions, which is why several 
sections of the Qur’an endeavor to provide guidelines concerning the 
seizure and distribution of enemy booty. 
 
Clearly, then, al-Qa`ida leaders and strategists are aware, perhaps 
increasingly so, of the importance of attacking economic targets in the 
U.S. and the West. Yet what is surprising is that there are apparently 
only a relatively small number of articles and treatises that are devoted 
exclusively to this subject. A native Arab speaker working with the 
preparers of this report systematically monitored 42 jihadist websites and 
examined thousands of pages of documents prepared by al-Qa`ida and its 
affiliates, yet he was unable to find very much material that was focused 
narrowly on attacking economic targets. Such material surely exists, but 
it constitutes only a drop in the bucket within the total corpus of jihadist 
literature, most of which is devoted to other matters, ranging from arcane 
disputes about theological matters and religious exhortations to practical 
instruction.   
 
There has, of course, been a voluminous amount of literature generated 
by al-Qa`ida and other Islamist terrorist groups over the years that has 
been specifically designed to provide practical instruction to would-be 
jihadists on a wide variety of technical, tradecraft, and operational or 
                                                 
269 Nur al-Din al-Kurdi, “The Arenas of Jihad,” Dharwat al-Sanam 3, pp. 27-28. 
Translation by Sammy Salama. This particular journal is published by Abu al-Mus`ab 
al-Zarqawi’s al-Qa`ida in Iraq organization. 
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narrowly tactical matters, such as how to make explosive devices, 
employ different types of weapons, provide for organizational security, 
carry out the surveillance of prospective targets, and launch attacks on 
different types of targets.270  
 
What is most surprising, however, is that there seems to be little or no 
discussion of critical infrastructure in al-Qa`ida materials and other 
jihadist literature, at least in the specific technical sense in which people 
in the West – especially officials charged with protecting it – employ that 
term. Here it is worth quoting from the notes prepared by our Arab 
translator: 
 
Following an extensive search and reading of al-Qa`ida 
primary source literature and websites in the past few months, I 
was surprised to find that the topic of critical infrastructure is 
nearly absent from al-Qa`ida’s own literature. While the 
network has extensive operational and ideological 
literature…very limited information actually touched on the 
topic of critical infrastructure…This term is all but absent from 
al-Qa`ida’s lexicon, as I have yet to come across it in any of the 
group’s manuals, literature, or speeches. The group’s materials 
do not specifically discuss this topic, although specific 
references are made to certain critical industries or facilities 
(namely the oil industry, tourism, religious facilities, 
diplomatic facilities, and vague references to attacks on 
transportation). 
 
This summation seems to confirm the tentative conclusions herein that 
al-Qa`ida has no clear understanding of critical infrastructure in the 
Western sense, much less a coherent strategy for attacking critical 
infrastructure qua critical infrastructure. Still less does the group seem to 
grasp the potential advantages of making compound attacks on critical 
infrastructure, i.e., using certain components of the infrastructure to 
disrupt or destroy other key infrastructural elements. What al-Qa`ida 
does possess, however, is a strong desire to harm the economy of the 
United States and the West, and an increasingly sophisticated awareness 
that effectively targeting the oil infrastructure in the Gulf States will 
create serious economic burdens and dislocations in all of the world’s 
                                                 
270 Compare, e.g., the al-Qa`ida jihadist encyclopedia found in a British apartment, 
I`alan al-Jihad `ala al-Tawaghit al-Bilad [Declaration of Jihad against the Tyrants of 
the Land]; the Mawsu`at al-I`adad [Preparation Encyclopedia]; and “Destroying Train 
Tracks,” Al-Firdaws website, undated. 
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industrialized societies, none of which are part of the underdeveloped 
dar al-islam. 
 
In sum, there is an acute danger that al-Qa`ida will instigate, sponsor, 
and/or directly organize more and more attacks on vital oil facilities and 
pipelines, and that it will continue to attack sensitive infrastructural 
targets such as buildings, bridges, roadways, tunnels, and airports, places 
where large numbers of people tend to congregate. However, as in the 
past such attacks are likely to be carried out for a multiplicity of reasons 
– to strike symbolically significant political, military, or cultural targets, 
kill large numbers of “infidels,” physically destroy property, traumatize 
and frighten enemy civilians, rally and embolden Islamist supporters, 
and cause tangible economic damage – rather than simply to disrupt or 
destroy infrastructure in the narrowest sense of that term. 
 
However that may be, having analyzed al-Qa`ida’s ideological, strategic, 
and operational objectives, it is now necessary to look at the recent 
historical record in an effort to determine whether their doctrinal and 
strategic pronouncements have influenced their actual behavior. To what 
extent have the concrete actions undertaken by al-Qa`ida and its closest 
affiliates, in the context of critical infrastructure, mirrored the 
exhortations and proclaimed objectives of their leaders and principal 
thinkers? 
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Chapter Six:  
 
Capabilities for Attacking 
Critical Infrastructure*
 
 
 
efore turning to examinations of prior attacks on critical 
infrastructure by al-Qa`ida and its affiliates, another important 
facet in an analysis of al-Qa`ida’s threat to critical infrastructure 
involves an examination of the capabilities required to perform such acts 
and the extent to which al-Qa`ida possesses those capabilities. 
 
Al-Qa`ida has already demonstrated its flexible and adaptive nature as a 
terrorist organization and its ability to conduct a wide range of attacks, 
including those on critical infrastructure targets, such as the U.S.S. Cole, 
the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassies, and the World Trade Center 
towers. In order to examine al-Qa`ida’s capabilities in more detail, this 
section will first examine how the generally develops and executes its 
attack plans. A discussion of critical infrastructure targets and the 
capability attributes necessary for successful attacks on it will follow, 
along with a short case-study discussion of the capabilities required in 
two specific attacks. 
 
 
AL-QA`IDA ATTACK PLANNING 
 
Once target selection has occurred, most al-Qa`ida operations are divided 
into three general phases: surveillance, preparation, and the execution of 
the attack. First, intelligence teams conduct surveillance on the target. 
This is followed by a preparatory stage, encompassing rehearsals of the 
operation (perhaps at an al-Qa`ida camp), the organization of safe 
houses, vehicles, and other logistical necessities by a support team, and 
the final preparation of weapons and explosives. Finally, the attack team 
performs the operation. If the incident is not a suicide mission, extraction 
B 
                                                 
* This chapter was prepared by Elle DiLorenzo. 
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is the final step.271 However, suicide attacks have been and are likely to 
continue to be a preferred tactic, given the high level of difficulty 
involved in executing exit strategies for perpetrators.272
 
Emphasis is placed on thoroughness and a high level of pre-attack 
preparation. An examination of the following excerpt from an al-Qa`ida 
training manual supports this characterization of the group’s planning: 
 
The Organization’s command needs detailed information 
about the enemy’s vital establishments, whether civilian or 
military, in order to make safe plans, reach firm decisions, and 
avoid surprises. Thus, the individual who gathers information 
about a desired location should, in addition to drawing a 
diagram, describe it and all its details. 
 
The Drawing: The brother should draw a diagram of the area, 
the street, and the location which is the target of the 
information-gathering. He should describe its shape and 
characteristics. The drawing should be realistic so that 
someone who never saw the location could visualize it. It is 
preferable to also put on the drawing the directions of traffic, 
police stations, and security centers. 
 
The Description: It is necessary to gather as much information 
about the location as possible. For instance: 
 
1. Traffic directions and how wide the streets are 
2. Transportation leading to the location 
3. The area, appearance, and setting of the place  
4. Traffic signals and pedestrian areas 
5. Security personnel centers and government agencies  
6. Embassies and consulates 
7. The economic characteristics of the area and traffic  
congestion times 
8. Public parks  
9. Amount and location of lighting 
 
It is preferable to photograph the area as a whole first, then the 
street of the [desired] location. If possible, panoramic pictures 
should be taken. That is, the collection of views should be 
continuous in such a way that all pictures are taken from one 
location and that the ending of one picture is the beginning of 
the next. The photographer should be experienced with and 
                                                 
271 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 103-4. 
272 Ibid. 
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proficient in film processing and developing. It is risky to use 
an outside film processing service. When observing a military 
installation or camp, we discourage taking pictures where it is 
forbidden. The brother/photographer should use a modern 
camera that can photograph at night or from a distance and 
only the lens of the camera should be visible. When gathering 
information about a military camp, the brother should draw a 
diagram of the camp’s overall area, the camp itself, and its 
interior, if possible.273
 
A review of al-Qa`ida training materials and tactics, along with 
information from organization members, reveals a high level of planning 
and organization in the development of al-Qa`ida attack plans. 
According to Abu Jandal, bin Ladin’s former bodyguard, al-Qai`da 
adopts a strategy of “centralization of decision and decentralization of 
execution” while carrying out attacks. By this Abu Jandal meant that, 
“the decision was made centrally, but the method of attack and execution 
was the duty of field commanders.” In the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, field 
commanders selected the target and presented their findings to the 
Military Affairs Committee that approved the operation and provided 
funds for the attack.274 Similarly, in the attack on the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack cell was made up of four 
separate sections: the intelligence section, the administration section, the 
planning section, and the execution section.275
 
There are many additional variables required for a successful attack 
against critical infrastructure. To fully understand al-Qa`ida’s 
capabilities in relation to critical infrastructure, it is not only important to 
examine how the group operates, but it is equally crucial to review the 
types of targets in question and the range of capabilities required for a 
successful attack of them. This will permit a thorough evaluation of the 
extent to which al-Qa`ida meets those capability requirements. 
 
 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS 
 
General definitions of critical infrastructure have already been discussed 
in earlier sections of this report. However, a short examination of 
                                                 
273 Jerrold M. Post, ed., Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda 
Training Manual (Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2005), pp. 95-6. 
274 Bergen, p.253. 
275 See testimony of FBI agent Stephen Gaudin at the trial of U.S. v. Usama bin Ladin. 
Quoted in Bergen, pp. 220-221. 
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different types of critical infrastructure will provide an important 
backdrop for the subsequent discussion and evaluation of capability 
traits.  
 
Below is an illustrative list of various types of critical infrastructures:   
 
• Aviation Infrastructure 
• Chemical Plant 
• Communication 
Infrastructure 
• Dams and Waterways 
• Embassies/Consulates 
• Financial Institutions 
• Police Stations 
• Oil/Gas Infrastructure 
• Power Infrastructure 
• Public Service/ 
Government Office 
• Military Bases 
• Railways/Railroads/Rail 
lines 
• Roadways  
• Subways 
• Train/Bus Stations 
• Water Treatment/ Storage 
Facility 
 
 
In examining critical infrastructure targets, is must be remembered that 
all critical infrastructures are NOT the same. As represented in this 
list, there are many different kinds of critical infrastructures, so it is 
logical to assume that different capabilities are required to attack these 
entities. Moreover, each element of a critical infrastructure sector may 
possess different levels of protection, consisting of both passive and 
active defenses. It is almost trite to state that the level of protection is 
usually positively correlated with the capabilities required to conduct a 
successful attack. 
 
Critical infrastructure can take the form of facilities. Institutions such as 
banks, ports, universities, hospitals, police stations, and government 
buildings fall into this general category. Critical infrastructure can also 
consist of a collection of dispersed components, such as many 
transportation networks, like highways or public transportation systems. 
 
Some critical infrastructure targets may encompass a combination of 
virtual and physical systems. The Internet is one such entity, since it 
consists of physical units such as servers together with virtual elements 
across the world. Another example is SCADA (Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition) systems. These are computer systems of varying levels 
of complexity, which are used for large-scale data measurement and 
analysis. SCADA systems monitor and control plants and equipment, 
and can be found in a number of infrastructure sectors, including water 
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and waste control, energy, oil and gas refining, telecommunications, and 
transportation.  
  
Keeping these differences in mind, a baseline analysis of the capability 
requirements for attacking various types of critical infrastructure can be 
helpful in determining the minimum necessary capabilities for attacks 
against specific infrastructural targets. Analysis has already been 
conducted on evaluating the general capabilities needed to successfully 
attack and damage various categories of infrastructure. What follows is a 
summary of the empirically-derived determinations resulting from the 
analyses found in a prior report conducted by CETIS researchers.  
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the types of resources required to attack specific 
critical infrastructures. A more in-depth analysis of the capability 
categories necessary to attack critical infrastructure targets follows in the 
next section of this report.  
 
It should be remembered that these criteria and the analysis that follows 
are based on the evaluation of past attacks against critical 
infrastructure. The table provides only very crude estimations derived 
from empirical data. For example, protection levels in the table are 
classed very broadly as being either “low” or “high.” In reality, the 
defensive posture of each target is likely to differ considerably along a 
continuum, and for that very reason the table is meant to serve as a 
general guide to required capabilities for the purposes of this analysis 
rather than as a blueprint for force protection. Furthermore, any future 
changes in relevant factors, such as new developments in technology or 
changes in the vulnerabilities of various infrastructures, may make it 
easier or more difficult to attack each individual type of critical 
infrastructure. 
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Table 6.1: Capability Requirements for Attacking Specific Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
Infrastructure Type Protection 
Level  
Physical 
Resources  
Weapons  Financial
Resources 
Logistical 
Resources 
Ability to 
innovate 
Technology 
level 
Skill set (esp. 
military-type 
skills) 
Familiarity 
with Target 
Environment 
Communications 
High        High Medium Low Medium Medium Medium High High MediumAviation Infrastructure 
  Low          Medium Medium Low Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Unknown
Chemical Plant Low        Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
Communication Infrastructure Low         Low Low-Medium Low Low High High Medium High Unknown
Dams and Waterways Low          Medium Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Medium Medium High Unknown
Embassies/Consulates Low          Low Medium Low High High Medium High Medium High
High          Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High MediumFinancial Institutions 
  
Low 
Low-
Medium         Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
Police Stations (low impact 
only) High          Medium Medium Low Unknown Unknown Medium Medium Unknown Medium
Oil/Gas Infrastructure Low          Low Low Low Low Low Low Low High Low
Power Infrastructure Low         Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium-High Medium
High         Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High MediumPublic Service/ Government 
Office 
  Low       Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium-High Medium-High Unknown
Military Bases High        High Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
Railways/Railroads/Rail lines Low        Medium Low-Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
Roadways (low impact only) Low         Medium Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Medium Unknown Medium Unknown
Subways Low    Medium Medium-High Low-High Medium-High Medium-High Medium-High High High Medium 
Train/Bus Stations Low     Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High High Medium
Water Treatment/ Storage 
Facility (low impact only) Low          Low Low Low Unknown Unknown Low Unknown Unknown Unknown
HIGH        MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUMGENERAL 
LOW       LOW LOW-MEDIUM LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM
 
Physical Resources (equipment, vehicles, etc.): 
High: Plentiful vehicles, sophisticated equipment 
Medium: Standard equipment, some vehicles 
Low: Basic, minimal equipment 
Weapons: 
High: Sophisticated conventional explosives, WMD 
Medium: Large-scale simple conventional explosives  
Low: Small-scale IEDs, guns, mortars, grenades  
Financial Resources: 
High: >$50,000 available to carry out any attack. 
Medium: $10,000 – $50,000 available to carry out single attack 
Low: <$10,000 available to carry out attack 
Logistical Resources (safehouses; fake passports etc.): 
High: Vast: Competent logistical network with high redundancy 
Medium: Some safehouses and logistical competence 
Low: Minimal support network; difficulty coordinating anything other than basic attack 
Ability to innovate: 
High: Easily embraces new technologies and techniques; quickly gains tacit knowledge 
 
 
 
Medium: Competent at adopting new technologies and techniques, although not a 
particular strength 
Low: Difficulty adopting new technologies or techniques 
Technology level: 
High: High technical skill; aware of and capable of using newest technologies 
Medium: Standard technological level – commercial off-the-shelf technologies 
Low: Only rudimentary equipment and techniques – low-tech only 
Skill set (esp. military-type skills): 
High: Highly trained members with diverse relevant skills (e.g. explosives production, 
electronics) 
Medium: Some paramilitary type training, basic tradecraft 
Low: Amateurish, little to no formal training 
Familiarity with Target Environment: 
High: Intimately familiar with target environment, can blend in easily 
Medium: Some familiarity with target environment, but not perfect 
Low: Unfamiliar with target environment – easily noticeable 
Communications: 
High: Robust and extensive communications networks 
Medium: Workmanlike communications capabilities but no redundancy  
Low: only primitive, limited-channel communications possible
Capabilities for Attacking Critical Infrastructure 
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Capabilities Needed for Critical Infrastructure Attacks 
 
The general types of resources and operational capabilities required, to 
varying degrees, for carrying out critical infrastructure attacks include:276  
 
7. Physical and Logistical Resources  
8. Weapons 
9. Financial Resources 
10. Ability to innovate/Technology Levels/Skill sets  
11. Familiarity with the target environment 
12. Communication 
 
These capabilities will be examined, in turn, as they apply to specific 
types of infrastructure targets, followed by a discussion of the capability 
level possessed by al-Qa`ida.  
 
It should be noted that the degree to which these capabilities are 
required might change given the level of protection available for a 
particular type of critical infrastructure, i.e. the degree to which the 
infrastructure is protected against harm.277 This can be seen 
comparatively across countries, or across regions within countries (e.g., 
varying levels of protection and security at ports around the world), or 
over time (e.g., aviation security in a given U.S. airport before and after 
the 9/11 attacks). 
 
 
1. Physical and Logistical Resources 
 
Physical resources refer to items such as equipment and vehicles, which 
are necessary in to prepare for and carry out attacks. A group’s degree of 
resources can range from very minimal to highly sophisticated. 
Generally, a medium level of physical resources is required for most 
 
276 The ratings for each capability were determined after a review of historical cases, 
during which the researchers noted or estimated the required levels of both capabilities 
and resources and then averaged them. The ratings are categorized as high, medium, or 
low. 
277 Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey M. Bale et al, “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for 
Attacking Critical Infrastructure: Final Report,” Research project sponsored by 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the Department of Homeland Security, 
Unpublished (August 2004). 
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critical infrastructure attacks.278 The amount of physical resources 
available is generally amplified in relation to the size of the organization. 
Logistical resources such as safehouses and counterfeit passports allow a 
terrorist organization to more easily coordinate its activities and proceed 
with attacks without detection. Logistical resources are closely linked to 
other categories, such as physical resources and weaponry, in that they 
often facilitate the use or transfer of these other resources. Logistical 
capabilities can be vast, consisting of an advanced network with a high 
level of redundancy, or they can be quite low, providing a minimal level 
of support. Generally a level in-between these two is required for most 
infrastructure attacks.279
 
As part of its logistical efforts, al-Qa`ida has employed a comprehensive 
system to acquire identity documentation for its operatives. For example, 
under the authority of its security committee, the group maintained an 
office of passports and host country issues at Qandahar airport. There the 
committee “altered papers, including passports, visas, and identification 
cards.”280 Al-Qa`ida training courses also include lessons in passport 
alteration methods. 
 
Al-Qa`ida has also enhanced its logistical network through the use of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International 
Islamic Relief and the Refugee Services Center in Brooklyn, as 
operational fronts. These NGOs allowed al-Qa`ida operatives to acquire 
identity papers and gain legitimate employment, thereby facilitating the 
movement of funds and equipment.281  
 
However, since the 9/11 attacks many of these avenues have been 
compromised. In particular, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan 
destroyed al-Qa`ida’s stronghold and operations base in that country, 
greatly degrading its logistical, communication, and training capabilities. 
The arrests and killings of a significant percentage of the known pre-9/11 
leaders and the arrests of over 4,000 suspected members worldwide since 
those attacks, together with the detection and disruption of cells in 
Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and the freezing of over $140 
 
278 Calculation based on prior case analyses in ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Intelligence report, “Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad,” Sept. 9, 2003 and 
CIA analytic report, “Al Qaeda travel issues,” Jan. 2004, p. 1. In 9/11 Commission 
Report, p. 169. 
281 Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 138. 
Capabilities for Attacking Critical Infrastructure 
million in assets, have significantly added to the disruption of its 
logistical procedures and networks.282  
 
To cope with these problems, al-Qa`ida has taken on an increasingly 
cellular structure, building upon the ideals found in its pre-9/11 training, 
which taught members to operate as small autonomous units. While cells 
do rely on the main al-Qa`ida structure and key figures for certain things 
– such as speeches and teachings for motivation and new recruitment, 
and assistance for initial financing, networking, and training – the pre-
9/11 training camp system prepared members to act in small groups and 
learn to conduct their own operations. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, al-Qa`ida has also developed an increasing reliance on the 
Internet to support its cells as needed, using the Web both as a 
communications tool and as a vehicle for “virtual” training, recruitment, 
and inspiration for its members. 
 
In the current system, the overall physical and logistical capabilities of 
each cell become a function of the environment in which they operate, 
and highly skilled groups learn to adapt their tactics as a criminal 
network might. For example, a well-developed network would be very 
adept at operating under the radar of law enforcement, possibly even 
operating through corrupt means, with the knowledge and support of law 
enforcement and security officials when and where this is advantageous. 
Solid networks would provide an almost watertight system for acquiring 
weapons, forged documents, safehouses, and information on targets. 
Cells may even be able to take advantage of traditional shipping and 
trading, as well as illicit goods, drugs, and human smuggling routes to 
conduct such activities. A cell with an advanced network of this type 
would most likely be able to acquire a high level of physical and 
logistical capabilities. 
 
Cells can also take advantage of the presence of extremists and extremist 
networks where they are located. Although a majority of Muslims 
worldwide would not support the actions of al-Qa`ida or other extremist 
groups, some level of support does exist in most Muslim communities 
and this can therefore be exploited by adept cells. The highly communal 
nature of the Islamic community makes it easy to identify mosques, 
mullahs, and followers of the cause, thereby simplifying a cell’s search 
for supporters. Cell supporters need not participate directly in operations, 
but can provide a range of logistical support. For instance, networking 
                                                 
282 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” Heritage Lecture #928,  The 
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl928.cfm.  
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cell members with “insiders” in a critical infrastructure facility would 
ease access and enhance the cell’s capabilities to conduct an attack. 
Supporters could provide physical or financial support as well. 
 
 
2. Weapons 
 
Obtaining weaponry is another requirement for committing attacks 
against infrastructural targets. This can include anything from guns, 
grenades, and small-scale Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to large-
scale but simple conventional explosives, more sophisticated 
conventional explosives, or chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (CBRN) materials. Generally speaking, a medium- to low-level 
of weapons availability is required to attack most critical infrastructure 
targets.283 Furthermore, the ability of terrorists to adapt relatively simple 
weaponry to their needs allows them to carry out attacks without 
pursuing highly advanced types of weapons. The 9/11 hijackers’ reliance 
on the small box cutterss, etc., that they were able to bring onto aircraft 
is a case in point. 
 
Al-Qa`ida clearly possesses low- to medium-weapons capabilities, such 
as small arms, and basic conventional explosives. The group also 
encourages its members to create new weaponry to enhance its missions. 
For example, as depicted in a British documentary by reporter Deborah 
Davies, Abu Hamza is shown at a conference explaining the diagram for 
a Muslim Anti-Aircraft Net, which is a floating net laced with mines 
designed to trap and destroy civilian aircraft in the U.S. and Great 
Britain. According to the video, “[t]hese nets, if mass produced, can cost 
less than £10 and are undetected by radar. They can be launched from 
any point, and move to anywhere in the world. We urge all brothers and 
sisters to also being [sic] thinking of designs and techniques such as 
these, because the time for talking has long since passed.”284
 
Likewise, when al-Qa`ida is not already in possession of a particular 
weapon, it has demonstrated its ability to adapt its attacks to fit its 
current resource levels. Following the increased protection levels in the 
aviation industry, the low-level weapons used to conduct an attack such 
as 9/11 are no longer adequate. As such, terrorists have begun investing 
in MAN-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) in response to 
                                                 
283 Calculation based on CrITIC database analysis. 
284 Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, p. 190. 
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difficulties in smuggling weapons aboard an aircraft.285 Efforts have also 
been made to attack commercial airliners in countries with less-secure 
aviation systems, such as in Iraq in 2003 and in Kenya in 2002.286 
Attacking airport targets while they are on the ground or are airborne 
with Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) or Light Anti-tank Weapons 
(LAWs) are other foreseeable possibilities.287
 
 
3. Financial Resources 
 
It is no surprise that possessing greater financial resources offers benefits 
to a terrorist organization, but only a low level of funding is required for 
most infrastructure attacks. Al-Qa`ida has repeatedly shown itself to be 
able to marshall sufficient funds to carry out attacks, taking advantage of 
globalization and informal financial networking such as the hawala 
system and Islamic charities to finance its activities. Furthermore, 
despite efforts by the United States and other nations to curtail funding 
for terrorist organizations, through means such as stricter regulations to 
monitor both the traditional and non-traditional movement of money, 
increased due diligence requirements, as well as the creation of terrorist 
financing watch lists and international task forces, al-Qa`ida is still 
thought to be able to raise sufficient funds for even large-scale critical 
infrastructure attacks or attacks against well-protected targets. The only 
uncertainty in this vein is whether the group would have sufficient funds 
for high-cost CBRN attacks. 
 
This capability is facilitated by the low cost of most actual attacks, 
including large scale ones. According to The 9/11 Commission Report, 
“the 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and 
$500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.”288 Likewise, the cost of the 
2004 Madrid bombings is estimated at $10,000, while terrorists spent 
approximately $2,000 on the London bombings in 2005.289  
  
 
                                                 
285 Gunaratna, Changing Face of Terrorism, p. 26. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
288 9/11 Commission Report, p. 169. 
289 Compare Joshua Prober, “Accounting for Terror: Debunking the Paradigm of 
Inexpensive Terrorism,” PolicyWatch #1041, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, November 1, 2005. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2389; and Tariq Panja, 
“London Bombings Were Low-Cost Operation,” Associated Press, January 3, 2006.   
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4. Ability to Innovate/Technology Levels/Skill Sets 
 
These three categories can be considered complementary in a number of 
ways. For instance, the desire for innovation can lead an organization to 
more readily embrace new technologies and new techniques. Likewise, if 
an organization maintains members with both technological know-how 
and tactical skills, their overall attack capabilities will be enhanced.  
 
Individually, a medium level of innovation is required for attacking most 
infrastructural targets.290 This in turn entails a general competence in 
terms of adopting new technologies and techniques. Medium levels of 
technology and skill sets (especially military-type skills) are also 
required for attacks on critical infrastructure targets.291 There are several 
outside attributes that may affect these capabilities. For instance, the 
ideology or philosophy of a group can affect the level to which they will 
embrace innovation.292 Also, the larger the group, the greater the 
likelihood that its members will have higher levels of technical and other 
skills.293  
 
Al-Qa`ida’s adaptable and flexible nature also demonstrates its ability to 
innovate. The fact that the group has adapted to the environment of the 
post-9/11 world by changing its structure and operational techniques is a 
testament to its attributes in this regard. The evolution of al-Qa`ida into a 
loosely-linked worldwide network of cells, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, is the most obvious and profound example of this. In fact, al-
Qa`ida’s training methodologies, both before and after 9/11, provided a 
foundation of autonomy and self-sufficiency in its members that has 
eased the organization’s transformation into many small cells. To 
increase the group’s capabilities in innovation – as well as in technology 
and other necessary skills - al-Qa`ida has employed various training 
methods that will be discussed below. 
 
                                                 
290 Calculation based on CrITIC database analysis. 
291 Calculation based on CrITIC database analysis. 
292 Brian A. Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment 
Informed 
by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 24 
(2001) p. 193.  
293 Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups,” p. 202.  
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Training Camps 
 
The use of training camps has enabled al-Qa`ida to increase the 
innovation, technical, and other skill capabilities of both its own 
members and the members of affiliated and allied organizations.   
 
Al-Qa`ida training is reportedly divided into three main courses:  
 
1. Basic Training, focusing on guerilla warfare and Islamic law  
2. Advanced Training in the areas of explosive use, heavy weapons, 
and assassination techniques 
3. Specialized Training in surveillance and counter-surveillance, 
counterfeiting identity documents, and conducting maritime or 
vehicle-based suicide attacks.294 
 
In reference to critical infrastructure, take for example the testimony of 
Ahmad Rassam, who received his training primarily at the Khaldan 
training camp in Afghanistan. Rassam has revealed that his training 
included approximately one-month of sabotage training, during which 
trainees learned “how to blow up the infrastructure of a country.”295 
Targets included “electric plants, gas plants, airports, railroads, large 
corporations, gas installations and military installations also…Hotels 
where conferences are held.”296 This highlights a specific emphasis 
placed by al-Qa`ida on the development of specific know-how and skills 
that are required for attacking critical infrastructural targets. 
 
A further look at Rassam’s testimony demonstrates the range of skills 
taught at such camps. Rassam, who was arrested for an attempted plot to 
blow up LAX airport in Los Angeles in 2000, began his training in 1998, 
joining the Khaldan camp, which housed approximately 100 men, who 
were subdivided into cells of 6-14 trainees. The camp emphasized 
independent cell operation separate from any central command 
system.297 Rassam’s initial training focused on light weapons, handguns, 
machine guns, and RPG rocket launchers.298 The next phase of his 
training involved hands-on instruction in the use of explosives, including 
                                                 
294 Jerrold M. Post, Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2002), p. 35. 
295 Compare ibid., pp.549-50; and Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, p. 206. 
296 Testimony of Ahmad Rassam, U.S. v. Haouari, pp.549-50. 
297 Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, p. 206. 
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C4, TNT, and “black plastic,” as well as the aforementioned instruction 
on infrastructural sabotage.299  
 
Other aspects of Rassam’s training dealt with urban guerrilla warfare, 
tactical methods for assassination, procedures for conducting bombings, 
and security and assimilation methods to avoid being conspicuous and 
attracting suspicion.300 Rassam’s training concluded with advanced-level 
training on explosives manufacturing at the Darunta training camp.301
 
Muhammad `Attiyya, an imprisoned Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad 
operative, described similar features when he described his training in 
the al-Qa`ida-associated Badr camp. His training included  
 
[t]he use of weapons inside cities. I also studied topography, 
military tactics, how to ambush patrols, and how to shoot with 
the left hand in case the right hand was hit. I was taught how 
to shoot while riding a motorcycle or in a speeding car and 
how to rescue a hostage from [a] kidnapper by blocking roads 
and pointing guns at the kidnappers…There was also training 
in attacking police stations on [sic] a similar way.302
 
The high level of training described here demonstrates the emphasis that 
al-Qa`ida places on the development of highly-skilled operatives who are 
proficient in combat-related skills such as weaponry, explosives 
production, surveillance, and military tactics, as well as with techniques 
for conducting attacks against infrastructural and other targets and the 
means for assimilating into a target environment.  
 
Training Manuals and Operational Internet Websites 
 
In addition to the use of training camps, examinations of al-Qa`ida 
training manuals, Internet sites, and information from interrogations and 
testimonies of the group’s members have revealed countless examples of 
a clear and comprehensive understanding of the tactics needed to attack 
various types of critical infrastructure, along with the ability to train its 
members in these steps.  
 
In fact, since the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan, the Internet has 
emerged as a distance learning facility for operational terrorist 
                                                 
299 Ibid., pp.549-50 
300 Ibid., pp.550-2. 
301 Ibid., pp.554-5. 
302 Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, pp. 142-3. 
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techniques, often with lessons written by high level al-Qa`ida operational 
planners, such as Sayf al-Adl (alias Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi), al-
Qa`ida’s chief of operations and the man who trained Muhammed `Ata 
and other 9/11 hijackers. 303  
 
Two examples of tactical training provided via the Internet are 
highlighted below: 
 
 
a) Topic”Suggested Methods and Techniques for Disguising 
Explosive Charges” 
 
First, Operations inside markets: 
1. One can enter the market as a shopper carrying shopping 
bags (not Samsonite [i.e. business handbag]) filled with 
explosive charges. He can put the bag in one of the places 
pretending to purchase other products. He should choose a 
hectic place where no one will notice that he left a bag. 
2. It is possible to bring in large explosive charges into busy 
markets by putting them inside large boxes such as butter 
boxes and to push them on a cart while pretending to be a 
distributor. This is to be done following surveillance of the 
market and learning distribution times, types of products 
and entry points.  
3. It is possible to place large explosive charges in large 
cartons that contain Cola bottles or canned goods. It is 
preferred to use new boxes that contain a drawing of the 
goods, such as Cola cartons.  
4. Electronic goods boxes can also be used, by placing an 
explosive into a stereo or printer box. 
 
Things to watch for when disguising explosive charges: 
1. Need to pay attention to the weight of the charges, to make 
sure they are consistent with the weight of the original 
product. 
2. Need to pay attention to the size of the charges, to make 
sure they are consistent with the size of the original 
product. 
3. Need to avoid gaps in the boxes to prevent the charges 
from moving around, use a sponge or corks to fasten it 
firmly inside the container. 
                                                 
303 Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey M. Bale et al, “Report on CBRN Terrorism For Risk 
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4. Keep some of the original material (laundry soap …etc) in 
the top of the container to aid in disguising the charges.  
5. Insure even distribution of weight. 
6. Avoid having anything abnormal in the container, such as 
activation button, wires or lamp. 
 
Second, operations inside buses and bus stations: 
1. If the operation is to take place in a bus station or inside a 
bus, then it is preferable for the explosive charges to be 
placed inside a handbag or a Samsonite bag. 
2. If the plan is to detonate inside a bus station in a meeting 
place, then it is possible to place the explosives in a large 
travel suitcase. This should only be done if the buses 
transport passengers to long distances, and a large suite 
case does not look out of place. 
 
Note: Car bombs can be used to break into large meeting areas 
(open markets, open bus stops, closed markets, closed bus 
stops … etc).  
 
Third, operations in public places, restaurants or general 
buildings:  
1. If the operation is inside a restaurant, then you can place 
the explosives inside a handbag (on the shoulder) or inside 
a Samsonite bag, making sure that the perpetrator is 
dressed appropriately to carry a Samsonite [business 
handbag]. 
2. If the operation is inside an official building such as post 
office, banks, civil buildings, then it is possible to use a 
Samsonite.  
  
Fourth, using car bombs in operations (remote controlled or 
timed): 
1. Place the explosives in the car doors, front part and in the 
front or back bumpers especially if they are made of 
plastic. 
2. Place an amount of explosives in the trunk with gasoline 
and gas cylinders.  
3. Place the explosives in the Taxi sign on top of the car. This 
way you can direct the shrapnel to the heads.  
4. Place a suitcase filled with explosives on the top of the car. 
5. If the car has black windows, you can place cartons or 
boxes filled with explosives on the seats close to the glass.  
 
Appropriate targets for car bombs: 
1. Entrances to markets. 
 131
Capabilities for Attacking Critical Infrastructure 
2. Exits of sport stadiums. 
3. Entrances or exits of colleges. 
4. Entrances to movie theatres. 
5. Bus stops. 
6. Gathering places (protests, celebrations, fairs … etc). 304 
  
b) Topic: “Destroying Train Tracks” 
  
Train Tracks Should be Blown up at the Curve Point  
[i.e. the juncture where tracks are directed]: 
 
1. Lubricating the train tracks at the juncture points with 
grease, oil or fine soap for a distance of at least 100 meters. 
Adding some fine sand on the grease to make the tracks 
impossible to control.  
2. Cutting a large tree trunk and putting a large obstacle in 
front of the train. 
3. Knowing that the train is nearing the tracks (put your ear on 
the tracks to listen to the movement of the train). 
4. If you want to destroy the train itself, you should use 
explosives that can be detonated from a distance through 
wireless or electric wires.  
 
Notes: 
 
 The mujahidin should organize themselves in linked cells 
for sabotage operations. 
 The best sabotage operations target military supplies, 
including taking the enemy’s goods and funds.  
 Realistic planning for these operations.  
 The mujahid needs to develop more effective sabotage 
methods that are quicker and more powerful.305  
 
 
5. Familiarity with Target Environment 
 
Greater familiarity with the environment of the target can increase the 
likelihood of success for an operation. Generally a high level of 
familiarity, i.e., the ability to blend in easily, is required for critical 
                                                 
304 Jund al-Islam, “Suggested Methods and Techniques for Disguising Explosive 
Charges.” Al-Firdaws (Paradise) website, March 24, 2005. Translation by Sammy 
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305 Destroying Train Tracks.” Al-Firdaws website, undated. Translation by Sammy 
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infrastructure attacks306 Depending upon the target, familiarity can be 
localized, such as familiarity with a particular chemical plant that is to be 
attacked. However, familiarity with a wide range of attributes and the 
ability to blend into different environments would be required if an 
attack were to be conducted on foreign soil, such as with the 9/11 
bombings and in many other al-Qa`ida attacks. 
 
It should be noted, especially in terms of the narrower definition of target 
environment, that the use of insiders could dramatically increase a 
group’s capability in this category. The use of insiders can occur either 
before or after the selection of the target. The group may select the target 
in part because it already has an insider in that facility. Or the group may 
place an insider into the target environment after choosing to conduct an 
attack on it. 
 
Al-Qa`ida has proven itself to be highly skilled in this category, as 
exemplified by the operatives in the 9/11 hijacking. Overall, these 
individuals were able to live in the U.S., receive flight training, and 
board the target planes without problems, which presupposes a relatively 
high degree of familiarity with the target environment the availability of 
logistical resources such as counterfeit identity documentation. It should 
be noted, however, that due to the high level of vigilance and attention to 
details such as documentation, communications, etc., since the 9/11 
attacks, operating long-term in the U.S. and in many countries 
worldwide without detection has become increasingly difficult. 
 
 
6. Communications 
 
The ability to maintain robust and secure communications at various 
stages during attack preparations and operations is another important 
capability in coordinating and carrying out any attack plan. 
Communication levels can be anything from extensive networks with a 
great deal of redundancy to primitive systems supporting only limited 
levels of communications. Generally, a medium level of communication 
is required for infrastructural attacks.307 Varying communication levels 
will likely be required at different stages of planning and execution. The 
organization of a group is an important factor in the level of 
communications required for an incident. A group, such as al-Qa`ida, 
which trains its members to operate within smaller cells will probably 
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not require high levels of communication after initial training and 
briefings in order to coordinate the details of an attack. 
 
Interrogation testimony from Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, an integral 
member of al-Qa`ida, reveals that oral, and not written, reports were 
generally used by the organization:  
 
I conducted the September 11 operation by submitting only 
oral reports. I would travel for a day-and-a-half until I reach 
[sic] Bin Ladin, and I inform him what was happening. 
Sometimes I scratched down my notes on a small piece of 
paper about 10cm long … We spoke nonsense on the 
telephone with the operatives and the go-between people like 
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh. But in the end the operation was a 
success. I know that running an operation in the West 
demands specific administrative work. Yet, you must believe 
that the same operation could be run successfully with simple 
primitive means.308  
 
This lack of extensive communication and reporting simplifies the way 
in which al-Qa`ida conducts its operations. It minimizes opportunities for 
detection by the authorities and presupposes a great deal of autonomy for 
cells and cell members conducting operations. However, it should be 
remembered that to conduct whatever communication is needed without 
detection is much more difficult in the post-9/11 environment, so 
communication between leaders and operational cells is likely to become 
even less formal and prevalent than it was previously. 
 
It should also be noted that the Internet has enhanced many of the 
capacities of terrorist organizations, especially in terms of 
communications methods and logistical planning. According to Vincent 
Cannistraro, the former chief of counterterrorism at the CIA, it seems 
that a great number of al-Qa`ida members and allies are adept at 
computer science, and they appear to be focusing their attention on 
ensuring secure communications between al-Qa`ida cells.309 To that end, 
there have been indications that al-Qa`ida has been using the Internet to 
disseminate messages and strategic documents by utilizing encryption 
                                                 
308 “KSM Testimony,” pp. 55-6. 
309 Dan Verton, “Experts: Don’t dismiss cyberattack warning,” Computerworld, 
November 18, 2002, 
www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,76000,00.html. 
 134
The Jericho Option: Al-Qa`ida & Attacks On Critical Infrastructure 
software or posting these documents on the web coded in other digital 
packets, thereby enhancing their overall communications capabilities.310
 
 
 
BOX 6.1: AL-QA`IDA CAPABILITIES AND 9/11 
  
The development of the 9/11 operation illustrates the generally high level 
of al-Qa`ida planning and organization discussed earlier. During this 
operation, there was a great deal of compartmentalization of information 
among those involved in the attack. According to Khalid Shaykh 
Muhammad, 34 people knew about the attack, with only five having the 
full details: Usama bin Ladin, Abu Hafs al-Masri, Khalid Shaykh 
Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shayb, and Abu Turab al-Urduni.1 In 
addition, to minimize the need for constant communications once the 
operatives were in the United States, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad gave 
hijacker Muhammed `Ata the authority to act as a decision-maker on the 
ground, thus encouraging the members to be as normal as possible in 
their dealings, to never contact Pakistan, and keep communications 
short.2
 
This attack also demonstrates al-Qa`ida’s capacity for limiting or altering 
its targets based on its perceived capabilities (along with other factors). 
For example, according to KSM, the al-Qa`ida military committee held a 
meeting two and a half years before 9/11 to discuss a martyrdom attack 
inside the U.S. The committee originally chose to attack U.S. nuclear 
facilities, but changed its mind, “fearing that the attack would go out of 
control.”3 Later, the initial vision of a two-stage 9/11 operation, with a 
second set of attacks in the Pacific region, was reduced by Bin Ladin to 
only one geographical area. 
 
In terms of the use of skilled operatives, there is evidence that various 
hijackers were tasked according to their skills. For example, Sa`id 
Bahaji, who studied computer engineering at the Technical University in 
Harburg, was skilled at organization. As such, he was placed in charge of 
communications, as well as the handling of personalized money 
transfers.4 However, logistical exigencies at times outweighed desired 
skill levels. According to KSM, whether the operatives selected as 
hijackers had any talents or previous aptitude as pilots was not taken into 
account, either by him or by Bin Ladin. Instead, operatives such as  
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BOX 6.1 Cont.: Capabilities and 9/11 
  
Nawaz al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mikhdhar were selected primarily 
because they had U.S. visas.5
 
Familiarity with the target environment was also a consideration in the 
planning phase, and the use of members with experience in the West was 
emphasized.6 To that end, operatives Muhammad `Ata, Ramzi bin al-
Shayb, Marwan al-Shahhi, and Ziyad al-Jarrah were ideal candidates for 
this attack, since they possessing fluent English language skills and had 
lived in Germany for several years.7 Three of the four went on to 
participate in the hijackings as pilots, although Bin al-Shayb did not end 
up participating in the attacks because he was unable to obtain a U.S. 
visa despite multiple attempts. 
 
For those less familiar with Western life, the initial step upon arrival in 
the country for al-Hazmi and al-Mikhdhar, two of the other potential 
pilots, was to enter an English-language school in order to improve their 
language skills before enrolling in flight school.8 Despite this attempt at 
compensation for the lack of prior English-language ability, neither al-
Hazmi nor al-Mikhdhar ever mastered enough English to succeed in their 
flight training. They instead participated in the attacks as “muscle” 
hijackers.9
 
There were other difficulties with operatives which reduced al-Qa`ida’s 
capabilities to conceal its activities and blend into its surroundings, and 
which therefore could have hindered the success of the attack. For 
example, the selection of Zakhariyya Mussawi as an al-Qa`ida operative 
can be viewed as a mistake. Mussawi did not sufficiently blend into his 
surroundings, and especially stood out due to his bizarre conduct at the 
Pan Am International Flight Academy in Minnesota. This included his 
lack of previously attained flight credentials, the fact that he paid $9,000 
in cash for his training, and that he focused his interest solely on learning 
how to take off and land Pan Am’s Boeing 747. His unusual behavior 
and circumstances led the Minneapolis FBI Field Office to initiate an 
investigation on Mussawi on August 15, 2001, and they were able to 
arrest him shortly thereafter because of a visa overstay.  The 10
implications of this weakness in the selection of al-Qa`ida operatives 
were not fully realized by law enforcement officials until after the attack 
and thus did not negatively impact on al-Qa`ida’s capabilities as much as 
it could and indeed should have.
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BOX 6.1 Cont.: Capabilities and 9/11 
 
In sum, the above information reveals that a great deal of planning, 
training, skill development, security in communications, and assimilation 
to the target environment were evident in the “planes operation.” Indeed, 
all of these capabilities contributed to the success of the 9/11 attacks.  
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BOX 6.2: THE JULY 7, 2005 LONDON BOMBINGS 
  
While there is still much that remains unknown about the planning of the 
London bombings – including the confirmation of credit claimed by Abu 
Hafs al-Masri1 – a review of several key details begins to reveal a picture 
about the capabilities of those who committed the attacks. In terms of 
financing, the attacks required a relatively low-level of financial 
resources, with the homemade bombs costing approximately $2,000 to 
produce.2 The bombers – Muhammad Siddiq Khan from Dewsbury, 
Shehzad Tanweer from Beeston, Hasib Husayn from Beeston, and 
Jermaine Lindsay from Huddersfield – were clearly familiar with their 
target environment, having gained this from being born in Britain. 
 
Some technical skill in bomb-making was required, but it should be 
remembered that these bombs were relatively simple knapsack devices 
that were made with peroxide-based chemicals and detonated by cell 
phones.3 There has also been speculation that the operatives acquired the 
know-how to create these bombs from information available on the  
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BOX 6.2 Cont.: London Bombings 
 
Internet.4  
 
Photographic evidence of a trip to Pakistan by Khan and Tanweer in 
November 2004, along with records of a trip to Pakistan by Husayn, has 
lead to suspicions that the trio traveled to Afghanistan for suspected 
training by al-Qa`ida or other jihadist groups.5 Links to al-Qa`ida, if they 
do in fact exist, may have provided the bombers with additional training 
as well as financial, logistical, and other capabilities.  
 
What these scant details reveal is the relatively low level of capabilities 
required to commit a small-scale attack on the London subway system. 
The low levels of protection provided in most subway systems, with their 
unrestricted public access, lack of security screening, and generally large 
crowds, further reduced the need for high levels of various capability 
traits. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Although credit for the London attacks was taken by Abu Hafs al-Masri (the same 
group that claimed the 2004 Madrid attacks), it is likely that the perpetrators of the 
London attacks did not have any formal relations with the Spanish al-Qa`ida related 
cell. 
2 Tariq Panja, “London Bombings Were Low-Cost Operation,” Associated Press, 
January 3, 2006. 
3 “CIA: Bomber tape ‘appears genuine’”, CNN.com, September 2, 2005. 
4 “Leak Gives Official Story Of London 7/7 Attacks” Intelligence Wire, China Daily 
Source: Financial Times Information Limited – Asia, April 10, 2006; “London 
bombings low budget affair, no Al-Qaeda link: report,” Agence  
France Presse – English, April 9, 2006 
5 Photographic records are taken through the Pisces system of all individuals traveling 
to and from Pakistan through legal points of entry. “Killers’ journey to heart of evil - 
London 7/7 Terror Threat,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia), July 20, 2005. 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: AL-QA`IDA’S CAPABILITIES FOR 
ATTACKING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The above evaluation of the baseline capability requirements to conduct 
attacks against critical infrastructure suggests that these levels are 
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sufficiently low to allow terrorists groups to conduct the majority of such 
attacks. While an exact measure of al-Qa`ida’s capabilities in these areas 
is not currently quantifiable, a general calculation of its abilities supports 
the view that al-Qa`ida is capable of attacking a broad cross-section of 
critical infrastructure targets. It should also be remembered that large-
scale attacks along the lines of the 9/11 attacks are not always necessary 
to further al-Qa`ida’s short- or long-term goals. More recent attacks, 
such as the Bali bombings and the London bombings, may have lacked 
the scope and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks or the U.S.S. Cole attack 
in 2000, but these were nonetheless successfully completed operations 
that brought al-Qa`ida back to the forefront of political debate and the 
public eye.311 These incidents also served as a reminder that the U.S. and 
other “enemy nations” must be constantly vigilant and increasingly 
devote resources to protect themselves against new attacks. After all, 
even relatively small-scale attacks can further al-Qa`ida’s goals of 
inciting fear in the West and slowly weakening the economic strength of 
Western nations. 
                                                 
311 Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An 
Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). 
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Chapter Seven:  
 
Al-Qa`ida-Linked Terrorist 
Attacks on Critical 
Infrastructure Outside the 
United States312*
 
 
 
ttacks and plots by al-Qa`ida against critical infrastructure targets 
in the United States will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter, but in order to provide context for these and to provide 
additional details about the ways in which al-Qa`ida might carry out 
attacks against American infrastructure, this chapter will discuss the past 
record of al-Qai`da-related attacks against non-U.S. targets. Although al-
Qa`ida’s attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure have been devastating 
in their effects, successful attacks against critical infrastructure targets in 
America constitute just under 3 percent of all such attacks perpetrated by 
the group and its affiliates (see Figure 7.1). In contrast to the five 
successful North American al-Qa`ida critical infrastructure attacks 
examined later in the study, this chapter examines regions that have 
witnessed 3, 10, and 147 successful al-Qa`ida attacks against critical 
infrastructural sectors – respectively, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East 
and North Africa. This allows for some degree of quantitative analysis 
when looking at these attacks. 
A 
 
This chapter has three sections. Section I provides a quantitative 
assessment of successful al-Qa`ida critical infrastructure attacks in 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, with a more in-
                                                 
312 This section is mainly drawn from the Critical Infrastructure Terrorist Attack 
(CrITerA) database, created by analysts at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence 
Studies (CETIS). The database includes over 7,000 cases of attacks on critical 
infrastructure (CI) by non-state actors (e.g. plots, failed and successful attacks, etc.). 
* This chapter was prepared by Charles Blair, with Elle DiLorenzo and Christopher 
Lunsford. 
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depth examination of certain notable attacks. Section II investigates al-
Qa`ida attacks targeting critical infrastructure components that were 
ultimately deemed unsuccessful, either because the attacks failed or were 
foiled, or because they never proceeded beyond the plot phase and were 
interdicted by the authorities or otherwise abandoned.313 Finally, section 
III of this chapter offers an overview of al-Qa`ida’s quantitative attack 
trends against critical infrastructure in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
F igu re 7 .1 : Su ccessfu l A l-Q a`ida  Related C I Attacks: 
by Region  
M iddle East &  North  
Africa, 148 
Sub-Saharan A frica, 5
South As ia, 7
Southeast As ia, 2
North Am erica, 4 
W estern Europe, 3 
 
 
 
                                                 
313 The quantitative aspects of this chapter differ from the chronology. In the latter, 
cases are included that were ultimately unsuccessful, such as the attempted bombing of 
Air France Flight 63 by the so-called “shoe bomber” (Richard Reid). See Section II of 
this chapter for an explanation of why a statistical analysis of plots, threats, hoaxes and 
failed attacks, on the basis of open source investigations, is inherently problematic. 
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SUCCESSFUL AL-QA`IDA CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS IN EUROPE, ASIA, 
AND THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA  
 
Europe 
 
Despite more than a dozen years of simmering jihadist activity, Europe 
was slow to confront the dangers posed by al-Qa`ida.314 Ironically, until 
its displacement by the Middle East and North Africa in 2004, Europe as 
a region saw the greatest number of attacks on critical infrastructure –
29% of the global total. Yet these attacks were almost all at the hands of 
ethno-nationalist or secular utopian (particularly extreme left) terrorist 
groups, e.g. Action Directe (AD: Direct Action), the Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF: Red Army Faction), the Front de Libération Nationale de 
la Corse (FLNC: National Liberation Front of Corsica), the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA: Basque 
Fatherland and Freedom), and various individuals. In short, despite a 
long history of critical infrastructure attacks, it was not until 2004 that 
Europe witnessed attacks on its critical infrastructure perpetrated by 
jihadists seeking to cause mass casualties. Even after the shocking 
attacks of 9/11, which demonstrated that Europe was a nucleus in almost 
all of al-Qa`ida’s operations, Europeans in general were reticent to view 
al-Qa`ida as a serious security threat.315 In contrast, following the March 
2004 Madrid train attacks (see Box 7.1) and the July 2005 London Tube 
and bus attacks, Europeans have begun to awaken to the grim threat that 
al-Qa`ida poses to the continent’s critical infrastructure. For statistical 
purposes, the Madrid attacks (four train bombings) and London attacks 
(one bombing of a double-decker bus and three bombings of cars in 
separate underground trains) constitute all eight of al-Qa`ida’s successful 
attacks in Europe.316  
                                                 
314 Certainly this is not to say that Europe was unaware of the dangers of jihadism. For 
example, among the many terrorist groups active in Europe throughout the mid- and 
latter part of the 20th century, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA: Armed Islamic Group) 
provided a preview of al-Qa`ida’s future attack modality on 9/11. In December of 1994, 
the GIA hijacked an Air France Airbus in Algiers. Although its plan was ultimately 
foiled, the GIA’s apparent intent was to “crash a fully fueled plane onto the Eiffel 
Tower in the heart of Paris.” Moreover, there was speculation that the terrorists also had 
plans to “blow the plane up in midair over Paris.” See Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 
164. 
315 See Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West 
from Within (New York: Doubleday, 2006). 
316 As noted earlier, there is no open-source information directly linking the al-Qa`ida 
core to the planning or financing of the Madrid or London attacks. The perpetrators 
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BOX 7.1: THE MADRID TRAIN ATTACKS 
 
The Thursday morning commute on March 11, 2004 was proceeding 
normally; the trains were arriving and departing like clockwork, as they 
did every day, laden with workers and students making their daily 
journey into Madrid. Running fifteen minutes apart from one another, 
four separate trains stopped at the Alcalá de Henares Station to transfer 
passengers before heading toward the Spanish capital. 
  
As the first train pulled into Madrid’s Atocha Station at 7:37 a.m., 
explosions erupted, blasting the third, fourth and sixth carriages of the 
train. Almost simultaneously, four bombs exploded in the first, fifth and 
sixth carriages of a second train, which followed behind the first and 
stood only 500 meters outside the Atocha Station. Only a few minutes 
later, the air erupted with the sound of two more explosions at the El 
Pozo del Tio Raimundo Station three miles away, where the fourth and 
fifth carriages of a double-decker train had been ruptured. At 7:42 a.m. 
one final explosion demolished the steel hull of a fourth train heading 
from Guadalajara to Principe Pio in Santa Eugenia  
Station.1
 
In total, 10 bombs exploded on four trains, claiming the lives of 191 
people and injuring more than 2,000.2 The bombs were carried onto the 
trains at the Alcalá de Henares Station in duffel bags, one of which was 
discovered at the El Pozo Station containing a bomb which had failed to 
detonate. This bag contained approximately 10 kg (22 lb) of Goma-2 
explosives, a copper detonator, and metal fragments, mostly nails and 
screws, designed to create shrapnel.3  
 
On March 11, 2004, the same day as the bombings, the London-based 
Arab newspaper Al-Quds al-`Arabi received a letter from a group calling 
itself the Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri (Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades).  The 
group was claiming responsibility, on al-Qa`ida’s behalf, for the Madrid 
attacks, as well as for a suicide attack in Istanbul two days earlier.4 The 
letter went on to demand the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq and 
warned of future attacks in retaliation for non-compliance.5   
 
 
                                                                                                                       
were members of independent cells that were, however, beholden to the same jihadist 
ideology. 
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BOX 7.1 Cont.: The Madrid Train Attacks  
 
The attack in Madrid possessed many of the hallmarks of a classic al-
Qa`ida operation – numerous attacks on multiple critical infrastructural 
targets carried out at approximately the same time. Carrying out several 
attacks nearly simultaneously accords every strike the element of 
surprise, preventing other planned targets from being hardened with 
increased security before a subsequent attack can take place. By 
attacking multiple trains in multiple locations at a specific time when 
casualties would be greatest, the suspects not only incapacitated the 
transportation infrastructure,6 but indirectly affected other critical 
infrastructure sectors, such as emergency first responders, law 
enforcement, and hospitals, by straining the limits of their resources in 
terms of equipment, supplies, and personnel. In this case, there were so 
many people requiring medical attention that medical teams were forced 
to use a nearby stadium to treat the wounded because the logistics of 
taking everyone to various hospitals around the city would have been 
overwhelming.  
 
Two salient points stand out regarding the Madrid train bombings. First, 
in the past al-Qa`ida had often targeted Western, especially U.S., 
embassies and other targets that were directly associated with Western 
governments and interests. As a reactive and preventative measure, those 
governments have significantly increased security procedures and 
defenses at such sites. Al-Qa`ida, in turn, may have been adapting to this 
fact by going after “softer” targets. The Madrid and London bombings,7 
both of which targeted the transportation infrastructure, are examples of 
such planning and may constitute part of a broader, ongoing trend to 
identify “soft” critical infrastructure targets for attack.8 Secondly, the 
attackers clearly sought to manipulate the political landscape in Spain.9  
 
The Madrid attack was strategically devised to take place three days 
before the general elections. Prime Minister José María Aznar’s ruling 
conservative Partido Popular (PP: Popular Party) was leading in the polls 
by a slim margin of four and a half points against the Socialist Party.10 
The attackers were presumably well aware that the majority of the 
populace in Spain opposed Aznar’s decision to send troops to Iraq, and 
was therefore likely to blame the ruling party, at least indirectly, for the 
attack. In addition, PP spokesmen initially accused ETA of involvement 
in the attacks, even as evidence to the contrary was beginning to mount, 
which gave the public the impression that Aznar was more concerned  
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BOX 7.1 Cont.: The Madrid Train Attacks 
 
with political gain than with bringing the true perpetrators to justice.11 
Aznar’s party consequently lost the elections, and Spanish troops were 
subsequently withdrawn from Iraq. The terrorists were seemingly astute 
in their expectations of manipulating the Spanish masses and the political 
scene to achieve their goals.12
 
Adapting to the post-9/11 hardening of Western targets, al-Qa`ida-
related groups are opting for a leaner approach: striking softer, less 
fortified targets, and causing mass casualties. Transportation 
infrastructure, excluding aviation, is especially vulnerable, and the future 
may reveal a rise in maritime attacks, a sector that has seen relatively 
few terrorist attacks in comparison with other elements of the 
transportation infrastructure.13 The most striking point about the Madrid 
bombings was the attackers’success, inadvertent or otherwise, in 
manipulating the political landscape. Such calculations will likely play a 
larger role in future attacks.  
 
In more symbolic terms, the Madrid attacks may portend the passing of 
the al-Qa`ida mass-casualty attack torch from the United States to 
Europe. Muhammad Ashraf – the leader of the Madrid attack cell – 
reportedly received a letter from Muhammad Salama in February 2003 
(Salama, as will be noted later in this study, is currently imprisoned in 
Supermax for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing). “Make us live with happiness, make us die as martyrs,” 
Salama wrote to Ashraf, “may we be united on the Day of Judgement.”14
 
NOTES 
 
1 “The Attacks,” In Depth: Madrid Train Attacks, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/europe/05/madrid_bombings/html/1d.stm. 
2 Blake D. Ward, Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda. (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2005). 
3 “The Investigation,” In Depth: Madrid Train Attacks, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/europe/05/madrid_bombings/html/2.stm. 
4 In the November 20, 2003 bombing in Turkey, a suicide bomber detonated an 
explosive device in downtown Istanbul near buildings housing the British and Israeli 
Consulates (Some reports promulgate the idea that the Islamic militant group IBDA-C 
may have carried out the attacks, but this is highly questionable). According to reports, 
the explosion was so big that buildings hundreds of meters away had their windows 
blown out. The attack killed an estimated 28 people and injured 450.  
5 “Al-Qaida letter claims Spain bombings,” Al-Jazira, March 12, 2004,  
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http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8FE71593-885E-48E2-9B7F-
AE0D4C817D9D.htm. LastAccessed May 13, 2006.  
6 Not only were those particular rail lines affected, but nearly all rail traffic in and out 
of the city was effectively shut down due to the implementation of a “cage operation,” 
or “operación jaula,” designed to prevent the terrorists from fleeing the city. 
7 Jihadists struck the transportation system in central London on July 7, 2005, killing 52 
people and injuring more than 770. Although using the same moniker as those that 
struck in Madrid (Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri ), it seems clear that the perpetrators of 
the London attacks were members of a different al-Qa`ida-related cell. 
8 It has been noted that “Spanish investigators believe that the group [responsible for 
the attack] had been studying the Spanish railway system for a possible attack for 
almost three years.” See Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground 
of International Jihad (New York: Prometheus, 2006), p. 298. 
9 In a larger sense, it has been argued that Spain is a particularly appealing target to 
jihadists because Spain was a home to Islam for more than 500 years. The expulsion of 
Muslims from the Iberian peninsula in 1492 “resonates in the fundamentalist 
imagination,” writes David Remnick, “like the defeat of the Muslim armies in Vienna 
in 1683 and the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.” David Remnick, “Comment 
After Madrid,” The New Yorker, March 29, 2004. 
10 Lawrence Wright, “A Reporter At Large, The Terror Web,” The New Yorker, August 
2, 2004. 
11 There was, however, good reason to initially doubt the claim of responsibility by the 
Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri. Other than claiming accountability for the November 20 
bombing in Turkey, an assertion that was weakened somewhat by a similar claim of 
responsibility by another group, Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri had already issued a 
blatantly false statement. The group claimed initial responsibility for the August 2003 
blackout that hit the northeastern United States – a power failure that was, in fact, 
caused by a grid overload and “communications failures.” Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe, 
pp. 294-5. 
12 Jihadists had been active in Madrid, however, since the mid-1980s. Indeed, Madrid 
had some of Europe’s most active al-Qa`ida cells. One of those charged in the Madrid 
attacks, `Amir Azizi, has been accused by Spanish magistrates of organizing the July 
2001 tête-à-tête between 9/11 hijackers Muhammad `Ata and Ramzi bin al-Shayb in 
Cambrils, Spain. Moreover, as noted above, the planning for attacks on the Spanish 
railway system, according to Spanish intelligence officials, was underway for almost 
three years prior to its culmination in Madrid – long before the U.S. war in Iraq. See 
Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe, p. 321 and The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company , 2004), pp. 243-7. 
13 Rohan Gunaratna, The Changing Face of Terrorism, (Singapore: Eastern Universities 
Press, 2004), p. 26. 
14 As quoted in Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe, p. 329. 
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Asia  
 
CETIS researchers identified a total of nine successful critical 
infrastructure attacks by al-Qa`ida-related terrorists in Asia as a whole. 
 
• Southeast Asia has experienced two successful al-Qa`ida-
related critical infrastructure attacks; both of which took place in 
Indonesia and were perpetrated against government targets by 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI: Islamic Community). The first was the 
bombing of the Indonesian Parliament building in July 2003, 
which was followed by the September 2004 car bombing of the 
Australian Embassy.  
 
• South Asia has had a total of seven successful critical 
infrastructure attacks at the hands of al-Qa`ida-related groups. 
 
¾ Al-Qa`ida was responsible for two of the attacks: the 
1999 rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, and 
another rocket strike, this time in 2003, on an airport in 
Afghanistan.  
¾ Harkat-ul Mujahidin (HuM: Mujahidin Movement) – an 
al-Qa`ida affiliate – staged two major attacks, both in 
Pakistan. One was a bombing at Karachi’s main port and 
the other was the gruesome and bizarre attack on the 
Macedonian Consulate in Karachi (see Box 7.2).  
¾ Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM: Army of Muhammad) – 
another group affiliated with al-Qa`ida – conducted three 
major attacks in India against targets that can be 
construed to constitute critical infrastructure; most 
notably the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian 
Parliament building and the attack on the Kashmir State 
Assembly in October of that year. The third attack 
involved the destruction of a critical rail line and the 
consequent crash of a large freight train. 
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BOX 7.2: THE MACEDONIAN CONSULATE IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
As investigators entered the gruesome scene at the consulate, their 
attention was drawn to one side of the room. Scrawled in blue ink across 
one wall still standing amongst the rubble were the words “Al-Qa`ida 
Pakistan, result of infidelity,” and an admonition entitled “Message for 
Infidels” that included the following couplet: 
 
Loyalty will be returned in loyalty. 
Oppression in oppression. 
We are men like you. 
We will do what you do.1
 
A few hours earlier on that December 5, 2002 evening, the Macedonian 
Consulate in Pakistan had been infiltrated by suspected members of the 
al-Qa`ida-affiliated group Harkat-ul Mujahidin (HuM: Mujahidin 
Movement), a militant Islamist network based in Pakistan that operates 
primarily in Kashmir. Three bodies were found inside the building – two 
Pakistani men and a woman – each with their hands and feet bound and 
their throats slit. The victims included a security guard at the consulate 
and two of his acquaintances.2 After executing the three individuals, the 
attackers stole computer equipment and other property before detonating 
a bomb that officials believe was constructed of dynamite strips.3
 
On the most basic level, the bombing is widely believed to have been an 
act of retaliation for the killing of seven Pakistani men by Macedonian 
Special Police Officers (SPOs) on March 2, 2002. The facts surrounding 
the March 2002 incident, known as the Rastanski Lozja case, were 
extremely controversial. The officers involved claimed that they had 
fired on a van as it attempted to drive through a roadblock in the capital 
city of Skopje. The Pakistanis inside the van were reportedly planning 
attacks on Western embassies. Investigations later revealed that they 
were merely migrant workers who had been lured by SPOs into a 
deceptive plot and a deadly ambush.  The ploy’s rationale was reportedly 
to gain international attention for Macedonian efforts in fighting 
terrorism and, in doing so, to curry favor with the U.S., which was 
seeking partners for its new anti-terrorism campaign.4 Many Pakistanis 
suspected foul play even before the outcome of the official investigation, 
and this incident likely catalyzed the targeting of the Macedonian 
Consulate in Pakistan. 
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BOX 7.2 Cont.: The Macedonian Consulate in Pakistan 
 
The Rostanski Lozja incident is also a reflection of Macedonia’s alliance 
with the West’s “War on Terror.” The perception that Macedonia was so 
eager and willing to use deceptive means to “prove its loyalty” as a 
partner with the U.S. undoubtedly angered those who carried out the 
attack on the Macedonian Consulate, as indeed it angered many others 
throughout the world. The incident identified Macedonia as a “co-
conspirator” with the West, and therefore marked it as a legitimate and 
noteworthy target for al-Qa`ida and its associates.  
 
The Macedonian Consulate bombing, though carried out by an al-
Qa`ida- affiliated group, did not share the characteristic, common 
features of many other al-Qa`ida strikes – simultaneous attacks on 
multiple Western targets (often soft targets) carried out by a handful of 
radical suicide bombers, ideally creating fear and chaos across a city or 
country and also overextending the emergency response and medical 
infrastructure. Why, indeed, were the victims bound and their throats 
cut? Why did the attackers take the time to write a message on the wall? 
Why not simply drive a car laden with explosives into the consulate? 
Though the attack was in line with al-Qa`ida’s greater goal of jihad – 
waging war against Western “infidels” – the Macedonian Consulate 
attack in Pakistan was exceptionally personal and visceral, and its 
message was unequivocal and direct: “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth.”5  
 
NOTES 
 
1 Zahar Khan, “Pakistan Questions Militants on Killings,” The Associated Press, 
December 10, 2002. 
2 “Pakistan Court Sentences Nine Over Macedonian Mission Attack,” BBC Monitoring, 
August 26, 2004. 
3 “US Interferes in Pakistan’s Affairs as FBI Visits Macedonia Consulate,” Financial 
Times Information,  
Global News Wire, December 11, 2002. 
4 Harry de Quetteville, “Macedonia ‘staged fake terror plot to woo US,’” The Daily 
Telegraph (London), May 22, 2004. 
5 The entire verse reads, “But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye 
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, 
bruise for bruise.” Exodus 21:23-25 (NIV). 
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Middle East and North Africa  
 
CETIS researchers have identified 145 successful al-Qa`ida-related 
critical infrastructure attacks in the Middle East and North Africa. Not 
surprisingly, Iraq dwarfed all other states in the region, as it experienced 
121 total attacks; 80% of the region’s total (see Figure 7.2). Due to the 
opaque qualities of the insurgency in relation to accurate attack 
ascriptions, Iraq may well represent somewhat of a statistical outlier in 
any attempt to represent critical infrastructure attacks by al-Qa`ida-
linked groups.317 Accordingly, this section offers quantitative figures that 
include Iraq critical infrastructure attacks, as well as calculations that 
omit Iraq (see Figures 7.3 and 4.4). 
 
A detailed examination of the data reveals that the attacks represented in 
Figure 7.2 were committed by al-Qa`ida and a number of its affiliate 
groups, as highlighted below: 
                                                 
317 The difficulty here lies in differentiating between the actions of Ba`thist and 
nationalist insurgents in Iraq and those actions taken by al-Qa`ida-related groups in 
Iraq. CETIS analysts have made every effort to validate that the recorded attacks on 
critical infrastructure in Iraq were actually perpetrated by al-Qa`ida-related jihadists, as 
opposed to other types of insurgents. However, it is impossible to completely separate 
these two groups, as it is likely that their contacts and actions dovetail frequently. 
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 Al-Qa`ida (the Base). Although having only launched eight 
successful attacks in the region, al-Qa`ida proper has struck the 
greatest number of countries in the region: five. The May 2003 
Morocco attacks included an assault on the Belgian Consulate (see 
Box 7.5); Saudi Arabia has been struck twice – the first attack was 
against a Saudi National Guard facility (jointly operated with the 
United States) in 1995; the diplomatic district of Damascus, Syria 
was struck in April of 2004; Yemen has borne the brunt of three 
attacks, the most notable being the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 
October 2000. Finally, Iraq has had one attack by al-Qa`ida proper; 
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in October 2003, the group struck a hotel facility that was 
temporarily serving as a center for senior Iraqi governmental leaders. 
 Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Haramayn (Al-Qa`ida in the Land of the Two 
Holy Places); also known as al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula and 
al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia. This group has successfully struck Saudi 
Arabian critical infrastructure on three occasions. On December 6, 
2004, it attacked the U.S. Consulate in Jedda. On December 29, 
2004, the Interior Ministry building was attacked, followed 30 
minutes later by a military recruitment center.  
 
 Al-Qai`da fi Bilad al-Rafidyan (Al-Qa`ida in the Land of the Two 
Rivers); also known as al-Qa`ida in Iraq, al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia, 
and the Zarqawi group. Formerly known as the Jama`at al-Tawhid 
wa al-Jihad (JTJ: Unity of God and Jihad Association). CETIS 
researchers have identified 84 critical infrastructure attacks directly 
attributable to al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Thirty-four of these attacks (40%) 
occurred in the weeks leading up to the January 30, 2005 Iraqi 
National Assembly Elections, all of which were on polling stations. 
Police infrastructural targets have been attacked 20 times (24%), and 
critical military-related infrastructure has been attacked on six 
occasions (7%). The remaining 24 attacks (28%) mostly targeted 
governmental (non-military) critical infrastructure.  
 
 Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam). Ansar al-Islam has attacked 
critical infrastructure on three occasions, all in Iraq and all in 2003. 
Two of the attacks were suicide car bombings: on September 10, 
2004, Ansar al-Islam attacked a U.S. military intelligence facility, 
and on October 14, 2003, they struck the Turkish Embassy in 
Baghdad. The third attack – on November 17, 2003 – was against an 
oil pipeline. 
 
 Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the Sunna). Ansar al-Sunna has 
recorded 18 attacks against critical infrastructure, all of them in Iraq. 
Six of the attacks have been directed against critical police 
infrastructure, whereas nine attacks were visited upon elements of 
Iraq’s political infrastructure – polling places, political party 
headquarters and, on one occasion, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Three 
attacks were against critical oil infrastructure, i.e., pipelines and 
storage tanks.  
 
 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC: 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting). The GSPC has struck 
critical infrastructure in the region (North Africa and the Middle 
East) on eight occasions, all of them in Algeria. Five of the attacks 
were against critical components of Algeria’s energy sector 
(electrical power stations and power plants). The groups’ remaining 
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attacks against critical infrastructure were against a water supply, an 
oil pipeline, and the railroad infrastructure, all on one occasion.  
 
 Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (JTJ: Unity of God and Jihad 
Association). Prior to changing its name to al-Qa`ida in 
Mesopotamia, the JTJ conducted 17 attacks on critical infrastructure, 
all of them in Iraq.318 Eight of the attacks were on police-related 
critical infrastructure; four on Iraqi military-related critical 
infrastructure. In addition, the JTJ struck the Green Zone and a U.S.-
Iraqi air base. Finally, the JTJ attacked a bridge, a hospital, a water-
treatment plant, and an oil terminal.  
 
 
                                                 
318 On October 17, 2004, the JTJ proclaimed its full allegiance to Usama bin Ladin and 
al-Qa`ida, and pledged to follow the former’s orders and instructions. As noted in the 
Chronology, the JTJ was putatively responsible for an attack on Iraqi critical 
infrastructure after it changed its name. This attack was most likely carried out by a 
splinter faction, or was the result of inaccurate reporting.  
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Figure 7.3: Al-Qa i`da Successful CI Attacks: 
Middle East & North Africa by Country and Group 
 
The Jericho Option: Al-Qa`ida & Attacks On Critical Infrastructure 
A
lg
er
ia
 
Is
ra
el
Jo
rd
an
 
M
or
oc
co
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a 
Sy
ria
 
Tu
rk
ey
 
Ye
m
e
Al-Qa`ida
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq 
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula
GSPC
Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri 
2
8 
0 
3
0
1 
2 
1 2
1
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Figure 7.4: Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: 
Middle East & North Africa by Country and Group 
(excluding Iraq) 
 
 
UNSUCCESSFUL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
ATTACKS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
 
A statistical analysis of plots, threats, hoaxes, and failed attacks, on the 
basis of open source investigations, is inherently problematic for two 
reasons. First, CETIS researchers are acutely aware that plots to attack 
critical infrastructure may be abandoned during their planning or 
operational phases and thus never come to the attention of outsiders. 
Second, numerous plots have undoubtedly been thwarted by the 
authorities, and their very existence has never left the classified realm 
and made it into the public record. This unavoidable lack of 
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comprehensiveness severely compromises any attempts at a quantitative 
analysis of foiled and failed attacks, plots, hoaxes, threats, etc. 
  
While a robust quantitative analysis of unsuccessful critical 
infrastructure attacks is therefore beyond the scope of this study, open 
source information about plots and failed attacks – as evidenced 
throughout this study – is extremely valuable in assessing al-Qa`ida’s 
goals, methods, and attitudes toward critical infrastructure. In addition to 
those plots discussed below in the section dealing with American targets 
outside the U.S., the Middle East and North Africa region has 
experienced several noteworthy plots and unsuccessful attacks, two of 
which are discussed below in Boxes 7.3 and 7.4. 
 
 
 
BOX 7.3: SAUDI ARABIA’S ABQA`IQ OIL FACILITY 
ATTACK 
  
February 24, 2006 marked an important milestone for al-Qa`ida. On that 
day its operatives attacked Saudi Arabia’s Abqa`iq oil facility, which 
marked the very first attack on an oil facility in that country. Abqa`iq is 
the largest oil refinery in the world: it generates approximately two-
thirds of Saudi Arabia’s oil output, and processes 5-7 million barrels of 
oil per day.1 Responsibility for the Abqa`iq attack was claimed by al-
Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Haramayn (Al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Holy 
Places) on an Islamic website shortly after the incident.2 The message 
called the attackers “holy warriors” and said that the attack was “part of 
a series of operations that al-Qa`ida is carrying out against the crusaders 
and the Jews to stop their plundering of Muslim wealth.”3
 
The attack occurred on a Friday afternoon at approximately 3 p.m. local 
time, several hours after daily prayers.4 The perpetrators approached the 
facility in two or three vehicles laden with explosives and bearing the 
logo of Aramco, the state oil company and owner of the facility.5 The 
operatives attempted to drive through the gate of the outermost of three 
fences circling the perimeter of the compound, but were halted by  
security guards who opened fire on the vehicles. One bomber’s car 
collided with the gate, causing an explosion and blowing a hole in the 
fence. A second car drove through the hole, exploding as a result of 
police gunfire. Two of the attackers, Abdallah `Abd al-`Aziz al-Tuwajri 
and Muhammad Salih al-Ghayth, were killed in the blasts.6
A two-hour gunfight ensued between the guards and the remaining  
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operatives, and ended when, almost unbelievably, the militants escaped. 
Two security guards were fatally wounded during the attack, which also 
caused a small fire that was quickly brought under control. No other 
damage and no disruption in oil production occurred.  
  
Three days later, on February 27, 2006, Saudi security forces killed five 
suspects who were allegedly linked to the attack during a raid on their 
hideout in the al-Yarmuk district of Riyadh. Three of the five had been 
tracked after having fled the scene of the foiled attack, including Fahd 
Faraj al-Juwayr, the leader of al-Qa`ida’s network in Saudi Arabia and 
the Kingdom’s most wanted terrorist suspect. The others were Saudi 
Jaffal Rafi` al-Shamari, Sulayman `Abd al-Rahman Sulayman al-Talaq, 
Ibrahim Abdallah Ibrahim al-Mutayr, and Abdallah Muhiyya Shalash al-
Sulayti al-Shamari. The latter two were suspected al-Qa`ida militants on 
the Saudi most-wanted list. A vehicle that had been used in the Abqa`iq 
operation was also found at the scene.7  
  
Saudi investigations have also led to the arrests of many others with 
suspected links to the attacks. A sixth suspect was arrested in Riyadh 
directly after the February raid, and on March 29, 2006,8 40 suspected 
terrorists were arrested, eight of whom were allegedly connected to the 
Abqa`iq attack.9 An additional five suspects in the Abqa`iq operation 
were arrested in mid-April 2006.10
 
The modus operandi of this attack can be seen as a new and lethal tactic 
of al-Qa`ida and its affiliates. Indeed, two car bombs and weapons near 
the Abqa`iq oil refinery complex that were discovered by the Saudi 
security forces on March 28, 2006 were suspected munitions for a 
second attack on the facility.11 In addition, two days after the thwarted 
attack, Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz ibn Rashid al-Anzi, a cleric affiliated with 
al-Qa`ida, posted a statement on the Internet entitled “The Religious 
Rule on Targeting Oil Interests,” which provided religious justification 
for attacks on oil-related targets.12 This statement complemented others 
by Usama bin Ladin and his associates, urging their followers to bleed 
the enemy by economically weakening the U.S. and the West. 
 
Attacks on the oil industry could significantly further this economic goal. 
Despite the failure of the February 24, 2006 plot, the Abqa`iq incident 
affected the global energy market, in that oil futures immediately jumped  
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by $2.31, raising prices to $62.85 per barrel.13 Further attacks could lead 
to greater spikes in oil prices, resulting in higher costs for the U.S. and 
other oil-importing nations. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Department of Energy (DOE) Country Analysis Briefs, Saudi Arabia, August 2005. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html; See also Hasan Jamali, “Al-Qaida 
Claims Attack on Saudi Refinery,” Associated Press Online, February 25, 2006. 
2 Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph and John C.K. Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: 
The Achilles Heel  
of the Western Economy,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 2006, p.30.; and “Al-
Qaida Claims  
Responsibility for Attack on Saudi Oil Facility,” Voice of America News, February 24, 
2006. 
3 Donna Abu Nasr, “Al-Qaida threatens more attacks on Saudi oil sites in Web posting, 
two wounded guards die,” The Associated Press, February 25, 2006. 
4 Jamali, “Car bombers attack world’s largest oil processing facility in eastern Saudi 
Arabia.” 
5 Ibid; and  Scheuer, Ulph and Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities,” p. 28. 
6 Abdullah Al-Shihri, “Saudis say kingdom’s al-Qaida leader, two oil complex attackers 
slain in raids,” The Associated Press, February 28, 2006. 
7 Abdullah Al-Shihri, “Saudis identify fifth wanted al-Qaida militant killed in Riyadh 
raids,” Associated Press Worldstream, March 1, 2006; and “Five oil plot suspects killed 
in Saudi clashes,” Agence France Presse - English, February 27, 2006; Abdullah Al-
Shihri, “Saudis say kingdom’s al-Qaida leader, two oil complex attackers slain in 
raids,” Associated Press, February 28, 2006. 
8 Al-Shihri, “Saudis say kingdom’s al-Qaida leader, two oil complex attackers slain in 
raids.” 
9 Scheuer, Ulph and Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities, p  29. 
10 Al-Shihri, “Saudis arrest five suspects linked to attack on Abqaiq oil processing 
facility in February. 
11 Scheuer, Ulph and Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities, p. 47. 
12 Shaykh `Abd-al-`Aziz ibn Rashid al-Anzi, “The Religious Rule on Targeting Oil 
Interest,” February 26, 2006, http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums; compare also Scheuer, 
Ulph and Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities, p. 47. 
13 Arab News, February 28, 2006, cited in Scheuer, Ulph and Daly, “Saudi Arabian Oil 
Facilities, p. 31. 
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BOX 7.4: SAUDI HIJACKING PLOT: “THIS IS OUR 
9/11” 
 
The three Moroccan nationals were “behaving suspiciously” on May 21, 
2003, according to passport clearance officials at Saudi Arabia’s Jedda 
Airport. 1 When asked if they were traveling together, one of the three 
men answered in the affirmative, while another answered “no.” When 
they were subsequently arrested and questioned, the trio ultimately 
admitted to having a close affiliation with al-Qa`ida. The men – armed 
with knives and carrying forged documents and copies of the Qur’an 
bookmarked with their last will and testaments – admitted intricate plans 
to hijack their Saudia Airlines flight on its scheduled service to 
Khartoum and crash the plane into a Saudi landmark. Though the 
intended landmark was undisclosed, some suggested the headquarters of 
the National Commercial Bank in Jedda or the Kingdom Centre, a 300-
meter tall skyscraper and the largest tower in Riyadh, as plausible 
targets.2
 
Earlier that same day, the Arab satellite station al-Jazira broadcast a 
three-and-a-half minute audio tape purportedly from Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command. Zawahiri, while praising the actions of 
the suicide hijackers who attacked the United States on September 11, 
2001, urged Muslims to attack American, Jewish, and other Western 
interests. “O Muslims,” the message said, “muster your resolve and hit 
the embassies of America, England, Australia and Norway, their 
interests, their companies and their employees. . .learn the lesson from 
your 19 brethren who attacked America with their planes, in New York 
and Washington, wreaking on it unprecedented havoc from which it is 
still reeling.”3 The tape also reproached Arab countries for allowing the 
U.S. military to use Arab land and facilities. Specifically, al-Zawahiri 
announced, “Here is Saudi Arabia, where [U.S.] planes are launched 
from their airports.”4 Al-Zawahiri’s call to action may well have inspired 
the would-be attackers to strike in the “exemplary” style of the 9/11 
attacks on the U.S.  Indeed, it may be no coincidence that mere hours 
later, the suspects’ intent was to hijack a plane belonging to Saudi 
Arabia’s largest national airline carrier and collide into a major Saudi 
edifice. 
The arrests of the three Moroccan men at Jedda Airport came less than 
two weeks after Western-occupied residential compounds in Riyadh 
were attacked by suspected al-Qa`ida suicide bombers in explosive-laden 
vehicles, killing a total of 34 people and injuring 60.5 Four days  
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following the May 12, Riyadh bombings, 14 suicide bombers attacked 
multiple Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, Morocco (see Box 
7.3). Informed of the hijacking plot, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa`ud al-
Faysal told reporters, “This is our 9/11.”6 While Saudi authorities believe 
that the three men arrested in Jedda took part in the May 12, attack, it 
remains unclear whether the previous attacks and the hijack plot were 
coordinated events.7 What is clear is that all were carried out (or were 
intended to be carried out) by suicide operatives, all with links to al-
Qa`ida.  
 
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that whereas the Riyadh and 
Casablanca bombings explicitly targeted Western sites in Muslim 
countries, the Saudi hijack plot did not target Western or Jewish 
interests. Al-Zawahiri’s message communicated the indignation felt by 
Islamic fundamentalists toward Arab countries for their collaboration 
with the West and their perceived maladministration or outright 
“apostate” secular abandonment of the shari`a (Islamic law). 
 
Within a day of the Jedda arrests, the U.S. State Department closed its 
consulates in Jedda and Dhahran and its embassy in Riyadh. The event 
arguably contributed to the decision by U.S. officials to raise the 
American terrorist threat level the same day. Britain and Germany also 
closed their embassies.8
 
Also significant is the redundancy of the plan itself in the Saudi Airlines 
case. The hijack plot was to be carried out in a style starkly reminiscent 
of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. The success of these attacks made that 
particular style of operation worthy of imitation, as al-Zawahiri 
emphasized. Transportation infrastructure, which has often been targeted 
by al-Qa`ida and its affiliates, remains a sector of critical infrastructure 
that is highly vulnerable to attack and where successful terrorist attacks 
often yield an excessive loss of life. The aviation infrastructure is a 
particularly vulnerable arena, since once they are hijacked planes can 
then be used as a weapon themselves against land-based and maritime 
targets. Although aviation security has been tightened in many Western 
countries, contined vigilance is needed to limit the possibility of a 
successful repeat of the 9/11 attacks. Any weak link in the transportation 
chain near a target, or even in an adjacent state, is likely to pave the way 
for successful catastrophic attacks.9  
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1 “Airport trio ‘planned hijack,’” Daily Mail (London), May 22, 2003. 
2 Brian Whitaker, “Al-Qaida tape calls for more attacks,” The Guardian (London), May 
22, 2003. 
3 Audio tape of Ayman al-Zawahiri, quoted in Omar Hasan, “Saudi Arabia continues to 
crackdown in bid to thwart new terror threats,” Agence France Presse, May 22, 2003. 
4 Audio tape of Ayman al-Zawahiri, quoted in Brian Whitaker, “Al-Qaida tape calls for 
more attacks,” The Guardian (London), May 22, 2003. 
5 “Airport trio ‘planned hijack,’” Daily Mail (London), May 22, 2003. 
6 Saudi Foreign Minister: ‘This is our 9/11,” CNN.com, May 21, 2003.  
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/21/saudi.alqaeda/index.html. 
7 “This is our 9/11.” 
8 “This is our 9/11.” 
9 Rohan Gunaratna, The Changing Face of Terrorism, (Singapore: Eastern Universities 
Press, 2004), p. 26. 
 
 
 
Miscellaneous Plots Involving American Targets Overseas 
 
While the primary operations against critical infrastructure targets on 
American soil will be detailed below, several other attempted attacks and 
plots against American infrastructural targets elsewhere in the world 
have been linked to al-Qa`ida or its affiliates. Examples include the 
following:319
 
 After the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 the 
CIA, along with foreign police and intelligence services, began 
breaking up terrorist cells in Uganda, India, and Albania. A computer 
confiscated during an Albanian raid revealed surveillance on 
hundreds of al-Qa`ida-approved targets worldwide, including a plan 
to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, the Albanian capital.320 
 The arrest of a French Algerian named Jamal Baghal in July 2001 for 
passport fraud in the United Arab Emirates eventually led to the 
discovery of a plan to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris and a nearby 
                                                 
319 For a comprehensive list of attacks committed by al-Qa`ida or its affiliate groups, 
please refer to the Chronology at the end of this report. 
320 John Miller and Michael Stone with Chris Mitchell. The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, 
and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 2002), p. 212-13. 
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U.S. cultural center. After interrogation, Baghal confessed details of 
the plot, stating that he was acting on orders from al-Qa`ida. In 
September 2001, several men were arrested in connection with the 
plot, including Nizar Trabalsi, who confessed to a second planned 
attack on the Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium, where American 
nuclear weapons are allegedly stored. Six men were convicted in the 
Paris plot, including Baghal, while Trabalsi was convicted for the 
planned Belgium attack.  Baghal later recanted parts of his 
confession.321  
 NATO officials broke up an al-Qa`ida cell in October 2001, finding 
plans to attack Eagle Base, an installation in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that housed 3,000 U.S. peacekeeping forces.322 
 On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid attempted to blow up 
American Airlines Flight 63 by igniting explosives in his shoes. The 
flight, which originated in Paris, was destined for Miami. Reid’s 
attempt was foiled when crewmembers and fellow passengers 
subdued him before he could activate the bomb. Reid stated that he 
acted alone, but also declared that he was a member of al-Qa`ida. 
Reid pled guilty, receiving three life sentences plus an additional 110 
years in prison for his crimes.323  
 A plan to bomb U.S. and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar 
was foiled by Western and Moroccan officials in June 2002. The 
terrorist operatives would have sailed small dinghies with explosives 
alongside the vessels and exploded them there. Three members of an 
al-Qa`ida cell living in Morocco were arrested for the plot.324 
 
 
 
                                                 
321 See “Man ‘planned attack’ on US embassy in Paris,” The Guardian, October 2, 
2001; Jon Henley, “Paris plot reveals link to terror chief: Bombs aimed at embassy and 
cultural centre,” The Guardian, October 3, 2001; Pierre-Antoine Souchard, “Six 
Convicted in Alleged Paris Bomb Plot,” Associated Press Online, March 16, 2005; 
Constant Brand, “Al-Qaida suspect: Belgian air base was his target, not U.S. embassy 
in Paris,” Associated Press Worldstream, November 15, 2002. 
322 Andrew Purvis, “The Suspects: a Bosnian Subplot,” Time, November 12, 2001, p. 
10. 
323 Richard A. Serrano, “The Nation: ‘Shoe Bomber’ Reid Given 3 Life Terms,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 31, 2003.; Denise Lavoie, “Shoe bomber gets life for trying to 
blow up trans-Atlantic flight,” The Associated Press State & Local Wire, January 30, 
2003. 
324 Richard Norton-Taylor, Giles Tremlett and Julian Borger, “MI6 hunts terror plot 
network: Al-Qaida cell planned Gibraltar attacks,” The Guardian, June 12, 2002; 
Patrick Sawer, “Terror plot to blow up Navy warships is foiled,” The Evening Standard, 
June 11, 2002. 
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Another major foiled plot was Operation Bojinka or Oplan Bojinka. This 
was a 1995 plan for a large-scale attack centered on destroying twelve 
airliners on January 21 and 22, 1995. The wider plot included the 
assassination of Pope John Paul II and a plane crash attack on the CIA 
headquarters. The Bojinka plot, whose name may have had its roots in 
the Serbo-Croatian word for explosion or loud bang, was devised by 
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and Ramzi Yusuf.  
The Assassination of Pope John Paul II 
The papal assassination plot would have taken place on January 15, 
1995, while Pope John Paul II was in the Philippines for World Youth 
Day 1995. In one version of the plan, a suicide bomber dressed as a 
priest would hide a bomb in the sleeves of his robes. Once the Pope 
approached the supposed priest to kiss him, the operative would detonate 
the explosion.1 A second adaptation involved the planting of a remote-
controlled bomb on the Pope’s scheduled route.2 This assassination 
would also serve to divert attention from the second phase of the plot, the 
airline bombings. 
The Airliner Bombings 
 
Planning for the airliner bombings began in the summer of 1994, when 
KSM and Yusuf started acquiring bomb-making materials and began 
casing flights and testing airport security. While he was involved in early 
stages of the plot and in the recruitment of Wali Khan `Amin Shah, KSM 
returned to Qatar, leaving the main preparations to Yusuf.3  
 
In the fall of 2004, Yusuf, Shah, and `Abd al-Hakim Murad traveled to 
Pakistan, where Yusuf trained the others in building explosives and 
timing devices.4 In late October 1994, the operatives formed the 
Bermuda Trading Company as a front to procure chemicals and other 
bomb-making raw materials.5 The bombs would be nitroglycerin based – 
the chemical smuggled onboard concealed in contact solution bottles – 
with timing devices that were constructed from Casio watches.6 
According to most experts, these bombs would have been undetectable 
to even the most skilled and motivated security screeners.7
 
During the attack, five operatives would place bombs on twelve U.S.  
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carrier airplanes, all scheduled to fly over the Pacific Ocean within a 48-
hour timeframe. Eleven of the twelve were ultimately destined for U.S. 
cities. The bombers would board the planes in Southeast Asia, assemble 
the bombs while onboard, and then exit the plane during the first layover. 
All bombs would be timed to detonate almost simultaneously.8 If 
successful, the plot would have resulted in up to 4,000 deaths.9  
 
Yusuf conducted in-depth planning for the operation. He obtained 
blueprints for the Boeing 747 in order to calculate the most devastating 
locations to plant his bombs; by choosing a seat adjacent to the wing and 
above the central fuel tank, this would allow the explosion to detonate the 
fuel on board.10 Several tests were also conducted to prepare for the airline 
attack. On December 1, 1994, Yusuf and Shah exploded a sample bomb 
under a seat at a Manila movie theater, injuring several patrons. On 
December 11, 1994, Yousef conducted a small-scale trial of the operation, 
planting a test bomb under a seat during the first leg of a Philippine Air 
Lines (PAL) flight from Manila to Japan. Yusuf disembarked during the 
stopover, and the bomb exploded on the second leg of the flight, resulting 
in the death of one passenger and the injuring of others.11
 
The Attack on CIA Headquarters  
 
Plans for the CIA attack were divulged by Murad after his arrest in 
Manila. According to Murad, he was to rent, buy, or hijack a small plane, 
which would then be filled with explosives. He would then pilot the 
plane, crashing it into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.12 Another 
conception of this attack was that the twelfth airliner from the bombing 
attack would be diverted and crashed into the CIA building. Other targets 
for this phase had also been discussed, including the U.S. Congress, the 
White House, and the Pentagon, but there were difficulties in gathering 
enough trained pilots.13
 
Detection and Capture 
 
The Bojinka plot was uncovered on January 6, 1995, when Yusuf and 
Murad accidentally caused a fire in their Manila apartment while burning 
chemicals for the operation. The Philippine police arrived on the scene and 
discovered incriminating evidence, including chemicals, bomb components, 
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and a laptop computer that contained the plans for the bombing.14  
 
In the laptop, a letter was also found that described the rationale for the 
attack. The letter, purportedly prepared by a group calling itself the Fifth 
Battalion Liberation Army, proclaimed that the attack was “in retaliation 
for the financial, political, and military support extended by the 
American government to the Jewish state, which occupies the land of 
Palestine.”15 The letter further rationalized attacks against the American 
public, stating that U.S. citizens were responsible for the actions of their 
government since the “government represents the will of the people.”16
 
Police arrested Murad when he came back to the apartment to retrieve 
the laptop.17 Shah was also captured, though he escaped from custody 
and was arrested again in Malaysia a year later. Yusuf managed to flee 
the country, but was apprehended in Pakistan the next month.18 All three 
received life sentences for their parts in the plot. 
 
Despite the failure of the attacks to materialize, the core ideas were used 
as the foundation for the 9/11 attack plan, especially in the development 
of a later-cancelled scheme with attacks both inside the U.S. and in Asia. 
This phase, which was proposed by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, but 
never fully planned, would have involved blowing up U.S. airplanes in 
the Pacific region.19
 
NOTES 
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3 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 147-8. 
4 “Prosecution’s Statement.”United States v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Eyad Ismoil, Abdul 
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ANALYSIS AND INDICATIONS OF CHANGING 
TRENDS 
 
Assessing the frequency of al-Qa`ida-related attacks on critical 
infrastructure outside the United States is complicated by the insurgency 
in Iraq. When Iraq is included in the totals, the indication is that critical 
infrastructure attacks are sharply rising in Europe, Asia, and the Middle 
East and North Africa as a whole (see Figure 7.5). If, however, Iraq is 
excluded from the dataset, the trends become less distinct and one gets 
the impression that that they rose from 2002 to 2004 – peaking at close 
to 18 critical infrastructure attacks per year – and then sharply dropped in 
2005 to the base level of around two attacks seen from 1998-2000 (see 
Figure 7.6). Indeed, if Iraq is excluded from the total, it is possible to 
draw three inferences from the data. First, Europe is now clearly being 
targeted by al-Qa`ida-linked groups. Second, of the four regions of Asia 
– Central, South, Southeast, and East – South Asia is home to more al-
Qa`ida-related critical infrastructure attacks than any other region in Asia 
(see Figure 7.7). Given the neuralgic regional context, it is likely that this 
trend will continue. Finally, if Iraq is discounted, Saudi Arabia and 
Algeria lead all other states in al-Qa`ida-related critical infrastructure 
attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (see Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.5: Successful Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: 
Europe, Asia and the Middle East & North Africa 
by Year 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 7.6: Successful Al-Qa`ida CI Attacks: 
Europe, Asia and the Middle East & North Africa 
by Year (excluding Iraq) 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 167
Al-Qa`ida-linked Critical Infrastructure Attacks Outside the U.S. 
Al- 
Q a`ida H uM JeM
JI
 E ast Asia
S outheast Asia
S outh Asia
C entral Asia
2  2
3
2
0 
1 
2 
3 
F igu re 7 .7 : Su ccessfu l A l-Q a` ida  C I A ttacks : 
Asia by Group and Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 168
  
Chapter eight:  
 
Case Studies of Prior Al-
Qa`ida-Linked Critical 
Infrastructure Attacks on 
U.S. Soil 
 
 
 
n the last chapter, the attacks on critical infrastructure by al-Qa`ida 
and affiliated groups outside the U.S. were discussed, totaled, and 
briefly analyzed. Now it is time to turn to major al-Qa`ida attacks, 
whether planned or executed, against significant infrastructural targets in 
America itself. These attacks will be described in a succession of case 
studies. 
I 
 
 
THE 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING 
(RAMZI YUSUF AND “NUSAYR CELL”)*  
 
The 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing325 was the first attack on 
American critical infrastructure in which al-Qa`ida (or what would later 
become known as al-Qa`ida) was involved, although the degree of 
influence of al-Qa`ida leaders on the actual target selection process is 
debatable.326 The immediate precursor to the 1993 plot was the 
indictment and conviction of Al-Sayyid Nusayr, an Egyptian, for the 
November 5, 1990 shooting in New York of the radical Jewish ideologue 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gary A. Ackerman. 
325 The 1993 WTC attack will only be briefly outlined here insofar as it possesses 
features relevant to al-Qa`ida’s overall strategy and tactics with respect to critical 
infrastructure. For a more detailed discussion of the attack, including its perpetrators 
and aftermath, see Miller et al,  The Cell, Chapters 1 through 8; Jim Dwyer, David 
Kocieniewski, Deidre Murphy, and Peg Tyre, Two Seconds Under the World (New 
York: Ballantine, 1994); and Reeve, New Jackals. 
326 This aspect will be discussed further below. 
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Rabbi Meir Kahane.327 Materials seized from Nusayr’s home in 1990 
contained manuals for making urea-nitrate bombs (the kind eventually 
used in the WTC bombing328) as well as a long list of targets he might 
have been considering, whichi included the names of local Jewish 
leaders, politicians, and New York landmarks such as the Statue of 
Liberty, Times Square, the Empire State Building, the Rockefeller 
Center and, most portentously, the World Trade Center.329 
Unfortunately, most of these materials went untranslated until after the 
WTC was bombed. Before striking out on his own personal jihad, 
Nusayr had been a follower of the radical Egyptian cleric, Shaykh `Umar 
`Abd al-Rahman, and even after he was jailed, Nusayr continued to 
surround himself with a coterie of `Abd al-Rahman’s supporters. Chief 
among these was Mahmud Abu Halima, a burly, red-bearded Egyptian 
who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The group began to 
plan to carry out acts of jihad against the U.S.330 It was joined some time 
later by Ramzi Yusuf,331 a skilled bombmaker, who arrived in the U.S. 
on September 1, 1992 and within a short space of time took de facto 
control over the group’s planning and activities.332
 
Soon Yusuf had put a plan together to conduct a large-scale bombing, 
including settling on the World Trade Center as the target. The core 
group of conspirators now consisted of Yusuf, Abu Halima, a simpleton 
named Muhammad Salama, Salama’s close friend Nidal `Ayyad (who 
was a chemical engineer and worked for the chemical company Allied 
Signal), and an Iraqi named `Abdul Rahman Yasin. Operating out of an 
                                                 
327 Technically speaking, due to a capable defense attorney, the jury did not convict 
Nusayr for killing Kahane, but rather for shooting two bystanders while fleeing the 
scene and being in possession of an illegal weapon. 
328 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, pp. 170-1. 
329 Miller et al, The Cell, p.45. 
330 One of the members of this group, Imad Salim, actually turned out to be an FBI 
informant, although amidst disagreements with his FBI handlers his warnings about an 
incipient plot went largely unheeded by the authorities, and Salim ceased congregating 
with the conspirators before the WTC attack plans were finalized. See Dwyer et al, Two 
Seconds, pp. 170-1. 
331 To this day, Yusuf’s true identity remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. While 
involved in the WTC plot he used the name “Rashid,” whereas investigators believe his 
true name to be Abdul Basit. The obscurity surrounding his identity has led to a host of 
alternative, if tenuous, theories about his origins, including that he was an Iraqi 
intelligence agent acting at the behest of Saddam Husayn. See, e.g., Laurie Mylroie, 
Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein’s War 
Against America (Lanham, MD: AEI, 2001). 
332 Yusuf’s traveling partner, one Ahmad Ajaj, was arrested upon their entrance to the 
U.S. at John F. Kennedy Airport with a fake passport and several bomb-making and 
other military-type manuals. See Miller et al, The Cell, pp.  76-7. 
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apartment in Jersey City, in October 1992 Salama and `Ayyad opened a 
series of bank accounts with Salama and Yusuf spending thousands of 
dollars every month on overseas phone calls.333 Beginning in November 
Yusuf and Salama had begun ordering chemicals from chemical 
suppliers, and on November 30, 1992 Salama rented a storage shed on 
Mallory Avenue in Jersey City under an assumed name. On December 1, 
1,000 pounds of urea and 1,500 pounds of nitric acid were delivered to 
the storage shed.334
 
In early January 1993 Salama rented an apartment on Pamrapo Avenue, 
which would serve as the group’s bomb-making laboratory. The most 
difficult part of preparing the bomb would be the production of the 
notoriously unstable nitroglycerine needed to detonate the larger urea-
nitrate portion of the bomb. `Ayyad used his access at his employer to 
acquire “restricted chemicals” like lead nitrate, phenol, and 
methylamine.335 Salama, a somewhat incompetent driver, involved 
himself and Yusuf in a car accident in late January, resulting in Yusuf’s 
hospitalization, thus nearly derailing the entire plot. After returning from 
the hospital, Yusuf continued work on the bomb. On February 15, 
Salama and `Ayyad drove into Manhattan to surveil the target, entering 
the B-2 level of the WTC parking garage and studying the location. 
 
Then, on February 26, 1993, having loaded the bomb into a rented Ryder 
Ford Econoline van, the conspirators drove the van into the parking 
garage, lit four fuses, and left. At 12:17 pm the bomb exploded, creating 
a huge crater in the parking garage of 1 World Trade Center and 
collapsing several floors. However, it did not succeed in bringing down 
either of the twin towers. Ultimately, six people lost their lives and over 
1,000 were injured in the blast.336
                                                 
333 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, pp. 205, 207. 
334 Miller, et al, The Cell, p.86. 
335 Ibid., p. 91. 
336 Soon after the bombing, the attackers sent a letter to the New York Times claiming 
responsibility on behalf of the Liberation Army: “We are, the fifth battalion in the 
LIBERATION ARMY, declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned 
building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical and 
military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in 
the region. 
OUR DEMANDS ARE: 
1.  Stop all military, economical and political aids to Israel. 
2.  All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop. 
3.  Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs. 
If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to 
execute our missions against military and civilians targets in and out the United States.  
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In the aftermath of the bombing investigators recovered, by dint of good 
fortune, the identification number from a portion of the Ryder van’s 
wreckage and were therefore able to trace the van to the rental company, 
which had previously received a report from Salama that the van had 
been stolen. When Salama foolishly returned to collect his deposit on the 
van, he was arrested and the perpetrators revealed. However, by that time 
two of the ringleaders, Yusuf and Abu Halima, had already fled the 
country. Both would eventually be captured and brought back to the U.S. 
for trial, but in the case of Yusuf only after several infamously active 
years on the run as the world’s most wanted terrorist. 
 
A note on the extent of al-Qa`ida’s involvement in the 1993 WTC 
bombing is warranted. In 1992-1993, al-Qa`ida was still in the process of 
coalescing as a distinct organization pursuing jihad against the U.S. and 
the West. Although it is possible, there is no concrete evidence to 
confirm that the 1993 WTC bombing was an “al-Qa`ida operation” in the 
sense that it was planned and directed by al-Qa`ida’s leadership and used 
al-Qa`ida-trained recruits (as was the case in the 2001 WTC attack). 
Nonetheless, there was certainly some degree of al-Qa`ida involvement 
in the attack – Yusuf had been seen in Bin Ladin’s training camps in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan,337 there was a trail of money leading to Bin 
Ladin,338 and Yusuf was in constant contact with several overseas parties 
during the course of the plot, including his uncle Khalid Shaykh 
                                                                                                                       
This also will include some potential Nuclear targets.  For your own information, our 
army has more than 150 suicidal soldiers ready to go ahead.  The terrorism that Israel 
practices (Which is supported by America) must be faced with a similar one.  The 
dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some countries are 
practicing against their own people must also be faced with terrorism. 
The American people must know that their civilians who got killed are not better than 
those who are getting killed by the American weapons in support. The American people 
are responsible for the actions of their government and they must question all the 
crimes that their government is committing against other people.  Or they – Americans 
– will be the targets of our operations that could diminish them. 
We invite all the people from all countries and all the revolutionaries in the world to 
participate in this action with us to accomplish our just goals. 
“IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST YOU 
TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE AGAINST HIM . . .” 
LIBERATION ARMY FIFTH BATTALION 
AL-FAREEK AL-ROKN, Abu Bakr Al-Makee.” See United States of America v Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, S1293CR.180 (KTD), September 17, 1997. 
337 Reeve, New Jackals, p. 136. 
338 Investigators believe that at least some of the $20,000 Bin Ladin gave to Ibrahim al-
Jabrawni, ostensibly for Nusayr’s legal defense, was used in making the WTC bomb. 
See ibid., p. 79. 
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Muhammad and perhaps even bin Ladin himself. Moreover, there can be 
little doubt that the 1993 WTC bombing influenced later al-Qa`ida 
attacks, especially considering that KSM was the architect of the 9/11 
attacks that eventually brought the towers down. Therefore, even though 
the direct hand of al-Qa`ida is not completely clear in the case of the 
WTC 1993 bombing, there is sufficient evidence to confirm a substantial 
al-Qa`ida connection to the plot, making inclusion of this episode 
important in understanding al-Qa`ida methods and orientation 
concerning critical infrastructure. 
 
Target Selection 
 
Various factors contributed to the selection of the WTC as the target for 
the 1993 bombing. First, from the very beginning of the planning 
process, attacks against large buildings were on the table. Amongst the 
materials confiscated from Nusayr’s apartment were diagrams and 
photographs of prominent New York landmarks (including the WTC), a 
copy of a sermon in which `Umar `Abd al-Rahman encouraged his 
followers to “destroy the edifices of capitalism,”339 and a manifesto in 
which jihadists were urged to topple the “tall buildings of which 
Americans are so proud.”340 To the extent that Nusayr influenced the 
planning process from prison, the group was initially encouraged to seek 
out a target bearing characteristics similar to those of the WTC. 
 
Second, it appears as if the World Trade Center was not the original 
target. Before the arrival of Yusuf, there was a plan to detonate bombs at 
twelve unspecified “Jewish locations,” including synagogues, banks, and 
Jewish centers around Brooklyn and Manhattan.341 This plan did not 
materialize, and although Yusuf initially agreed to follow along, once he 
was in control of the group, the focus shifted squarely to the WTC. 
 
Yusuf himself was something of an enigma in that, unlike many of his 
associates, he did not practice Islam devoutly. For instance, like his uncle 
KSM, he engaged in frequent womanizing. Nevertheless, he harbored an 
intense hatred for the U.S. Part of his reason for choosing the WTC was 
punitive – he wanted to topple one of the towers into the other, causing 
                                                 
339 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, p. 170. 
340 Miller et al, The Cell, p. 46. 
341 Ibid., p. 73. 
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as many as 250,000 fatalities to punish America for supporting Israel.342 
He reasoned that only by sustaining a level of casualties on the scale of 
that inflicted by the U.S. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would the 
American public realize it was at war.343 Yusuf apparently wanted to 
shatter America’s will by destroying “the symbol of its greed and 
power.”344 Kohlman suggests that he also wanted to destroy Wall Street 
during the attacks and cripple “the economic heart of America.”345 
Assuming that these assessments are correct, Yusuf selected the WTC 
for a mixture of reasons – punitive (killing America’s citizens in a 
retaliatory attack), symbolic (attacking a national symbol to spread fear 
and undermine the national psyche), instrumental (crippling the U.S. 
economy), and practical (since he regarded Israeli targets as being too 
well defended). 
 
On the other hand, Mahmud Abu Halima reportedly told his cellmate 
that the goal of the bombing was to force the U.S. government to release 
Nusayr from prison.346 While it is true that Nusayr concocted several 
schemes by which to leverage his release, it is unlikely that Yusuf, who 
was responsible for the ultimate targeting decision, gave these 
considerations much weight. Perhaps he merely allowed Nusayr’s 
friends such as Abu Halima to believe that freeing Nusayr was the 
primary motive behind the bombing. 
 
 
Operational Details 
 
In addition to the central issue of target selection already discussed, the 
1993 WTC bombing also revealed several operational details worthy of 
mention: 
 
1) Incompetent group members can derail a plot. No matter how 
good a plan may be, it is up to the available operatives to carry it 
out. Muhammad Salama was a completely incompetent 
conspirator whose shoddy driving landed Yusuf in hospital and 
whose foolish return to the rental company resulted in the rapid 
                                                 
342 Testimony of Brian Parr, United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad 
Ismoil, S1293CR.180 (KTD), October 22, 1997. When asked why he did not select an 
Israeli target, Yusuf replied it was too difficult to attack them. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, p. 215 
345 Evan Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (New 
York: Berg, 2004). 
346 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, p. 314. 
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identification of the perpetrators. Despite the direction of a 
professional terrorist like Yusuf, the group made a number of 
errors which could have brought them to the attention of law 
enforcement. It is these mistakes that may provide the opening 
for security agencies to interdict future plots against critical 
infrastructure. 
 
2) Ad-hoc group of perpetrators are potentially dangerous, but 
technical expertise is required. The group that participated in the 
1993 WTC plot was not composed of “regular” terrorists in the 
sense of individuals who formally belonged to a given 
organization. Some of them, for instance Mahmud Abu Halima, 
had some experience fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, but the 
group was very much an ad-hoc affair made up of like-minded 
amateur jihadists among Nusayr’s wider circle of acquaintances. 
Despite much experimentation, they were unable to produce 
explosives on their own, and as a result Abu Halima reportedly 
asked his contacts to send Yusuf. The amount of explosives 
required to bring down something like a skyscraper (over 1,500 
pounds of urea-nitrate were used and yet proved to be 
insufficient) required a highly-skilled explosives expert like 
Yusuf to construct, especially when it involved producing 
volatile substances like nitroglycerin. 
 
3) Simple, yet secure detonators work well. Instead of relying on 
unreliable electronics or a suicide detonation, the bombers used 
the simple but effective mechanism of lighting four fuses 
simultaneously, which increased the probability of success 
through redundancy. Moreover, the fuses were packed in surgical 
tubing, which slowed their burn rate to allow sufficient time for 
the perpetrators to escape, as well as minimizing smoke and 
hence the risk of premature detection. 
 
4) The bomb itself was fairly sophisticated, but this did not 
guarantee success. In addition to adding aluminium azide and 
magnesium azide to enhance the effects of the urea nitrate 
explosive,347 Yusuf also included in his bomb compressed 
hydrogen tanks, which were intended to create a second, phased 
explosion. The idea was to distort the superstructure of the WTC 
tower with the first blast, and then to detonate the secondary 
                                                 
347 Reeve, New Jackals, p. 25. 
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explosion before the steel could contract.348 Fortunately, this did 
not work as planned, and the addition of the hydrogen merely 
enhanced the initial blast. 
 
5) Finances were available but limited the scale of the weapon. It 
is known that more than $100,000 was deposited and withdrawn 
from the bank accounts Salama and `Ayyad opened in October 
1992. The money came from sources throughout the Middle East, 
although a sizeable portion of the funds apparently was drawn 
from leftover money in Nusayr’s defense fund.349 However, 
following his capture in Pakistan, Yusuf admitted to FBI agents 
that his intent had been to bring down the towers and that if he 
had had access to more funds, he would have been able to 
develop a more efficient bomb, one that would have concentrated 
more of the blast horizontally to bring down one tower on top of 
the other.350 Yusuf also admitted that he would have liked to have 
developed a bomb that would have released cyanide gas, but that 
it was “too expensive to implement.”351 If Yusuf’s statements can 
be taken at face value, it would seem that funding sources, while 
numerous, were not quite sufficient to attain the desired result. 
Moreover, funds were not distributed to all group members – one 
of the reasons Salama returned to the rental company was 
because he did not have enough money for a plane ticket out of 
the U.S. 
 
6) Use of an “insider”.  Nidal `Ayyad was by all accounts a 
successful young professional, with a chemical engineering 
degree from Rutgers University and a $35,000 a year job,352 yet 
he played a major role in the execution of the bomb plot. Not 
only did he use his position to procure difficult-to-acquire 
chemicals for the bomb, he also rented cars and even scouted out 
the target location before the bombing. One should bear the 
example of `Ayyad in mind when tempted to rely on a certain 
“profile” of terrorists and their capabilities. He is an early 
example of an individual who seems well-established in 
                                                 
348 Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, p. 217. 
349 Ibid., p. 207. 
350 Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, p. 72. Apparently Yusuf even had to borrow 
money for his plane ticket out of the U.S. 
351 Testimony of Brian Parr. 
352 Jim Dwyer et al, Two Seconds, p. 205. 
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American society, but whose ideological proclivities resulted in 
his participating in terrorist acts.353
 
7) Thorough surveillance of the target is necessary. Despite 
consisting mostly of amateurs (Salama’s fool’s errand to the 
rental company after the bomb being but one example), the group 
conducted advanced surveillance of their target. During his trial, 
Yusuf admitted that he had visited the WTC four or five times 
prior to the bombing354 and `Ayyad even visited the WTC ten 
days before the bombing and sketched the layout of the parking 
garage. 
 
 
Relevance for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
The 1993 WTC bombing was the first major attack by jihadists in the 
U.S. Although the consequences of the attack paled in comparison to 
those that would occur at the same location eight years later, the 
bombing is instructive in a number of respects. It seems, in this case at 
least, that “key resources” (nationally recognized structures) were 
singled out from the very beginning of the attack process. Moreover, it 
appears as if the economic role played by the WTC and its environs was 
also a factor in its selection as the target. However, other elements of the 
target selection process had little or nothing to do with the infrastructural 
nature of the WTC – a large part of the reason Yusuf chose it was 
because of the number of potential casualties that could be produced in a 
successful attack. In sum, there were multiple influences on the choice of 
the WTC as the target, only certain of which related to its role as an 
element of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  
 
At the level of operations and tactics, the 1993 WTC case is somewhat 
recondite. On the one hand, a small band of ad-hoc terrorists with one 
skilled operative came close to destroying one of America’s icons and 
killing thousands of people. The production and nature of the bomb itself 
evidenced sophisticated tradecraft, and the terorirsts did their homework 
on their target. On the other hand, the amateurishness of the some group 
members showed, and the group struggled with the financing aspect of 
the operation, which perhaps would have succeeded in causing far more 
damage had Yusuf been given access to more funds. 
                                                 
353 A similar situation came to light when the identities of the suicide bombers of the 
London underground in 2005 were revealed. 
354 Testimony of Brian Parr. 
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1993 TUNNEL AND BRIDGE PLOT*
 
In 1992-93 an al-Qa`ida terrorist cell based in the U.S. planned a series 
of terrorist attacks that targeted key transportation, commercial, law 
enforcement, and international governmental infrastructure in New York 
City. One of the plots would come to fruition on February 23, 1993 as 
the first World Trade Center bombing, in which a truck bomb was driven 
into the underground parking garage of the WTC. However, Al-Sayyid 
Nusayr, the assassin of the Rabbi Kahane, would remain active even 
from his Attica prison cell. Indeed, he conceived of a new plot – a “day 
of terror” in New York City during which there would be a series of 12 
terrorist attacks, including bombings of the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland 
Tunnel, and if possible the George Washington Bridge, FBI headquarters 
at 26 Federal Plaza, and the United Nations building, along with the 
assassination of Jewish leaders and the judge who presided in his own 
trial.355
 
The New York City cell’s spiritual leader during the conception, 
planning and preparation of these plots was the Egyptian Shaykh `Umar 
`Abd al-Rahman, the infamous “Blind Shaykh.” However, `Abd al-
Rahman had long been much more than the spiritual guide of this 
particular cell in terms of the global jihad. He was the spiritual and 
political leader of the terrorist group al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya, and by 
1990 was regarded by no less of an authority than Usama bin Ladin as 
the jihad’s spiritual and organizational leader after the death of Usama’s 
mentor, the Jordanian Palestinian Shaykh Dr. `Abdallah `Azzam. `Abd 
al-Rahman was born in Egypt in 1938, and as a baby was blinded by 
diabetes. Mastering the Qur’an through the Braille method by age 
eleven, he was imprisoned by the Egyptian government in 1970 for 
condemning the holding of prayers for assassinated Egyptian President 
Jamal `Abd al-Nasir as sinful. After his release, `Abd al-Rahman 
traveled across the world preaching and gathering volunteers and 
funding for the Egyptian and then the global jihad. In 1989, having been 
recognized as a key leader of Egypt’s Islamic opposition, `Abd al-
Rahman was placed under house arrest for inciting civil unrest by the 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gordon M. Hahn. 
355 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, United States District Court, Southern District of 
New York, United States of America v. Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel Rahman [hereafter USA 
v. Rahman], S5 93 Cr. 181 (MBM), January 30, 1995, pp. 1584 and 1597. 
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Egyptian government. He soon managed to escape from house arrest and 
made his way to Sudan, where he obtained a U.S. visa with the help of 
fellow Egyptian Mustafa Shalabi, the representative of the Afghan 
Services Bureau (MAK) in New York. Bin Ladin had developed a close 
relationship with `Abd al-Rahman from the time of his first visit to 
Pakistan in 1985. The two men also met in Afghanistan in 1990, after 
Usama had approved, if not organized, the November 24, 1989 
assassination of `Azzam.356  
 
Shaykh `Abd al-Rahman entered the U.S. in 1990 and settled in Jersey 
City, New Jersey, where he continued to organize for the global jihad.357 
His role in the run-up to the day of terror was one of spiritual leader and 
teacher, ideologist, motivator, and ultimate decision-maker and arbiter. 
He lectured on Islamism and the religious meaning and political goals of 
jihad, approved targets, resolved disputes, and steadied wavering 
doubters. He encouraged his followers to make attacks on the enemies of 
Islam and provided consultation on whether or not it was permissible 
according to Islamic law to strike certain targets. 358
 
Abd al-Rahman’s cell was already actively training before his arrival in 
the U.S. It reported back to him on the members’ progress in military 
and terrorist training, which they were conducting in a secret training 
camp located in a remote area near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The plot to 
bomb the tunnels proceeded so far that the conspirators had made dry 
runs, driving through and simultaneously videotaping the Holland and 
Lincoln Tunnels, and had already begun mixing the bombs that would be 
loaded into the car bombs when they were arrested by the FBI on June 
24, 1993. Another plan was to drive car bombs into the underground 
parking garages beneath the UN building, using diplomatic license plates 
so that they could enter without suspicion. Still another was to kill the 
guards outside FBI HQ at 26 Federal Plaza with an Uzi machine gun, 
drive explosives-laden cars into the underground garage, and then take 
flight in a backup car. In both cases, the goal was to make the buildings 
collapse.359
 
                                                 
356 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 32-3 and 135-6. 
357 Testimony of FBI Special Agent Harlen Bell, USA v. Rahman, January 30, 1995, pp. 
1959-60. 
358 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, pp. 1583-4. 
359 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, p. 1582. 
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The FBI’s foiling of the day of terror and its investigation of the WTC 
bombing would eventually yield the arrest of the Blind Shaykh and all 
the known members of his NYC cell in June 1993. Indeed, the plot was 
uncovered early on when its operational organizer Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq 
`Ali approached Imad Salim about building the necessary bombs. Salim 
was an FBI informant who agreed to “assist” the terrorist plotters. Salim, 
working with the FBI, rented the garage, which was wired with 
surveillance equipment, thus allowing law enforcement authorities to 
record the plotting and preparations and ultimately prevent the attack by 
arresting the terrorists as they moved toward implementation of their 
plans. Salim also agreed to wear a tape recorder to the cell’s meetings. 
Although Salim eventually ceased acting as an informant, refused to 
testify in open court, and “disappeared” into the government’s witness 
protection program fearing for his family’s safety, his and other tapes 
provided incontrovertible evidence of the defendants’ active involvement 
in terrorist plots.360 The prosecution’s tapes and the trial transcripts 
provide a rare glimpse into the jihadist mode of leading and organizing 
terrorist cells and of planning and preparing attacks on critical 
infrastructure targets such as tunnels and bridges. 
 
After the trial of the cell members began, key member Siddiq `Ali 
withdrew his earlier not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea on seven of 
fifteen charges against him, including conspiring to wage a terrorist war, 
conspiring to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt, conspiring to 
bomb buildings and other facilities used in commerce, participating in an 
attempted bombing in the spring of 1993 (the “day of terror” tunnels and 
bridges plot), transporting an Uzi machine gun to be used in that 
bombing, using and carrying an Uzi in connection with that bombing, 
and carrying a destructive device to be used in that bombing.361 His 
testimony further corroborated the government’s charges against `Abd 
al-Rahman and the other members of his New York cell. 
 
The cell consisted of ten members besides Shaykh al-Rahman and 
mastermind of the World trade center bombing Ramzi Yusuf: Nusayr, 
                                                 
360 As discussed above, Salim at one stage left the cell following disagreements with the 
FBI. He was replaced and the first World Trade Center bombing ensued. After the 
bombing, Salim agreed to reacquaint himself with the cell members in order to prevent 
further attacks. 
361 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, U.S. District Court, Southern District of 
New York, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, [hereafter USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq 
Ali] February 6, 1995, pp. 2221 and 2227-30. 
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Ibrahim al-Jabrawni, Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, Muhammad Salih, 
American citizen Clement Hampton-El (alias Dr. Abdul Rashid 
Abdullah), Viktor Alvarez, Tariq al-Hasan, `Amir `Abd al-Ghani, Fadhl 
`Abd al-Ghani, Faris Khallafalla, and latecomer to the cell Wahid Salih. 
Three others in the group – Mahmud Abu Halima, Nidal `Ayyad, and 
Muhammad Salama – were involved in the 93 WTC plot. There was 
some degree of hierarchy and a certain division of labor within the cell. 
Ibrahim al-Jabrawni was Nusayr’s relative and principal lieutenant, 
following the pattern of kinship ties prevalent in the al-Qa`ida terrorist 
network.362 He obtained detonators and a safe house for the bombing 
plot, and agreed to assist Nusayr in breaking out of prison.363 Next in the 
hierarchy came Siddiq `Ali. He had three years of college education, in 
part received in his native Sudan and in part in the U.S.364 He conducted 
military training for the cell’s foot soldiers, helped one of the 93 WTC 
bombers flee the country, and devised the scheme for the day of terror to 
bomb tunnels, bridges, and buildings. The local New York City foot 
soldiers were Victor Alvarez and Clement Hampton-El, who worked in a 
hospital and supplied the group with detonators, explosive materials, and 
training. Alvarez provided the Uzi that the group planned to use, mixed 
chemicals, and tried to find cars for the car bombings. Wahid Salih 
agreed to provide the cars to be used for the bombings. The cell’s foreign 
Muslim foot soldiers Tariq al-Hasan, the `Abd al-Ghani brothers `Amir 
and Fadhl, and Faris Khallafalla were Sudanese, like Siddiq `Ali.365
 
The group came together gradually, as it gathered the personnel needed 
to carry out its still unformulated but ambitious plans. In late 1990 
Shaykh `Abd al-Rahman met with Siddiq `Ali, Hampton-El, al-Hasan, 
and Abu Halima for the first time. Siddiq `Ali, who became `Abd al-
Rahman’s bodyguard and later his translator, and these others soon grew 
close to their new mentor, who brought them tightly under his fold as he 
preached theology and lectured on politics to them. During Nusayr’s trial 
for the murder of Rabbi Kahane, this portion of the cell came to know 
Nusayr, al-Jabrawni, Salama, and `Ayyad. During 1992, acquaintances 
were made with Ramzi Yusuf, the `Abd al-Ghani brothers, Khallafalla, 
Salih, and U.S. government informant Salim. In 1993 the group was 
rounded out by Alvarez and finally Salih.366
                                                 
362 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2004), pp. 112-13. 
363 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, pp. 1584-85. 
364 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, p. 2222. 
365 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman,  pp. 1585-88. 
366 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, pp. 
2234-5. 
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Target Selection 
 
The plot to attacks tunnels and bridges emerged in the course of the 
training and discussions that evolved over a period of time and produced 
the World Trade Center bombing. Proposals emerged and plans 
developed, as events inspired and conspired against some but not others. 
In 1992, Siddiq `Ali and the others engaged in firearms training at Abu 
Bakr mosque in Brooklyn, the aim of which – known to the `Abd al-
Ghani brothers, Khallafalla, and al-Hasan – was to prepare for the 
assassination of American officials who supported Israel. In late 1992 
and early 1993, further military training was conducted at the cell’s 
clandestine camp near Harrisburg. This was to prepare the group for 
assassinations and other operations in the U.S. and overseas, including 
the assassination of Mubarak, U.S. officials who supported Israel, and 
unspecified Israeli officials. Among the attendees were the `Abd al-
Ghani bros, al-Hasan, and Ahmad Hajjaj. At this time, Siddiq `Ali first 
raised the idea of bombing tunnels and a bridge with al-Hasan, the `Abd 
al-Ghani bros, and others, and soon Siddiq `Ali, Abu Halima, and 
Hampton-El were discussing the testing of explosives and participated 
later at some at the camp conducted tests.367
 
Meanwhile, `Abd al-Rahman had issued a fatwa authorizing the 
assassination of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. After the arrest in 
Egypt of fellow cell member Abu Halima in March 1993 for his 
involvement in the February World Trade Center bombing, the cell 
developed a plan to assassinate Mubarak during his visit to New York, 
which was scheduled for April. Abu Halima had escaped from the U.S. 
to Egypt in February in the wake of the WTC bombing, with Siddiq 
`Ali’s direct assistance. Now Siddiq `Ali discussed the specifics with 
Hampton-El and another individual first, then with Hajjaj, al-Hasan, and 
the `Abd al-Ghani brothers. The latter were very enthusiastic about the 
plan, though Fadhl was less so, as he wanted to go back to the Sudan. 
However, he agreed to participate if requested. Hampton-El agreed to 
provide the firearms and grenades, but said he would need a few days to 
procure them and told the others to prepare to appear on a specific date 
to pick them up. Siddiq `Ali had devised two plans to assassinate 
Mubarak, in which cell members dressed as waiters would enter his hotel 
room and spray it with bullets. A second plan involved using a sniper in 
a stolen UPS van with a hole in the side to shoot him outside his hotel. 
The assassination plots were aborted when they were leaked to the FBI 
                                                 
367 Ibid., pp. 2235-6. 
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(presumably by Salim), and shortly thereafter Mubarak’s trip to NYC 
was canceled.368 Although there seems to have been little or no 
discussion later of a plot to attack nuclear power plants, the group carried 
out a “simulation” of such an attack in woods near their Pennsylvania 
training camp, which was located five miles from such a plant.369   
 
After Abu Halima was returned to the US for trial, Siddiq `Ali spoke 
with `Abd al-Rahman and Salim about attacking military targets such as 
armories in the U.S. The Blind Shaykh said this would be permissible 
under Islamic law. Indeed, Salim and al-Jabrawni were already making 
bombs at the request of Nusayr, who Saddiq `Ali and al-Jabrawni 
intended to help escape from prison. However, after hearing an anti-UN 
sermon by `Abd al-Rahman, Siddiq `Ali proposed to shift from military 
targets to the UN building. Again, `Abd al-Rahman gave his blessing for 
such an act, after which Siddiq `Ali proposed adding 26 Federal Plaza, 
the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the George Washington bridge to 
the list. With this, the general contours of the planned “day of terror” 
were in place. One minor change was under consideration, because `Abd 
al-Rahman and Nusayr seemed to nix the idea of bombing the UN 
building for different reasons.370 However, Salim testified that Saddiq 
`Ali nevertheless still hoped and indeed expressed his intent to 
implement that part of the plan.371
 
 
                                                 
368 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, pp. 1593 and 1595-6 and 
testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, pp. 2236-7. 
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garage, and the use of diplomatic license plates. One of those representatives had 
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Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, pp. 2238-40. 
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Operational Details 
 
The Pennsylvania Traning Camp 
 
As noted above, even before `Abd al-Rahman’s arrival in New Jersey, 
the cell’s operatives had established a military training camp in a remote 
wooded area not far from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The American 
Clement Hampton-El provided an American face and cover in finding a 
good location and setting up the military training camp, which he 
implemented. The cell’s foot soldiers – al-Hasan, the `Abd al-Ghani 
brothers, and Khallafalla – trained at the camp under the leadership of 
Siddiq `Ali. They practiced using firearms, tested explosives, and as 
noted above, even executed a “simulation” of an attack on a nuclear 
power plant.372
 
Planning and Preparing Execution of the “Day of Terror” 
 
By May 1993 the plotters were already deep in their preparations for 
executing the “day of terror.” The plan was to drive getaway cars and car 
bombs filled with barrels of an explosive mix of diesel fuel and fertilizer 
through the tunnels, feigning an auto breakdown and switching to the 
getaway cars. Abandoning the car bombs would block up traffic behind 
them, maximizing the death toll caused by the explosion and resultant 
flooding.373 They hoped to maximize damage to the tunnel by placing the 
bombs such that the tunnel’s structure was compromised in four or five 
places.374 Each aspect of the operation was tested beforehand in order to 
probe the viability of the plan and provide those executing the plot with 
as much practice and familiarity with the task and object at hand as was 
possible without risking the operation’s secrecy.  
 
On June 23, 1993, daring preparatory steps were taken. In addition to 
carrying out surveillance of the UN building, `Amir `Abd al-Ghani and 
Khallafalla did a dry run through the Holland Tunnel, in the midst of 
                                                 
372 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, pp. 1585-88; Testimony of Tariq 
al-Hasan, USA v. Rahman, August 21, 1995, pp. 16993-5, 17007, and 17047-58; and 
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Clement Hampton-El, USA v. Rahman, August 3, 1995, pp. 15797-9. 
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which they stopped and switched cars.375 In another car ride, Siddiq `Ali 
and Salim videotaped the Holland and Lincoln tunnels. During that ride 
Salim secretly recorded their conversations.376 The purpose of the 
videotape (government Exhibit 369) was so that members of the group 
could watch the tape later at the safe house and make decisions about the 
operation. The videotape showed the police checkpoints at the entrance 
to the tunnels, the cameras positioned inside, where the bombs were to 
be placed inside the tunnels, and the escape routes that the drivers would 
take after placing the bombs in both the tunnels. The camera panned 
along the walls of the tunnel so that they could identify the locations of 
tunnel security cameras and the traffic monitoring booths along the side. 
One important piece of information they sought to get from the filming 
was the duration of time that the tunnel monitors would need to get to the 
stopped vehicle where the bomb would be placed, so they could set the 
timer in the bomb appropriately. They also shot the green road signs that 
one sees coming out of the tunnel in order to identify the route to be 
taken by the bombers in their escape. Noting the police booths, they 
discussed the vital importance of not attracting attention, since the police 
might decide to search for hazardous materials and discover the bombs 
and weapons. Siddiq `Ali asked Salim to take pictures of the inside 
traffic booths and designated a blue sign where he said the bomb should 
be placed.377
 
The plotters were meticulous about planning the explosion so as to 
maximize casualties. Salim had a conversation with al-Hasan in the safe 
house about the structure of bridges and tunnels, with Siddiq `Ali and 
`Amir present. Al-Hasan said he knew a civil engineer who was a good 
“brother” and loved jihad and that he would “make a study to bring the 
blueprints of the tunnels and bridges so we can see the weak points.”378 
Al-Hasan consulted his civil engineer friend to get advice, and was 
informed that tunnels had strong and weak sides.379 The car bombs, it 
was decided, were to be timed to detonate five minutes apart, as it had 
been calculated that the tunnels’ structural integrity was vulnerable to a 
dispersed, staggered explosion. In this way, they hoped the explosions 
                                                 
375 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, p. 2240. 
376 These were videotaped and audiotaped by Salim. Prosecutor’s Opening Statement, 
USA v. Rahman, p. 1680. 
377 Testimony of FBI informant Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, March 22, 1995, pp. 
5637-9 and 5643-7. 
378 Ibid., pp. 5652-4. 
379 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, p. 1598. 
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would thereby collapse the tunnels and drown people trapped in their 
cars.380
 
Careful planning and the desire to maximize casualties did not seem 
necessarily to trump religious considerations. When discussing what 
time of day would be best for the explosions to detonate, the first 
suggestion was that it be done in the middle of the night, between 2 and 
4 am, and Siddiq `Ali decided that 2:30 am would be good. Al-Hasan’s 
view was that this would be a particularly good time, since Muslims 
believe that the most effective time to pray to Allah for success is in the 
early morning, when one wakes. This idea seemed to reinforce the 
decision.381
 
 
Bomb-Making 
 
Securing materials for making the car bombs was the most challenging 
and risky part of the operation, one fraught with the danger of raising 
suspicions or exposing their activities. Some elements were relatively 
easy to acquire. Khallafalla bought the timers, and Hampton-El supplied 
the detonators.382 Members of the cell also underwent detailed training 
regarding the setting of timers.383 The bomb components were to be the 
rather standard car bomb materials: fuel, in this case diesel fuel, and 
fertilizer.384  
 
Most sensitive was the procurement of large amounts of diesel fuel and 
its transporting to the garage/safe house in Queens. In May 1993 Siddiq 
`Ali and Salim met with Salih, and Salih later supplied the group with 
the necessary fuel free of charge. The fuel was picked up on two separate 
occasions, once by Siddiq `Ali and `Amir `Abd al-Ghani, and once by 
the two `Abd al-Ghani brothers. These latter, who played leading roles in 
this aspect of the operation, felt during one fuel pick up and transport 
that they were being watched.385 They nevertheless succeeded in picking 
                                                 
380 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, p. 1582; Testimony of FBI 
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up fuel oil and delivering it to the Queens safe house.386 Siddiq `Ali and 
the ‘Abd al-Ghanis then mixed the bomb chemicals.387 The bomb 
components were being mixed in a rented garage in Queens in June 
1993, in preparation for what was apparently the imminent execution of 
the operation. On June 24, 1993 Joint Terrorist Task Force agents burst 
into the Queens safe house and arrested all but three members of the cell 
as they were again mixing the bomb components.388
 
The other key ingredient in the car bomb was the cars into which the 
barrels of explosives would be loaded and in which they would be 
delivered to the targets, as well as the other vehicles in which the 
terrorists would make their getaway. Alvarez and Salih agreed to provide 
untraceable cars, and Khallafalla collected money to buy them.389  
 
 
Financial and Other Resources 
 
The financing of the operation seems to have come from numerous 
sources, including from al-Qa`ida, from local contributions raised 
ostensibly for the mujahidin in Bosnia, and from the conspirators 
themselves. During the June 24, 1993 FBI search of `Abd al-Rahman’s 
Jersey City apartment, agents uncovered $61,000 in $100 bills.390 
However, much of this money clearly was intended for maintaining the 
Blind Shaykh himself, i.e., providing for his living expenses. Therefore, 
in order to fund the “day of terror,” the cell sought funding from and 
through cell members and those participating in the plot. In June 93, 
Siddiq `Ali and Salim met with Salih to request funding for the 
operations, at which time they provided the latter with a list of their 
prospective targets. Salih agreed to assist with the financing. However, 
he never actually contributed money for the plot, but only supplied the 
diesel fuel for building the bombs free of charge.391 As discussed above, 
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Khallafalla collected money to buy stolen cars. He also paid for the first 
batch of fertilizer. Alvarez offered to bring guns to help neutralize 
potential sentries, and provided an Uzi which Siddiq `Ali and Salim then 
transported from New Jersey to a safe house in Queens.392  
 
 
Cell Functioning 
 
Although much of the planning was impressive in its thoroughness and 
efficiency, the cell did exhibit weaknesses. Some of the cell’s members 
appeared to be less than well prepared for the tasks they were assigned. 
Thus, when Siddiq `Ali assigned to Khallafalla the task of purchasing the 
timers for the bombs, the latter had some problems getting to the store 
before it closed and buying the right timers. Salim had to pick him up at 
the Port Authority (PATH) station on 32nd Street, accompany him to the 
store, and point out which timer he should buy.393 People like Hampton-
El and Alvarez appeared to be lost souls who were easily manipulated 
but also less than permanently committed. There was also some 
contestation and conflict, with members even coming to blows at times. 
For example, at the Pennsylvania training camp Fadhl `Abd al-Ghani 
questioned Siddiq `Ali’s military expertise and character, which 
provoked the latter to physically assault the former.394
 
Not surprisingly, `Abd al-Rahman and his New York cell were 
especially vigilant regarding the maintenance of secrecy surrounding the 
cell and its operations. Cell members seemed to be constantly on alert 
against any infiltration by informants or other breaches of cell security. 
Thus, when Siddiq `Ali and Salim visited `Abd al-Rahman’s Jersey City 
apartment to discuss their activities, the latter told Siddiq `Ali to warn 
Salim to be cautious and not to speak about such matters in the 
apartment, because he thought it was bugged.395 During the FBI’s June 
24, 1993 search of `Abd al-Rahman’s Jersey City apartment, apart from 
jihadist materials and documents, a device for detecting listening devices 
was found.396 During a visit to Salih’s Yonkers apartment, Siddiq `Ali 
maintained the secrecy of the “project” by first writing down for him the 
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projected bombing targets in a notebook, including the UN building and 
the two tunnels; then he tore out and crumpled up that particular piece of 
paper and asked Salih to eat and thereby dispose of it, which he did.397 
`Abd al-Rahman’s al-Qa`ida cell used code to refer to various elements 
of the plot in order to maintain secrecy. For example, the word haduta 
(Arabic for “fairy tale”) was their code name for bombs, “kid’s toys” 
was code for “weapons,” and “salt” was code for the fertilizer needed for 
the bomb.398 According to FBI informant Salim, Siddiq `Ali was 
cautious about providing information to other members of the group (for 
example, concerning someone in Abu Dhabi who was involved in 
financing terrorist operations), including Salim himself, even though the 
two men spent about eight hours per day together throughout May 1993 
discussing plans to blow up bridges, tunnels, and buildings.399  
 
Suspicions that an informant was in their midst even led `Abd al-
Rahman to conduct a trial at one point. After the Mubarak assassination 
plot had to be at least postponed when Mubarak’s trip to NYC was 
canceled, Hajjaj informed the group that the FBI was on to the plan, so in 
the end Hampton-El did not provide the plotters with any weapons. 
These events sparked a crisis of mutual confidence within the cell, as 
Hajjaj had made an allegation that the reason why information on the 
plot had been leaked and Abu Halima had been arrested was because 
Siddiq `Ali was an FBI informant.400 `Abd al-Rahman convened a trial in 
his apartment to ferret out the informant, but to no avail.401
 
Despite the prosecution’s claims to the contrary, there was something of 
a hierarchical pecking order within the cell. `Abd al-Rahman obviously 
stood atop the organization as chief, religious authority, ideologist, 
arbiter, and strategic decision-maker. For example, as has been 
mentioned, he vetoed or provided religious justification for types and 
targets of attack. His importance was underscored by a certain distance 
he maintained from the operational details. This was clearly a measure 
intended to protect the Shaykh, who also took measures to protect 
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Ghani, USA v. Rahman, p. 17671. 
399 Testimony of FBI informant Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, April 3,1995, pp. 6729-
30. 
400 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, pp. 
2236-8. 
401 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, pp. 1596 and 1607. 
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himself. For example, apparently no bomb manuals and blueprints or 
lists of targets were discovered in the search of `Abd al-Rahman’s Jersey 
City apartment.402 In the event that the cell was uncovered by U.S. law 
enforcement agencies, this would have provided him with some credible 
deniability of any knowledge regarding the plot, potentially limiting his 
legal liability. He was also the ultimate authority reinforcing the chain of 
command and discipline when members wavered. 
 
Clearly, after `Abd al-Rahman and Nusayr came Siddiq `Ali, who served 
as the main link between his two superiors and the cell’s more rank-and-
file operatives. Not only did Siddiq `Ali run the Pennsylvania training 
camp, he also conceived of specific plots, organized them, and could 
command the cell’s foot soldiers. It was he who organized the logistics 
for implementing the “day of terror,” including drafting the diagrams 
mapping the targets. He also decided when the bombs should go off in 
the tunnels, and where they should be placed.403 He instructed 
Khallafalla to purchase the timers. One incident clearly demonstrated 
Siddiq `Ali’s authority. When he told Salim to swallow a piece of paper 
on which he had written a list of bombing targets, the latter warned that 
the pen ink might be poisoned. Siddiq `Ali retorted that if he ordered 
Salim to eat the paper, he had to comply.404 Senior operatives like Siddiq 
`Ali used the religious faith of those who wavered to reinforce their 
commitment to jihad and the often distasteful tasks at hand. For 
example, when al-Hasan began to doubt the propriety of the planned 
attacks, Siddiq `Ali gave him a “long lecture” on Islam, faith, and the 
impermissibility of doubting or thinking badly of a fellow Muslim.405
 
 
The Role of Mosques 
 
It is apparent from the al-Qa`ida operatives’ use of the Abu Bakr mosque 
in Brooklyn that jihadists view mosques as legitimate venues and good 
covers for the most nefarious of their activities. As has been noted, `Abd 
al-Rahman’s New York cell conducted firearms training in the Abu Bakr 
mosque. More generally, the Blind Shaykh’s sermons served to inspire 
the terrorists in their activities, and the mosque was a frequent meeting 
                                                 
402 None were found during the FBI’s June 24, 1993 search. Testimony of FBI Special 
Agent Harlen Bell, USA v. Rahman, p. 1996. 
403 See the description of Government Exhibit 676 in the transcript of the Testimony of 
FBI informant Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, March 22, 1995, pp. 5698-701. 
404 Ibid., p. 5615. 
405 Testimony of Tariq al-Hasan, USA v. Rahman, p. 17024. 
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place for the plotters. Thus, Siddiq `Ali was able to confirm from 
unidentified persons at the Abu Bakr mosque that Salim and the by then 
arrested al-Jabrawni were making bombs.406 Cell members often met at 
the mosque for prayer, and then proceeded to the safe house for planning 
and preparation meetings and activities. Thus, in the spring of 1993 
`Amir `Abd al-Ghani and Faris Khallafalla were introduced to Salim by 
Siddiq `Ali after evening prayers at the mosque on First Avenue and 11th 
Street. They then all drove over to the Queens safe house, where `Abd 
al-Ghani and Khallafalla were shown around the safe house and told 
about the group’s projected targets.407 The mosque served as an ideal 
locale for `Abd al-Rahman to reach out to Americans as potential 
recruits to the jihad.408
 
 
Relevance for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
There is little evidence in the materials from the tunnels and bridges 
plots to support or refute the view that targeting critical infrastructure 
results from al-Qa`ida’s perception that such infrastructure constitutes a 
species of target different from other target types. The focus seems to 
have been on executing a spectacular attack and, more importantly, on 
carrying out one that would yield the maximum number of casualties. 
However, a 1980s al-Qa`ida training manual found by the police in 
Manchester, England, which recommends attacking bridges and tunnels 
that lead in and out of large cities, suggests that this may be among the 
goals of such operations, but one that the top leadership is especially 
concerned with, leaving the specifics of the operation to lower-level 
operatives who are encouraged to implement attacks designed to destroy 
or disrupt infrastructure in such a way that they also kill and injure as 
many people as possible. There is a reference to taking out the “federal 
system” in the terrorists’ discussion of attacking the FBI headquarters on 
Federal Plaza in NYC,409 suggesting that there was a “larger” purpose in 
attacking the law enforcement infrastructure. This would mean, in this 
                                                 
407 See, for example, testimony of FBI informant Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, March 
22, 1995, pp. 5621-3. 
408 In the early spring 1993, for example, `Abd al-Rahman gave a speech at the 
Muhammad mosque in New Jersey on jihad, and praised HAMAS as a good example 
for mujahidin to follow. Salim was asked to translate `Abd al-Rahman’s words into 
English for the benefit of the Americans in the audience. Testimony of FBI informant 
Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, March 22, 1995, pp. 5617-21. 
409 Testimony of Clement Hampton-El (Dr. Rashid), USA v. Rahman, pp. 15798-9. 
406 Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, pp. 
2238-9. 
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sense at least, that at times al-Qa`ida purposely targets critical 
infrastructure or elements of what the U.S. government would regard as 
such. 
 
There are signs that al-Qa`ida and affiliated jihadists see the international 
value to the jihad of attacking critical infrastructure targets such as 
tunnels and bridges. Thus, the `Abd al-Rahman cell’s Hasan suggested 
sending copies of such blueprints of the tunnels to mujahid countries like 
the Sudan so that future operations could be launched.410 This may have 
been picked up recently by Chechen jihadists. It appears that in late May 
2005, Russian law enforcement officials stumbled upon a plot to blow up 
the Gimri Tunnel in Russia’s predominantly Muslim and terrorist-ridden 
republic of Dagestan. Destruction of the tunnel would cut off the 
mountainous part of Dagestan, where 720,000 people reside, from the 
rest of the republic.411  
 
The bridge, tunnels, and attendant plots say something about more 
general issues of jihadist motivations and modes of operation. Although 
during the planning and preparation of operations jihadists endeavor to 
maintain the greatest secrecy, they are often quite open about their 
overall intentions in making public threats regarding future attacks. After 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, `Ayyad wrote a letter to the New 
York Times explaining that the act was designed as a punishment for U.S. 
policies in the Middle East, that future attacks would be more lethal, and 
that there were 150 suicide bombers ready to launch them. The 
prosecution noted this article during the `Abd al-Rahman cell’s trial.412 
The jihadists were at the time also quite open in acknowledging one of 
their motivations for their actions: the “evils” of U.S. foreign policy. 
Even in private, cell members and `Abd al-Rahman seemed to be driven 
                                                 
410 Testimony of FBI informant Imad Salim, USA v. Rahman, March 22, 1995, p. 5654. 
411 At 5:30 in the morning on 29 May, Buinakskii district criminal investigation 
department chief Asker Askerov and a group of policemen attempted to stop three 
suspicious persons near the entrance to the Gimri (Gimrinskiy) Tunnel. The three 
suspects opened fire, killing Askerov. A search of the area uncovered 23 artillery shells 
hidden five kilometers from the tunnel’s entrance. One of the three terrorists, 
Derbishgadzhi Gazimagomedov, was apprehended. See Russia and Eurasia Terror 
Watch (Retwa.com), May 29, 2005, www.retwa.com/index1.cfm?pgm 
Name=month&postcat=NewsTerror&month=5&year= 2005. While the officers were 
checking Gazimagomedov’s papers, his apparent accomplices shot officer Askerov 
dead. However, Gazimagomedov was acquitted in May 2006 of terrorism charges but 
found guilty of possessing false identity papers. See Paul Murphy, “Jury Acquits 
Suspected Gimrinskiy Tunnel Terrorist,” Retwa.com, May 12, 2006, 
www.retwa.com/home.cfm?articleId=2336. 
412 Prosecution’s Opening Statement, USA v. Rahman, p. 1594. 
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by hatred of what they saw as U.S. interference in the Muslim world, 
including Bosnia, as well as its support for Israel.413  
 
It needs to be emphasized, however, that stated intentions, even those of 
a movement’s leaders to their followers in private, and especially the 
statements of al-Qa`ida’s foot soldiers, cannot be taken to represent al-
Qa`ida’s ultimate goals. The political rhetoric of al-Qa`ida and its 
affiliates, while focused on U.S. foreign policy, often seem to serve as a 
convenient cover for their broader objective – Islamism’s expansion. 
 
 
AHMAD RASSAM AND THE DECEMBER 1999 
“MILLENIUM PLOT”*
 
At around 6 pm on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, an Algerian national 
named Ahmad Rassam drove off of the docked M. V. Coho ferry that had 
just arrived from Victoria, British Columbia. As he was trying to pass 
through a United States border checkpoint in Port Angeles, Washington, 
his rented dark green Chrysler 300M with B.C. plates was stopped by 
U.S. Customs Inspector Diana Dean. When he grew agitated and began 
rummaging in the vehicle’s console in response to her simple, 
straightforward questions concerning his destination and purposes for 
visiting America, she became suspicious, asked him for his driver’s 
license, and gave him a customs declaration form to fill out to keep his 
hands busy. The license identified him as Benni Antoine Noris, a 
Canadian citizen from Montreal. As the man was slow to comply when 
she ordered him to turn off the engine, pop open the trunk, and step out 
of the car, Dean called for the assistance of nearby inspectors. After 
failing to communicate with Rassam in Spanish and also coming to the 
conclusion that his behavior was “hinky,” Inspector Mark Johnson took 
                                                 
413 This is evident from defense’s opening statements as well as testimony in the USA 
v. Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel Rahman trial and the trials of the other cell members. 
Defense Opening Statement on behalf of Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel al-Rahman, USA v. 
Rahman, January 30, 1995, pp. 1622; Defense Opening Statement on behalf of Siddiq 
`Ali, USA v. Rahman, 31 January 1995, pp. 1730-1; Defense Opening Statement on 
behalf of Hampton-El), USA v. Rahman, 31 January 1995, pp. 1737-8 and 1743-6; 
Defense Opening Statement on behalf of `Amir `Abd al-Ghani, USA v. Rahman, 31 
January 1995, pp. 1785-7; pp. Defense Opening Statement on behalf of Khallafalla), 
USA v. Rahman, 31 January 1995, pp. 1805-6; Defense opening statement (London on 
behalf of Tariq al-Hasan), USA v. Rahman, 31 January 1995, pp. 1834-6; and 
Testimony of Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq `Ali, USA v. Siddiq Ibrahim Siddiq Ali, 6 February 
1995, pp. 2238-40. 
* This section was prepared by Jeffrey M. Bale. 
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his arm and escorted him from the car over to a table so that he could 
search the pockets of his trench coat. Meanwhile, inspectors Dan Clem 
and Mike Chapman removed a suitcase from his trunk and unscrewed 
the covering over the spare tire. To their surprise, the wheel well was 
loaded with “ten plastic garbage bags filled with white crystals, two olive 
jars with amber liquid, black boxes, [and] two pill bottles.”414 Clem 
assumed these were ingredients for manufacturing illegal drugs and 
alerted Johnson, who grabbed Rassam by both shoulders and walked him 
over to the trunk. While Johnson was patting him down, Rassam 
suddenly slipped out of his oversized trench coat and began running 
through the streets of Port Angeles. After a four-block, more or less 
circular chase, the inspectors managed to catch and subdue him. 
 
Unbeknownst to any of them at the time, what had begun as a seemingly 
uneventful day had ended with their nabbing of a terrorist with links to 
both the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA: Armed Islamic Group) 
and al-Qa`ida, a man who was planning to detonate an explosive device 
at Los Angeles airport (LAX). It turned out that the Tylenol bottle 
contained a powerful, military-grade explosive known as 
cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine or RDX, whereas the smaller zinc lozenge 
bottle contained hexamethylentriperoxodiamin or HMTD, an unstable 
explosive so dangerous that it is not manufactured commercially. The 
two olive jars each contained 50 ounces of ethylene glycol dinitrate or 
EGDN, a chemical similar to nitroglycerin that is also highly sensitive. 
The garbage bags contained 118 pounds of urea fertilizer and 14 pounds 
of sulfate powder which, when mixed properly with the other chemicals, 
results in the manufacture of a very powerful bomb.415
 
This strange saga had in fact begun years earlier, in Algeria, where 
Rassam was born into a modest middle class family in 1967. His father, 
a chauffeur who had fought the French during the Algerian war of 
independence, had high hopes that his first-born son, a “lively child” and 
a “decent student,” would pass the tough qualifying examinations that 
would allow him to obtain a free university education that would in turn 
                                                 
414 The details in the first two paragraphs are drawn from Paula Bock, “An Otherwise 
Ordinary Day,” Pacific Northwest, a magazine inserted into the Seattle Times, 
November 25, 2001, available at: 
www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/pacificnw/2001/1125/html; supplemented by Hal 
Bernton et al, “The Terrorist Within,” chapter 12, Seattle Times, July 2002, available at: 
www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/chapter12.html.  
415 For more on these materials, compare Rassam’s own testimony in U.S. District 
Court, Southern District of New York, United States v. Mokhtar Haouari [Mukhtar 
Hawari], S4 00 Cr. 15 (JFK) [hereafter U.S. v. Haouari], June 29, 2001, pp. 575-7. 
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provide him with a good middle class living.416 However, young Ahmad 
was so afflicted by stomach cramps that he was sent for medical 
treatment to France, where he was treated for a festering ulcer. His long 
convalescence forced him to repeat a year of high school, and he ended 
up failing his final examination in mathematics, which effectively 
prevented him going on to get a university education. He also failed to 
get a job as a policeman, further limiting his options. As Algeria’s 
economy precipitously declined, and radical Islamist movements arose 
preaching jihad, Rassam instead worked in his father’s cafe, drank wine, 
smoked hashish, wore Western clothes, flirted with girls at nightclubs, 
and dreamed of escaping to France or French-speaking Canada. 
 
On September 5, 1992, as violence escalated between the radicals in the 
Front Islamique de Salut (FIS: Islamic Salvation Front) and the socialist-
oriented government and its military forces, Rassam took the bus to 
Algiers, from where he caught a ferry to Marseilles.417 After his 30-day 
visa expired, he became an illegal immigrant, traveled to Corsica, and 
found work picking grapes and painting houses. Despite having obtained 
a fraudulent French passport, he was arrested in November 1993 and 
charged with immigration violations, then released on his own 
recognizance until his scheduled March 1994 trial date. Unwilling to risk 
deportation to Algeria, which had by then descended into outright civil 
war, he obtained another false passport in February and managed to 
secure an Air Canada flight to Montreal. Although he admitted under 
questioning by a Canadian immigration official that his passport was not 
genuine, he appealed for political asylum by falsely claiming to have 
been mistakenly arrested for selling firearms to a terrorist and then 
tortured by the Algerian police.418 He was then detained briefly, released 
                                                 
416 See Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” Seattle Times, chapter 2, June 2002, for the 
details in this paragraph. 
417 For the details in this paragraph, see ibid., chapters 3-4, 6; Rassam testimony, U.S. v. 
Haouari, pp. 536-8. For political developments in Algeria during this and subsequent 
periods, see Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Columbia University, 
1997); Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (New 
York: New York University, 1996); and Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-
2002: Studies of a Broken Polity (London and New York: Verso, 2003). 
418 Note, however, that both the French internal security agency, the Direction de la 
Surveillance du Territoire (DST: Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), and a French 
investigative journalist reported that Rassam really was involved in selling arms to 
Islamist guerrillas in 1992, and the latter added that he was then imprisoned for thirteen 
months at a prison in Blida before being released. Compare Cour d’Appel de Paris, 
Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris, Requisitoire definitif contre Salah Achour + 27, 
P96 263 390LZ, undated [hereafter Requisitoire], p. 142; and Ali Laïdi, Le jihad en 
Europe: Les filières du terrorisme islamiste (Paris: Seuil, 2002), pp. 231-2. However, 
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on bond, and told to hire a lawyer for the upcoming March 28 hearing, 
the standard and absurdly lax Canadian policy vis-à-vis asylum seekers. 
Like hundreds of other cagey illegals whose claims were never 
confirmed, Rassam was released and allowed to collect monthly welfare 
checks. He soon found a room at a local YMCA, where he encountered a 
fellow Algerian. This individual then invited Rassam to move into his 
small, squalid apartment, where several other Algerian expatriates also 
lived. Meanwhile, Rassam failed to attend his scheduled hearing, was 
rejected for asylum, and was then rearrested, but he was simply given a 
new hearing date and released again. 
 
Rassam soon began regularly attending the Masjid [mosque] al-Salam in 
Montreal, initially for social reasons, since there he was able to make 
contact both with “struggling immigrants like himself and successful, 
confident Muslims who had woven their way into the fabric of French-
Canadian culture.”419 During this period Rassam befriended a number of 
small-time criminals, as well as certain key activists linked to Islamist 
terrorist groups. Shortly thereafter, having been employed as a 
distributor of advertising leaflets for only a single week, he embarked on 
an extended career as a petty thief. In the course of engaging in these 
illegal activities, which involved around forty incidents of shoplifting, 
pickpocketing, stealing the luggage of tourists, or taking traveler’s 
checks, passports, and credit cards and then selling them, he was arrested 
four times, fined a few times, and even convicted once, but was 
invariably released instead of being deported.420 Alas, such activities 
were far from atypical in the Algerian immigrant community within 
which he found refuge. The key question was whether particular 
disaffected individuals were engaged in criminal activities of this sort 
primarily for personal gain, or whether they carried them out consciously 
in support of radical political agendas. 
 
In fact, Rassam’s life was about to change course. In late 1994 and early 
1995 he increasingly socialized with certain influential members of 
jihadist cells linked to al-Qa`ida. Two of these individuals were 
particularly important. First, among the persons to whom Rassam sold 
stolen passport and identity cards in exchange for money was Fatih 
Kamal, an Algerian veteran of the Afghan and Bosnian jihads who has 
                                                                                                                       
Laïdi also claims that Rassam later traveled to Barcelona, where he was put up by 
jihadist “brothers,” before moving on to Paris, an itinerary that has not been confirmed 
by other sources. 
419 Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 6. 
420 Ibid; Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, p. 538, 631-6, 639. 
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been described as the “operational chief” of the al-Qa`ida network in 
Europe and North America.421 Kamal was born in Algiers in March 
1960, but traveled to Canada in 1987 or 1988, where some friends of his 
already lived, in order to pursue business opportunities. However, in 
1990 he returned to Algeria to join the armed Islamist resistance 
movement, which was then waging a guerrilla war against the ruling 
military regime. In the course of fighting in the ranks of this movement 
Kamal met many “Afghan Arabs,” i.e., Algerians who had fought against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan and later returned, radicalized and battle 
hardened, with the aim of overthrowing the government and establishing 
a puritanical Islamic state in their home country. He himself was then 
sent to al-Qa`ida training camps in the Hindu Kush, where his 
intelligence, courage, and Canadian citizenship attracted the favorable 
attention of both operations chief Abu Zubayda and military committee 
head Muhammad Atif, who ensured that he was rapidly promoted. In 
1993 Kamal was sent to join the international Katiba al-Mujahidin 
(Mujahidin Brigade) in Zenica, Bosnia, where he operated under the 
orders of Anwar Sha`ban, a senior member of the Egyptian terrorist 
group al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya, and `Abd al-Qadir Mukhtari (alias Abu al-
Ma`ali), an Algerian “Afghan Arab” and militant in the GIA. Although 
Kamal was anxious to engage in combat, Mukhtari recognized his talents 
and appointed him as the logistical officer of the unit, in which capacity 
he was responsible for organizing an external support apparatus to funnel 
false documents, money, weapons, and recruits into the group’s ranks.422
 
In order to accomplish this important mission, Kamal was not based 
permanently in Bosnia but instead regularly traveled back and forth to 
places such as Zagreb, Montreal, Paris, Milan, Ancona, Hamburg, 
Frankfurt, Freiburg, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, and Istanbul, as well as to 
locales in Austria, Belgium, Slovenia, and Morocco. Indeed, a French 
judicial investigation revealed that Kamal had “multiple links” to 
“diverse Islamic terrorist organizations around the world, and 
particularly in Bosnia, in Pakistan, in Germany, and in London.”423 
Among the many components of Bin Ladin’s jihadist international that 
he was connected to were the Istituto Culturale Islamico on Viale Jenner 
in Milan, a hotbed of Islamist subversion, and the violent “Roubaix 
gang” in France, which was composed primarily of mujahidin who had 
                                                 
421 Laïdi, Jihad en Europe, p. 225. 
422 Ibid., pp. 225-8. 
423 Requisitoire, p. 126. 
 197
Prior Al-Qa`ida-linked Critical Infrastructure Attacks in the U.S. 
fought in Bosnia and led by Christopne Caze, a French medical student 
who had converted there to a radical version of Islam.424
 
In the mid-1990s, Kamal returned to Montreal. With the help of a 
Moroccan named Muhammad `Umari, he created an elaborate 
“humanitarian” support network called Save Bosnia Now, bought a small 
craft shop on St. Laurent boulevard in the center of Montreal, Artisanat 
Nord-Sud, and became the co-partner of an export-import firm known as 
Société Mandingo. Under the cover of these seemingly innocuous front 
organizations, Kamal built up an international network of “aid workers” 
and “business associates” who were actively engaged in the trafficking 
of arms, documents, and jihadist fighters to Bosnia and other hotspots. 
Although he frequently left Canada and traveled abroad in order to 
manage these far-flung organizing activities, Kamal arranged for several 
jihadist “brothers” who were on the run, such as Labsi Mustafa and 
La`ifa Khabu, to take refuge in Canada and stay for a time in an 
apartment at 6301 Place de la Malicorne, where Rassam, Adl Abu 
Mazbur, and Kamal’s assistant Sa`id Atmani (alias Karim) by then all 
resided. Following Kamal’s arrest by the Jordanian authorities on April 
8, 1999, after which he was interrogated and extradited to France, his 
Canadian cell and its activities were taken over and run by his lieutenants 
Murad Ikhlaf, who had carried out a deadly bombing at the Algiers 
airport in 1992, and Mukhtar Hawari, another well-integrated Algerian 
who subsequently purchased the Artisanat Nord-Sud firm from Kamal’s 
wife. After doing so, Hawari used the company as a means of obtaining 
genuine identification card and credit card numbers that he then made 
use of to forge fraudulent cards.425 Rassam was one of the thieves who 
sold stolen credit and identification cards such as driver’s licenses to 
Hawari.426 As for Kamal, after being sentenced to ten years in prison on 
April 6, 2001, by a Parisian court, he was released early for good 
                                                 
424 For the Milan cultural center, see Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New 
Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), pp. 217-33; 
Guido Olimpio, La rete del terrore: Come nascono e agiscono I militanti delle Guerre 
Sante (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 2002), pp. 87-97; Magdi Allam, Bin Laden in Italia: 
Viaggio nell’islam radicale (Milan: Mondadori, 2002), pp. 62-72. For the Roubaix 
gang, see Hassane Zerrouky, La nébuleuse islamiste en France et en Algérie: Enquête 
(Paris: Editions 1, 2002), pp. 218-20; Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: 
The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2004), pp. 188-97. 
425 Laïdi, Jihad en Europe, pp. 231-2. For the case against Hawari, see U.S. v. Haouari, 
passim. 
426 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 539-41. 
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behavior and thence made his way back to Canada on January 29, 
2005.427
 
The second key figure who Rassam encountered in Montreal was `Abd 
al-Ra`uf Hannashi, an al-Qa`ida recruiter in his mid-40s and “jolly 
uncle” figure who openly expressed his hatred for the West and 
frequently regaled select congregants at the al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya 
mosque about the training he had received in Bin Ladin’s camps in 
Afghanistan, where he had learned how to fire assault rifles and rocket-
propelled grenade launchers, manufacture explosives, and wage urban 
guerrilla warfare.428 Like Kamal, Hannushi was a man who was well-
respected in the local Muslim community, which gave him a certain 
cachet amongst alienated individuals like Rassam. As a result, the latter 
and his roommates became increasingly obsessed with traveling to 
Afghanistan for training and waging jihad themselves. Unbeknownst to 
them, their apartment had by then been placed under surveillance by the 
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), which had received a 
warning from both French anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguière and 
the Italian secret services about the dangers posed by Kamal and his 
Montreal associates. Even so, the CSIS officers involved were so 
contemptuous of the group’s potential for mayhem that they referred to 
its members derisively as the “Bunch of Guys” (or “BOG.”) rather than 
as jihadist cell members. Of all the members of the group, they 
considered Rassam to be the least likely to cause serious trouble. 
 
During the summer and early fall of 1997, after having been inspired by 
Hannashi and other friends who had recently returned from Afghanistan, 
Rassam became increasingly interested in traveling there to receive 
training. Ostensibly, his original goal in obtaining such training was so 
that he would become capable of returning home and waging jihad in 
Algeria itself.429 However that may be, he flew from Toronto via 
Frankfurt, Germany to Karachi on March 17, 1998, with the assistance of 
Hannashi, who had arranged the details and functioned as an 
intermediary between Rassam and Abu Zubayda. The Algerian met next 
                                                 
427 Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around 
the World (Mississauga, Ontario: Wiley & Sons Canada, 2005), p. 159. 
428 For the information in this paragraph, see Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 
7. 
429 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 545-55. Compare also his December 17, 
2002, testimony in United States District Court, Western District of Washington at 
Seattle, In Re: Letter Rogatory from Germany to the United States dated October 2, 
2002, pp. 17-19, 113. The latter deposition is focused primarily on the training that 
Rassam received in Afghanistan and his operational objectives following his return. 
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in Islamabad or Peshawar with Abu Zubayda, who was in charge of the 
training program along with his deputy Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, and it was 
decided that Rassam should receive training at al-Qa`ida’s Khaldan 
camp near Khost. After being provided with a letter, an Afghan guide, 
and Afghan clothes, Rassam was driven in an automobile to the Afghan 
frontier. He crossed the Khyber pass with a group of Afghans to 
Jalalabad, then traveled on to the Khaldan camp, where he arrived at the 
end of April 1994. Together with a contingent of thirty other Algerians 
headed by someone named al-Mu`taz – who were organized into cells 
according to their intended regions of operation – he received training in 
light weapons, handguns, small and large machine guns, and rocket-
propelled grenade launchers (RPG’s), how to make charges and 
explosives (specifically TNT, C4, and “black plastic”), sabotage 
operations, urban guerrilla warfare, assassinations, and security 
measures. He was also taught covert tradecraft techniques that would 
enable him to approach and enter prospective targets and carry out 
bombings without calling attention to himself. Rassam finished his basic 
training at the Khaldan camp in September 1998, and with the blessings 
of Ibn Shaykh al-Libi he was then sent first to a Kurdish camp for two 
weeks to receive pistol training and then on to another camp called 
Darunta to receive further training in the manufacture of explosives. 
There, under the direction of Abu Sulayman, he spent about a month and 
a half learning how to mix chemical substances together and how to 
build detonators and electronic circuits for bombs.430
 
The question of critical infrastructure is directly alluded to in this context 
by Rassam, who defined “sabotage training” as “how to blow up the 
infrastructure of a country” and included targets such as the enemy’s 
“installations, special installations and military installations…such as 
electric plants, gas plants, airports, railroads, large corporations, gas, gas 
installations…[and] hotels where conferences are held.” Urban guerrilla 
warfare referred to “how to carry out operations in cities, how to block 
roads, how to assault buildings, and the strategies used in these 
operations.”431 In another deposition, he added a few more interesting 
details. For example, he admitted that at the Khaldan camp he had 
received training “in theory” about where to place explosives in the best 
manner to destroy tanks, military bases, “a place where there are 
airplanes”, and possibly automobiles and infrastructural facilities such as 
                                                 
430 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 554-5. It was also there that he witnessed 
the release of a chemical agent, which he identified as cyanide, which resulted in the 
death of a dog. See ibid., pp. 620-6. 
431 Ibid., pp. 549-51. 
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“a power facility”.432 Moreover, he indicated that the trainees were 
taught how to examine and evaluate targets in order to determine 
whether or not they were suitable for attack. This depended above all on 
whether they constituted “military bases and sensitive areas that are 
crucial” to the enemy, specifically “anything that relates to the economy 
and anything related to the military things.”433 Rassam himself 
considered airports to be economic targets, but claimed he could not 
recall whether targeting airports was actually discussed at the camps. He 
also said he could not remember if businesses owned by Jews were 
identified as especially valuable targets, or whether he heard anything in 
the camps about plans to attack the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or 
the Capitol building in Washington, DC.434 Later, at the Darunta camp 
where Rassam received advanced training, one of the schemes discussed 
was the releasing of cyanide gas into the air intake vents of a building, 
such as a government office, in order to kill large numbers of people 
inside without endangering themselves or being detected. However, they 
did not actually practice carrying out such an operation.435
 
During his sojourn in Afghanistan, Rassam and four other Algerian 
“brothers” discussed possible future operations, including returning to 
Canada and carrying out a series of bank robberies to obtain the funding 
to launch an attack inside America, ideally before the end of 1999. The 
members of this prospective Canadian jihadist cell were four “Afghan 
Arabs” – Rassam himself (alias Nabil), Mustafa Labsi, Fuda’il, and Abu 
Ahmad – and Atmani, a former mujahid in Bosnia. Afterwards, they 
hoped to be able to escape from the U.S. and make their way back to 
Algeria. Among the potential targets they discussed striking were 
airports and consulates.436 In early November 1998, after completing 
their training, they arranged to travel individually and then meet up in 
Canada, but in the end two of the principal cell members were unable to 
make it through customs in Britain and were therefore not able to reach 
Canada. Worse still, in October 1998 Atmani was arrested in Niagara 
Falls in possession of stolen credit cards, and was thereafter deported 
first to Bosnia and then to France, where he was wanted in connection 
with the crimes committed by the Roubaix gang. Since the members of 
this particular cell had originally planned to make their final targeting 
and operational decisions collectively after they had reconvened in 
                                                 
432 Rassam testimony, October 2, 2002, Letter Rogatory, pp. 39-40. 
433 Ibid., pp. 45-6. 
434 Ibid., pp. 47, 111-12. 
435 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, p. 624. 
436 Ibid., pp. 555-61. 
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Montreal, in the end Rassam was left to his own devices and forced to 
plan the North American operation himself.437
 
In early February 1999 Rassam met one final time in Pakistan with Abu 
Zubayda, who arranged for his flight home and asked him to acquire 
Canadian passports for the use of other mujahidin when he got there. Al-
Mu`taz, the `amir based in Jalalabad who oversaw training at the 
Khaldan camp, had previously provided Rassam with 12,000 Canadian 
dollars, two chemical substances to make explosives (hexamine and 
glycol), and a notebook with instructions on how to manufacture those 
explosives.438 Rassam then flew back on Asiana Airlines via Seoul, 
South Korea, and Los Angeles airport to Vancouver, where he stayed 
with a friend named `Abd al-Majid Dahoumane before returning to 
Montreal and finding a succession of new apartments, the first on 
Sherbrooke Avenue and another on Rue du Fort. He claimed that he had 
not been given any specific instructions about what targets to attack by 
higher-ups, and at that time had still not developed a concrete plan for a 
terrorist strike.439
 
Between February and December 1999, Rassam involved himself in 
making preparations to carry out a terrorist attack on American soil.440 
He endeavored to acquire passable false documents, identify places 
where he could obtain chemical materials, and procure weapons for the 
other cell members that he still expected to arrive. However, in the early 
summer he phoned both Labsi and the cell’s al-Qa`ida liaison Abu Duha 
(alias Dr. Haydar) in London, at which point he learned that Labsi and 
Fuda’il had both failed to make it through customs and would therefore 
be remaining in Britain. Realizing that he was now on his own, in 
                                                 
437 For these details, see Rassam testimony, Letter Rogatory, pp. 87-90, 92-4. 
438 For the materials provided to Rassam by al-Mu`taz, see ibid., pp. 73-4, 114-5; and 
Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 559-60. 
439 Rassam testimony, Letter Rogatory, pp. 81-2. Note that these claims have been 
contested by the U.S. government, which charges Abu Duha, a senior al-Qa`ida 
operative who handled networks of Algerian jihadists, with having discussed an attack 
on an American “airport or other large facility” with Rassam in mid-1998, at the 
Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, as well as with having conspired to provide logistical 
and material support for the Canadian cell. See United States District Court, Southern 
District of New York, United States v. Abu Doha, Indictment, 01 Cr., undated, p. 3. For 
more on Abu Duha, see Laïdi, Jihad en Europe, p. 234, where he is identified as a key 
logistical operative in al-Qa`ida’s Europe network, one of whose tasks was facilitating 
the transfer of Algerian mujahidin to and from Afghan training camps and battle zones 
such as Chechnya. 
440 See Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 570-4; and Bernton et al, “Terrorist 
Within,” chapter 10, for his preparations and planning. 
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August 1999 he made a decision to attack the Los Angeles airport 
(LAX), both because he had stopped over there and scouted the premises 
on his return flight from Pakistan and because he considered it to be 
“sensitive politically and economically.”441 He thence bought a French-
language tourist guide to North America along with a map, on which he 
circled three separate Los Angeles-area airports as potential targets even 
though he only intended to attack one of them. His plan was extremely 
simple: he would do a test run at LAX by placing a normal unattended 
bag on a luggage cart and then observing how long it took security 
officials to notice and examine it. If the time lag was sufficient, he would 
return later and surreptitiously place a bag laden with explosives on a 
similar cart, walk away, and arrange it so that the bomb would detonate 
after he had left the terminal. Two other “brothers” provided him with 
operational advice in connection with his projected future terrorist attack. 
Samir Ait Muhammad, a close friend who wanted to establish his own 
training camp in Afghanistan, recommended that Rassam carry out an 
attack in the affluent Jewish Montreal suburb Outremont, specifically by 
placing a bomb inside a gasoline truck so as to cause a larger and 
deadlier explosion. Rassam’s roommate Ikhlaf, the Algiers airport 
bomber, instead provided him with advice on his planned bombing of 
LAX. Rassam was considering using a secondary explosion to kill rescue 
workers as they responded to the initial blast. However, Ikhlaf counseled 
him to wear a disguise, use one large explosive device instead of two 
(since the more devices used, the more likely they were to be 
discovered), place it near a crowded security checkpoint to maximize 
casualties, and set the timer of the device so that it would detonate thirty 
minutes after it was positioned there.442 Nevertheless, Rassam later 
implausibly claimed that had the LAX operation not been interdicted he 
would have tried to avoid causing unnecessary civilian deaths.443
 
During that same summer of 1999 Rassam re-established contact with 
his friend Mukhtar Hawari, in part because, as an illegal subject to 
deportation, he needed to obtain a bogus Canadian visa card. It turned 
out that Hawari himself was an advocate of jihad in places like 
Chechnya, praised the terrorist bomb attacks carried out in France and 
against the U.S. embassies in Africa, expressed a personal desire to 
travel to Afghan camps for training, and allegedly took an interest in 
                                                 
441  Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, p. 572. 
442 Ibid., pp. 647-54; Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 10. In his testimony, 
Rassam also revealed that Ikhlaf – who he did not actually name – had provided him 
with other logistical assistance and operational advice. 
443 Ibid., pp. 626-9. 
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Rassam’s plans to carry out an action in America. Therefore, he not only 
agreed to let the younger man claim that he was working at the Artisanat 
Nord-Sud store (so he would have a good pretext to apply for a visa 
under a phony name), but even filled out the visa application for him. 
Subsequently, in late October, Hawari, Samir Ait Muhammad, and 
another “brother” named Sa`id Harrar asked Rassam to open a new store 
for them under his fake Benni Noris visa name, so that they would be 
able to utilize this business to collect credit and ATM card information, a 
scheme that Rassam agreed to in exchange for payment. He was already 
aware that Hawari manufactured counterfeit documents in his 
Sherbrooke home, and had actually seen him mail the completed false 
documents overseas to the United States and other countries.444
 
In early November 1999, Rassam told Hawari that he had to carry out 
some “very important and dangerous business” in America and asked the 
latter to manufacture both a fake driver’s license and a bogus Algerian 
passport for him.445 He also asked if he could cash in his interest in their 
newly-opened Marche Benni store so that he could obtain some ready 
money. Hawari agreed to both requests, and shortly thereafter provided 
Rassam with a driver’s license in the name of Mario Roig along with 
3,000 Canadian dollars. During this same time period, Hawari indicated 
that he had a friend named `Abd al-Ghani Maskini who knew English 
well, lived in Brooklyn in the United States, loved American beer and 
Hollywood movies, had been involved in cons and bank fraud, wanted to 
travel to Afghanistan to train for jihad, and was willing to help Rassam 
carry out his mission. Rassam agreed to contact the man, took his contact 
information, and phoned him solely because his friend Hawari had 
vouched for him, and indicated that if he proved helpful there would no 
problem arranging for his travel to Afghanistan. Indeed, soon after 
Rassam contacted his al-Qa`ida liaisons Abu Ja`afar and Abu Duha to 
inform them of his plans and obtain visas for both Maskini and 
Dahoumane, with the result that Mustafa sent him two blank visas from 
London which he in turn passed on to Hawari so that forged stamps 
could be prepared for them. Rassam’s tentative plan was to meet up with 
Maskini after he entered the United States. 
 
Even before he flew from Montreal to Vancouver on November 17, 
1999, Rassam had purchased electronic components that he used to make 
circuits and four timing devices. He stayed in Vancouver for two weeks, 
during which time he and Dahoumane collected chemical materials from 
                                                 
444 Ibid., pp. 561-6, 589-91, 636-42. 
445 For the information in this paragraph, see ibid., pp. 577-84, 591, 594-7. 
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garden stores, including two fertilizers used in agriculture known as urea 
and aluminum sulfate, and both nitric and sulfuric acid, which they stole 
from companies that manufactured agricultural fertilizers.446 They then 
rented a room at the Motel 2400, where they began preparing the 
explosives. Rassam paid for the chemicals, motel, plane tickets, and auto 
rental with the money that both al-Mu`taz and Hawari had given him. 
When he returned to Montreal for the last time, he asked Hawari to send 
his proceeds from the store to his comrades in Britain, and advised him 
and Samir to lie and deny having known who he was if the police later 
questioned them. He then left Montreal for good and flew back to 
Vancouver on December 6 or 7, after which he and Dahoumane spent 
the following week completing the manufacture of the explosives before 
placing them in garbage bags or other containers and stuffing them into 
the wheel well of the trunk of Rassam’s rental car. On December 14, the 
two men drove from Vancouver to Victoria to catch an auto ferry to Port 
Angeles. In Victoria Rassam bought a ticket for the ferry, reserved a 
hotel room in Seattle, and bought Dahoumane – for whom he had 
already rented a motel room back in Vancouver and a plane flight to 
Montreal – a bus ticket for the return trip to Vancouver.447 As described 
above, when Rassam arrived in Port Angeles later that day, he panicked 
at the checkpoint and was arrested. 
 
Had he not been arrested, Rassam’s plan was to meet up with Maskini in 
Seattle, have him help transfer the explosives to some suitcases, return 
the rental car, and then take the train separately to Los Angeles. It was a 
long distance from Washington state to southern California, and Rassam 
was concerned that the explosives-laden trunks might be dangerously 
sensitive to shock, impact, or sudden motion. When he arrived in LA, he 
intended to make contact again with Maskini, get a hotel room, go with 
his new friend to get a rental car (using his fake name), and then head to 
the airport to follow through on his simple but potentially devastating 
plan. After carrying out the bombing, he hoped to make his way back to 
Montreal, say good bye to his friends, pick up the Algerian passport that 
Hawari had made for him, and then fly on to Europe and Algeria.448
 
In the end, however, Rassam was arrested as he tried to enter the United 
States. In April 2001, he was convicted in a Los Angeles courtroom on 
nine criminal counts, including conspiracy to commit an act of 
international terrorism. Facing a sentence of between 57 and 130 years in 
                                                 
446 Ibid., pp. 574-7, 591-3, 658; Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 11. 
447 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari, pp. 593-4, 600-6. 
448 Ibid., pp. 606-8;  
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prison, he was ready to listen when Department of Justice officials 
offered him a deal to reduce his sentence: in exchange for testifying 
against his friend Hawari and revealing everything he knew about al-
Qa`ida’s plots, training, and tactics, they offered to cut his minimum 
sentence by more than half, to 27 years. On May 10, 2001, the first of 
dozens of interviews with Rassam was conducted, in the course of which 
most of the details enumerated above emerged.449 In the end, even 
though he endeavored to conceal the identities and activities of some of 
his associates despite his agreement to reveal everything, and from 2003 
on became increasingly uncooperative, on July 27, 2005 Rassam was 
given only a 22-year sentence by a Seattle judge instead of the 35-year 
sentence that the prosecutors asked for. Since the judge’s leniency meant 
that Rassam might be released after spending only 14 years in jail (for 
time already served and good behavior), on August 26, 2005, the U.S. 
government decided to appeal that sentence.450
 
 
Relevance for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
The reasons why this particular case is relevant to any evaluation of al-
Qa`ida’s possible interests in targeting critical infrastructure are twofold. 
First, elements within the Algerian expatriate circles with which Rassam 
was associated were undoubtedly linked to al-Qa`ida. Not only had 
several of them received training in Bin Ladin’s Afghan camps, but their 
recruiters or handlers were key al-Qa`ida operations and logistics 
officers, such as Hannushi and Kamal. Rassam himself met personally in 
Pakistan with Abu Zubayda, a very senior operational leader of al-
Qa`ida, and was thereafter in semi-regular contact with two key al-
Qa`ida liaison officers, Abu Ja`afar in Pakistan and Abu Duha in 
London, from whom he periodically received assistance. Indeed, 
according to a formerly classified and now infamous intelligence memo 
concerning al-Qa`ida’s intentions, entitled “Bin Ladin Determined to 
Strike in US,” which was made available to President George W. Bush 
and his national security team on August 6, 2001, Rassam admitted both 
that Abu Zubayda had “encouraged him” to carry out an attack on 
American soil and “helped facilitate” it, and that Bin Ladin himself was 
                                                 
449 Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 16. 
450 Gene Johnson, “Would-Be Millenium Bomber Gets 22 Years,” Associated Press, 
July 27, 2005; Mike Carter, “US seeks longer sentence for Ahmed Ressam millennium 
bomb plot terrorist,” Seattle Times, August 26, 2005. 
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“aware of the Los Angeles operation.”451 Second, as Rassam himself also 
acknowledged, he had received advanced training in manufacturing 
explosives at certain Afghan camps, training which was specifically 
designed to help him attack targets that fall into the infrastructural 
category. Indeed, Rassam’s statement that he was trained “how to blow 
up the infrastructure of a country” suggests that at least some portions of 
that training were specifically geared toward attacking infrastructure qua 
infrastructure. 
 
However, that particular statement should probably not be interpreted too 
literally. As has been argued elsewhere, assaults on certain types of 
infrastructural targets enabled al-Qa`ida to achieve a multiplicity of 
operational objectives, including killing large numbers of people, 
exerting a profound psychological impact on hostile and friendly target 
audiences, striking famous symbolic targets, and physically damaging 
important buildings and facilities. Yet ironically, disrupting 
infrastructure in the narrow sense of that term seems not to have loomed 
particularly high in their considerations. That was seemingly true in this 
case as well. Among the indications of this were that Rassam and his 
“brothers” debated attacking a number of targets that did not fall into the 
category of critical infrastructure, e.g., Jewish neighborhoods in 
Montreal. Moreover, even when they considered attacking targets that 
could technically be construed as critical infrastructure, such as the 
Bureau of Exchange in Montreal, LAX, and government buildings such 
as an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Israeli 
embassy in Washington, DC, their main objectives were not in fact to 
disrupt the functioning of those facilities.452 For example, in the case of 
the Bureau of Exchange, the scheme was hatched as a possible means of 
stealing money that could thence be used to finance other jihadist 
operations, and both the planned bomb attack on LAX and the 
hypothetical plans to attack government buildings, including with 
                                                 
451 “Transcript: Bin Ladin determined to strike in US,” CNN, April 10, 2004. This 
memo later became a subject of political controversy, since it revealed that the Bush 
team’s post-9/11 claims not to have received any warnings about al-Qa`ida’s intentions 
of carrying out attacks on American soil were not, strictly speaking, true. Apparently, 
the reason why Bin Ladin knew about the North American Algerian cell’s plans was 
because in the summer of 1998 Abu Duha visited the al-Qa`ida leader in Qandahar and 
personally informed him. See Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 8.  
452 Schemes to attack an FBI office and the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, are 
mentioned in Bernton et al, “Terrorist Within,” chapter 16. 
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cyanide, were viewed as good ways to kill large numbers of “infidel” 
enemies.453
 
 
THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 “PLANES OPERATION”*
 
In the early morning of September 11, 2001, four teams of al-Qa`ida 
terrorists boarded four U.S. commercial jetliners, seized control of their 
cockpits, altered their courses, and flew them towards high-profile targets 
that had been pre-selected by the planners of the operation. The first 
aircraft to be seized was American Airlines flight 11, which was scheduled 
to take off at 7:45 am and fly directly from Boston’s Logan International 
Airport to Los Angeles airport. It was taken over by five hijackers – 
Muhammad `Ata, `Abd al-`Aziz al-`Umari, Sultan al-Suqami, Wa`il al-
Shahri, and his brother Walid al-Shahri – at around 8:14, re-routed to New 
York, and flown into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46. 
The second aircraft seized was United Airlines flight 175, which was 
scheduled to depart from Logan at 8:00 and fly directly to Los Angeles. It 
was taken over by five hijackers – Marwan al-Shihi, Muhand al-Shahri, 
Fayaz Rushd al-Qadi, Ahmad al-Ghamdi, and his brother Hamza al-
Ghamdi – between 8:42 and 8:46, re-routed to New York, and flown into 
the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03. The third flight seized 
was American Airlines flight 77, which was scheduled to take off from 
Dulles airport outside Washington, DC, at 8:10 and fly on to Los Angeles. 
It was seized by five hijackers - Hani Hanjur, Khalid al-Mikhdhar, Majid 
ibn Muqid al-Harbi, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and his brother Salim al-Hazmi – 
between 8:51 and 8:54, redirected back to D.C., and flown into the 
Pentagon at 9:37. The fourth aircraft seized was United Airlines flight 93, 
which was scheduled to depart from Newark airport at 8:15 and fly 
directly to San Francisco airport. It was taken over by four hijackers – 
Ziyad al-Jarrah, Ahmad al-Haznawi, Sa`id al-Ghamdi, and Ahmad al-
Na`mi – at 9:28 and rerouted towards D.C., but the passengers prevented 
the terrorists from flying the aircraft into the Capitol Building by storming 
the cockpit, which in turn caused al-Jarrah to crash the plane into a field in 
                                                 
453 Rassam testimony, U.S. v. Haouari,  pp. 624, 648-50. Note that the cyanide attack 
scheme directly conflicts with Rassam’s claims to have intended to avoid causing 
unnecessary casualties by, e.g., attacking a government building at night. See ibid., pp. 
626-7. 
* This section was prepared by Jeffrey M. Bale. 
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Pennsylvania.454 As a result of these attacks, nearly 3,000 American 
citizens lost their lives. 
Given the unusually spectacular, destructive, and traumatic nature of these 
particular terrorist attacks, which constituted the most effective surprise 
attack on American soil since the Japanese aerial assault on the U.S. naval 
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i on December 7, 1941, the basic course of 
the events that transpired on September 11, 2001 are etched in the minds 
and emotions of most Americans, perhaps above all those of the personnel 
in the U.S. counterterrorism community who were and remain responsible 
for preventing such attacks. Hence there is no real need to reconstruct the 
operational mechanics of these attacks in further detail, all the more so 
because the U.S. government has produced several “official” reports that 
have not only provided a thorough description of the attacks themselves, 
but also of a number of related matters, including the failure of the 
American intelligence community to respond appropriately to the many 
warning signs that such an attack was in the offing.455
 
Consequently, the aim of this particular section is not to go over the very 
same ground that has already been covered by others with a reasonable 
degree of thoroughness – albeit perhaps not exhaustively, given the 
persistence of certain unanswered or inadequately answered questions – but 
rather to focus specifically on the objectives of the sponsors and actual 
planners of the attacks: Usama bin Ladin, the military committee of al-
Qa`ida’s Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), and the actual architects of 
the attack plan, above all Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and his 
lieutenant Ramzi bin al-Shayb. The aim herein will be to try and determine 
whether the 9/11 attacks were conceived and prepared, narrowly speaking, 
as attacks on critical infrastructure. The best way to answer this question is 
to examine and analyze the statements made by KSM and Bin al-Shayb, 
both in the April 2002 interviews they solicited and then gave to Yosri 
                                                 
454 For the basic facts concerning the hijackings, see United States Government, 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, Final Report 
[hereafter 9/11 Commission Report] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2004), pp. 1-14. Compare also Der Spiegel [Editorial Team], Inside 9/11: What Really 
Happened (New York: St. Martin’s, 2001), esp. Part I and the two appendices, 
“Chronology of the Attacks” and “Timetables of the Hijacked Flights,” pp. 255-62; and 
Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most 
Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen (New York: Arcade, 2003), esp. 
pp. 142-5. 
455 See, e.g., ibid; and United States Government, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Report of the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S House Permanent 
Committee on Intelligence, 107th Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002). 
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Fouda, an investigative reporter for al-Jazira, and/or in the course of a series 
of interrogations following their capture in Pakistan. 
 
As is well-known, and in accordance with its custom at the time, al-Qa`ida 
did not immediately claim responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. Hence 
despite the certainty expressed by both terrorism experts and by the 
governments of the U.S. and Britain that Bin Ladin and his group had 
been responsible, all sorts of bogus “conspiracy theories” were soon 
concocted, whether disingenuously or sincerely, that suggested that other 
parties – most often the Americans themselves or the Jews and Israeli 
secret services – were secretly behind the catastrophic attack.456 Such lies 
and delusions should have been dispelled immediately when Bin Ladin 
openly admitted, during a videotaped private dinner on November 9, 2001 
with Sulayman Abu Ghayth and Ayman al-Zawahiri, that he had not 
expected the two towers to collapse, but some observers nevertheless 
insisted that the recovered and subsequently broadcast tape was a 
forgery.457 However, this sort of deception and self-deception became 
virtually impossible for rational people when on June 7, 2002, al-Jazira 
broadcast the videotaped last will and testament of Ahmad al-Haznawi, 
                                                 
456 For the distinction between bogus, all-encompassing “conspiracy theories” and the 
serious analysis of real-world covert and clandestine politics, see Jeffrey M. Bale, 
“Political Paranoia versus Political Realism: On Distinguishing between Bogus 
“Conspiracy Theories” and Genuine Conspiratorial Politics,” Patterns of Prejudice 41:1 
(February 2007), forthcoming. For representative examples from what has become a 
veritable cottage industry of recent conspiratorial books suggesting that someone other 
than al-Qa`ida was behind the 9/11 attacks – most often the Bush Administration itself 
and Israeli intelligence – or at least that Usama bin Ladin’s network was aided and 
abetted by more powerful and sinister forces operating behind the scenes, compare 
Thierry Meyssan, L’effroyable imposture: 11 September 2001 (Chatou: Carnot, 2002); 
idem, Le Pentagate (Chatou: Carnot, 2003); Eric Hufschmid, Painful Questions: An 
Analysis of the September 11th Attack (no place: Ink and Scribe, 2002); Jim Marrs, 
Inside Job: The Shocking Case for a 9/11 Conspiracy (San Rafael: Origin, 2005); 
David Icke, Alice in Wonderland and the World Trade Center Disaster: Why the 
Official Story of 9/11 is a Monumental Lie (Wildwood, MO: Bridge of Love, 2002); 
Arnold Schölzel, ed., Das Schweigekartell: Fragen und Widersprüche zum 11. 
September (Berlin: Homilius, 2002); Andreas von Bülow, Die critical infrastructureA 
und der 11. September (Munich: Piper, 2004); Maurizio Blondet, 11 settembre: Colpo 
di stato in USA (Milan: Effedieffe, 2002); idem, Osama bin Mossad (Milan: Effedieffe, 
2003); Bruno Cardeñosa, 11-S, historia de una infamia: Las mentiras de la “versión 
oficial” (Madrid: Corona Borealis, 2003); and Robin de Ruiter, 11 settembre: Il 
Reichstag di Bush (Frankfurt: Zambon, 2003). 
457 For a media report on Bin Ladin’s remarks at that dinner, see Ben Fenton, “Damned 
by his Gloating Smile,” The Telegraph, December 14, 2001. Compare also Fouda and 
Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, pp. 134-5. 
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one of the 9/11 hijackers.458 Further proof was presented in September of 
2002, when al-Jazira journalist Fouda publicly reported on his secret 
journey to Pakistan five months earlier to meet with KSM and Bin al-
Shayb, who had both proudly acknowledged their roles in planning the 
“planes operation.” Fouda and his fellow journalist Nick Fielding first 
published an article with these revelations in the London Sunday Times on 
September 8, 2002, and Fouda then followed this up on September 11 and 
12, 2002, by broadcasting a two-part television documentary on al-Jazira 
that contained, amongst much other evidence, direct statements by KSM 
and Bin al-Shayb claiming responsibility for “Holy Tuesday.” In between 
those two dates, on September 9, 2002, al-Jazira broadcast a propaganda 
video on the “planes operation” that had been prepared by KSM and Bin 
al-Shayb and released by al-Qa`ida’s own television production company, 
al-Sahab (The Clouds). Clearly, the two al-Qa`ida operatives had grown 
more and more concerned about the ongoing “attempts to strip the 
brothers of the credit” for carrying out the attacks, and wanted both to set 
the historical record straight and boast about their own roles in the 
event.459 What, then, can be learned from their firsthand accounts? 
 
Before turning to this question, some basic background information needs 
to be provided about KSM and Bin al-Shayb. KSM was an intelligent 
“terrorist entrepreneur” who, like his nephew Ramzi Yusuf, the ostensible 
planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was a Baluchi who 
grew up in Kuwait.460 He claims to have been brought up in a religious 
family, to have joined the Jami`yyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of 
the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood) at age 16, and to have 
become enamored of violent jihad. In 1983 he came to the U.S. to attend 
colleges in North Carolina, and in December 1986 earned a degree in 
                                                 
458 For the details in this paragraph, see ibid., pp. 151, 157-9. All but one of the 9/11 
hijackers had prepared such videotaped statements. However, as coincidence would 
have it, Bin al-Shayb was arrested after a shootout with Pakistani security forces on 
September 11, the very same day that Part I of Fouda’s documentary was shown on al-
Jazira. In order to head off increasing Muslim speculation that Fouda had somehow 
arranged to set up Bin al-Shayb, on September 21, 2002, al-Qa`ida released an official 
statement absolving Fouda of guilt. See ibid., pp. 161-2. 
459 Ibid., pp. 28 (quote), 114-15. To prove their involvement, Bin al-Shayb showed 
Fouda a briefcase full of 9/11 planning materials that had been used by `Ata and the 
other pilots, which included flight manuals, Boeing brochures, textbooks about how to 
fly, compact discs, flight simulator CD-ROMs. He had taken them from the Hamburg 
apartment shared by `Ata and other cell members. 
460 Much of the biographical information in the following paragraph is derived from the 
account in the 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 145-7, which is in turn based on 
information provided in KSM’s interrogation reports and other U.S. intelligence 
sources. Compare Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, pp. 88-92. 
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mechanical engineering. In 1987 he traveled to Peshawar to participate in 
the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, where he came under the influence of 
Afghan mujahidin commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf, a Pashtun 
professor who had trained at al-Azhar University in Egypt, converted to 
Wahhabism during a sojourn in Saudi Arabia, was sent back to 
Afghanistan by the Saudi intelligence service to organize a Wahhabi 
political party known as the Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan 
(Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan), and in 1986 established 
the “university” of Da`wa al-Jihad (Call to Jihad) outside Peshawar, where 
20,000 mujahidin are said to have received guerrilla training.461 KSM was 
one of those who received such training, and he claims to have then fought 
on the frontlines for three months before being recruited by the famous 
Shaykh `Abdallah `Azzam to perform administrative duties. Between 
1988 and 1992 he worked at an Islamic NGO sponsored by Sayyaf that 
was designed to aid Arab volunteers. After going to Bosnia to fight for a 
period, KSM took a position in Qatar as a project engineer in a 
government ministry. However, this phase of relative normalcy and 
inaction was not destined to last. 
 
For his part, Ramzi bin al-Shayb was a Yemeni who family members 
and boyhood friends recall as being friendly, likable, mischievous, and 
“religious, but not too religious.”462 After working as a clerk for the 
International Bank of Yemen between 1987 and 1995, Bin al-Shayb 
applied for but ultimately failed to obtain a U.S. visa. Instead, in 
September 1995 he traveled to Germany under a false name, claimed to 
be a Sudanese citizen, and requested asylum. He lived for a while in a 
Hamburg flat on Zimmerstrasse with Muhammad ibn Nasir Balfas, an 
unofficial “minister of [Islamic] immigrants,” worked a few odd jobs, 
and hung out at local mosques together with other alienated Muslim 
émigrés, including Muhammad `Ata. Investigators now believe that it 
was at the al-Quds mosque, a fundamentalist haven established by 
                                                 
461 For the background of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, see ibid., pp. 91, 93; John K. Cooley, 
Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 
2000), pp. 232, 237-8; Mary Anne Weaver, A Portrait of Egypt: A Journey Through the 
World of Militant Islam (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), pp. 180, 210-12; 
and Terry McDermott et al, “The Plots and Designs of Al Qaeda’s Engineer,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 22, 2002. Later on, appalled by the Saudi regime’s decision 
to allow U.S. troops to use the kingdom as a military base to repel Saddam Husayn 
from Kuwait, Sayyaf made an ideological transition from Wahhabism to jihadist 
Salafism. 
462 For the basic biographical information below, see 9/11 Commission Report, p. 161; 
Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, pp. 73-5; and Terry McDermott, Perfect 
Soldier. The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It (New York: Harper Collins, 
2005), pp. 36-46. 
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Moroccan radicals on Steindammstrasse in Hamburg, that `Ata and the 
other members of his group – including Bin al-Shayb – were recruited by 
al-Qa`ida.463 In any event, when his asylum appeal was denied in 1997, 
Bin al-Shayb briefly went home to Yemen, but soon returned under his 
true name to Germany, where he registered as a student. His energies 
were never devoted to academic pursuits, however, and as a result he 
was expelled from school in September 1998. By then, Bin al-Shayb and 
`Ata had become itinerant teachers in their own extremist Islamic study 
group, were core members of an al-Qa`ida cell in Hamburg centered at 
the so-called bayt al-ansar (House of the Supporters) apartment at 54 
Marienstrasse, traveled to Afghanistan for further training, and at the end 
were busily engaged in preparing for the “planes operation.” Bin al-
Shayb himself was originally slated to be the “twentieth hijacker,” but 
after repeated failures to obtain entry into the U.S. he instead became one 
of the key logistical operatives and intermediaries between KSM and the 
various 9/11 hijacker teams.464
 
Target Selection 
 
In order to assess the operational objectives of the “planes operation” 
properly, it is necessary to consider the other terrorist actions that KSM 
and his close associates had planned and/or actually carried out in the 
years leading up to September 11, 2001. Otherwise, there is a danger of 
artificially extracting the 9/11 attacks from their context, i.e., the overall 
pattern of spectacular plots that the two men devised over the years, 
which might conceivably lead observers to misinterpret the motivations 
and objectives of what jihadists nowadays refer to as the “blessed 
operation” and “Holy Tuesday.” The first question that needs to be 
addressed, however, is whether it was KSM or his nephew Ramzi Yusuf 
who was the real instigator of this series of plots, or whether both jointly 
contributed to their development. Unfortunately, it is difficult to resolve 
this matter on the basis of the currently available information. According 
to the reconstruction of the 9/11 Commission Report, KSM was himself 
inspired to plan operations against the U.S. by his nephew Yusuf’s bold 
1993 attack on the WTC, after which he accompanied his relative to the 
                                                 
463 For the al-Quds [Jerusalem] mosque, see ibid., pp. 1-5; and Inside 9/11, pp. 187-8. It 
is, however, possible that some members of the cell had been recruited even before they 
arrived in Germany. 
464 [Central Intelligence Agency], “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed” [hereafter “KSM Testimony”], pp. 29-30. Bin al-Shayb expressed regret 
to Fouda that he had not been able to take part in the 9/11 operation. See Fouda and 
Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 119. 
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Philippines in 1994.465 In contrast, Fouda and Fielding suggest that KSM 
may have been the person who actually came up with idea of attacking 
the WTC in 1993, whereas Yusuf functioned essentially as the attack’s 
“main planner and organiser” within the U.S.466 Indeed, in the two 
journalists’ depiction, KSM is portrayed as someone who probably 
played a role in tempering Yusuf’s hotheadedness and initial lack of 
strategic forethought. Among the many reasons why it is difficult to shed 
more light on this matter is that the two relatives were very close when 
they were growing up, and that they subsequently operated in small, 
tight-knit cells made up primarily of their own family members and close 
friends, which implies that they most likely bounced ideas off one 
another in the course of regular interactions over a period of years.467 
However that may be, both men were apparently determined to make a 
name for themselves in jihadist circles, and thus spent time coming up 
with innovative and often spectacular schemes. 
 
When one considers the various plots hatched and attacks carried out by 
Yusuf and KSM between the 1993 WTC bombing and 9/11, it soon 
becomes evident that their most noticeable common denominator was 
their relatively innovative and potentially spectacular nature. Having 
settled in Manila in 1994, since al-Qa`ida was then making strenuous 
efforts to solidify links with regional jihadist groups such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI: Islamic Community) in Indonesia and both the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the 
Philippines, the two men were soon involved in the execution of a series 
of terrorist attacks, including the 1994 bombings of an important Shi`i 
shrine in the Iranian city of Mashad, the Greenbelt Theatre in Manila, 
and a Philippines Air Line (PAL) passenger jet destined for Japan. 
(Some have also blamed KSM for organizing twenty simultaneous 
bombings in ten different Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve of 2000, as 
well as five bombings in Manila less than a week later.) They also 
planned numerous other strikes, including the assassinations of Pakistani 
leader Benazir Bhutto, U.S. President Bill Clinton, Pope John Paul II, 
Philippine President Fidel Ramos, and an Iranian government official, 
and the bombings of international schools, Catholic churches, other Shi`i 
shrines, nuclear plants, Israeli and American embassies, local 
government installations, and U.S.-bound cargo carriers. Perhaps most 
                                                 
465 9/11 Commission Report, p. 147. This interpretation seems to be seconded by 
McDermott, Perfect Soldiers, p. 139. 
466 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 95. 
467 Ibid., pp. 89-90, 92-3. For example, two of KSM’s brothers and several of Yusuf’s 
younger brothers were involved in interrelated jihadist activities, and their cell in the 
Philippines incorporated two old friends. 
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ambitious of all, the crown jewel of the so-called “Oplan Bojinka” plot 
envisioned the blowing up of twelve U.S. passenger jets in flight over the 
Pacific during a two-day period.468  
 
However, several of the most spectacular of these projected actions 
collapsed in the wake of a chemical fire that erupted in Yusuf’s Manila 
apartment in January 1995, immediately after which his bomb-making 
lab was discovered by police, forcing both men to hastily leave the 
Philippines. Although Yusuf himself was arrested at the Su Casa 
guesthouse in Islamabad by Pakistani authorities on February 7, 1995, 
KSM managed to escape to Qatar. However, in January 1996, aware that 
the Americans were after him, KSM fled to Afghanistan and renewed his 
relationship with Abdul Sayyaf. Shortly thereafter, Bin Ladin and the 
cadres from al-Qa`ida began arriving in the area after having departed 
from the increasingly inhospitable Sudan. It was not long before KSM, 
taking advantage of the fame accrued by his nephew Yusuf, managed to 
make contact with al-Qa`ida’s leader. 
 
What is most striking about this list of projected actions, apart from their 
grandiose scope, operational creativity, and potentially devastating 
human and material costs, is the tremendous diversity of the targets 
chosen by the individuals who later masterminded the catastrophic “Holy 
Tuesday” assaults. This alone provides a clear indication that KSM and 
Yusuf were not thinking exclusively about damaging critical 
infrastructure in selecting their targets, which in turn suggests that the 
9/11 “planes operation” was also not conceived with such a narrow 
purpose in mind. Such a conclusion appears even more probable when 
one considers 1) the range of targets discussed in connection with the 
prospective “martyrdom” operation on U.S. soil, and 2) the diverse 
motives expressed by the actual planners for launching them. 
 
In terms of the phases in the evolution of the plan, the initial idea may 
have been that of `Abd al-Hakim Murad, a close friend of Yusuf’s and a 
                                                 
468 For more on this, see Simon Reeves, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin 
Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University, 1999), pp. 65-93; 
Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia:  Crucible of Terror (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), esp. pp. 101-10; 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 147-8. 
The name “Oplan Bojinka” combines the Bahasa Malay term for “operation” and the 
Bosnian term for “explosion,” and therefore means “Operation Explosion.” The 
relatively small bomb detonated by Yusuf on the PAL jetliner, which killed a Japanese 
businessman, was intended as a test run for the preparation of the explosive devices that 
were to be used in the grand plan to down twelve U.S. planes. For more information on 
this plot, please refer to Box 7.5 in chapter 7 of this report. 
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trained pilot, who revealed that he had discussed flying an explosives-
laden plane into the headquarters of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) with KSM in 1994. Furthermore, both KSM and Murad later told 
interrogators that they themselves, together with Yusuf and Wali Khan 
`Amin Shah, initially conceived of “Oplan Bojinka” in that same year, 
after they had gathered in the Philippines to form a terrorist operational 
cell.469 This is very important because, according to the Philippine 
National Police, the laptop found in Yusuf’s Manila apartment contained 
a good deal of revealing operational information, including the outline of 
an “alternate plan” in the event that “Oplan Bojinka” could not be carried 
out. This alternate plan was a veritable blueprint for 9/11, in that it 
discussed crashing jetliners into the World Trade Center, the White 
House, the Pentagon, the John Hancock Building and Sears Tower in 
Chicago, and the Transamerica Building in San Francisco. In short, if 
Philippine police sources can be trusted, the outline of a 9/11-style plan 
had been formulated as early as 1994, and information regarding that 
plan had been provided to U.S. intelligence officials by 1995.470
 
Next, in the middle of 1996, during a meeting with Bin Ladin in Tora 
Bora that had been arranged by Muhammad Atif, the head of al-Qa`ida’s 
military committee, KSM took the opportunity to brief the wealthy Saudi 
mujahid on the 1993 WTC bombing and the various plots that he and 
Yusuf had hatched in the Philippines. At this initial meeting KSM, in an 
effort to secure funding, claims to have outlined several prospective 
terrorist operations, including a bold scheme to hijack ten U.S. airliners 
and fly them into high-profile targets on American soil, five on the East 
Coast and five on the West Coast.471 Bin Ladin was initially skeptical 
about the feasibility of such an operation and was therefore non-
committal, but two years later, in the wake of his “declaration of war” on 
America and the 1998 bombings of the two U.S. embassies in Africa, he 
summoned KSM to a meeting and asked him to plan an operation 
involving the hijacking of jetliners and flying them into American 
targets. The al-Qa`ida leader stated that he wished to attack the 
Pentagon, the White House, and the Capitol Building simultaneously.472 
Shortly thereafter, when Muhammad `Ata was selected as a key 
participant in the operation, Bin Ladin convened another meeting at 
which he, Abu Hafs, `Ata, and KSM were all present. At that point, 
                                                 
469 Compare “KSM Testimony,” pp. 4. 27; and Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of 
Terror, pp. 98-9. For the context, see Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 101-
6. 
470 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 99. 
471 “KSM Testimony,” pp. 4-5, 10. Compare 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 148-9. 
472 “KSM Testimony,” pp. 4-5, 11-12. 
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operating under the assumption that only three pilots would be available, 
Shaykh Usama indicated that he wanted to hit one military, one political, 
and one economic target. The men then discussed dozens of potential 
targets, including the World Trade Center, a nuclear reactor, the Empire 
State Building, the headquarters of the CIA and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), a foreign embassy in Washington, DC, and a 
location with a “large Jewish population.” At this meeting, KSM 
expressed the view that large U.S. buildings were both vulnerable to 
attack and easy to strike.473 Finally, before KSM moved from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan, Bin Ladin gave him a list of targets and 
specifically told him that four targets must be hit: both towers of the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Capitol Building.474
 
Other specifics are of interest in this context. First, KSM passed Bin 
Ladin’s list and instructions on to `Ata, who was told that, apart from the 
four targets that had already been pre-selected by al-Qa`ida’s leader, he 
was free to choose from among various other targets. These latter 
included the White House, the Sears Tower, and a foreign embassy in 
DC. Using a computer program, `Ata also managed to locate a nuclear 
power plant in Pennsylvania, which Bin Ladin agreed to add to the target 
list.475 This is significant, because at their earlier target selection 
meeting, the principal planners of the “planes operation” had discussed 
attacking a couple of nuclear facilities but had rejected the idea because 
they thought it might be too risky. However, in 2002 KSM told Fouda 
that this idea was only temporarily abandoned – “for now,” as he put it – 
thereby strongly implying that it might well be resuscitated in the 
future.476 Bin Ladin’s decision to add the nuclear plant suggested by `Ata 
suggests that by 1999 he had already overcome his earlier reservations 
about targeting such a facility. 
 
Second, as has long been typical of al-Qa`ida attacks, in order to 
maintain compartmentalization and thereby ensure the operation’s 
overall security, individuals were informed about the 9/11 plot on a 
need-to-know basis. The particular operational details were as usual left 
to the actual executors of the plan, to the extent that higher-up leaders 
and planners were themselves generally only informed about them at the 
last minute or after the fact. Thus, in this instance the specific 
distribution of the hijacking teams was left to `Ata, who had been 
                                                 
473 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
474 Ibid., p. 14. 
475 Ibid., p. 13. 
476 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 114. 
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appointed by Bin Ladin as the `amir (commander) of the “planes 
operation,” whereas the decisions about which planes would strike which 
targets were left to `Ata and the other pilots.477
 
Third, in the Spring and Summer of 1999, after two of the initial four 
pilots selected for the 9/11 attacks found themselves unable to obtain 
U.S. visas, KSM altered the initial scheme and developed a two-prong 
plan. In the first phase, American airliners would be hijacked, turned into 
missiles, and flown into major targets within the U.S. In the second, 
Muhammad Salih ibn Attash and Abu Bara al-Yamani – the two 
Yemenis who were not allowed to enter the U.S. – were assigned the 
task of hijacking and blowing up planes in flight over the Pacific Ocean 
in Asia, which essentially constituted an attempt to revive “Oplan 
Bojinka.” The purpose of carrying out two separate terrorist spectaculars, 
in the words of KSM, was to “maximize the psychological impact of the 
attack.” In the Spring of 2000, however, Bin Ladin canceled the Asian 
portion of the plan because he thought it would be too difficult to 
synchronize the two actions.478
 
Finally, plans were set in motion by KSM and al-Qa`ida’s military 
leaders to launch a series of “second wave” attacks to follow up the 9/11 
strikes. Initially, the term “second wave” referred to any and all actions 
that might be taken in the wake of the “planes operation” to multiply its 
impact, including aerial attacks, “subway strikes, poisoning of reservoirs, 
demolition of bridges, etc.” 479 However, it was later used in a more 
restrictive fashion to refer to 9/11-style attacks carried out elsewhere 
within the U.S. In contrast to the initial attacks, the hijackers in the 
“second wave” attacks were selected because they held passports from 
Western or Asian rather than Arab countries, which is one reason why 
French passport-holder Zakhariyya Mussawi was one of the two pilots 
that had been lined up for this phase despite his haughty attitude and 
consistently poor tradecraft. Although the exact targets had not been 
determined when Mussawi’s arrest caused KSM to abandon the whole 
“second wave” operation, which was in any case in only a rudimentary 
stage of preparation, a number of targets had been considered, including 
the “tallest building in California,” a bridge in the San Francisco or San 
                                                 
477 “KSM Testimony,” pp. 28-9, 32. The one exception is that KSM assigned Hani 
Hanjur, the most experienced of the four pilots, to target the Pentagon, a lower building 
that was more difficult to hit with a jetliner. See ibid., pp. 23-4. 
478 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
479 Ibid., pp. 37-8. 
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Mateo area, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the White House, and a foreign 
embassy in DC.480
 
 
Relevance for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
On the basis of this overview of the targeting decisions for the 9/11 
operation and projected follow-up attacks, which has been drawn almost 
entirely from the testimony of its mastermind KSM, one can conclude 
that at least five direct objectives were being pursued by al-Qa`ida.481 
The first was entirely practical: to attack targets that could be 
successfully attacked. Throughout KSM’s testimony there are indications 
that practical considerations influenced al-Qa`ida’s targeting decisions in 
this case, and that plans were altered to increase the likelihood of the 
success of the attacks. To provide just one additional illustrative 
example, it was decided to target the Capitol Building rather than the 
White House for essentially navigational reasons, i.e., the latter was 
smaller and harder to strike.482 Second, the planners of the attack clearly 
wanted to produce a huge psychological impact on target audiences, both 
the American people and Muslim observers who al-Qa`ida hoped to 
inspire. As noted above, KSM specifically indicated that he wished to 
“maximize the psychological impact of the attack.”483 Elsewhere, he 
stated that the attacks were designed to create “havoc” and to “be a big 
slap for the American people on American soil,” as well as something 
calculated to “wake the American people up” to the supposedly anti-
Muslim policies of their own government, which is why not only 
governmental or military targets were chosen.484 This proclaimed 
emphasis on generating psychological effects on wider target audiences 
is precisely why the 9/11 attacks can be described, in the technical sense, 
as acts of terrorism. Third, the sponsors and planners of these attacks 
clearly wanted to cause “as many deaths as possible.”485 Fourth, KSM 
admitted that tall buildings and other high-profile targets were selected 
for their “symbolic” value and impact.486 It is this that serves to explain 
Bin Ladin’s expressed desire to attack well-known political, military, 
                                                 
480 Ibid., pp. 14-15, 37, 40-1, 43, 52. 
481 The author is here distinguishing between direct objectives and indirect objectives, 
such as provoking an American overreaction at home and invasion of Muslim territory. 
482 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 127. 
483 “KSM Testimony,” pp. 5-6. 
484 See, respectively, Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 114; and “KSM 
Testimony,” p. 11. 
485 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, p. 114. 
486 “KSM Testimony,” p. 14. 
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and economic targets in the U.S. Fifth, there is no doubt that al-Qa`ida 
wished to damage economically valuable American targets. KSM 
himself specifically acknowledged that New York City was “always the 
first target on my mind” because it was the “economic capital of the 
U.S.”487 Moreover, among the potential follow-up attacks being 
considered were “subway strikes, poisoning of reservoirs, demolition of 
bridges, etc.,” all of which are constitute part of the critical infrastructure 
of this country.488 This surely is indicative of the fact that one of the 
many objectives Bin Ladin was pursuing in carrying out the 9/11 attacks 
was to cause economic damage by striking infrastructural targets. 
 
Even so, precisely because so many different motives were explicitly 
mentioned by the planners of the “planes operation,” it would be ill-
advised to assume that the sole or even that the primary objective of the 
9/11 attacks was to harm infrastructure qua infrastructure. Here, as in so 
many other instances, one can identify multiple motives behind the attack. 
In short, even when considering the most spectacular of all modern 
terrorist attacks, one which did in fact strike significant components of the 
critical infrastructure of the U.S., one is forced to acknowledge that this 
does not seem to have been the main purpose for carrying out these 
devastating assaults. Furthermore, although this was not specifically 
mentioned by KSM, in part because it is such a base, vulgar, and only 
partially conscious motive, there is no doubt that the 9/11 attacks were 
carried out in part for less-than-rational “expressive” reasons, specifically 
to express the jihadists’ outright hatred for Western “unbelievers” and to 
satisfy their overwhelming desire to avenge the “oppression” and 
“humiliation” of Muslims, real or imagined, at the hands of the “Great 
Satan” and its client regimes in the Middle East. This is implied by Fouda 
and Fielding, who characterized Yusuf as a “desperately angry man” who 
displayed “little strategic thought” prior to falling under KSM’s 
influence.489 Perhaps this compulsion to deal out death and destruction to 
the “enemies” of Islam is why Yusuf – and, by extension, many other 
jihadists – had “no qualms about mass murder, indeed he wanted to be 
sure everyone on the [Bojinka] planes would die…”490
 
 
                                                 
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid., pp. 37-8. 
489 Fouda and Fielding, Masterminds of Terror, pp. 97. 
490 Reeve, New Jackals, p. 77. 
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THE AYMAN FARIS CASE: AL-QA`IDA 
PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK A NEW YORK CITY 
BRIDGE AND DERAIL TRAINS*
 
The general goal of destroying or disrupting transportation infrastructure, 
most notably the destruction of bridges that provide vital transportation 
routes in and out of major cities, was laid out in a the already-cited 1980s 
al-Qa`ida training manual found by police in Manchester, England. A 
recent plot to destroy New York City’s Brooklyn Bridge provides 
evidence of ongoing al-Qa`ida intent, specific plans, and preparations for 
carrying out such attacks. In 2003, U.S. authorities arrested and 
convicted Pakistani-born American citizen, Ohio truck driver, and al-
Qa`ida operative Ayman Faris for assisting a foreign terrorist 
organization and planning to commit a terrorist act by providing material 
support and resources to al-Qa`ida in the plot. Faris won a plea bargain 
in exchange for cooperating with federal authorities. Since then, 
however, his lawyers have sought to overturn the verdict by contesting 
the legality of the state’s evidence, which was gathered using the 
infamous NSA surveillance “wiretaps.” 
 
The prosecutor’s statement of facts in “USA v. Iyman Faris”, to which 
Faris pled guilty under the plea bargain, charged that in early 2002 Faris 
had been informed by a top al-Qa`ida operative (unnamed in the court 
transcripts491) of a plan to bring down an unidentified New York City 
bridge by severing its suspension cables, as well as about a plot to derail 
trains. Faris was asked to procure equipment for these operations. In 
April 2002, Faris returned to the U.S. from Pakistan and carried out 
internet research on the targeted bridge and the so-called “gas cutters” 
needed for severing its suspension cables. He then approached an 
acquaintance with a technical background and inquired how he might 
obtain the gas cutters. Between April 2002 and March 2003, Faris 
communicated via email with an unnamed top al-Qa`ida operative 
regarding his continuing efforts to obtain the equipment for both the 
bridge attack and train derailment operations. When one al-Qa`ida 
operative who was handling Faris during the operation’s planning and 
preparations was arrested in the U.S., Faris inquired about the arrest with 
another unnamed top al-Qa`ida leader. In late 2002, Faris traveled to 
New York City to make an onsite assessment of the bridge’s 
                                                 
* This section was prepared by Gordon M. Hahn. 
491 Several news articles have identified the al-Qa`ida operative in question as Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad, see Newsweek “Terrorists in Our Midst” and “Al Qaeda in 
America.” 
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vulnerability to the attack as planned. In a coded message to his al-
Qa`ida mentors, he concluded that the bridge’s structure and security 
were such that the plot’s success was “very unlikely” to succeed.492
 
It is clear from this case involving plots to destroy bridges that al-Qa`ida 
regards this element of infrastructure as an important potential target. 
Aside from the call to destroy bridges providing routes into and out of 
large cities in the al-Qa`ida training manual cited earlier, it is difficult to 
determine precisely whether the importance of bridges as a target for al-
Qa`ida is because of the likelihood that lots of “infidels” might be killed, 
or because of the financial cost that would be incurred to rebuild a similar 
structure, or because of the losses to the economy resulting from the 
disruption of transportation routes. It is nonetheless clear, depending upon 
the location and nature of the targeted bridge, that the desired damage 
could be financial, symbolic, and even security-related should it come on 
the eve of another from of attack on the city or cities which the bridge 
services. There is no reason to presume that the recent calls by al-Zawahiri 
to focus on oil targets, which perhaps suggest a renewed interest in critical 
infrastructure writ large, would exclude renewed efforts to strike targets 
such as bridges and other transportation infrastructure.   
 
 
FALSE “AL-QA`IDA” CLAIMS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR ACCIDENTAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
DISASTERS*
 
In addition to actually attacking critical infrastructure, al-Qa`ida and its 
associates have also falsely claimed responsibility for accidents or other 
incidents involving infrastructural targets. The attraction behind taking 
credit for incidents that inflict damage on the United States or other areas 
should not be surprissing. If such claims were to be believed, al-Qa`ida 
and its affiliates would be able to further their psychological warfare 
against target populations and demonstrate their continued presence – all 
without actually making the effort to orchestrate the attacks in question. 
A short examination of two occasions where terrorist claims have been 
proven false will highlight this phenomenon:  
 
                                                 
492 Prosecution’s Statement of Facts in the Case of “USA v. Iyman Faris,” 
Findlaw.com, 
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/faris/usfaris603sof.pdf, pp. 3-4. 
* This section was prepared by Elle DiLorenzo. 
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The 2003 Blackouts 
 
The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, an avowed affiliate of al-Qa`ida, 
claimed responsibility for the August 14, 2003 power blackouts that 
stretched across the Northeast and Midwest of the United States and into 
parts of Canada. The claim came one week after the blackout, while both 
Americans and Canadians were having trouble explaining the cause of the 
incident. The Brigades published an Internet communiqué claiming 
responsibility for “Operation Quick Lightning in the Land of the Tyrant of 
this Generation.” The group stated that they had triggered the blackout by 
attacking two electrical generators on the East Coast, adding that they 
could not reveal how these plants were struck because they planned to use 
the same method again. The message also asserted that the attack was 
carried out on orders from Usama bin Ladin to target the U.S. economy, 
and represented a “realisation of bin Laden’s promise to offer the Iraqi 
people a present.”493 The communiqué added, “let the criminal Bush and 
his gang know that the punishment is the result of the action, the soldiers 
of God cut the power on these cities, they darkened the lives of the 
Americans as these criminals blackened the lives of the Muslim people in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. The Americans lived a black day they 
will never forget. They lived a day of terror and fear…a state of chaos and 
confusion where looting and pillaging rampaged the cities, just like the 
capital of the caliphate Baghdad, and Afghanistan and Palestine were. Let 
the American people take a sip from the same glass.”494
 
However, a U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
investigation found that the blackouts, which left 50 million people 
without electricity and cost between $4-10 billion dollars, were caused 
by a series of human and system failures at the utility companies that 
combined to transform a potentially small outage into a major blackout. 
In addition, a complementary investigation by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the North American Electrical Reliability Council, 
and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not discover “any evidence 
indicating that the outages were the result of activity by international or 
                                                 
493 “Al-Qa’ida Claims Responsibility for Last Week’s Blackout,” The Middle East 
Media Research Institute,” Special Dispatch Series - No. 553, August 19, 2003, 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP55303, Last 
Accessed May 11, 2006. 
494 Mohamad Saleh, “Al Qaeda Claims Responsibility For Power Blackout In U.S.!” 
Dar Al-Hayat Website, August 18, 2003, http://english.daralhayat.com/arab_news/08-
2003/Article-20030818-14bdd659-c0a8-01ed-0079-6e1c903b7552/story.html. 
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domestic terrorists or other criminal activity.”495 FBI officials further 
added that “the claim of the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade to have caused 
the blackout appears to be no more than wishful thinking.”496
 
The British Petroleum Oil Refinery Explosion 
 
Another such case occurred when two previously unknown groups 
claimed responsibility for an explosion at the British Petroleum (BP) oil 
refinery in Texas City, Texas, on March 23, 2005. The incident killed 15 
and injured 170 others. Both the Al-Qaeda Organization for Holy War in 
the United States of America and the militant group Jund al-Sham 
(Soldiers of the Levant) took credit for the blast. 
 
Jund al-Sham, a group operating under the greater al-Qa`ida “umbrella,” 
posted their claim on an Islamist Internet website the day after the attack. 
The message stated that the attack “was a new kind of operation as we 
promised before.”497  It went on to say that “Jund al-Sham is able to attack 
with an iron fist all the enemies of Allah wherever they are. This operation 
was a big surprise, which we spoke of in other statements, and we will 
continue our suicide operations inside and outside America, and we will 
attack the economy of America as America did the economies of the 
Muslims.”498 The statement also contained threats to carry out attacks in 
Italy and Britain, claiming that these actions would continue “until the last 
soldier of the Crusaders or Jews is no longer in an Islamic country.”499
 
The FBI rejected both claims for the incident, having “found no evidence 
to support criminal or terrorist activity.”500 BP’s investigation into the 
event revealed that the fluid levels in a splitter tower were 20 times 
                                                 
495 “FBI Infrastructure Awareness,” Testimony of Larry A. Mefford, Executive 
Assistant Director, FBI, Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and 
Research and Development, and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border 
Security of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 4, 2003. 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/mefford090403.htm. 
496 Ibid. 
497 “Group claiming Qatar bombing says it carried out Texas refinery blast,” Agence 
France Presse – English, March 25, 2005. 
498 Ibid. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Statement by Al Tribble, Houston FBI office spokesman. “FBI rejects Islamic terror 
link to Texas refinery blast,” AFX International Focus, March 28, 2005. 
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higher than they should have been. This caused overheating and led to 
the explosion.501  
                                                 
501 “BP Issues Final Report on Fatal Explosion, Announces $1 billion Investment at 
Texas City,” British Petroleum Press Release, December 9, 2005. 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7012963. 
Accessed May 10, 2006.  
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Chapter nine:  
 
Conclusion*
 
 
 
n light of the massive spending on and resource allocation towards 
protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure, including the creation 
of a dedicated division within the Department of Homeland Security, 
the development of a National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the 
maintenance of a plethora of joint public-private advisory boards 
representing individual infrastructures, one might assume that there is a 
comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by terrorist adversaries 
to this target set. Yet the vast majority of the theoretical and analytical 
work dealing with critical infrastructure protection has focused on the 
vulnerability and consequence aspects of the overall risk equation, with 
relatively little serious study of terrorist motivations as they relate to 
critical infrastructure targets. This study represents an effort to delve 
more deeply into the extent of the threat posed by al-Qa`ida, arguably the 
single most dangerous terrorist organization operating at present, to 
critical infrastructure on American soil, both now and in the future. 
I 
 
The approach adopted herein has been an open-ended one that has 
involved examining the question from various perspectives and 
consulting a wide variety of source materials that bear on the topic, 
ranging from sacred religious texts and historical accounts to al-Qa`ida-
linked source materials and the firsthand testimony of captured members 
of the group. It has also intentionally combined multiple approaches, 
including exploring the more esoteric religio-historical referents that 
serve to influence al-Qa`ida’s behavior, providing a strategic analysis of 
its targeting, closely examining the statements and writings of al-Qa`ida 
leaders and spokesmen (including primary source translations), offering 
a descriptive analysis of its past global attack patterns, and producing 
concise but nonetheless in-depth case studies of its previous attacks on 
U.S. soil.   
                                                 
* This chapter was prepared by Gary A. Ackerman and Jeffrey M. Bale, with Charles 
Blair and Elle DiLorenzo. 
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At the outset, the above analyses tend to support the preliminary 
assessment made by some of the authors in an earlier report, namely, that 
transnational jihadist organizations are amongst the most likely extremist 
groups to conduct successful attacks against targets that U.S. officials 
would categorize as elements of this country’s critical infrastructure. 
These networks clearly have the operational capabilities to carry out such 
attacks, even on a large scale, and they display a number of ideological 
proclivities that may incline them to attack such targets. Yet, the study 
has also yielded more detailed insights into the behavior and orientation 
of al-Qa`ida and its affiliated networks. In order to synthesize these 
findings, we now revisit the framing questions listed in the introductory 
chapter and address each one in turn. 
 
 
1. Does al-Qa`ida perceive “infrastructure” or “critical 
infrastructure” as a species of target different from other 
target types? 
 
The question of whether al-Qa`ida as a whole perceives infrastructure as 
a distinct species of target is a rather complex matter. Al-Qa`ida sources 
do occasionally mention infrastructure, and to some extent evince an 
understanding of the “criticality” of certain infrastructures, but this does 
not necessarily mean that they perceive infrastructure in the same way 
that the U.S. government defines and analyzes it.  
 
Within the broader Islamic historical and religious tradition there are 
many allusions to targets that can be broadly conceived of as 
infrastructure. Several of these referents provide a justification, explicitly 
or implicitly, for launching strikes against present-day infrastructural 
targets, and perhaps even for adopting specific types of plans of attack. 
In that sense, attacks on critical infrastructural clearly fall within the 
Islamic historical tradition, as embodied in the military actions taken or 
authorized by Muhammad himself, such as attacks on the caravan trade 
and the burning of date-palms.  
 
What emerges is something less than a full-blown prescription within the 
Islamic tradition for attacking critical infrastructures. What this tradition 
does provide is ample raw material from which al-Qa`ida, which has in 
fact radicalized Islamic traditions of warfare, can justify (at least to its 
own followers) attacking critical infrastructure targets should such 
targets be chosen. Moreover, it should be reiterated that its radicalization 
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and selective reading of Islamic tenets mean that the group is unlikely to 
embrace or be bound by any religious prohibitions on attacking such 
targets.  
 
In addition to providing legitimization for their attack choices, the 
Islamic historical record, real and imagined, can and does serve as a 
source of inspiration for contemporary jihadists. For this reason Islam’s 
historical “infrastructural” attacks could provide a kind of model for the 
zealous attack planner. As noted above, to the creative operative the 
poisoning of water wells and the destruction of fruit trees might, for 
example, suggest attacks on water reservoirs and river dams, as well as 
on agricultural and food supplies with chemical or biological agents. 
However, these types of attacks are not the only kinds that were carried 
out by Muhammad and his commanders, and as such it is possible to 
justify attacking all sorts of targets on the basis of the Prophet’s 
exhortations and actions. Therefore historical episodes only represent a 
single arrow amongst a quiver of targeting guideposts that can be drawn 
from early Islamic sources, above all the Qur’an itself and the 
collections of ahadith. 
 
In terms of their own utterances, on the one hand, certain statements by 
jihadists seem to suggest that they view critical infrastructure as core 
elements of Western society. For example, would-be “millennium plot” 
bomber Ahmad Rassam testified that he had been trained “how to blow 
up the infrastructure of a country” in al-Qa`ida’s Afghan training camps, 
and Shaykh `Umar `Abd al-Rahman specifically referred to taking out 
the “federal system” in discussions with the cell members who were 
plotting to bomb FBI headquarters in New York City, thereby suggesting 
that there was a “larger” purpose in attacking this particular law 
enforcement facility. On the other hand, al-Qa`ida does not display a 
clear conception of infrastructure in the Western sense, much less a 
coherent strategy for attacking infrastructure qua infrastructure. What 
seems to be missing from al-Qa`ida’s strategic repertoire is a focus on 
the overall functional aspects of infrastructure. Despite recognizing the 
importance of the psychological disruption brought about by the group’s 
attacks, one finds very little evidence in al-Qa`ida sources that its leaders 
and strategists are thinking specifically in terms of disrupting the 
functions of infrastructural systems in the narrow sense of that phrase. 
Instead, al-Qa`ida’s sense of infrastructure, such as it is, seems to be 
based primarily on either recognizing the practical or symbolic value of 
targeting discrete structures, especially landmarks such as buildings and 
bridges, or on the general economic importance of the prospective target. 
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In the final analysis, there is very little evidence suggesting that al-
Qa`ida targets critical infrastructure as a category worthy of attack 
simply because it is critical infrastructure. Put another way, there is little 
to suggest that a target’s status as critical infrastructure is alone sufficient 
to recommend it as a target. Indeed, al-Qa`ida normally targets 
infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives, above all to kill large 
numbers of people and strike the symbols of “infidel” prestige and 
economic power. 
 
 
2. To what extent do al-Qa`ida ideology, strategy and 
tactics purposely target “critical infrastructure” or elements 
of what are considered critical infrastructure by the United 
States Government? 
 
One of the key findings from our analysis of al-Qa`ida’s statements, 
materials, and actions is that al-Qa`ida normally has a variety of 
objectives in mind when it carries out attacks, and that targets are, in the 
main, specifically chosen in order to maximize the attainment of as many 
of those objectives as possible. The multiplicity of operational objectives 
that al-Qa`ida seeks to achieve include killing large numbers of people, 
exerting a profound psychological impact on hostile and friendly target 
audiences, striking famous symbolic targets, causing widespread 
economic harm to the enemy, and physically damaging important 
buildings and facilities.  
 
In the investigation of previous al-Qa`ida plots and attacks, the authors 
found that almost no targets were selected purely for their function as 
infrastructure. This does not mean, however, that al-Qa`ida’s targeting 
process will not often result in the selection of targets that fall within 
what the U.S. regards as its critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure 
as currently defined502 encompasses a broad range of assets and systems, 
and it is therefore likely that several of these assets and systems will 
fulfill one or more of al-Qa`ida’s operational and strategic objectives. 
The set of targets favored by al-Qa`ida might then substantially intersect 
the set of assets and systems we think of as falling under the rubric of 
critical infrastructure. 
                                                 
502 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 9 above: “Systems, assets, or functions, whether physical or virtual, 
publicly or privately owned, that are used by or provide benefit to the public and are so 
vital to the U.S. that the exploitation, destruction, or incapacitation of such systems, 
assets, or functions would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 
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There are also certain targets that fall within the U.S. conception of 
critical infrastructure that al-Qa`ida seems particularly drawn towards, as 
is evidenced either by ideological predilections or the fact that these 
targets have been specifically mentioned in al-Qa`ida statements and 
documents. For example, financial targets would fulfill the desire to 
wage economic jihad and to symbolically punish the usury of Western 
society, and such targets have been specifically singled out in previous 
jihadist statements and writings. 
 
Since al-Qa`ida does not seem to conceive of critical infrastructure as a 
distinctive target set, in order to make more sense of the discrepancy, 
i.e., to reconcile al-Qa`ida’s strategic aims in target selection with the 
U.S. understanding of critical infrastructure, we need to disaggregate 
“critical infrastructure” into its component sectors and examine which of 
these sectors fulfill which targeting goals of al-Qa`ida and to what 
extent. 
 
Table 9.1 compares al-Qa`ida’s targeting goals, as determined in Chapter 
3, with individual, “officially designated” U.S. critical infrastructure 
sectors.  
 
The goal types taken into account are: 
 
1. Punitive – the desire to kill or injure as many “infidels” as 
possible. 
2. Economic – the desire to cause national-level (or at least far-
reaching) economic harm to the U.S. 
3. The desire to select targets that have high symbolic or 
psychological resonance, either for the American people, in order 
“to wake them up” to their governments purported injustices 
against Muslims, or for al-Qa`ida’s own perceived audience (the 
putative umma). 
4. Inherent factors making a particular infrastructure more 
attractive, as may be suggested by Islamic religious or historical 
referents, al-Qa`ida’s past targeting behavior, or the group’s 
statements and writings. 
 
Certain targeting factors are not included in this table: 
 
1. Practical considerations – for current purposes, since the table 
considers general targeting behavior (target types as opposed to 
specific targets), we assume that the infrastructures listed can be 
successfully attacked. Obviously, the level of vulnerability of a 
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particular target at a particular point in time and the perceived 
likelihood of the success of an attack on it are extremely 
important factors in terrorist target selection, but we are here 
focused more on target orientation than the specifics of individual 
targets, which will vary dramatically even within the same sector. 
2. The notion that some targets are specifically chosen in order to 
provoke a particular desired government or social response (such 
as may have been the case with the March 2004 Madrid 
bombings). In these cases target selection is closely related to 
other factors, such as the number of expected fatalities and the 
symbolic resonance of the target, as well as particular sets of 
political circumstances. While it is important for analysts to take 
these considerations into account, they are too context-specific to 
be included in a more generalized representation such as the table 
below. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Table 9.1: Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment Analysis 
 
 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
CATEGORY 
 
 
Casualties 
i
 
Economic 
Harm ii
 
 
Symbolic/Psychological 
Resonance iii
 
Inherent 
Attractiveness 
iv
 
 
AGRICULTURE 
 
 
* 
 
 
** / *** 
 
* 
 
* 
 
BANKING & FINANCE 
 
‘ 
** 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY & 
HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS 
 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
* 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL 
BASE 
 
 
* 
 
** 
 
* 
 
* 
 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
* 
 
ENERGY V
 
* / ***  
 
 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
FOOD 
 
*** ** *** * 
 
GOVERNMENT (In the 
Sense Of COG) 
 
 
*/** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
INFORMATION & 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
 
* 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
KEY RESOURCES VI
 
*/**  
 
* 
 
*** 
 
*/** 
 
 
POSTAL & SHIPPING 
 
 
* 
 
** 
 
* 
 
* 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
 
**/*** 
 
**/*** 
 
*** 
 
* 
 
TRANSPORTATION 
 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
WATER 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
** 
The Jericho Option: Al-Qa`ida & Attacks On Critical Infrastructure 
 
All effects are based on a large-scale, successful attack 
 
i Casualties: 
  *     = Can be expected to cause low—moderate levels of fatalities (<100) 
  **   = Can be expected to cause moderate—high levels of fatalities (100-1,000) 
  *** = Can be expected to cause high—catastrophic levels of fatalities (>1,000) 
 
ii Economic Harm (on a national level): 
  *     = Unlikely that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
  **   = Some possibility that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
  *** = Likely that an attack on this infrastructure sector would cause national-level economic harm 
 
iii Symbolic / Psychological Resonance: 
  *     = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have low symbolic/psychological resonance  
  **   = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have moderate symbolic/psychological resonance 
  *** = Most targets falling in this infrastructure sector have high symbolic/psychological resonance 
 
iv Inherent Attractiveness: 
  *     = Infrastructure sector does not possess any inherent targeting attractiveness 
  **   = Some indications that this infrastructure sector possesses some inherent targeting attractiveness 
  *** = Definite indications that this infrastructure sector possesses specific inherent targeting attractiveness 
 
v Variances found in the “casualties” column reflect the range of different types of facilities included in the     
   energy infrastructure, e.g. oil pipeline vs. nuclear facility) 
 
vi Variances found in the “casualties” and “inherent attractiveness” columns reflect the range of relative    
   differences between specific targets in this category, e.g. Mt. Rushmore vs. the Empire State Building. 
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According to the above table, then, the infrastructure sectors that in 
general have the greatest capacity to fulfill al-Qa`ida’s aims are: Banking 
& Finance; Energy (especially oil pipelines); Food; Continuity of 
Government (although this is unlikely to be a common target since it is 
especially difficult to attack); Public Health; Transportation; and Key 
Resources. 
 
However, one must be cautious about “adding up” or averaging across 
the different objectives. For instance, a particular infrastructure category 
may be so vulnerable to attack and be capable of causing so many 
casualties (e.g., an attack on a chemical plant) that al-Qa`ida selects that 
target, since in this specific case practical considerations and a 
preponderance of effect along a single objective might outweigh more 
general considerations. Thus the table, as provided, is merely a means for 
exploring the intersection between the U.S.’s current official 
understanding of critical infrastructure and those targets which al-Qa`ida 
is likely to attack. Nonetheless, it offers a more nuanced perspective on 
al-Qa`ida’s targeting as it relates to critical infrastructure, and when 
combined with vulnerability and consequence analysis, might prove to 
be a useful tool when analyzing al-Qa`ida attack patterns. 
 
 
3. Do recent trends in al-Qa`ida statements and behavior 
signify a major shift in al-Qa`ida’s strategy with respect to 
critical infrastructure? 
 
Recent statements by al-Qa`ida spokesmen that exhort the group’s 
followers to attack elements of the energy infrastructure, as well as 
recent attacks and plots by “homegrown” jihadists targeting the high-
density public transportation targets, could conceivably be regarded as 
signaling a shift in al-Qa`ida’s targeting strategy. A discussion of the 
nature and extent of this perceived shift is thus warranted. 
 
First, the missives of Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, especially those relating 
to targeting elements of the energy infrastructure, should be taken 
seriously. After all, past experience has shown al-Qa`ida’s leaders are 
often explicit, albeit in generalized terms, about their future plans. 
However, one should not take such comments out of context. While 
perhaps upgrading the attractiveness of oil and gas pipelines and 
facilities in the Middle East as al-Qa`ida targets (which may contribute 
to an overall rise in the attractiveness of infrastructural targets), this does 
not mean that the group’s existing targeting priorities, including causing 
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widespread economic damage and mass casualties, will be abandoned. 
These statements are therefore more likely to represent a tactical shift 
within a specific domain of targets (energy infrastructure) in a specified 
area (the Middle East), rather than a wholesale shift in targeting strategy. 
In other words, homeland security planners should certainly not shift 
their attention away from other target types, including other elements of 
critical infrastructure that have been identified as highly attractive targets 
above. 
 
Second, one cannot ignore the potential impact of the increasing 
prevalence of self-radicalized jihadist entrepreneurs, who often include 
so-called “homegrown” jihadists, on the targeting of critical 
infrastructure. It is necessary to distinguish between attacks carried out 
by these self-radicalized cells and those carried out by “official” al-
Qa`ida operatives, since the targets attacked by the latter have generally 
been carefully selected through a vetting process carried out by senior al-
Qa`ida operatives and leaders, while the target selection of individual 
cells is more independent and idiosyncratic and therefore difficult to 
predict. In many cases, the influence of al-Qa`ida leaders might be 
restricted to general guidelines posted on Internet sites. This is not to say 
that al-Qa`ida proper does not support the actions of these local jihadists 
– indeed, al-Qa`ida leaders probably view such actions as a valuable 
supplement to their efforts to “bleed America into bankruptcy” and 
humble the “infidels.”  
 
However, the (d)evolution of the jihad in many cases to self-radicalized 
cells may have two important implications for target selection. The first 
is the likelihood that target selection, divorced from the direct control of 
al-Qa`ida’s leaders and ideologues, will become less sophisticated, in the 
sense of fine-tuning the selection of targets over a period of time in order 
to simultaneously attain multiple objectives, maximize the probability of 
success, and still remain concordant with perceived religious mandates. 
This might mean that targets are selected based more on practical factors, 
such as local knowledge, or the attainment of only one or two primary 
objectives. It would also increase the saliency of statements and 
instructions purveyed by al-Qa`ida leaders on the Internet (particularly as 
these relate to infrastructural targets), since these might be all the 
guidance from their gurus that the relatively isolated, self-radicalized 
jihadist cells might have access to. The continued monitoring of jihadist 
websites, specifically to detect any changes in targeting guidelines, 
might thus become more crucial than ever. The second possible effect of 
a shift to actions initiated by self-radicalized jihadists relates to their 
capability to attack critical infrastructure targets. This is not to say that 
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the face of al-Qa`ida, as represented by such cells, will be incapable of 
attacking critical infrastructure, but we may see less sophisticated 
asymmetrical attacks that require less planning and coordination than the 
large-scale operations undertaken by the al-Qa`ida core (i.e., attacks that 
are more along the lines of the 2005 London underground bombings than 
the 9/11 attacks). These “simpler” attacks by independent cells can still 
be extremely deadly and effective in terms of contributing to the 
economic weakening of Western nations and the evocation of feelings of 
terror in the Western public, but are more likely to require simpler 
materials and shorter lead times and to focus on relatively “soft” targets. 
 
Besides the impact of these shifts in targeting statements and the nature 
of jihadist operatives, it is instructive to consider the general evolution of 
al-Qa`ida’s capabilities with regard to attacks against critical 
infrastructure. As can be seen from the discussion of the individual 
capabilities necessary for critical infrastructure sector attacks and the 
illustrative review of case studies of actual attacks (in chapters 6, 7, and 
8 above), both the capabilities maintained by al-Qa`ida and the 
capabilities required for a successful attack are constantly evolving. The 
most obvious example is the increased emphasis placed on the protection 
of various targets since the 9/11 attacks, including elements of critical 
infrastructure.  
 
As such, there is a great deal of speculation about whether al-Qa`ida’s 
target selection will evolve to reflect these changes. Some experts assert 
that al-Qa`ida targets will shift to unprotected or poorly defended targets. 
According to this logic, since military, diplomatic, and some 
transportation sector targets are receiving greater protection, terrorist 
attacks will shift to economic targets, such as banks and tourist locations, 
as well as religious targets and population centers.503 Likewise, since the 
United States has vastly increased domestic protection levels, attacks 
may also shift to American targets abroad and to the allies of the U.S.504
 
Others maintain that al-Qa`ida will seek to acquire additional technology 
or employ new techniques in order to locate and exploit loopholes in 
infrastructure targets, even those that are currently provided with higher 
levels of protection. One of the chief questions in this regard is whether 
we will see a new focus on cyberterrorism. While there seems to be a 
general consensus that al-Qa`ida’s large-scale employment of 
                                                 
503 Gunaratna, The Changing Face of Terrorism, p.11. 
504 Ibid. 
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cyberterrorism could have potentially devastating consequences, there is 
less agreement on whether al-Qa`ida is actually moving in this direction.  
 
A CIA analysis paper submitted to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence in 2002 stated that “[v]arious terrorist groups, including al-
Qa’ida and Hizballah, are becoming more adept at using the Internet and 
computer technologies. These groups have both the intentions and the 
desire to develop some of the cyberskills necessary to forge an effective 
cyber attack modus operandi.”505 Others, including Vince Cannistraro, 
the former chief of counterterrorism at the CIA, believe that al-Qa`ida is 
using cyberskills to increase the security of communications between its 
cells.506  
 
Adding motivational concepts to the analysis of the cyber-debate, those 
who doubt that al-Qa`ida will focus on cyberattacks emphasize the 
notion that resorting to cyberterrorism would result in the loss of the 
physical “big bang” that a physical terrorist attack provides. The 
alternative position is that if one of al-Qa`ida’s primary goals is truly the 
economic weakening of the United States, then cyberattacks would be 
likely to have a great appeal, especially if other types of attacks were to 
focus on causing casualties and symbolic targets. The ominous mid-way 
point between the two effects would be attacks on the combinations of 
virtual and physical critical infrastructure systems cited earlier in this 
report, such as the Internet or SCADA control systems. 
 
In broad terms, it is unlikely that al-Qa`ida’s strategy vis-à-vis critical 
infrastructure targets will undergo any radical changes in the near future. 
Specific targets (such as oil pipelines in the Middle East) may rise to the 
fore from time to time, the shift to self-radicalized local cells might 
affect attack modalities, and new techniques such as cyberattacks may 
become more common, but it is likely that al-Qa`ida’s basic attack 
objectives will remain relatively constant, barring any major changes to 
its leadership or ideological outlook. Therefore, it will continue to pursue 
its broad strategy of causing economic damage to the United States and 
“bleeding” the enemy, as well as its desire to inflict casualties and 
widespread psychological damage. The targets within what the U.S. 
defines as critical infrastructures will thus continue to fall within al-
Qa`ida’s cross-hairs, as was noted in the response to the second framing 
question above. Possible changes will most likely be at the tactical or 
operational levels, e.g., looking for loopholes in sectors with high 
                                                 
505 Verton, “Experts: Don’t dismiss cyberattack warning.” 
506 Ibid.
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security (imagine the psychological blow that would be dealt to the U.S. 
by another major attack on the aviation sector), as well as seeking 
“softer” targets with relatively lower protection levels or focusing on 
American targets overseas and the assets of America’s allies. Such 
actions would, after all, continue to force the United States to expend 
increasing revenue and resources to secure these expanding target 
categories.  
 
 
4. Can we learn anything about al-Qa`ida tactics and 
operations that would be useful in a counterterrorism 
context should al-Qa`ida or its affiliates target critical 
infrastructure? 
 
This study has focused on gaining a better understanding of al-Qa`ida’s 
attitude towards critical infrastructure, but in so doing it has revealed 
several potentially salient features of its tactics and operations in the 
context of its attacks against critical infrastructure, and often more 
generally too. The most important of these are summarized below: 
 
a. Al-Qa`ida’s past behavior has demonstrated that, in the main, it 
possesses adequate capability levels to attack almost all types of 
infrastructural targets. This does not necesssarily mean that each 
group of operatives will be capable of attacking any potential 
target, but rather that, as a whole, analysts should not exclude any 
target types from being attacked based on al-Qa`ida’s 
capabilities. Moreover, due to the rapid growth in online manuals 
and operational guides, it is unlikely that future would-be al-
Qa`ida attackers would require the kind of personal training that 
cadres previously received in camps in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. At the same time, the lack of centralized and direct 
tactical instruction may limit the scale or effectiveness of attacks 
carried out by disparate cells, at least for a time.  
 
b. Al-Qa`ida is not afraid of imitating past successful attacks. The 
Saudi Airlines case detailed in Chapter 7 was starkly reminiscent 
of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Therefore, one must not 
assume that increasing protection levels will necessarily result in 
target substitution; as mentioned above, al-Qa`ida may be all too 
eager to exploit gaps in protection even in relatively well-
defended sectors. The public transportation sector, especially 
commercial aviation, will thus continue to be a prime al-Qa`ida 
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target, since this sector has the capacity to fulfill so many of al-
Qa`ida’s attack objectives. 
 
c. In the era of globalized jihadist terrorism, attack groups can be 
made up of either local or foreign operatives, or a combination of 
the two. In other words, the persons involved in planning and 
carrying out attacks against critical infrastructure are not confined 
to a specific geographic location. 
 
d. Based on past attacks and plots against critical infrastructure 
targets, the geography of attacks on critical infrastructure seems 
to be following that of al-Qa`ida attacks in general, namely 
continued attempts against U.S., Middle Eastern (especially 
Saudi Arabian and Iraqi), and South Asian targets, and a rise in 
attacks on targets in Europe, especially the United Kingdom. 
 
e. Perpetrators, even the more “amateurish” self-radicalized cells, 
expend significant efforts and resources on surveilling potential 
critical infrastructure targets and engaging in “dry runs.” This 
may provide important opportunities for detection and 
interdiction by counterterrorist forces. 
 
f. Despite the plethora of vulnerable targets available to would-be 
al-Qa`ida attackers and the difficulties associated with infiltrating 
disparate cells, many of the cases examined in this study reveal 
that al-Qa`ida operatives face substantial difficulties of their own 
in conducting effective attacks. Specifically, operations are often 
plagued by a lack of sufficient funds to carry out the desired scale 
of attack, as well as by the presence of incompetent cell members 
who can delay or compromise an operation before its execution. 
It is vital that authorities exploit these difficulties and errors in 
order to forestall attacks against critical infrastructures. 
 
As has been stated previously, however, even as al-Qa`ida’s strategy 
remains relatively constant, its tactics and capabilities are constantly 
evolving. Therefore, we are likely to see examples of innovation, 
adaptability, and development in the group’s tactics and procedures, 
especially as levels of protection around critical infrastructure targets 
increase.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study has utilized various approaches in an attempt to trace al-
Qa`ida’s propensity to attack what has been characterized in the United 
States as critical infrastructure. Despite the finding that al-Qa`ida does 
not distinguish critical infrastructure as an independent category of 
targets and that disrupting the function of these infrastructures does not 
appear to be a primary targeting motivation, critical infrastructure targets 
will often fall into the set of targets that al-Qa`ida will find attractive in 
terms of fulfilling its broader strategic objectives. We have come to the 
conclusion that in counterterrorist efforts to forecast likely targets, it 
would be best to designate targets that, if attacked, would produce 
multiple effects simultaneously, including massive human casualties, 
severe economic disruption and damage, and maximum media attention 
and psychological terror. This was certainly the template for al-Qa`ida’s 
attacks on the WTC twice, and it seems also to have driven the 2000 
Millennium Plot, the 1993 Tunnels and Bridges Plot, and the Madrid 
train and London underground bombings, among others. 
 
We believe that this study has brought considerable information to bear 
on this important topic and thereby contributed to the development of a 
more nuanced understanding of al-Qa`ida’s intentions and operational 
objectives in relation to critical infrastructure. We are hopeful that this 
will in turn help to facilitate the development of better threat assessment 
procedures by relevant U.S. government agencies. Yet we are under no 
illusions that this study represents the final word in this regard. 
Continued monitoring of al-Qa`ida and its related networks’ behavior 
and publications is essential, but if nothing else this study provides a 
baseline from which to track future al-Qa`ida targeting goals and 
preferences as these relate to critical infrastructures. 
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Appendix A:  
 
Al-Qa`ida CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK 
CHRONOLOGY*
 
 
 
he chronology that follows records attacks that – primarily or 
secondarily – targeted components of critical infrastructure (CI). 
Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical systems that a 
community depends on to maintain its security, governance, public 
health and safety, economy, and public confidence.507 The constituent 
parts of such systems will vary according to the community contexts in 
which they are embedded.  
T 
 
Accordingly, the ensuing chronology, listed alphabetically by group, is 
divided into two categories: 
 
 “Primary CI Attacks” are attacks in which the perpetrators attempted 
to and/or succeeded in destroying or significantly damaging an 
element of a sector of infrastructure, or attacks in which the 
perpetrators sought to cause some degree of damage to a physical 
(non-human) target because of its symbolic value (e.g., embassies, 
the Pentagon, etc.).  
 “Secondary CI Attacks” are attacks carried out primarily for other 
purposes which inadvertently ended up damaging CI. 
                                                 
* This appendix was prepared by Charles Blair and Elle DiLorenzo. 
507Attacks aimed at individuals, even if their work serves some infrastructure, have not 
been considered as CI attacks unless in the course of those attacks CI was damaged, 
destroyed, or seriously disrupted.  
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This chronology includes all CI attacks that have been creditably 
attributed to two types of al-Qa`ida-related groups:508
 
1. “Core” al-Qa`ida organizations, networks, or branches.  
 
A. Al-Qa`ida (The Base); now known, since its fusion with 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s faction of the Egyptian Tanzim al-
Jihad, as Qa`idat al-Jihad). 
 
B. Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Haramayn (Al-Qa`ida in the 
Land of the Two Holy Places); also known as al-
Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qa`ida in 
Saudi Arabia 
 
C. Al-Qai`da fi Bilad al-Rafidyan (Al-Qa`ida in the 
Land of the Two Rivers); also known as al-Qa`ida in 
Iraq, al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia and the Zarqawi 
group. Formerly known as the Jama`at al-Tawhid wa 
al-Jihad (JTJ: Unity of God and Jihad Association). * 
 
D. Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) * 
 
E. Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the Sunna)* 
 
F. Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (JTJ: Unity of God 
and Jihad Association). * Later changed its name to al-
Qa`ida in the Land of the Two Rivers.  
 
G. Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri (Abu Hafs al-Masri 
Brigades)509 
                                                 
508 This listing is not intended to represent all al-Qa`ida-associated groups; rather, it 
lists those al-Qa`ida-related groups that have been known to engage in attacks that have 
either directly or indirectly had an impact on CI. Groups seemingly far removed from 
any al-Qa`ida input— the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM: Moroccan 
Islamic Fighting Group), for example—are not considered. Nor are groups with 
questionable, tenuous, or outdated links to al-Qa`ida. 
 ∗ The attacks listed for these groups are arguably examples of insurgent actions as well 
as terrorist attacks. Thus, their goals, tactics, and targets may differ significantly from 
other groups considered by this study. “The resistance is not a unified movement 
directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision,” writes Ahmed Hashim with 
regards to the insurgent side of the resistance coin. “Indeed,” he asserts, “the insurgents 
may have calculated that their success does not require an elaborate political and 
socioeconomic vision of a ‘free’ Iraq; articulating the desire to be free of foreign 
occupation has sufficed to win popular support. Because they wish to avoid fratricidal 
conflict, these groups are mostly cooperating with one another and coordinating attacks 
at the operational and tactical levels despite profound political differences.” Ahmed S. 
Hashim, “Iraq: From Insurgency to Civil War?” Current History 104 (2005): 1018, p. 
10. 
509 Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri is not considered to be an operational group; rather it is 
the proclaimed mouthpiece of al-Qa`ida in Europe. Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri almost 
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2. Independent groups that have been very closely affiliated 
with al-Qa`ida. 
 
A. Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat 
(GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting) 
 
B. Harkat-ul Mujahidin (HuM: Mujahidin Movement) 
 
C. Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM: Army of Muhammad) 
 
D. Jaysh Adan-Abyan al-Islami (AAIA: Aden-Abyan 
Islamic Army) 
 
E. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI: Islamic Community) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 2/26/1993: Bombing of World Trade Center – United States  
• 8/7/1998: Bombing of U.S. Embassy – Kenya  
• 8/7/1998: Bombing of U.S. Embassy – Tanzania  
• 11/12/1999: Rocket attack on U.S. Embassy, World Bank, etc. – 
Pakistan  
• 6/14/2001: Thwarted car bombing of U.S. Embassy – India  
• 9/11/2001: Hijacking and crashing of two jets into the World 
Trade Center – United States  
• 9/11/2001: Hijacking and crashing of jet into Pentagon – United 
States  
• 9/11/2001: Hijacking and crashing of jet over unintended target 
(open-field) – United States  
• 04/16/2002: Bombings of Yemeni Intelligence Services 
compound and Civil Aviation Department – Yemen  
                                                                                                                       
certainly had no direct involvement in the attacks listed in this chronology— the attacks 
carried out in their name were done so by individual cells.  However, in addition to 
sharing its weltanschauung, the cells have active links with al-Qa`ida. Four of the 
Madrid bombers, for example, are believed to have “had help from highly trained bomb 
makers with ‘a clear Al Qaeda [sic] link.’ ” Fawaz Gergez quoting British authorities,  
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, (Cambridge University 
Press): New York, 2005), p. 247. 
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• 5/16/2003: Suicide bombings of various sites, including Belgian 
Embassy – Morocco  
• 5/21/2003: Thwarted hijacking and crashing of jet into unknown 
building – Saudi Arabia  
• 8/19/2003: Truck bombing of United Nations (UN) Headquarters 
– Iraq 
• 8/20/2003: Rocket strike on airport – Afghanistan  
• 11/20/2003: Bombings of U.K. and Israeli consulates and banks – 
Turkey  
• 12/07/04: Assault on U.S. Consulate – Saudi Arabia  
• 2/24/2006: Suicide bombing of oil processing facility – Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 11/13/1995: Bombing of Saudi National Guard’s training 
facilities – Saudi Arabia  
• 12/31/1999: Thwarted plot to bomb Los Angeles International 
Airport (LAX) – United States  
• 10/12/2000: Suicide bombing of USS Cole – Yemen 
• 9/15/2001: Reconnaissance for attack on Heathrow Airport – 
United Kingdom  
• 12/22/2001: Attempted bombing of Air France flight (the so-
called “shoe bomber”) – France  
• 4/16/2002: Bombing of intelligence and security facilities – 
Yemen  
• 11/28/2002: Unsuccessful rocket attack on airliner – Kenya 
• 10/12/2003: Bombing outside hotel housing Iraqi government 
leaders and US contractors – Iraq   
• 11/5/2003: Alleged plan to attack U.S. military base – 
Kyrgyzstan  
• 4/13/2004: Shooting of security officers, followed by siege and 
shootout – Saudi Arabia 
• 4/27/2004: Bomb and gun attack on diplomatic district – Syria  
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Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Haramayn 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACK 
 
• 12/6/2004: Attack and hostage taking at U.S. Embassy – Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 12/29/2004: Suicide car bombing of Interior Ministry building, 
aimed at Interior Minister – Saudi Arabia 
• 12/29/2004: Suicide car bombing of security forces recruitment 
center – Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
Al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Rafidyan 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 11/6/2004: Car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 11/6/2004: Car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 11/6/2004: Car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 11/6/2004: Car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 12/3/2004: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 12/3/2004: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 1/4/2005: Suicide car bombing of Iraqi special forces’ 
headquarters – Iraq 
• 1/11/2005: Suicide car bombing near police station – Iraq 
• 1/16/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/16/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/16/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/24/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/24/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/24/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
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• 1/25/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket and mortar attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Rocket and mortar attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Mortar attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Mortar attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Bomb attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/25/2005: Bomb attack on voting station – Iraq 
• 1/26/2005: Suicide tractor bombing outside the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party office – Iraq  
• 1/30/2005: Bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Mortar attack on polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 1/30/2005: Suicide bombing near polling station – Iraq 
• 2/8/2005: Suicide bombing of military recruiting center – Iraq 
• 2/23/2005: Mortar attack on television station – Iraq 
• 3/2/2005: Suicide car bombing of military recruiting center – Iraq 
• 3/3/2005: Suicide car bombing of emergency police headquarters 
– Iraq 
• 3/3/2005: Suicide car bombing targeting Interior Ministry 
headquarters – Iraq 
• 3/7/2005: Suicide car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 3/20/2005: Suicide bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 4/14/2005: Attack on police station – Iraq (Joint with: Ansar al-
Sunna) 
• 4/19/2005: Suicide car bombing of military recruiting center – 
Iraq 
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• 4/24/2005: Suicide car bombing of checkpoint at police academy 
– Iraq 
• 4/29/2005: Suicide car bombing near Interior Ministry special 
forces’ headquarters – Iraq 
• 4/29/2005: Suicide car bombing of Interior Ministry’s Special 
Forces’ headquarters – Iraq 
• 5/25/2005: Attack on Al-Anbar Governorate building – Iraq 
• 5/29/2005: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 5/29/2005: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 6/11/2005: Suicide car bombing in front of Slovak Embassy – 
Iraq 
• 6/26/2005: Suicide bombing of hospital at police station – Iraq 
• 6/26/2005: Suicide car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 7/2/2005: Suicide bombing of police recruitment center – Iraq 
• 7/10/2005: Suicide bombing of military recruiting center – Iraq 
• 7/15/2005: Suicide car bombing of former Defense Ministry 
headquarters – Iraq 
• 7/29/2005: Suicide bombing of military recruiting center – Iraq 
• 9/5/2005: Rocket, mortar, and gunfire attack of Interior Ministry 
building – Iraq 
• 9/28/2005: Suicide bombing of military recruiting center – Iraq 
• 10/25/2005: Suicide car bombing of security building – Iraq 
(Joint with: Jihad Pegah) 
• 10/30/2005: Mortar attack on security forces’ headquarters – Iraq 
• 12/1/2005: Mortar attack at an Iraqi registration office – Iraq 
• 12/1/2005: Mortar attack at the governor’s office – Iraq 
• 12/6/2005: Suicide bombing of police academy – Iraq 
• 2/22/2006: Bombing inside `Askariyya (“Golden Dome”) 
Mosque – Iraq 
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 2/28/2005: Suicide car bombing of medical clinic – Iraq  
• 4/29/2005: Car bombing near telephone exchange – Iraq 
• 6/1/2005: Car bombing at airport checkpoint – Iraq 
• 6/11/2005: Suicide bombing of police assembly, targeting 
commanding officer – Iraq 
• 7/15/2005: Suicide car bombing on bridge near Iraq’s presidential 
residence – Iraq 
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• 7/16/2005: Suicide bombing next to oil tankers, in front of 
mosque – Iraq 
• 9/14/2005: Suicide car bombing near gas station – Iraq 
• 9/29/2005: Car bombing near bank – Iraq 
• 1/9/2006: Suicide bombing of National Police Day celebration – 
Iraq 
 
 
 
Ansar al-Islam 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 10/14/2003: Suicide car bombing of Turkish Embassy – Iraq  
• 11/17/2003: Bombing of oil pipeline – Iraq  
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACK 
 
• 9/10/2003: Suicide car bombing of U.S. intelligence headquarters 
– Iraq  
 
 
 
Ansar al-Sunna 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 10/7/2003: Explosion at Iraqi Foreign Ministry – Iraq  
• 11/20/2003: Suicide bombing of political party headquarters – 
Iraq 
• 11/23/2003: Suicide car bombings of police station – Iraq  
• 12/19/2003: Attack on oil pipeline – Iraq  
• 12/21/2003: Attack on large fuel storage tanks – Iraq  
• 2/1/2004: Suicide bombing of political party headquarters – Iraq  
• 1/3/2005: Suicide bombing of political party headquarters – Iraq  
• 1/23/2005: Suicide car bombing of polling station – Iraq 
• 4/13/2005: IED attack on oil pipeline – Iraq (Joint with: al-Qa`ida 
in Iraq) 
• 4/14/2005: Attack on police station – Iraq (Joint with: al-Qa`ida 
in Iraq) 
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• 5/4/2005: Suicide bombing of police recruitment center – Iraq 
• 5/11/2005: Suicide bombing of police recruitment center – Iraq 
• 5/11/2005: Suicide car bombing of marketplace, likely attempting 
to hit nearby police station – Iraq 
• 6/14/2005: Mortar attack and car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 1/17/2006: Attack on election commission office – Iraq  
• 1/17/2006: Bombing of political party headquarters – Iraq  
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 1/19/2005: Killing of Internet specialists setting up elections 
network – Iraq 
• 5/23/2005: Car bombing of municipal office, likely targeting 
Kurdish official – Iraq 
 
 
 
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat 
(GSPC) 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 06/21/04: Bombing of Hama power plant – Algeria  
• 06/27/04: Destruction of two large electricity pylons – Algeria  
• 3/22/2000: Bombing of oil pipeline – Algeria 
• 4/28/2004: Bombing of railroad tracks, subsequently causing the 
destruction of  large freight train – Algeria  
• 6/21/2004: Truck bombing of power station – Algeria 
• 9/15/2005: IED bombing of high-tension electrical energy 
transformation station – Algeria  
• 2/23/2006: Sabotage of National Gas Company’s electrical plant 
– Algeria 
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 5/21/2003: Attack on city water supply – Algeria   
• 06/04/2005: Large attack on Mauritanian Army base – 
Mauritania  
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Harkat-ul Mujahidin  
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 12/5/2002: Bombing/killing at Macedonian Consulate – Pakistan  
• 5/25/2004: Bombing at Karachi port – Pakistan  
 
 
 
Jaish-e Muhammad  
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 10/1/2001: Car bombing/shooting at Kashmir State Assembly 
building – India  
• 12/13/2001: Shooting attack on Indian Parliament – India (With 
Logistical Support from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) 
• 3/12/2003: Bombing of Mumbai commuter train – India  
 
 
 
Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad* 
 
*On 17 October 2004, Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad announced its total allegiance to 
Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida, renaming the group al-Qai`da fi Bilad al-Rafidyan (i.e., 
al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia).  However, as the chronology below demonstrates, one 
more attack was nominally conducted by the Jama`at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad after 
October 2004.; this was most likely the effort of a splinter group or a consequence of 
reporting errors. 
 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 4/24/2004: Suicide boat bombings of oil terminals – Iraq  
• 5/4/2004: Suicide car bombing of bridge – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Attack on police station – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Car bombing of hospital – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Car bombing of Mosul Police Academy – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Car bombing of police station – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Car bombing of police stations – Iraq 
• 6/24/2004: Car bombing of police stations – Iraq 
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• 9/14/2004: Car bombing of police recruitment center – Iraq 
• 10/6/2004: Suicide vehicle-borne IED attack of National Guard 
camp – Iraq 
• 10/10/2004: Suicide car bombing of police recruitment center – 
Iraq 
• 3/16/2005: Suicide car bombing of Iraqi Army checkpoint – Iraq 
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 6/6/2004: Car bombing outside U.S.-Iraqi air base – Iraq 
• 6/17/2004: Car bombing near an Iraqi Army recruitment center – 
Iraq 
• 9/12/2004: Mortar attack on Green Zone – Iraq 
• 9/22/2004: Car bombing near National Guard recruiting center – 
Iraq 
• 9/30/2004: Car bombing at opening ceremony of water treatment 
plant – Iraq 
 
 
 
Jaysh Adan-Abyan al-Islami  
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACK 
 
• 10/6/2002: Bombing of oil tanker (possibly accidental, targeting 
U.S. Naval ship) – Yemen  
 
 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah 
 
PRIMARY CI ATTACKS 
 
• 7/14/2003: Bombing at Indonesian Parliament – Indonesia  
• 9/9/2004: Car bombing of Australian Embassy – Indonesia  
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Jundallah 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACK 
 
• 07/00/2004: Plot to attack U.S. Consulate – Pakistan 
 
 
 
Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri* 
 
Regarding the operational status of Kata`ib Abu Hafs al-Masri See footnote #504.  
 
 
SECONDARY CI ATTACK 
 
• 11/20/2003: Suicide bombing near British Consulate – Turkey 
• 11/20/2003: Bombing of HSBC Headquarters (whose effect was, 
inter alia, the suspension of Istanbul’s stock exchange and 
devaluation of the Turkish lira) – Turkey  
• 3/11/2004: Bombing of commuter trains (10 bombs on four 
separate trains) – Spain  
• 4/16/2004: Threats to Spanish diplomats – Pakistan  
• 7/7/2005: Suicide bombing of subway trains (three separate 
bombs) – United Kingdom  
• 7/31/2005: IED attack on bus – United Kingdom  
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CETIS CORE Project Team 
 
 
 
Gary Ackerman is Director of the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies. Prior to taking up his current position as Director, 
Mr. Ackerman was Director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Terrorism Research Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
in Monterey, California, and he earlier served as the Chief of Operations 
of the South Africa-based African-Asian Society. He received his M.A. 
in International Relations (Strategic Studies – Terrorism) from Yale 
University and his Bachelors (Law, Mathematics, International 
Relations) and Honors (International Relations) degrees from the 
University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Originally hailing from South Africa, Mr. Ackerman possesses an 
eclectic academic background, including past studies in the fields of 
mathematics, history, law, and international relations, and has won 
numerous academic awards. His research encompasses various areas 
relating to terrorism and counterterrorism, including terrorist threat 
assessment, terrorist technologies and motivations, terrorism involving 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, 
terrorist financing, environmental extremism, and the modeling and 
simulation of terrorist behavior. 
 
Charles Blair is Deputy Director of the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies. A specialist on radiological and nuclear weapons, 
Mr. Blair has focused primarily on the nexus between diverse non-state 
actors and so-called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He was born 
and raised in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and has consequently had a long 
and enduring interest in national security issues. As an exchange student 
in Moscow in the mid-1980s, Mr. Blair witnessed first hand the closing 
salvos of the Cold War and, since the end of that era, has worked on 
issues relating to the diffusion and diversification of WMD in the context 
of the rise of mass casualty terrorism incidents. His most recent 
publication examines the evolution of US nuclear doctrine since the end 
of the Cold War amid efforts to develop so-called “earth penetrating” 
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nuclear weapons: “Visions of Fission: The Demise of Nuclear Negative 
Security Assurances on the Bush Administration’s Pentomic Battlefield,” 
Nonproliferation Review 12:1 (March 2005) (with Jean P. du Preez). In 
addition to attending university classes within the former Soviet Union, 
Mr. Blair has studied in India and France. He holds a B.A. in History 
from the University of Colorado at Boulder and an M.A. from the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies in International Policy 
Studies with a focus on the technical issues and policies surrounding 
WMD. 
 
Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale is Research Director of the Center for Terrorism 
and Intelligence Studies. He is also a Senior Researcher and Assistant 
Professor in the Terrorism Research and Studies Program (TRSP), a 
research center and curricular component of the Graduate School of 
International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, where he teaches a variety of courses on extremism and 
terrorism (including “Introduction to Terrorism,” “Militant Islamic 
Organizations,” “The Radical Right since 1945,” “WMD Terrorism”, 
and “Advanced Studies in Terrorism”). Dr. Bale obtained his B.A. in 
Middle Eastern and Central Asian History at the University of Michigan, 
his M.A. in Social Movements and Political Sociology at the University 
of California at Berkeley, and his Ph.D. in Contemporary European 
History at Berkeley. He has taught at Berkeley, Columbia University, 
and the University of California at Irvine and was the recipient of 
postdoctoral fellowships from the Society of Fellows in the Humanities 
at Columbia, the Office of Scholarly Programs at the Library of 
Congress, and the Center for German and European Studies at Berkeley. 
He reads numerous European languages and has also studied the Arabic, 
Farsi, and Turkish languages. Dr. Bale has been studying extremist and 
terrorist groups for nearly two decades - long before it suddenly became 
“fashionable” in the wake of the catastrophic al-Qa`ida attacks of 11 
September 2001 - and has published numerous articles on terrorism, 
right-wing extremism, Islamism, and covert operations. 
 
Dr. Gordon Hahn is a Senior Researcher for the Center for 
Terrorism and Intelligence Studies.  Dr. Hahn is an Academic Fellow at 
Smolny College, St. Petersburg State University, Russia. He has taught 
Russian domestic and foreign policy and international and comparative 
politics at Stanford University and St. Petersburg State University 
(Russia), as well as at Boston University, American University, and San 
Jose State University.  Dr. Hahn received both his B.A. (in 1986) and his 
M.A. (in 1988) from Boston College, and his Ph.D. from Boston 
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University in 1995. He is author of Russia’s Revolution From Above, 
1985-2000: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet 
Communist Regime (Rutgers, N.J.: Transaction, 2002), and The Bear and 
The Crescent: Russia’s Rising Islamist Challenge (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2006). He has published in the scholarly journals Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Demokratizatsiya, East European Constitutional Review, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Russian 
History/Histoire Russe, The Russian Review, The Journal of Cold War 
Studies, and numerous other English- and Russian-language newspapers, 
magazines, and newsletters.  
 
Elle DiLorenzo is a Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies. Before joining CETIS, Ms. DiLorenzo worked at 
Interpol in the Criminal Analysis Sub-Directorate, focusing on tracking 
global radiological trafficking and preparing strategic threat assessments 
for law enforcement use. Prior to that, she was a Research Associate for 
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) where she also collaborated 
with public health and law enforcement community leaders on 
bioterrorism emergency preparedness. In 2004 Ms. DiLorenzo was 
awarded a grant through the Freeman Foundation to conduct primary-
source research in the Russian Far East on Chinese migration into that 
area. Her experience in Russia also includes two years of Peace Corps 
service. Ms. DiLorenzo received her M.A. in International Policy Studies 
from The Monterey Institute of International Studies, with a 
specialization in International Security. She also graduated Magna cum 
Laude from Boston University with a B.A. in International Relations. 
Her research has focused on so-called Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), trafficking, threat assessment, and terrorism, with a regional 
emphasis on Russia, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia. 
 
Sundara Vadlamudi is a Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies. He obtained his B.E. in Computer Science from 
Thiagarajar College of Engineering, India, and he has significant 
programming experience in Java Script, Java Server Pages (JSP), Java, 
C, C++, HTML, PL/SQL, and Visual Basic. He is also familiar with 
managing databases, such as MS Access and Oracle, and currently 
supervises the maintenance of the WMD Terrorism Database at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies. Mr. Vadlamudi received his 
M.A. in International Policy Studies, with a Certificate in 
Nonproliferation, from the Monterey Institute. His research is focused on 
terrorist groups in South Asia, the linkages between South Asian 
terrorists and both transnational and regional terrorist networks, 
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technology assimilation by terrorist organizations, and the ideologies and 
motivations of terrorist groups. He has studied religious fundamentalism 
(especially militant Hindu fundamentalism), Hindu-Muslim relations in 
South Asia, and other types of sectarian strife in the region, and is also 
interested, more broadly, in proliferation issues and U.S. policies that 
concern South Asia. 
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